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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the governance of so-called regional innovation systems. It studies 
regional and sub-regional dynamics in building institutional environments conducive to 
innovation. The research employs a qualitative research methodology that comprises semi-
structured interviews with 47 policy-makers, practitioners and academics in four case studies 
of city-regions within the German Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia: Aachen, 
Dortmund, Duisburg and Düsseldorf. 
 
It identifies factors influencing the systemic-ness of business and innovation support, 
particularly within the triple helix of university-industry-government relations. It argues that 
important sub-regional governance dynamics are neglected by many contemporary regional 
conceptualisations and proposes considering local innovation systems as an alternative. 
Hence, it scrutinises the appropriateness of the current academic conceptualisations and, in 
particular, criticises their value in terms of operational guidance.  
 
The thesis argues that certain regional innovation policies and governance dynamics fail to 
constitute a regional innovation system and calls for organisational innovation in the 
framework structure to revive or maintain inter-institutional dynamics and cooperative 
relationships towards achieving a coherent, holistic and strategic policy approach. 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of how to make a regional innovation 
system work and what important aspects are to be considered for implementing innovation 
policy – including cluster policy – successfully.  
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Why do some industries continue their successful legacies, while others fail and decline over 
time? Why do some industries relocate, leaving their regions of origin struggling with 
structural change? And what can be done to address this? These questions of economic 
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The basic law from the Rhine 
 
Article 1 
It is as it is 
 
Article 2 
It comes as it comes 
 
Article 3 
It has always turned out all right 
 
Article 4 
What’s gone, is gone 
(the disposal article from the Rhine) 
 
Subarticle 4a 
Don’t know it, don’t need it, put it away! 
 
Article 5 
What’s all this nonsense in aid of then!  
(the universal law from the Rhine) 
 
 
Source: Own, free translation from Langenhuisen & 
Voogt (2002). 
 
Das Rheinische Grundgesetz 
 
Artikel 1 
Et es, wie’t es 
 
Artikel 2 
Et kütt, wie’t kütt 
 
Artikel 3 
Et hätt noch immer jot jejange 
 
Artikel 4 
Watt fott es, es fott 
(der rheinische Entsorgungsartikel) 
 
Unterartikel 4a 
Kenne mr nit, bruchemr nit, fott domet! 
 
Artikel 5 
Watt soll dä Quatsch! 
(das rheinische Universialgesetz) 
 
 
Quelle: Langenhuisen & Voogt (2002). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation has become a mantra of economic development policies. This is what most policy 
strategies claim to concentrate on. Many governments have attempted to gear their policies 
towards innovativeness in order for their economies to remain competitive. ‘Boosting 
innovation’ has for some time been a conceptual focus at the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997a, 1997b, 1999b, 2002a, 1999c, 2001) as well 
as a supranational policy focus at the European Union with a litany of communications with 
regards to innovation since the influential Green Paper on innovation ([European 
Commission], 2002; European Commission, 1995, 1996, 1999a, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 
2002a, 2002f, 2002g, 2002h, 2002i, 2002j, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003h, 2003i, 2003j, 2004c, 
2004d, 2004f, 2004k, 2005f, 2005i, 2005l, 2005p, 2006a, 2006b, 2006d, 2006e; European 
Communities, 2004).2 Furthermore, at the European Council Summit of the Portuguese 
Presidency in March 2000, the European Union gave itself the ambitious so-called ‘Lisbon 
Objective’ of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world’ (Council of the European Union, 2000, paragraph 5). The subsequent ‘Lisbon strategy’ 
focuses on ensuring the necessary support for research and technological development and on 
providing the appropriate framework conditions for the successful exploitation of innovation 
by businesses - as endorsed by the March 2002 European Council in Barcelona (Council of 
the European Union, 2002a, paragraph 47 on p. 20).  
 
                                                 
2 Green Papers published by the European Commission are key discussion documents on a specific policy area 
that present a range of ideas for public debate and consultation, while White Papers are documents containing an 
official set of proposals for Community action in specific policy areas - that sometimes (but not necessarily) 
follow upon a Green Paper. 
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This new innovation policy paradigm is based on the understanding that individual, 
organisational, and systemic competences and innovation activities are, indeed, the key 
drivers of globalised competition in an era of an emerging 24-hour knowledge-based 
economy. The empirical phenomena of spatial economic concentration and specialisation are 
thus seen as outcomes of specific business support environments that are conducive to 
innovation and to certain specialised competences and skills. Indeed, there is an abundance of 
success stories of industrial districts or clusters of industries to be found in the literature, 
which comprise narrations such as the widely reported and known case of Silicon Valley, but 
also the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna or the German State of Baden-Württemberg, to 
name just a few.  
 
Businesses constantly re-evaluate and compare their localised competitive environment to 
others, with the effect that often entire mature industries relocate to lower-cost production 
locations. This implies continuous structural economic changes with the effect that locations 
seek to develop unique competitive assets in order to keep, to attract and to incubate 
businesses. Consequently, providing an environment that is favourable to innovation appears 
to be the sole feasible and sustainable competitive strategy for businesses and locations alike, 
especially within advanced and highly competitive countries.  
 
The quest for economic growth thus turns into the question of how to become an innovative 
location. Despite the abundance of success stories, fully fledged cases of innovation 
production systems appear to be much rarer. Many governments have tried through economic 
development policies to copy Silicon Valley–type blueprints, or followed the hype in aiming 
to attract or breed the next new or future growth industry, and largely failed. Instead, 
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developing and implementing innovation policy emerges as a much more meticulous task, 
that faces significant obstacles. It is a task of importance to all regions but of particular 
relevance to less-favoured locations, which are already lagging behind in terms of presence of 
innovative firms and supporting institutional framework. 
 
More contemporary approaches of innovation policy-making have advanced from earlier 
industrial (subsidising) policies and incorporated a more strategic and holistic approach. They 
widely follow the new, systemic view of innovation, which renounces the traditional, linear 
understanding of the creation of innovation (i.e. stringently evolving from research to 
invention, innovation, and diffusion) by considering a broader range of influences. This New 
Institutionalism is reflected in the emergence of concepts of innovation systems, which 
consider the role of interactions within the wider collective institutional framework (cf. 
Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993, p. 4). An emphasis is placed on cooperation to complement 
competition as drivers of economic development (cf. Lagendijk, 1997b, pp. 18-19). This in 
effect means an increasing appreciation of the local environment, in which networked firms 
are located (Le Galès & Voelzkow, 2001, p. 3).  
 
More recent evolutionary ‘territorial innovation models’ (cf. Moulaert & Sekia, 2003) 
combine this institutionalist perspective with a new spatially downsized perspective. These 
approaches have been linked to the label of ‘New Regionalism’ (Barter, 2000; Keating, 1998; 
Lagendijk, 1997b; Lovering, 1999) since they imply favouring economic development 
policies driven by, or to taking place, at the regional level. The regional innovation systems 
strand has been regarded as being the ‘apex’ or ‘culmination of the New Regionalism 
discourse’ (Lagendijk, 1997b, pp. 20 and 23). Although contested (Lovering, 1999), the ‘New 
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Regionalism’ (for an overview see Barter, 2000) provides several democratic and functional 
arguments for the ‘hierarchy of regions’ (Hassink, 1992, p. 11), which were informed by the 
‘geographical turn’ (Martin, 1999, p. 67) of the conceptualisations of the New Economic 
Geography.  
 
This thesis looks into the quest for successful strategies to develop innovative learning 
regions. Its argument is that most contemporary academic models are under-operationalised. 
The reason for this lies in the belief that a proposition of any one-size-fits-all best-practice 
model will fail to address the peculiarities of reality and policy practice. While many studies 
identify certain success factors and describe successful cases of economic development, less 
attention has been placed on policy failures and the struggles of less-favoured regions (e.g. 
with the exceptions of Morgan & Nauwelaers, 1999c; S. A. Rosenfeld, 2002). Accordingly, 
current theories generally imply what policies should focus on with little to say on how to 
implement them practically and achieve their objectives. Similarly, there is widespread 
recognition in certain strands of the literature that ‘institutions matter’ but without sufficient 
investigation into why they matter and how they can make a difference. 
 
While the difficulties in terms of effective policy-making are noted by some (e.g. Bentley & 
Gibney, 2000; Nauwelaers & Morgan, 1999; Shutt, 2000; Stiglitz, 1998), they are believed to 
be underestimated still by many others. 
 
Aim of this thesis 
Hence, overall this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of how to build a regional 
policy and business support environment conducive to innovation or, in simpler words, what 
 5 
are the ways to make a regional innovation system work and what important aspect are to be 
considered for implementing innovation policy – such as cluster policy – successfully. This 
entails asking the question how and why systemic governance is, or is not, achieved. 
 
The hypothesis is that certain regional innovation policies and governance dynamics fail to 
constitute a regional innovation system. It is thereby argued that conceptualisations of 
regional innovation systems do not adequately capture the regional and, in particular, the sub-
regional governance dynamics – i.e. the structures and relationships between the innovation 
actors – and thus are of little operational guidance to innovation policy-making.  
 
Correspondingly, these concepts are seen to insufficiently address the obstacles and pitfalls 
for policy-making and thus for achieveing the systemic-ness of the institutional governance 
framework, which is defined here as strategic and effective governance which encompass a 
‘well connected and functioning’ status of the structure and relationships between innovation 
actors that goes beyond its mere existence of an instititutional businesss support and 
governance superstructure. Insofar, it is supposed to actively facilitate the clustering or 
‘clusteredness’ of the business dimension of a regional innovation system. Certain conditions 
(or incentives) are assumed to be needed to constitute the ‘well connectedness and 
functioning’ of an innovation system, such as that key actors are being generally cooperative 
and coherent in an overall strategic approach which must be present.  
 
In order to analyse the governance dynamics, a set of intangible success factors of systemic-
ness, which are thought to characterise the dynamics and structures of the governance system, 
was derived from theory (cf. also Brosza, 1993, p. 89; European Spatial Planning Observation 
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Network, 2005, p. 73). These factors serve as analytical criteria and were used to analyse and 
compare the fieldwork results, and to explain differences. The factors that are thought to 
signify evidence of systemic-ness include the following: 3 
 
1. whether there is a strategic and theory-informed policy orientation;  
2. whether there is organisational connectedness, cooperation and coherence;  
3. the extent of inclusiveness;  
4. the extent of participatory and an open policy-making process, and support for 
coordination; and finally 
5. the extent of opportunism.  
 
Definitions 
 
Innovation is seen here as the ‘conversion of new knowledge into economic and social 
benefits’ – now acknowledged to take place as the result of complex long-term interactions 
between many players in an innovation system. This understanding of innovation has 
superseded the previous perspective of the over-simplified and now largely discredited ‘linear 
model’ of innovation of simple transfer of specific technologies form the research base to 
industry (European Commission, 2002e, p. 22) by recognising the systemic dimension of 
                                                 
3 See also the list of important aspects of governance as outlined by ESPON (European Spatial Planning 
Observation Network, 2005, p. 73), which are proposed as a basis for approaches to measure differences in the 
capacity of governance. They comprise the areas of existing institutional settings including government 
structures (e.g. satisfaction with actual government, number of public employees, and openness in terms of cross 
border activities); economic governance (e.g. network activities expressed by the number of regional cluster, e-
government, and regulatory burdens); civil society (e.g. participation, trust, and information & communication 
patters, and ‘attachment to region’ as an indicator of decentralisation); and space (e.g. ‘flow’ characterising 
relations and exchange between different regions, interdisciplinarity and multi-level composition of actors 
involved in governance processes. Furthermore, also consult the ‘Explorative Innovation Scoreboard’ of the 
EXIS report (Arundel & Hollanders, 2005), which features data for the governance dimension. Moreover, confer 
Hoppe’s (2000, pp. 232-233) reference criteria for the detection of system immanent strength and weaknesses of 
implementation procedures of information and support structures.  
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innovation and the importance of the institutional superstrucure, proximity between actors and 
their relational capital.4 
 
The transformation to a wider and systemic view of innovation that has taken place is also 
reflected in the changes made to the definition and typology of innovation proposed by the 
OECD in its ‘Oslo Manual’ as well in the revision of the innovation indicators within 
‘European Innovation Scoreboard’ (EIS) published by the European Commission. In contrast 
to the previous version of the Oslo Manual, the third edition (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development & Eurostat, 2005, §146 on p. 46), for instance, explicitly includes 
organisational innovation and marketing 5 and the fifth edition of the EIS for 2005 (European 
Commission, 2005f, pp. 6-8) also correspondingly introduced two indicators such as 
registered Community trademarks and designs granted for the EU by the Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) as a first proxy of these two new dimensions. 
 
It is believed that innovation is nurtured in functioning innovation systems. The regional 
innovation systems concept represents in this respect an advanced form of a ‘regional learning 
system’, as Cooke & Morgan (1998, p. 71) imply, and it is defined here ‘in terms of a 
                                                 
4 In this respect, the Oslo’s Manual own discussion of innovation theory and the presentation of its conceptual 
understanding of the structure and character of the innovation process (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development & Eurostat, 2005, §74-97 on pp. 28-34) is useful as it provides a quick glance at currently as 
important perceived topics and issues concerning innovation and its key characteristics. Furthermore, it 
particularly illustrates the changes to and the evolution of the understanding of innovation, when juxtaposed with 
the earlier editions of the manual (e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development & Eurostat, 
1997).  
5 While the OECD’s earlier definition used in the second edition of the Oslo Manual (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development & Eurostat, 1997, §130 on p. 31 and cf. also Figure 3 on p. 36) was mainly based 
upon technological product5 and process (TPP) innovation that ‘comprise implemented technologically new 
products and processes and significant technological improvements in products and processes’, the third edition 
(2005, §146 on p. 46) defines innovation as ‘the implementation of a new or significantly improved product 
(good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method inbusiness practices, 
workplace organisation or external relations.’ The earlier and narrow 1997 definition explicitly only comprised 
new or improved purely organisational innovation ‘if there is a significant measurable change in output’ (ibidem 
1997, §156-157 on pp. 36-37). 
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collective order based on microconstitutional regulation conditioned by trust, reliability 
exchange and cooperative interaction’ (Cooke, 1998, pp. 24-25; Cooke, Gomez Uranga, & 
Etxebarria, 1997, p. 490). Importantly, this comprises ‘the full panoply of innovation 
organizations set in an institutional milieu where systemic linkage and interactive 
communication among the innovation actors is normal’ (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 71). The 
array of organizations corresponds to economic, institutional, technological and social sub-
systems, ‘which interact continuously with each other and operate as a system’ (Cooke, 1997, 
p. 362). 
 
The definition of the governance dimension applied here follows Le Galès & Voelzkow 
(2001, pp. 5-6), who refer to governance as ‘the entirety of institutions which co-ordinate or 
regulate action or transaction among (economic) subjects within an (economic) system 
(Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997b; Hollingsworth, Schmitter, & Streeck, 1994; Streeck & 
Schmitter, 1985)’. Correspondingly, the governance infrastructure does not just comprise the 
regional tier (and other multiple levels) of government that influence regional innovation 
policy and activities, but the wider organisational framework and environment of business 
associations and networks, business support organisations and services, university-industry 
technology transfer agencies, and so on. Moreover, innovation policy is also defined here in a 
wider sense, which not just comprises actual initiatives and programmes, but the structures 
and relationships between actors in the governance system too (cf. European Spatial Planning 
Observation Network, 2005, pp. 72-73). 
 
The advocated cluster policy as part of building an innovaton system ‘refers to a wider set of 
specific government policy interventions aiming at strengthening existing clusters or 
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facilitating the emergence of new ones’ that ‘may take different forms and follow different 
objectives, such as industrial and SME olicy or research adn innovatin policy’ (European 
Commission, 2008a, p. 73). 
 
Research objectives and questions 
 
Consequently, this thesis aims to ascertain whether the regional innovation system model 
takes enough account of the specialities and peculiarities of the complexity of regional 
governance and economic policy-making in practice. Thereby, this analysis reviews the key 
characteristics and features of regional innovation systems - that are detailed for instance, by 
contemporary theoretical conceptions by scholars such as Braczyk, Cooke, & Heidenreich 
(1998a) - and scrutinizes the extent to which they describe what is found in practice. By doing 
so, it is intended to contribute to the process of comprehending what the governance dynamics 
of regional innovation systems entail and, especially, how they function and how they can be 
made to work. 
 
Correspondingly, the overall objective of this thesis is to investigate the dynamics and 
conditions that effect the functioning of the relationships between and perceptions of actors 
within the governance infrastructure of a regional innovation system. In order to shed some 
light on the nature of these dynamics, its causes and their effects, this thesis more precisely 
aims: 
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• to review the key features of the concept of regional innovation systems and to 
contribute to the understanding what they are and, more importantly how and why 
they work; 
• to identify and compare potential significant differences in terms of structures and 
dynamics within the governance of a regional innovation system and its sub-systems;  
• to explore and ascertain the reasons for any such differences; and subsequently  
• to identify enablers and obstacles to structural and institutional change as well as to 
the overall governance of regional innovation systems and its sub-systems; and 
eventually  
• to contribute to the development of the regional innovation systems conceptualisation;  
• to draw theoretical and practical implications that contribute to a better understanding, 
conceptualisation and practice of systemic innovation policy-making; and thereby 
• to bridge any apparent gap between theory and practice. 
 
Accordingly, the research objectives outlined above can be split into the following specific 
research questions, which this thesis tries to answer: 
 
• How and why do regional innovation systems work or not work in practice, in 
particular with regards to the functioning of the governance infrastructure?  
• What are the similarities and differences of the dynamics and structures within the 
governance of a regional innovation system and its sub-systems in terms of strategic 
policy measures, organisational set-up, relationships, processes, perceptions and 
sources of ideas? 
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• What are the enablers and obstacles for successful innovation policy, governance 
coherence and cooperation in order to make regional innovation systems work?  
• Can a systemic-ness of governance structures be generally found in practice and why?  
• Does innovation policy as such exist and is there a gap between the conceptualisations 
of innovation policy in theory (by academics) and practice (by policy-makers and 
practitioners)? 
 
By aiming to provide policy-makers with a vision of how they could or should overcome 
obstacles and implement facilitating processes and structures within a regional innovation 
system, this thesis hopes, thereby, not to be of mere interest to academics but to practitioners 
in the wider innovation policy sphere.  
 
Research approach and design 
 
This thesis adopts a qualitative research approach in order gain an insight and understanding 
of the underlying reasons behind the complex dynamics, perceptions and relationships 
between actors, which a quantitative approach would have found difficult to grasp.6 
Following the aim of scrutinizing regional and in particular sub-regional dynamics of regional 
innovation systems, and to limitations in scope, this thesis comprises an investigation of the 
working of the governance dimension in one (albeit a very large) German region, that is the 
Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia. The research design is composed of four in-depth 
qualitative case studies all within the same - at least supposedly functionally homogenous - 
                                                 
6 If an assessment of governance conditions would have been the primary goal, then the quantitative 
measurement of certain indicators related to important aspects of governance could have been considered at a 
larger scale. Still, measuring governance remains an empirical challenge. Yet, the ESPON programme (European 
Spatial Planning Observation Network, 2005, p. 73) has recently presented some initial proposition on how to 
measure important aspects of governance. 
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regional setting, namely the city-regions of Aachen, Dortmund, Duisburg and Düsseldorf. 
While the fieldwork centres upon these sub-regional case studies, their regional level as well 
as other dimensions of governance are also considered.  
 
North Rhine-Westphalia was chosen as a research setting for the case studies because it was 
reported to have followed a (sub-) regionalised policy approach (e.g. see Grabher, 1993a, p. 
272; Heinze & Voelzkow, 1997) and because it has a long history in attempting to execute 
structural and institutional change as a former heavily industrialised region. Thereby, this 
thesis is different from other case studies in that it investigates a region still struggling with 
industrial change and not one that is currently highlighted as a model region in terms of 
economic performance.  
 
The research comprises an extended literature review and detailed desk-study of secondary 
literature as well as a total of 50 semi-structured interviews with 47 policy-makers, 
practitioners, and academics. The timeframe of the research focuses upon the period between 
February 2001 and January 2003. It also considers some recent developments since the 
fieldwork was undertaken. 
 
Overview of chapters 
Chapter 2 provides a general theoretical background in understanding how economies work 
and what the major determinants are to national and regional economic development and 
growth. It introduces different schools of thoughts on economic development in explanation 
of economic differences in terms of productivity and competitiveness. This chapter explains 
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the important role that innovation plays for economic development and gives an insight into 
the innovation process. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a spatial perspective to both policy-making and economic development. 
Starting with a conceptualisation of what a region constitutes, this chapter draws attention to 
the recent trends towards regionalisation and regionalism. In the first part, this chapter reports 
on the rise of devolved regional governance and regional government as well as the 
consequent regionalisation of policies and institutions. It presents the main rationales behind 
these trends and argues that the region, indeed, appears to be the appropriate governance level 
to drive innovation policy. The second part of the chapter elaborates on the rediscovery of the 
regional economy under the so-called ‘New Economic Geography’. 
  
Next, Chapter 4 presents some of the contemporary conceptualisation of so-called ‘territorial 
innovation models’ (Moulaert & Sekia, 2003), which aim to explain the spatial concentration 
of economic activity. These models such as new industrial spaces, industrial districts, 
innovative milieux, clusters, and innovation systems are briefly juxtaposed and placed in the 
context of, what is labelled here, the ‘Economic Geography Triangle’ (of industrial 
organization, social institutional environment, and innovation). The organization of the 
discussions in this chapter follows this triangle. Building upon the discussions of the previous 
chapter on industrial organization, this chapter then focuses upon elaborating the evolutionary 
and institutional turns in economics. The evolutionary view is also put into a spatial context 
discussing the relevance of proximity in the globalised knowledge-based economy. 
Furthermore, this chapter elucidates the recent rise of the increasing importance attached to 
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the role of the socio-instititutional environment, which marked an ‘institutional turn’ in 
economics (Amin, 1999, p. 368; Blyth, 2002, p. 18; Raco, 1999).  
 
This institutional perspective is next linked to innovation in Chapter 5, which discussion 
centres on the main conceptual model of this thesis, regional innovation systems. The chapter 
starts by outlining some of the common characteristics of the systems of innovation approach 
are outlined, before its different strands are discussed in more detail. First, the national 
innovation systems strand is very briefly introduced. Then, the regional innovation systems 
strand is decoded into its three subtle propositions (on region, innovation, and system). 
Finally, its conceptualisation is compared to that of the cluster concept, which is perceived 
here as being embraced by it. This chapter further addresses some of the criticism that has 
been addressed at clusters, e.g. the concept’s fuzziness. To contribute to a clearer 
understanding of what clusters constitute, this thesis presents common characteristics that 
have been outlined and provides a useful overview of typologies of clusters that can be found 
in the literature.  
 
This detailed conceptual discourse precedes the presentation of suggested policy interventions 
that were derived from these theoretical contributions. Thus, Chapter 6 compiles proposed 
innovation policy measures associated with new institutionalism and the regional innovation 
systems concept. In order to build successful innovation systems, it is argued that innovation 
policies need to facilitate cluster development in a holistic manner and to construct 
institutional thickness. This chapter starts by considering the rationales behind policy 
interventions and discussing the role of government. In the following, the chapter elaborates 
the proposed symbiotic measures of cluster and institutionalist policy. A specific emphasis in 
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this respect is placed upon the nature of the policy decision-making process, Finally, this 
chapter identifies some potential practical policy flaws that policy ought to consider prior to 
implementation.  
 
The methodological approach of the thesis is discussed in Chapter 7. It discusses the methods 
employed in analysing the working of the governance dimension of innovation systems in 
more detail. The chapter first starts with introducing the thesis’s general epistemological 
perspective, which follows reflexive, social constructivist approaches, as opposed to 
rationalist and positivistic explanative frameworks, in that it views reality as being socially 
constructed by the various actors and the researcher itself (cf. Meyers, 2004a, pp. 463-464). 
Secondly, the chapter presents the chosen methodological approach applied in testing the 
hypothesis. This includes an explanation why an empirical-analytical social network analysis 
and a case-study approach were chosen. It further presents the methodological research steps. 
Thirdly, the chapter discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different research methods 
and justifies why a qualitative research approach was employed. Fourthly, it presents the 
analytical framework and specifies in more detail the methods of gathering information. This 
involves the presentation of a set of identified success factors of systemic-ness for the 
working of an innovation system as well as for the effectiveness of policy-making (i.e. 
governance) of innovation systems. Finally, the chapter explains the reasons behind the case-
study design and why the sample city-regions were selected as well. 
 
In Chapter 8, the results of the fieldwork are presented. First, an introduction is given to the 
national and the regional settings. Hence, some common characteristics of the German 
national innovation system and the regional Land level of North Rhine-Westphalia are 
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presented. Latter comprises an outline of the contextual and historical settings within the 
Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia, which includes an overview of past and current 
policies and organisation for the support of innovation. This identifies a shift from bottom-up 
inclusive regional structural policy to a top-down process of competitive bidding labelled here 
as ‘localised regional cluster policy approach’. Then, the particular findings at the sub-
regional level are reported. This includes a description of innovation policies and local 
initiatives, organisational governance structures, relationship between and perceptions of 
policy-makers and practitioners, and a categorization of the institutional interactions and 
systemic-ness within the four case-studies of the city-regions of Aachen, Dortmund, Duisburg 
and Düsseldorf.  
 
Then, Chapter 9 compares the results of a cross-case analysis comparing the findings of 
Chapter 8 in order to answer the research questions raised. The comparative analysis 
highlights the differences in innovation policies and institutional dynamics found in the 
fieldwork at multiple levels of governance and between different governance structures at the 
sub-regional level. Consequently, this chapter identifies the obstacles and enablers to the 
systemic-ness of governance and policy development. Correspondingly, this chapter proposes 
some potential practical implications and options for policy development and -making to 
enhance its coherence and cooperative reach. This concerns in particular the lessons learned 
with regards to the overall organisational set-up and the nature of policy- and decision-making 
processes. Subsequently, necessary changes to contemporary theoretical conceptualisations 
and practical approaches of regional innovation policy, strategies and governance are 
discussed and suggested.  
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Conclusions are drawn in the last Chapter 10, which provides a summary of the key findings 
of the thesis and its contribution to academic thinking and policy thinking. It demonstrates 
how the objective of the research was reached and how the research questions have been 
addressed. It indicates the originality and importance of the research as well as some of its 
limitations. The chapter concludes by raising some new questions that have evolved from the 
research findings and, therefore, proposes some issues and scope for future research to be 
undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A GENERAL BACKGROUND  
 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION 
 
A profound understanding of economic growth and its underlying determinants is necessary if 
the aim is to investigate policies towards regional economic development. Therefore, this 
thesis begins by sketching out the main determinants of economic growth and development as 
well as point to recent trends and drivers and subsequent changes in the views about the most 
determining factors of economic growth. This makes it necessary to address wide-spread 
issues such as regional competitiveness, regional economic development, innovation 
promotion and to summarise how these issues are linked to each other and why they are 
important for employment and the prosperity of a region.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly outline past and current academic thinking on how 
national and regional economies work. This involves introducing the various schools of 
thought concerned with economic development and growth as such, and policy-making in 
particular. Different theories of economic development and growth are introduced to provide 
a background to regional economic development.  
 
First, some general comments are made about the economy and economic growth in particular 
and their underlying determinants identified. Then, recent trends and paradigm changes in 
theoretical conceptualisations are presented. Next, the special role of innovation as one of the 
factors that determine growth, as well as the prominence given to the regional level are 
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discussed, followed by an analysis of the role of institutions and systemic structures of 
economies.  
 
The quest for a successful economy  
Economic growth and development represents one of the central questions of economics. In 
order to find new or refined answers to the question of economic development and growth, 
academics have not only drawn from and built upon existing knowledge in obvious fields 
such as macroeconomics and business studies but also brought in patterns of thinking and 
understanding from associated disciplines such as Geography, History, Political Sciences, 
Social Science, Biology, and Psychology. Scholars of diverse backgrounds and disciplines 
have all provided explanations of how our economy works and why differences exist in 
economic prosperity between countries and regions.7 The disciplinary boundaries for example 
between economics, geographical and political sciences have merged and been blurred in the 
quest for successful regional development and policy.  
 
Different theories for explaining regional productivity differences 
The various theories have differing assumptions and stress different individual factors in 
explaining economic growth. While neoclassical (equilibrium) theory (Solow, 1956, 1957; 
Swan, 1956) emphasise the supply side8, post-Keynesian9 as well as economic base theory10 
                                                 
7 Closely linked to question of why differences exist, is the question whether these differences will widen, 
sustain or narrow. Opinions on this matter differ greatly and the corresponding discussion is known as the 
convergence-divergence debate (e.g. see H.W. Armstrong, 1998; H. W. Armstrong & Vickerman, 1995; Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992; Button & Pentecost, 1999; P. Cheshire & Carbonaro, 1997; European Commission, 
2004h; Gardiner, Martin, & Tyler, 2004; Labour Asociados, 2003; Reiner Martin, 1999). 
8 This goes back to Adam Smith’s classical understanding, which derived from his observation of pin 
manufacturing, which ascertains that the ‘Wealth of Nations’ (first published in 1776) is dependent upon an 
efficient use of production factors that is foremost achieved by the benefits of a division of labour and 
subsequent specialisation. 
9 The postKeynesian growth theory emphasises demand and views investment as the decisive determinant of 
economic growth. It points out that additional investment causes an income (multiplier) effect, a capacity 
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emphasize demand as the main determinant of productivity differences. More lately, the new 
growth theory and innovation theories highlight the creation of technological progress as a 
key factor to growth (Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1986, 1990) and emphasise 
human capital, knowledge and learning by doing in this respect (Arrow, 1962a; Lucas, 1988; 
Stokey, 1988; Young, 1991).  
 
New Economic Geography  
 
Building upon some of the findings of the new growth theory, more recent approaches of 
explaining regional productivity differences have stressed the importance of spatial 
concentration of economic activities for economic growth. By emphasising economic 
agglomeration, these concepts reintroduced the variable ‘space’ into the analysis of the 
economy, which had been eliminated before by the classical school (cf. Krugman, 1991, p. 8; 
Schätzl, 2001, p. 17). As these concepts merge to some extent the disciplines of economics 
with geography, they are grouped under the label of the so-called ‘new economic 
geography’.11  
                                                                                                                                                        
increasing effect and creates incentives for complementary investments along the value chain by forward and 
backward linkage effects, final demand linkage effects as well as technological and fiscal complementary 
effects. PostKeynesian Scholars (or neoKeynesian as they are also called) who have build upon the aggregate 
economics that originated from Keynes’ book The general Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) 
include, for instance, Evsey D. Domar, Roy F. Harrod, Albert O. Hirschman and M. H. Watkins (cf. Schätzl, 
2001, pp. 143-146 who summarises their contributions). 
10 The economic base theory - sometimes also referred to as ‘export base theory’ - stresses the importance of 
exports, which basically represents external demand (Fritsch, 1991; Geck & Petry, 1981; Krietemeyer, 1983; 
Richmann, 1979). 
11 This study takes a wide view of which concepts fall under the grouping of the new economic geography. Here, 
it is understood as to comprise dynamic-cyclical approaches which focus on interregional movements of 
economic activity as well as the more recent dynamic evolutionary approaches of economic geography that 
concentrate on intraregional economic development. Thereby, this study follows Schätzl’s (2001, p. 202) 
grouping instead of Martin’s (1999, pp. 66, 68 and 79) and Amin’s (1999, pp. 368-369) more narrow view that 
only comprises the more formal (mathematical) models of equilibrium location theory and regional or local 
economic agglomeration or the new growth theory, while the more soft ‘eclectic and empirically-orientated 
concepts’ that ‘emphasise the political, economic institutional and social bases of regional development and 
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These contributions mainly emanate from the thought that proximity matters – more lately 
also with particular regards to innovation (Boschma, 2005a, 2005b; Capello & Faggian, 2005; 
Kirat & Lung, 1999; Morgan, 2001a; Oerlemans & Meuus, 2005; Torre & Rallet, 2005; 
Turok, 2004). They assume in contrast to the neoclassical perspective that here is not an equal 
and unimpeded geographical diffusion of innovation (Gardiner et al., 2004, p. 1049) but 
instead a concentration of economic activity in general and of innovation in particular. 
Consequently, similar to the new growth theory, the new economic geography models allow 
for interregional differences, while the neoclassical theory did not, as discussed above. 
However, this strand of theory does not consent to the assumption of natural free factor 
mobility with balancing, converging effect (e.g. by flows of knowledge workers) but instead 
conceptualises ‘centripetal forces’ (Krugman, 1991, p. 37; 1998; cf. Turok, 2004, p. 1076) 
that lead to the agglomeration or clustering of economic activity – as already identified long 
ago by Alfred Marshall’s (1898) classical analysis of industry localization. As a result, the 
new economic geography rather postulate the evolution of ‘core-periphery’ equilibrium 
pattern of productivity (Davis & Weinstein, 2001; cf. Gardiner et al., 2004, p. 1050) or 
‘center-periphery pattern’ with persistent interregional differences (Krugman, 1991, pp. 15-17 
and 26). While traditionally these differences were predominantly viewed in international and 
interregional comparisons (e.g. factor endowment), evolutionary approaches have more 
recently focussed on intraregional economic development. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
industrial agglomeration’ are not labelled as ‘new economic geography’ but contrasted as ‘economic geography 
proper’. 
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Table 1 Three theoretical perspectives on regional productivity growth 
Theory 
 
 
Explanation of regional 
productivity differences 
Predicted evolution of 
regional productivity 
differences12 
Neoclassical Growth Theory Due to different factor 
endowments, especially 
differences in capital/labour 
ratios and technology 
Regional convergence (catch 
up) in productivity based on 
the assumption of constant 
returns to scale; diminishing 
returns to factors of 
production; free factor 
mobility and geographical 
diffusion of technology.13 
New Growth Theory (NGT)/ 
Endogenous Growth 
Theory14 
 
Due to differences in the 
capital/labour ratios, 
knowledge base and the 
proportion of the workforce in 
knowledge-producing 
industries15, which leads to 
localized knowledge/ 
technology spillovers 
No long-term convergence. 
Convergence, persistence or 
divergence (widening) of 
productivity gaps depending 
upon changes in the degree of 
geographical diffusion of 
technology and knowledge, 
and flows of knowledge 
workers 
‘New Economic Geography’ 
models 
Due to spatial agglomeration / 
specialization / clustering 
(localisation and urbanisation 
advantages), as sources of 
positive externalities and 
increasing returns (labour, 
knowledge spillovers, 
specialist suppliers etc.)  
‘Core-periphery’ equilibria 
and persistent regional 
differences in productivity as 
a result of increasing spatial 
concentration and 
specialization of economic 
activity and labour migration 
 
Source: Altered and shortened version of Table 1 by Gardiner, Martin, & Tyler (2004, p. 1049).16 
 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of the empirical literature concerning the evolution of regional productivity differences 
literature consult the contributions to the convergence divergence debate (e.g. see H.W. Armstrong, 1998; H. W. 
Armstrong & Vickerman, 1995; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992; Button & Pentecost, 1999; P. Cheshire & 
Carbonaro, 1997; European Commission, 2004h; Gardiner et al., 2004; Labour Asociados, 2003; Reiner Martin, 
1999). 
13 The overall growth rate of an economy is entirely determined by the exogenous given growth rate of 
technology. 
14 The New Growth Theory – which is sometimes also labelled as Endogenous Growth Theory because of its 
‘endogenous explanation’ of technological progress – should not be confused with Theories of Endogenous 
Development, which stress the activation of intraregional potential as key to the economic development. 
Contributions to theories of endogenous development (cf. chapter 2.3.4 in Schätzl, 2001, pp. 155-158) often call 
for a bottom-up approach to policy-making in order to overcome existing bottlenecks and to further specialise 
existing comparative strengths within a region.  
15 Thereby stressing one particular aspect of factor endowment, namely human and knowledge resources. 
16 For further characteristics of the New Growth Theory and New Economic Geography with regards to spatial 
concentration of economic activity, see also Sternberg (2001, Tab. 1 on p. 161) based upon Lagendijk (1997b, 
first version, p. 22).  
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In the following, the increasing recognition of innovation is explained in more detail, while 
this thesis returns later on to this strand and discusses some of the key concepts of new 
economic geography in the context of the resurgence of the role of the region.  
 
On the importance of innovation 
Traditionally, innovation was long regarded in economic theory solely as an isolated 
technological invention created through research that is exogenously given. Nowadays, 
however - following evolutionary research on innovation and knowledge and according to the 
so-called new growth theories, innovation has regained 17 a prime place within the last decade 
in explaining the success and failure of regional and national economies within economic 
development theory.  
 
It is necessary to start by pointing out some rather obvious but fundamental reasons of why 
innovation is important: For businesses, improving their innovation performance means 
maintaining or gaining competitive advantage and enabling future growth (cf. Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development & Eurostat, 2005, p. 35). A common message 
from innovation studies ([European Commission], 2002, p. 2) is that ‘in an increasingly 
global, increasingly knowledge-based economy, innovation assumes greater importance than 
ever before.’18 Innovation and entrepreneurial activities enable businesses to improve 
productivity and to meet fast-changing market needs and increasing consumer awareness and 
bargaining power, which are results of the progressing realization of an information (and 
knowledge-based) society. Consequently, innovation is not only a prerequisite but also an 
                                                 
17 Referring here to early works of scholars such as Schumpeter’s 1934 study on The Theory of Economic 
Development. 
18 This point represents one of five key messages from the 2002 status report ([European Commission], 2002, pp. 
2-3), which summarised the latest results that emerged from 20 ‘innovation policy studies’ edited up to 2002 by 
the Commission’s Directorate-General for Enterprise. 
 24 
imperative of staying ahead in the increasing global competition of the ‘knowledge-based 
economy’.19  
 
For regions or nations, it just means exactly the same. Innovation is just as much key to 
competitiveness and hence economic prosperity for the spatial areas of businesses. Innovation 
within a business may enable the wider regional business base to benefit from positive 
externalities and can provide chances for the region to defend or to develop a sectoral or niche 
competence, which may shape and form part of the region’s ‘diamond system’ of 
determinants of its competitive advantage. Indeed, reaching or sustaining the innovation-
driven stage for a national or regional economy is the most sufficient means of securing future 
economic growth – especially for already advanced economies, which cannot compete on 
labour costs but on productivity and by innovative products. Hence, innovation should not be 
seen as an end in itself but the most effective means of defending one’s competitiveness. 
 
The emerging innovation paradigm and why its importance has now been recognised 
For understanding the importance of innovation and its implications for businesses and their 
territorial systems, which emanates from it, one should not only look at current trends and 
academic thinking on how the economy works, but also at those of the past. Among the array 
of papers on paradigm changes 20, Capello’s (1996) extended review essay based upon Conti, 
Malecki &Oinas (1995), for example, elaborates upon three distinct economic paradigms of 
industrial organization, which by no means are exhaustive but, nevertheless, highlight the 
                                                 
19 The OECD’s third edition of the Oslo Manual (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development & 
Eurostat, 2005, §71 on p. 28) defines the knowledge-based economy as ‘an expression coined to describe trends 
in advanced economies towards greater dependence on knowledge, information and high skill levels, and the 
increasing need for ready access to all of these by the business and public sectors.’ 
20 Cooke and Morgan (1993, p. 562) define a paradigm as ‘a hegemonic set of principles, methods of 
understanding, and practices which provide a coherent and useful way of engaging with the world’. Dosi (1988, 
p. 224) distinguished paradigm from changes or trends by seeing it as being “patterns” ‘for solutions of selected 
techno-economic problems based un highly selected principles derived form the natural sciences’. 
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most prominent changes in understanding corporate strategy and regional development in the 
second half of the last century: the large firm paradigm characterised by economices of scales 
as a result of automated mass production (‘Fordism’) and division of labour (‘Taylorism’) , 
the industrial district paradigm with a shift to a ‘flexible regime of accumulation’ (Albrechts 
& Swyngedouw, 1989) with a cluster of specialised small firms realising economies of scope, 
and the network paradigm (Cooke & Morgan, 1993) highlighting the need for cooperation, 
networking and co-competencing between businesses in order to use economies of association 
(i.e. network externalities) and to take account of the transition from an industrial to a 
complex knowledge-based society and economy (cf. European Commission, 2002d, pp. 8-9 
and 22-23; Schätzl, 2001, pp. 224-225) .21  
 
Indeed, businesses need to become efficient ‘learning organisations’ (cf. M. Armstrong, 1996, 
p. 521) in order to fully exploit their quality potential and to satisfy and adapt quickly to fast 
changing customer demands (Missethon, 1993, p. 10) through continuous improvement. 
Hence, networking becomes a competitive strategy, in particular for smaller firms (Cooke, 
1997, pp. 359-360), with a focus on learning and information exchange. This form of 
collaboration offers an opportunity – sometimes in a rather unspecified way – for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to share and access tangible resources as well as intangible 
knowledge resources, which they would have not been able to create or to obtain themselves 
due to their limited resources. Besides this association, Michael Enright (1995), a colleague of 
Michael Porter, notes in this respect though to the need for an optimal mix of collaboration 
                                                 
21 In his paper on innovative networks and regional development, Sternberg (1999, p. 85) also builds upon 
Capello’s presentation of paradigms and provides a German translation in slight alteration of Capello’s valuable 
table 1 (1996, p. 487) characterizing the three paradigms. 
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and competition in order for a given (regional) industry cluster to be most effective (cf. 
Cooke, 1997, p. 360; Cooke, 1998, p. 5). 22 
 
More importantly, with their network paradigm, Cooke & Morgan (1993, p. 554) draw 
attention already to what they call ‘the microregulatory networks of institutions which give 
spatial definition to interfirm networking’ by discussing the cases of the successful networked 
regional economies of Baden-Württemberg and the ‘intelligent region’ (cf. Cooke & Morgan, 
1991) of Emilia-Romagna and as well as to the two aspirational cases of the Basque Country 
and Wales. In their conclusion, Cooke and Morgan (1993, p. 562) summarise the key 
(success) features of networking. At corporate level they name ‘interdivisional integration, 
total quality, delayering, user involvement, market response, alliances, and collaborative 
subcontracting’, while at spatial level they highlight ‘a thick layering of public and private 
industrial support institutions, high-grade labour-market intelligence and associated 
vocational training, rapid diffusion of technology transfer, a high degree of interfirm 
networking and, above all, receptive firms well-disposed towards innovation.’23 
 
In order to promote the process of innovation in a region, an environment has to be created in 
which innovation activities are enhanced and ideas, new technologies and best practice can be 
disseminated. While the focus in this respect was previously on the accumulation of human 
                                                 
22 However, this is not an easily comprehensible argument since collaboration and competition traditionally 
represent a paradoxical combination. Nevertheless, on the one hand, effective industry clusters need competition, 
as it forces businesses to constantly upgrade and innovate their products and services and thus does not allow 
inertia to set in due to a false feeling of security. On the other hand, collaboration in some activities can provide 
external economies of scale, e.g. by sharing the same laboratory or using increased bargaining power in joint 
bulk purchasing (Cooke, 1997, p. 360). 
23 Hence, the network paradigm is to be seen as a kind of prelude and in line with their later proposed 
‘associational economy’ (Cooke & Morgan, 1998) and the ‘regional innovation systems’ model (H.-J. Braczyk, 
P. N. Cooke, & M. Heidenreich, 1998b), which will be addressed and introduced later. 
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capital through education and learning, nowadays it is more on creativity (Merschmann, 
2005), which to foster becomes part of a successful businesses’ innovation management.  
 
However, this is a difficult task, which faces inherent organisational obstacles, as every new 
idea is a disruptive factor to the existing order of things. Indeed, innovations are incremental, 
piecemeal improvements, they represent cumulative and localized change, or in other words, 
they are mutations in routines (Boschma, 2004, p. 1003).24 Therefore, the key to success is 
‘developing and sharing an innovation culture’ as the Green Paper on Innovation (European 
Commission, 1995, p. 1) points out.25 This concerns the individual business as much as the 
wider innovation system. In this respect, the importance of relational capital (Capello, 2002; 
Capello & Faggian, 2005, p. 79) has been stressed for collective learning and regional 
organisation of economic restructuring.26  
 
The link between innovation and economic growth  
The link between innovation and economic growth has long been investigated, both 
theoretically and empirically. Undoubtedly, there is a clear general consensus that innovation 
drives productivity and in logical consequence economic development. As an example, the 
UK government (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003a, pp. iv and 8) has recognised 
innovation as ‘the most important influences on productivity growth alongside changes in 
                                                 
24 Similar to parents, who try to oppose children’s ideas and creativity if it changes the normal way to do things, 
businesses’ dynamics often also suppress creativity. For this reason, Panse calls for less strategic communication 
and more emotional discussions, linked to the notion of children’s leadership (Schamari, 2005). 
25 The European Commission’s (1995, p. 1) Green Paper (discussion paper) on Innovation states in this respect 
the following: ‘According to the dictionary, the opposite of innovation is “archaism and routine”. That is why 
innovation comes up against so many obstacles and encounters such fierce resistance. It is also why developing 
and sharing an innovation culture is becoming a decisive challenge for European societies.’ 
26 According to Capello & Faggian (2005, p. 79), relational capital is formed by public and private partnerships 
as well as  explicit and implicit cooperation among actors within the relational space at local level. 
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skills and capital intensity’, and uses it as one of five drivers of productivity for their 
framework analysis of how to increase productivity. 
 
Even though it may be hard to establish a clear direct link between innovation and GDP at the 
national level for instance (European Commission, 2005f, p. 22) – because ‘some forms of 
innovation may also only be partially captured in the EIS’ (European Innovation Scoreboard) 
and because ‘innovation is only one factor among other structural ones’ such as employment, 
education, skills and lifelong learning, regulation, taxation, and macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation, exchange rates etc., to name a few27 – all in all, there is ample and sufficient 
empirical evidence in the literature (further cf. also Mairesse & Mohnen, 1995) to suggest a 
strong link between innovation performance - whether measured in R&D expenditure or 
patents - and productivity, which again is seen as key to economic growth 28  
 
Focus on weaknesses of an innovation system may be more effective  
 
An interesting result from the 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) published by the 
European Commission (2005f, pp. 6, 15 and 29-30) stems from the attempt of testing whether 
innovative capabilities are more likely to spill over from areas of strength to areas of 
                                                 
27 Other important issues in this respect are government deficits, inward investment and the role of multi-national 
companies (MNCs), the impart of EU enlargement and further consolidation of the Single Market as well as ‘the 
cost of non-Euro zone’. Latter is coined here as an allusion to the pre 1992 discussion of ‘The cost of non-
Europe’ by the Cecchini report published by the European Commission (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1988), which exaggeratly demonstrated possible economies of scale within a Single Market (cf. 
also Cecchini, 1988). Here, this phrase means the potential opportunity costs for the development of regions in 
countries having opted out or yet declined the participating in the Euro zone, namely the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden. 
28 This link between innovation performance and economic development serves as a policy rationale for 
supporting innovation by addressing obstacles and market failures that prevents innovation (cf. European 
Commission, 2005f, p. 21). 
 29 
weakness, or whether it is more likely that weak area act as a ‘blockage’, thus preventing 
progress.  
 
The correlation of the variance for seven composite indicators – the five dimension from the 
EIS plus data for innovation demand and governance from the EXIS report (Arundel & 
Hollanders, 2005)29 - against the Summary Innovation Index (SII) for 21 countries shows 
(European Commission, 2005f, p. 30) that there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship, with innovation performance (SII) declining with the amount of variance in the 
seven sub-indices (R² = 0.84, p < 0.001). These results provide initial evidence for the 
assumption that an even performance on the various dimensions of innovation fosters the 
overall innovation performance.30 In other words, ‘countries which show a below average 
performance on one of these dimensions as compared to the country’s overall performance 
[such as Germany, Denmark and the UK (ibid., p. 15)], might be in danger of hampered future 
innovative performance’(ibid., p. 6). These results crucially imply that ‘policy would be more 
effective in improving overall innovation performance by concentrating on improving areas of 
weakness than on making further improvements to areas of strength’ as the EIS report points 
out (ibid., p. 30).  
 
However, this point needs to be clarified here, as there is the risk of misinterpreting the 
implications to a general oversimplified policy message. While, on the basis of these EIS 
results, one has to agree that policy-makers should focus on the weak ‘dimension(s)’ of the 
innovation system, the results do however not imply the transfer of the same message to the 
                                                 
29 The EXIS report features an ‘Exploratory Innovation Scoreboard’ that complements the European Innovation 
Scoreboard (EIS). It is available online at 
http://www.trendchart.org/scoreboards/scoreboard2004/scoreboard_papers.cfm 
30 Please note that the variance is calculated after standardization to remove the performance effect (cf. European 
Commission, 2005f, pp. 6 and 29). 
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sectoral level. Hence, any interpretation of these results in the sense that policy-makers should 
focus on weak ‘sectors’ is vividly rejected. Addressing weak ‘dimension’ such as skills 
shortages is on the other hand advocated.  
 
This standpoint is, however, in stark contrast to Nelson & Winter’s (1977, p. 36) view, who 
argue that that the most important innovation policy issues concern making currently lagging 
sectors more progressive. Instead, here rather the opposite is advocated: to focus on the weak 
‘systemic’ dimensions and on strong performing sectors that have the potential to ‘innovate at 
the leading edge’ (cf. von Hippel, 1988, p. 9) and stand the test of international benchmarking 
and reach world-class status, and as a result can form the core of a so-called future cluster  
 
The reason for this argument is that these efforts could change competition conditions (from a 
focus of price competition to innovation) for these sectors and act as a spark for others (by 
spill-over effects). Whether in less-favoured regions (LFR) or in an already well-performing 
region, the key of policy has to be to enhance the framework conditions for businesses to 
reach excellence, while avoiding a more direct subsidizing of either declining or growing 
sectors.31 
 
Yet, these objectives may not be to the liking of policy-makers and politicians alike. While, 
practitioners might favour not having to train and bet on a lame horse, so to speak, and relish 
potential credit for a success story, policy-makers and in particular politicians may disfavour 
such policy. In simplified and exaggerated generalisation, politicians often want to be seen as 
                                                 
31 While there is no argument for providing financial assistance for those latter growing sectors (apart from 
ensuring access to growth finance), subsidies to declining sectors are likely to fritter away and may - instead of 
spurring an innovation culture - create a subsidy culture, which expects continuous support of otherwise non-
competitive industries. 
 31 
the heroic, omnipotent saver who steps in at the last minute helping the poor, weak and 
needed, instead of being accused of giving money to the rich. In contrast, practitioners instead 
are perceived here as wanting to be seen as the maker, organiser, mover & shaker, string-
puller and so on. 
 
From innovation to the link between Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth 
Innovativeness can further provide the necessary impetus for as well as be itself nourished 
from entrepreneurship within a given region. To illustrate this, one can first refer to the so-
called spin-out or spin- off companies, which are defined as ‘a new company established to 
commercialise the knowledge and skills of a university, non-university research institute or 
corporate research team’(Elle et al., 1997, p. 77; and cf. European Commission, 2002e, p. 23) 
Thus, entrepreneurship can be viewed in these cases as a kind of output of innovation 
activities too.  
 
Secondly, in generalisation, new start-ups are often vibrant enterprises that are creative and 
therefore provide a source for innovations. According to the Austrian economist Joseph Alois 
Schumpeter (1883-1940), economic growth is based upon innovative activity that derives 
from entrepreneurs, who take risks and introduce new technologies and thereby stimulate 
economic activity. He famously labelled this conducive replacing of old technologies as a 
process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1976b).32 This idea of technological and 
business cycles was later further developed by Technology and Innovation Research (or so-
called innovation theories) and Evolutionary Economics (cf. Cantner, 1995, pp.27-28). 
 
                                                 
32 Schumpeter’s elaboration of ‘The Process of Creative Destruction’ features in his book ‘Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy’ (1976a) that was first published in the USA in 1942. It can also be found in the excellent reader 
(reference collection) by Edquist & McKelvey  (2000b, pp. 75-80). 
 32 
Similar to innovation, entrepreneurship is also linked to economic growth. Yet, in addition, 
with reference to the literature review by Audretsch (2003), the Entrepreneurship Green Paper 
(European Commission, 2003f, p. 6) highlights that entrepreneurship not only contributes to 
economic growth but to job creation too (something with which innovation is not always 
directly attributed). Another empirical study to be considered here is the 2000 Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) report, which outlines the extent to which the level of 
entrepreneurship activity (Total Entrepreneurial Activity Rate) influences the growth rate of 
an economy and prosperity of a country given as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
rate for 1999-2000 in constant prices (see Table 4.4 in Sternberg, Otten, & Tamásy, 2000, p. 
17).33 The research shows a positive relationship between entrepreneurship activity and 
economic growth with a correlation coefficient of 0.69 that is statistically highly significant.34  
 
Above’s reference to Coriat & Dosi’s (1998b, p. 107) notion of ‘virtuous circle’ and ‘vicious 
circle’ concerning innovation can equally be applied to entrepreneurship. In this respect, one 
can flag out the typology of four regional growth regimes (see Table 2 below) provided by 
Audretsch & Fritsch (2002, p. 119).35 According to their characterisation, high entrepreneurial 
activity turns a regions rather in an ‘entrepreneurial growth regime’ instead of a ‘routinized 
growth regime’ (i.e. Grabher’s (1993b) mentioning of the ‘locked-in’ Rhine-Ruhr area); or 
makes a region a ‘revolving door regime’ (with a high degree of simultaneous entry and exit 
of businesses) instead of a ‘downsizing regime’ (for which the perhaps more fitting label of an 
                                                 
33 The data for GDP and Total Entrepreneurial Activity Rate were based on the GEM citizen surveys in the 
summer of 2000 as well as on the IWF World Economic Outlook Database of April 2000. 
34 The difference in the level of start-up activities explains around half of the goodness of fit (R²=0.48) of 
economic growth. 
35 Within the theory of growth regimes, the concept of the technological regime was extended ‘from the unit of 
observation of the industry to a geographical unit of observation’ as Audretsch & Fritsch (2002, p. 119) state 
themselves.. Therefore, this represents similarities with the extension of the product life cycle theory (from a 
microeconomic viewpoint) and of the theory of long waves or Kondratieff-cycles (from a macroeconomic 
viewpoint) to the geographical unit of observation (e.g. cf. the discussion of dynamic-cyclical approaches in 
Schätzl, 2001, pp. 209-221).  
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‘exit or closed door regime’ is suggested here). Hence, for less favoured regions, 
entrepreneurship can be a question of a revolving or a closed door. 
 
Table 2 Audretsch & Fritsch's typology of regional growth regimes 
Type of regional 
growth regime 
Enterprise structure Entrepreneurial 
activity 
Growth rate 
(relative), or 
Employment 
Entrepreneurial regime 
 
Turbulent High High 
Routinized regime Large, incumbent enterprises 
in stable industries 
Low High 
Revolving door regime 
 
Non-innovative industries High Low 
Downsizing regime Large, incumbent enterprises 
in declining industries 
Low Low 
Source: Own creation based upon an article by Audretsch & Fritsch (2002, in particular pp. 115-116) 
 
On the basis of their empirical evidence showing that eight out of the 13 regions identified as 
revolving door regimes of the 1980s (out of a total of 74 West German regions investigated) 
became entrepreneurial growth regimes in the 1990, Audretsch & Fritsch (2002, p. 119) 
rightly point to the likely positive long run effects of a high level of start-up activity. They in 
fact conclude that small firms and new firm start-ups ‘are the seeds of future growth’ (ibidem, 
p. 122) and accordingly ‘that regional policy should focus in promoting new firm start-ups’ 
(ibidem, p. 121). 36 
 
However, the otherwise neat article is unfortunately absent of a note of caution with respect to 
a policy focus on start-ups within revolving door regime regions. At least in the short run, 
there is an obvious danger for policy support to start-ups falling flat (cf. van Stel & Storey, 
                                                 
36 The European Commission (2001a) report on ‘Creating an entrepreneurial Europe’, for instance, outlines the 
EU measures of the Third Multiannual Programme to assist SMEs (1997-2000) regarding its objectives of 
‘improving the framework conditions for SMEs’ and providing ‘support for businesses through various 
programmes and financial instruments to support SMEs’. The Third Multiannual Programme for SMEs has been 
succeeded by the Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (2001-2005). 
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2002, p. 29), and thus wasting scarce financial resources, if they result in mainly funding the 
non-innovative entries established out of unemployment that have elsewhere been defined as 
‘spin-in’ (Elle et al., 1997, p. 77) or ‘necessity entrepreneurship’ (Sternberg, 2002)37. As 
Audretsch & Fritsch (2002, p. 116) point out themselves, these types of start-ups are likely 
not to have a significant technological advantage and to produce for the regional market only, 
which only ‘crowd out local competition instead of creating additional employment in the 
region’.  
 
Indeed, Armington & Acs (2002, p. 43) find little support for a positive impact of 
unemployment on new firm formation rates. Instead, in their analysis of data on firm birth for 
384 US labour market areas in six industry sectors between 1991-1996 - from the new 
Longitudinal Establishment and Enterprise Microdata (LEEM) data base constructed by the 
Bureau of the Census -, Armington & Acs (2002, p. 43) conclude that variations in new firm 
start-ups are ‘substantially explained by regional differences in industrial density, population 
growth and income growth’, suggesting that market-size or agglomeration effects may be less 
important than other kinds of external economies. They also find ‘significant evidence on the 
importance of human capital on new firm formation rates’, thus rather emphasizing localized 
knowledge spillovers than economies of scales.  
 
However, Sternberg (2002, p. 30) points out that despite recent papers reporting positive 
relationship between the level of entrepreneurial activity and subsequent employment growth 
in West German regions (Audretsch & Fritsch, 2002) and, similarly, in British regions (van 
                                                 
37 Please note the notion of ‘necessity entrepreneurship’ was made by Professor Rolf Sternberg during his 
presentation at the Regional Studies Annual Conference on 21.11.2002 entitled ‘Entrepreneurial Climate, 
Economic Performance and New Firm Policy in German Regions’ and while it features in the draft full paper, it 
does not appear within the conference proceedings of his paper (Sternberg, 2002) published by the Regional 
Studies Association (Hardy, Larsen, & House, 2002). 
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Stel & Storey, 2002), there are nevertheless controversial empirical results regarding the 
impact of start-ups on regional development, exemplary referring to the discussion by Verheul 
et al. (2002).38 
 
In this respect, David Storey also questions the marginal effectiveness of ‘further’ start-up 
initiatives when start-up rates are already at high levels, as such in the UK and Germany 
(which are even higher than in the US.39 He also points out that according to recent research 
(Carree, van Stel, Thurik, & Wennekers, 2002) the correlation between GDP figures in 23 
OECD countries and the level of start-ups remains only modestly positive correlated (in 
particular if you would exclude Luxembourg and Ireland), with Japan for example having one 
of the lowest start-up rates while actually having a similar GDP growth in that time period as 
the UK.  
 
In addition, Storey points out further difficulties of start-up policy initiatives, such as the 
necessity of clear objectives, a long-term approach and a focus on ‘special groups’ as well as 
the difficulties of identifying good practice for this sort of policy. This is also supported by 
Feldman, Francis, & Bercovitz (2005, pp. 138-139) who claim that government policy 
focused on the creation and replication of entrepreneurial clusters are bound to fail. Hence, for 
Storey, support for established SMEs should not be neglected.40 
                                                 
38 Confer also van Stel & Storey (2002, pp. 4-5), who also render upon some empirical studies that have adopted 
different approaches and yielded different results concerning the relationship between ‘entrepreneurship’ and 
‘economic success’. 
39 The author is grateful to Professor David Storey of Warwick Business School who raised this issue during his 
presentation entitled “Why more firms?” at a conference entitled “Cluster Policies and Local Enterprise: Benefits 
to You”, held on November 28th 2002 by the Mercia Institute of Enterprises as part of the EnterpriseFest 2002 at 
the European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham.  
40 Presentation given by David Storey of Warwick Business School entitled “Why more firms?” at a conference 
entitled “Cluster Policies and Local Enterprise: Benefits to You”, held on November 28th 2002 by the Mercia 
Institute of Enterprises as part of the EnterpriseFest 2002 at the European Research Institute at the University of 
Birmingham.  
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Overall, this thesis takes the view that innovation and entrepreneurship are to some extent 
interlinked and that entrepreneurship is also a positive contributor to economic growth. 
Policies for the support of entrepreneurship, however, have to take the regional idiosyncrasies 
carefully into account.  
 
The innovation process  
The innovation process was long analysed as a black box (Rosenberg, 1982) i.e. ‘a system 
containing unknown components and processes’ (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986, pp. 278-279).41 
The linear model of innovation (cf. Kline & Rosenberg, 1986, pp.285-288; Klotz, 2003, p. 23; 
Schätzl, 2001, pp. 115-116) that emerged after World War II viewed innovation as 
continuously running process subdivided into the following rough, chronological phases, 
which together represent the sequence of the innovation process: research, invention, 
innovation, and diffusion (latter comprising imitation and adaptation).42 By this view, the 
individual phases became much more transparent and the technological innovation process as 
a whole lost its character of a ‘black box’, as Pfirrmann (1991, p. 64) puts it. 
 
By the 1980s, the stringent linear model was advanced by Kline & Rosenberg’s (1986, pp. 
289-294) chain-linked model, which made the relationship between the different phases more 
interdependent by including feed-back loops and links through accumulated knowledge and 
research. This paradigm - present up to the 1990s - was more a ‘holistic’ view of innovation 
and featured already a reference to the ‘systems nature’ of research (ibidem, p. 292). 
                                                 
41 The article by Kline & Rosenberg provides actually a neat overview on innovation, of which a copy can also 
be found in the reader (reference collection) compiled by Edquist & McKelvey (2000b). 
42 Most frequently, one finds the differentiation of three phases for the linear model: invention, innovation, and 
diffusion, though Kline & Rosenberg (1986, p. 286) render this conventional model - which was the paradigm 
since World War II up to the 1980s - as a succession of research, development, production, and marketing. 
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The chain-linked model was superseded by the integrated and enlarged systemic approach of 
innovation, which recognizes the complex nature of innovation. It is now widely accepted that 
‘innovation is systemic rather than linear’ ([European Commission], 2002, p. 3). ‘Systemic’ 
means that the innovation process is nowadays seen to be inter-disciplinary and 
multidimensional, e.g. in terms of competences, people, finances, and time. Thus, to grasp the 
innovation process, one looks not just at the individual entrepreneur or business but at the 
entire ‘system of innovation’, which may, for example, involve knowledge transfer and 
include businesses’ external linkages to other economic actors such as universities and so on.  
 
The complexity and uncertainty of innovation activities favours a joint collaborative approach 
of formal organisation towards innovation that bundles different competences in research or 
innovation teams or networks instead of efforts by individual innovators (cf. Dosi, 1988, p. 
223). Broadly following DeBresson & Amesse’s discussion (1991, pp. 367-368), there are the 
following three rationales for such cooperation: 
 
Firstly, innovation activities often require considerable financial investment over a longer 
period of time, while facing ‘strong technical and market uncertainties’ (DeBresson & 
Amesse, 1991, p. 367) and volatility.43 This is because innovation is ‘inherently stochastic’ 
and encompasses ‘considerable institutional complexity and variety’, as Nelson & Winter 
(1977, p. 115) highlight. Networking thus enables businesses to pool their resources and to 
share risks and costs. 
                                                 
43 The Collins Dictionary of Economics (cf. 'innovation' entry in Pass et al., 1993, p. 261) names photocopying 
as an example of an innovation that has been a lengthy and expensive process. In this case, it took Xerox 10 
years further development to launch a first commercial product following their invention of the photocopying 
process in 1948. 
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Arguably more important, though, is the second rationale, which concerns the complexity or 
‘systems dimension’ of the involved cutting edge technologies, processes or concepts – which 
requires diverse and multiple sets of complementary competences and skills from different 
disciplines.44. A collaborative approach such as networking means the bundling of 
competencies – which is of particular relevance for SMEs that sometimes may not have a 
critical mass of their own to carry out innovation activities. 
 
As a third sources and causes for networking, DeBresson & Amesse (1991, p. 368) identify 
the economic incentive of likely ‘super-additive gains’ from the new collaboration of actors. 
They labelled these joint innovative profits from this positive-sum game as the quasi rents of 
‘inter-preneurship’.  
 
A prerequisite for reaping the benefits is, however, the effective and efficient functioning of 
such networks. A status report of results form innovation studies ([European Commission], 
2002, p. 3) points out in this respect that well functioning innovation systems ‘may have 
technical components but, above all, are networks of individuals.’  
Accordingly, the systemic approach must take account of interactions and dynamics of 
interpersonal relations – including the possibility of opportunistic behaviour – as well as the 
relevance of the institutional framework conditions.  
 
In this respect, Capello & Faggian (2005, pp. 79 and 85), for example, have pointed out that 
cultural as well as social proximity as the basis of relational capital matters in promoting 
                                                 
44 One may only think only of the example of the automotive industry, where mechanics meet electronics, 
electrics etc.  
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innovation. They demonstrated that relational capital (measured via collective learning 
channels) affects the innovation activity of firms positively. Consequently, the proximity of 
actors is regarded as favouring networking and thus the innovation process, due to the 
peculiarity of learning, knowledge transfer and knowledge spillovers. 45  
 
As part of his contribution to the national systems of innovation approach, Johnson (1992, p. 
33) provides a good overview of the relations between learning, knowledge and innovation 
(see Figure 1 below). It builds upon the earlier understanding of different types of learning 
(cf. Cooke, 1998, pp. 12-15; Koschatzky, 1999, pp. 737-738; Malecki, 1997, p. 59) that 
comprises the stages of learning-by-doing (Arrow, 1962a), learning-by-using (Rosenberg, 
1982), and learning-by-interaction (Lundvall, 1988); for latter of which Johnson presents the 
forms of producing, searching, and exploring.46  
 
Johnson’s figure below disregards feedback loops and interdependencies only for the reason 
of simplification (1992, p. 33). It still clearly shows that innovation is an endogenous process 
and it also makes the case for continuous re-learning (or ‘remembering-by-doing’) in order to 
prevent the stock of tacit knowledge from deteriorating due to forgetting.47 More importantly 
for the systems of innovation’ approach, Johnson illustration also stresses that these complex 
relations are all shaped by institutional factors.  
                                                 
45 This point also represents one of five key messages from the 2002 status report ([European Commission], 
2002, pp. 2-3), which summarised the latest results that emerged from 20 ‘innovation policy studies’ edited up to 
2002 by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Enterprise. 
46 In her brief explanation of the ‘learning organisation’, Bund (1998, p. 41) differentiates between individual 
and organisational learning processes, where latter is characterised by single-loop-learning (that changes 
behavioural patterns), double-loop-learning (which also changes thinking patterns and values), and deutero-
learning (that improves learning capabilities, that is learning how to learn). Of relevance here is that the double-
loop-learning requires the capability of creative organisational forgetting from members of an organisation in 
order for the organisation to remain flexible and adaptable. In addition, more types of technological learning are 
listed, for example, by Malecki (1997, Table 2.3 on p. 59). 
47 Knowledge is generally classified (cf. Warrian & Mulhern, 2005, p. 163) into codified (i.e. know-why, know-
what) and tacit knowledge (i.e. know-how, know-who). 
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As a consequence, the advanced form of learning-by-interaction (and cooperative networking) 
can evolve to a superior reflexive stage close to Stiglitz’ (1987) notion of learning-by-learning 
(cf. Cooke, 1998, p. 13). If this is the case, the learning process is then embedded in a 
systemic integration approach in which the partnership model can be described as 
‘associative’ (Coleman, 1997; Cooke & Morgan, 1998; Hirst, 1994) towards enhancing the 
commercial community, and where institutional monitoring has become part of the system 
(Cooke, 1998, p. 13). Accordingly, such economic systems have been labelled as ‘learning 
economies’ and learning regions’ (e.g. Florida, 1995; Gertler, Wolfe, & Garkut, 2000; 
Hassink, 2001; Hudson, 1999). 
 
The FP5 funded CRITICAL project (Charles, 2007) defines a learning city or region as one 
‘that creates and supports institutions and social structures that invest in cooperation and 
learning between and within organisations, and has learning at all levels, the individual, the 
network of organisations and the societal level’ (The CRITICAL team, 2007, p. 10). They 
further specify that it is thus ‘a place encouraging civil society to participate in learning, 
defining the strategy of how learning is provided’ (ibid., p. 11). This may involve so-called 
communities of practice which is defined by Wenger and Snyder (2000, p. 139) as ‘groups of 
people informally bound together by shared expertise and passion’ with the primary output 
being knowledge.  
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Figure 1 The relations between learning, growth of knowledge and innovation 
Source: Johnson (1992, p. 33) 
 
This thesis investigates in particular the role of institutional actors as influencing factors to 
economic change. This focus is to be seen in this respect on changing perceptions, which may 
entails efforts towards a new vision, the realisation of lock-in, an analysis of the status quo 
and shortcomings, external independent advice, and a consensus on the way forward between 
the main actors within the economic system. 
 
‘Innovation is considered as an interactive, cumulative, and path-dependent process, 
unfolding along technological trajectories (Arthur, 1994; Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg, 
& Soete, 1988)’, thus also being a ‘historic and geographical process having a structure both 
in time and space (see also Capello, 1999)’ – as Tödtling (1999, p. 693) summarises (similarly 
to Morgan, 2001a, p. 6).  
 
The thesis turns to consideration of the rationale for the growing focus on the region. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RESURGENCE OF REGIONS  
Linked to the emergence of innovation at the forefront of academic research and policy focus 
for regional economic development is the increasing importance that is given to the concept 
of the region. This chapter looks at regionalisation and regional governance. It argues that the 
region is the location to drive innovation as innovation is viewed here as being 
‘geographically localised’. Therefore, it elaborates the rationales behind the ‘resurgence’ of 
the region including those that led to a ‘geographical turn’ in Economics.  
 
The concepts of region, regionalisation and regionalism 
The term region is ambiguous as it is used for supranational, national and subnational 
territorial areas alike, even though it is probably mostly used for supralocal geographical areas 
that are bigger than urban areas (Schätzl, 2001, p. 99) and less than the state in which it exists 
(Cooke, 1997, p. 354).48 The ambiguity is illustrated by Blotevogel (2000, p. 496) description, 
who sees the region as a ‘multi-dimensional semantic field’ with ‘fuzzy edges’ and ‘multi-
dimensional meaning’ (cf. Herrschel & Newman, 2002, p. 13). Its definition very much 
depends upon the problem one encounters (Jovanovic, 1997, p. 292) and hence there is ‘no 
general understanding of how to define a region (Harvie, 1994)’ as Cooke & Memedovic 
(2003, p. 3) write (and cf. Lovering, 1999, p. 383). A region is basically an geographical area 
that in terms of at least one specific feature (i.e. geographical, functional, social or cultural 
reasons) is considered as a unit (Collins, 1994, p. 1305). Accordingly, delimitations of regions 
                                                 
48 The different size of nations and regions add to the ambiguity of the concept of a region. For example, a 
German federal State such as North Rhine-Westphalia is regarded – here and elsewhere – as a region, even 
though in terms of population and economic output it is equal to countries such like Australia and the 
Netherlands. 
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often differ depending on which is highlighted: the homogeneity, e.g. in terms of per-capita 
income (cf. Jovanovic, 1997, p. 292); the functional relationships and thus intraregional 
interdependencies (A. J. Scott & Storper, 2003, p. 580); or the political and administrative 
planning unit of regions (cf. Schätzl, 2001, p. 99).49 Martin (1999, pp. 77-78) has criticised 
the lack of consideration of ‘how “regional” and “local” economies can be meaningful 
conceptualised, and how such conceptions can be translated into empirical terms’. He 
condemns the ‘cavalier’ treatment of space and place by adding that ‘[i]nstead, there is an 
ontological slippage between regions as abstract points and spaces [in the mathematical 
models], on the one hand, and the uncritical use of whatever administrative units happen to be 
convenient for illustrative and empirical purposes on the other.’ 
 
Accordingly, the term region has different interpretations and its conceptualisation also found 
different applications, for example, with the two derived terms of regionalisation and 
regionalism (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraphs d. and 2.7 on pp. 5 and 14; Collins, 1994, p. 1305; 
Cooke, 1997, p. 354), which are briefly introduced here.50 Regionalisation describes the top-
down process of creating regions and regional governance, which can either take place in 
                                                 
49 Scott & Storper (2003, p. 580) define the term region as ‘any area of subnational extent that is functionally 
organized around some internal central pole’. Furthermore, regions can also be differentiated in terms of their 
institutional environments in the framework of evolutionary economics, as Boschma (2004, p. 1005) indicates 
with his definition of the ‘region (at whatever spatial level) as a meaningful and relevant entity that affects the 
behaviour and performance of local organizations’. Cooke (1998, p. 15) also states that ‘[c]onceptually, regions 
are often defined in terms of shared normative interests (cultural areas), economic specificity (mono-industrial 
economies) and administrative homogeneity (governance areas). To these may be added such criteria as non-
specific size, except that of being subcentral in relation to its host state; identifiable homogeneity in terms of 
criteria such as geography, political allegiance and cultural or industrial mix; ability to be distinguished form 
other areas in terms of these criteria; and possession of some combination of internal cohesion characteristics.’ In 
his introduction of the concept of regional innovation systems, Cooke (1998, p. 16 ) actually defines ‘regions in 
terms of a system of collective order’ similar to A.J. Scott’s (1998a) discussion, and ‘as subcentral 
administratively and cohesive culturally, and in terms of political economy’(ibid., p. 24 ). 
50 Please note though that the meaning of these terms here need to be distinguished from the terminology used in 
other disciplines. With regards to international relations, for example, regionalisation refers to the concentration 
of international transactions between national entities in terms of trade, migration, communication and so on, 
while regionalism defines the institutional amalgamation of states to supranational entities for a particular or 
more fields of policy, mainly trade (Hummel & Menzel, 2004, pp. 422-423). Accordingly, the term regionalism 
is also defined as ‘preferential trade agreement among a subset of nations’ (Bhagwati, 1993, p. 22) and thus 
contrasts the terms of nationalism (or re-nationalisation) and globalism (globalisation). 
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form of a devolution of political power and administrative responsibility to self-governing 
autonomous regional states (‘political regionalisation’) or - tentatively weaker - ‘only’ as a 
functional decentralisation with a re-allocation of administrative resources to regional bodies, 
which fulfil a co-ordinating or administrative role (‘regional decentralisation’).51  
 
Regionalisation and regional governments vary greatly internationally and range between the 
two extreme forms of ‘unitary states (with, at most, central administrative functions 
undertaken at the regional level), to federal states, where regions have budgetary and 
legislative powers and directly elected parliaments’ (Barter, 2000, paragraph 2.7 on p. 14, 
emphasis added, and cf. Table 1 and 2 on pp. 33  and 35). Cooke (1997, pp. 354-355) 
describes regions in general as weak when they either operate ‘in a laissez faire or 
nightwatchman state’ such as contemporary USA, or in a unitary ‘dirigiste state like 
contemporary France or England’, while he views regions or regional governments as 
stronger which operate in states ‘where centralized sovereignty and hierarchy are low’. Latter 
includes the contemporary German Länder that are characterised as heterogeneous, 
competitive and pluralistic, as well as homogeneous regions that are characterised as 
associational and well networked, such as Catalonia in Spain.52 However, there can also still 
                                                 
51 Barter (2000, paragraph 2.7 on p. 14) reiterates the broad dichotomy between ‘regional decentralisation’ and 
‘political regionalisation’ referring to the Council of Europe (1998). Cooke (1997, p. 354) defines 
regionalization as ‘the delimitation of a supralocal territory by a superordinate political body’. This process can 
either take place in form of ‘devolving functions down or transferring responsibilities upwards’ (cf. Barter, 2000, 
paragraphs 3.8-3.10 on pp. 22-23 and 6.8 on p. 36). In other words, this means that some administrative 
responsibilities or powers are either taken away from the supraordinate (e.g. national) level or from the local 
level (cf. Morgan, 2002, pp. 805-807). Keating (1998, p. 2) instead labels the political and administrative 
decentralization by the state as ‘top-down regionalism’, as opposed to the bottom-up regionalism, which stems 
from pressures from below.  
52 In this respect, Cooke provides (1997, pp. 355-356) the Four Motors Regions of Lombardy, Rhône-Alpes, 
Baden-Württemberg, and Catalonia as regional examples (in this respective order). Cooke’s four-fold typology 
of conceptualisations of regions (1997, see Figure 1 on p. 355) is somewhat similar to the typology of forms of 
regional government presented by Barter (2000, see Table 1 on p. 33 and Table 2 on p. 35), who distinguishes 
between federal states with wide-ranging powers; regionalised states with advanced powers (political 
regionalisation); devolving unitary states with limited powers (regional decentralisation); and finally classic 
unitary states with no powers (latter meaning ‘regionalising without creating a regional level’). 
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exist important intrastate differences between regional governments (cf. Keating, 1998, p. 8). 
While, for example among the German Länder, Baden-Württemberg is seen to be more 
centralist, North Rhine-Westphalia is reported to regard regional policy more a sub-Land 
matter (Sturm, 1997). 
 
Correspondingly, regionalism describes the rather bottom-up advocacy, ideology or political 
call or for such a process of creating regions and regional autonomy. The term does therefore 
refer here also to ‘regional patriotism’ (Collins, 1994, p. 1305) and separatist endeavours at 
the sub-national level, such as in the Basque country, Catalonia, Corsica, Scotland, 
Lombardy, Quebec and so on (Hummel & Menzel, 2004, pp. 422-423). 
 
Distinguishing regional governance from government 
In this context, a distinction has also to be made between government and governance, used 
here mostly for the regional level. In contrast to the traditional notion of formal institutions of 
government, governance is understood here as a wider concept, which comprises the 
government sphere - of control, exercising political authority, or the action governing, 
political rule and administration (cf. Collins, 1994, p. 669) - but also goes beyond it by 
including the wider collective actions within flexible, self-regulating networks of actors from 
public-private partnerships, associations and so on (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraph 2.4 on p. 13; 
Herrschel & Newman, 2002, pp. 12-13; Keating, 1998, p. 3). According to Le Galès & 
Voelzkow (2001, pp. 5-6), ‘“[g]overnance” refers to the entirety of institutions which co-
ordinate or regulate action or transaction among (economic) subjects within an (economic) 
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system (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997b; Hollingsworth et al., 1994; Streeck & Schmitter, 
1985)’.53 
 
The rise of regional governance 
Overall, international evidence shows that there has been both ‘a rise of regional governance’ 
and an ‘emergence of regional government’ (Barter, 2000, paragraphs 2.4 on p. 13, 6.8-6.9 on 
p. 36 and cf. 1.3 on p. 11). Arguably, one of the most prominent examples is the UK with the 
devolution of political powers (political regionalisation) in Scotland and Wales and 
administrative regional decentralisation in England with the incremental creation of 
Government Offices (GOs), Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and Regional 
Assemblies. 
  
                                                 
53 There are, however, several distinct definitions of the concept of governance in the various fields of social 
science. Rhodes (1996, p. 652) has, for example, identified six different meanings: ‘the minimal State, corporate 
governance, new public management, good governance, social-cybernetic systems and self-organised networks’.  
In comparison, for instance, [European] ‘“Governance” means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way 
in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence’ - according to the European Commission’s (2001b, p. 8) White Paper on European 
Governance. Even though that these principles of good governance are outlined with particular regards to 
European Governance, it was actually stressed that they ‘apply to all levels of government - global, European, 
national, regional and local’ (European Commission, 2001b, p.10). These five principles are further linked to the 
three fundamental principles of the European Union, namely the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality, which ought to be considered before launching any European initiatives (European Commission, 
2001b, pp. 10-11). See also the European Commission’s website on ‘Governance’ in this respect at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/index_en.htm 
These three fundamental principles are enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. The Treaty states that from conception to implementation of policies, the European Union ‘shall act 
within the limits of the competences [or powers] conferred upon it by the Member States’ (principle of 
conferral) as well as that the appropriate level at which action is taken (from EU to local) and the appropriate 
instruments in proportion to the objectives must be selected. To elaborate on the latter two, this means that the 
European Union shall act ‘only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States’ but can rather ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved’ at union level (principle of subsidiarity, see also footnote 56). Further, it means that the content and 
form of Union action ‘shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty’ (principle of 
proportionality). 
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The rationale behind the rise of regionalisation 
There are a number of reasons given in the literature for the resurgence of the region and the 
call for regional government. Supporters of the thesis of the re-scaling of the nation-state such 
as Marks (e.g. Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996) and Hooghe (1995) postulated the emergence 
of a system of multi-level governance (MLG) with overlapping spheres of political control at 
the various spatial levels (local, regional, national, supranational) in the wake of progressing 
globalisation and European integration, which provided sub-national authorities with a new 
set of opportunities (cf. Giordano & Roller, 2003, pp. 912-914).54 While Giordano & Roller 
(2003, p. 913) identify these ‘windows of opportunities’ (cf. also A. J. Scott, 1998b, p. 392) 
within the economic, institutional and political spheres, Barter’s review (2000, section f on p. 
6 and paragraphs 2.11-2.35 on pp. 15-20), for example, rather identifies four underlying key 
arguments (together with counter-arguments) for developing a regional tier of government: 
democratic arguments, economic imperative arguments, European imperative arguments, and 
technocratic (functional) arguments.55 These arguments partly cut across the different spheres 
and are briefly covered below - starting with the democratic or political rationales behind 
regionalisation. 
                                                 
54 Rodriguez-Pose (2001, p. 27) describes the greater complexity of multiple governance levels strikingly as a 
Russian Doll. He subtly states the following: ‘Different territorial levels of economic and institutional 
governance are like a Russian matriushka, with local levels of governance embedded in regional, and these, in 
turn, in national and supranational levels. All are interdependent and interrelated.’  
55 The author wants to recommend the well-balanced preliminary literature review on the potential form, and 
remit, of ‘Regional Government in England’ compiled by Wendy Russell Barter from the Local & Regional 
Government Research Unit at the Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions (DETR) as a 
useful starting point for further study into this debate. The review (Barter, 2000) was published by the DETR in 
2000 and is available online directly at http://www.local.dter.gov.uk/research/data/review.pdf via 
http://www.local.detr.gov.uk/research/research.htm or http://www.local.detr.gov.uk/research/regngovn.htm . 
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The democratic or political arguments for regionalisation 
 
First of all, regional differences in identity, tradition, and needs and subsequent regionalism 
are the obvious arguments for creating a regional forum of expression and democratic 
reflection below the national level (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraphs 2.14 and 2.18 on pp. 15-16). 
However, the drive for regionalisation does not nor has to only come from regionalism. 
Indeed, sometimes regions or regional governments are even created without consideration of 
the demos, or the existence of a coherent regional identity (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraph 4.3 on 
p. 28). Artificially created regions such as the German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia have 
shown that, despite the lack of a pre-existing regional identity, they can maintain a coherent 
modern political identity. Hence, a regional identity is not necessarily a pre-requisite to 
regionalisation (ibid., paragraph p. on p. 8). 
 
Still, among the most common arguments put forward for political regionalisation (and 
consequent devolution of administrative responsibility) are that regional governments are 
more likely and suited to deliver better governance, especially in terms of more 
‘accountability, democracy and greater efficiency’ (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraphs 2.15 on p. 16; 
Straw, 1995). Jones (1988, p. 5), however, sees regional government as having the potential to 
weaken the role of municipalities and therefore it does not represent ‘genuine 
decentralisation’ but rather centralism in disguise (cf. also Barter, 2000, paragraph 2.17 on p. 
16; Morgan, 2002, p. 805).  
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The European-led push for regionalisation 
 
Linked to the democratic arguments in favour of devolving decision-making to the regional 
level is the so-called ‘European imperative’ (Barter, 2000, paragraphs f on p. 6 and 2.30-2.32 
on pp. 19-20). At supranational level of policy-making and implementation within the EU, 
regional governance is to be seen as a requirement under the principle of subsidiarity56, while 
regional governments appear to be the favoured interaction partner of the European 
institutions in an envisaged rhetoric of a ‘federated “Europe of the Regions”’ (Amin, 1993, p. 
278).57 This European-led push for regionalisation concerns most notably the access and 
control of regionally-steered programming, implementation and administering of the EU 
Structural Funds’ regional assistance - in particular of its European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF).58 
 
However, the impact of regional influencing of EU decision-making remains marginal (cf. 
also Barter, 2000, paragraph 2.31 on p. 19), or limited at best, since the national level retains 
its dominance. With respect to international relations in general, and the contested sphere of 
implementing EU regional policy in particular - especially within the UK - Bache (1999, pp. 
28-29) describes the role of central governments as that of an ‘extended gatekeeper’, thus 
                                                 
56 The principle of subsidiarity (see also footnote 53) stands for the principle of devolving decisions to the lowest 
appropriate level. The principle has its origins in the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, according to 
which all social bodies exist for the sake of the individual so that what individuals are able to do, society should 
not take over, and what small societies can do, larger societies should not take over (Collins, 1994, p. 1538). 
Within the EU, this principle is enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
which will becomes Article I-11 of the European Constitution, if entered into force (see the current and proposed 
legal texts, which are available at http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm).  
57 Besides defining the term Europe of the regions as ‘to encourage regional independence’ and referring to 
regionalisation, Amin (1993, p. 279) also provides the alternative interpretations of ‘encouraging regional 
cultural diversity’ and ‘eliminating regional economic disparities’. In his paper, Amin (1993, p. 293) actually 
concludes that the ‘Brussels vision of a return to regional economies will remain an illusion’.  
58 Bache (1999, p. 35) points out that the ‘creation of regional partnerships for the administering of the Structural 
Funds in 1998 was an attempt by the European Commission’ – even though rather unsuccessfully as he argues 
with regards to the UK – ‘to empower subnational actors at the expense of national government domination over 
the implementation process’. 
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taking a intergovernmentalist position. As a result, he opposes Gary Marks’ (e.g. Marks et al., 
1996, p. 342) pluralist concept of ‘multi-level governance’ by instead suggesting rather the 
mere presence of ‘multi-level participation’.59 
 
The drive for better governance 
 
The European-led drive to regionalisation does not only stem from the argument for more 
democratic governance but also from the ‘separate demand for more effective governance’ - 
which it is ‘all too often confused with’ (Morgan, 2002, p. 804). At the core of this demand 
lies the understanding that the intermediate tier of regional government, or otherwise 
strengthened regional governance structures, ‘will empower regions to pursue their own 
development goals’ (Amin, 1993, p. 279) and the believe that this is the best option in terms 
of efficiency and effectiveness. This view prevails even though the consequent interregional 
competition may come with some potentially counter-productive effect with regards to 
regional inequality as already ‘winning’ regions are likely to be better prepared and endowed 
for the competition (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraphs 2.27-2.28 on pp. 18-19).60 
 
                                                 
59 Even though the nation state may yet remain dominant (at supranational level) and the proclaimed ‘death of 
the nation state’ by functionalists (cf. Meyers, 2004b, p. 508) be exacerbated, the argument that some of the 
classical national state functions have become eroded and the traditional concepts of state and nation have begun 
to change and fade can hardly be disputed (cf. Marks et al., 1996, p. 371). This is the result of ever closer and 
complex international relations and consequently overlapping network of international and transnational 
organisations (e.g. with the accelerated process towards European Integration). Among others, Charles, Perry, & 
Benneworth (1996, p. 5) have recognised, for example, the shift towards multi-scalar science policy in the UK 
context. They rightly point out that science policy is no longer solely a matter of national policy but of regional 
and supra-national (e.g. EU) policy too. 
60 Not only may the different regional endowments and readiness for global competition become more 
transparent but also the apparent overall aim conflict at superior levels between the diverging objectives of 
balancing disparities (and helping less favoured regions catching up) on one side, and supporting advancing 
growth centres (which are in global excellence competition with the USA and Japan for example) on the other. 
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On the other hand, the local level is also seen as not being suitable to drive economic 
development. Instead, the regional level is advocated in performing the ‘brokerage role’ (cf. 
Barter, 2000, paragraphs f on p. 6 and 2.29 on p. 19). Supposedly, larger-scale regional 
authorities are functionally better endowed with the necessary competencies (than local 
authorities) to deal with the complex cross-cutting issues of strategic functions that, for 
example, are linked to economic development. Parr (2005, p. 556) also declares that the city 
too ‘is becoming something of an outmoded entity’, which ‘is emerging as an inappropriate 
unit, both for analysis and for local administration/government, in as much as it no longer 
adequately reflects the underlying structure of economic and social organization’.61 The 
traditional economic rationale for considering the city (or urban agglomeration) as a key locus 
(e.g. for its localization advantages as elaborated in the next section) is hence apparently 
becoming insufficient.  
 
In theory, this should facilitate the capacity and flexibility to adjust to economic and social 
changes and to create decentralised innovative capacity (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraph 2.24 on p. 
18; Morgan, 2002, p. 801). In line with the innovation systems theory which is discussed later 
(from p. 82 onwards), Barter (2000, paragraph 2.24 on p. 18) point outs that ‘[e]mpirical 
evidence suggests that institutional capacity – the extent and form of regional organisations – 
plays an important role within the economic development trajectory of regions.’  
 
However, it is important to stress that regional governance structures are one important 
influencing factor, but it is far from being a sufficient one (cf. Barter, 2000, paragraph 2.26 on 
                                                 
61 Parr (2005, p. 556) elaborates this point with reference to Senior (1966) by stating that the city ‘boundary, 
even if generously drawn, has lost much of its former significance, particularly with respect to the functioning of 
the housing market and the labour market, as well as the spatial structure of private and public service 
provision’. 
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p. 18; Morgan, 2002, pp. 801-804). For once, other regions may attempt to imitate successful 
structures, but foremost, at the end of the day, it is businesses that create economic 
development not policy, which can only support it.  
 
Governance versus government 
 
Finally, while the above stated arguments provide for a clear rationale for regionalisation, the 
case for regional government as opposed to regional governance remains at least contested. 
Here, the view is nevertheless taken that there is a value-added by the creation or existence of 
an intermediate level of regional government, despite the doubts raised by Jones (1988). Some 
benefits could stem, for example, from the added accountability and from the at least potential 
disadvantages of governance, which according to Keating (1998, p. 8) ‘represents a poorly 
structured space in which those interests with a minimal of organizational capacity have a 
huge advantage over other social interests, with no organizational capacity at all (cf. Stone, 
1989).’ 
 
However, this thesis argues that the key to strategic planning and business superstructure 
being efficient, effective and innovative, rests not solely with government, but in contrary is 
mostly distinguished by the dynamics within the wider institutional framework of governance, 
both at regional and local level. The extent and peculiarities of the institutional diversity and 
interactions and its effects form the core of later discussions below. 
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New Regionalism and the regionalisation of policies and institutions  
The rise of regionalisation is very much linked to the resurgence of interest in conceptualising 
economic development at the regional level. Both can actually be seen as mutually reinforcing 
parallel trends. One provides the incentive or argument for the other, and they both should be 
viewed in each other’s context.  
 
While the arguments presented in the previous section may serve as practical political 
justifications for demanding or initiating a process towards regional governance (including 
economic development policy), the following section instead provides arguments in favour of 
(re-)considering the region as the key locus for analysing economic development – mainly 
stemming from the concepts of the New Economic Geography. If one agrees with such an 
argumentation of a hierarchy of regional economies, or in other words believes that 
understanding how the economy works is best conceptualised at the regional level, then this 
can serve too as an argument for regional governance and as regarding the region as a level of 
economic policy-making (Storper, 1995, p. 192). To explain this ‘new regionalism’ 
(Lovering, 1999), if most of the determining factors for economic growth are seen to be at 
regional level, then it can consequently also be argued that economic development policies – 
if advocated - should intervene and be governed at the same level.62 Yet, the emphasis is 
placed upon ‘can argue’ as this proposed implication contains some complacency of a 
‘normative bias’ (cf. Keating, 1998, pp. 3-4; Lovering, 1999, p. 380) which forms part of the 
critique brought forward against ‘new regionalism’. 
 
                                                 
62 In contrast, Lovering instead argues the other way, that theory was mislead by policy  
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For instance, Lovering (1999) has provided - what can only be called - a ferocious attack on 
‘new regionalism’ and some its advocates.63 He regards (ibid., p. 390) the growth of New 
Regionalism in large parts as a response to the rise of a ‘new regional service class’ and 
‘symbolic analysis’ of issues in particular regions (e.g. Wales), hence suggesting that theory 
was [mis]led by policy (cf. also Lagendijk, 2001, pp. 151-155) – as his article’s title hints.64 
He illustrates this with a vivid though singular account of the impact that the ‘catchy tunes’ of 
a Cardiff Conference (subsidized by the marketing endeavours of economic development 
organizations and policy-makers to talk up their region) had on the empirical error of 
subsequent reporting of an allegedly successful Welsh ‘economic transformation’. 
 
The subsequent reaction or response on the policy side to the conceptualisations of regional 
economic development can be regarded as the third ‘regional shift’ besides the political 
(governance) shift and the conceptual shift to be covered in the following section. This third 
shift in practical policy endeavours towards the regional level is a reflection of both the 
awareness of the relevance of regional dynamics in industrial organization as well as of the 
importance of regional governance structures. Recent policy trends include the 
regionalisation of economic and innovation strategies and policies, i.e. initiatives, projects, 
and programmes that are specific to, subsumed and geared towards the regional level (see 
Dohse, 2001; Hassink, 1992, pp. 153 and 158; Heinze & Voelzkow, 1997; Klee & 
Kirchmann, 1998; Koschatzky, 2000, 2003; Lompe, Blöcker, Lux, & Syring, 1996; Raines, 
                                                 
63 Confer also Lagendijk’s (1997b; 2001) somewhat similar stance on this. 
64 Lovering (1999, p. 392) appears to see the construction of new regional structures under the New Regionalism 
only as a ‘guise’ for top-down policies of the competitiveness agenda ‘to dismantle national redistributive 
structures and hollow out the democratic content of economic governance’, which are to be replaced by inter 
regional competition. If he would not have not added ‘unwittingly’, one could have got the impression that he 
talks about a conspiracy. 
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2002a, p. 33; Raines, 2002b, p. 159; Sturm, 1997; Waniek, 1993, p. 469)65, and the support of 
the creation of further regional institutional structures in the area of economic development 
(e.g. set-up of regional development agencies or boards to drive economic and innovation 
strategies) – often with supranational support from the EU.66 Regarding the latter aspect of 
institutional regionalisation, Lovering (1999, p. 390) provides some interesting crude 
statistics on the proliferation of organizations of regional economic governance: 
 
In Britain, for example, there were barely a dozen agencies formally charged with 
local economic development in the early 1980s. Now [in 1999] there are several 
hundred, including over 400 local authorities, 80 training and enterprise councils, 
numerous enterprise agencies, innovation support units, technology-transfer bodies 
and so on. World-wide there were perhaps four hundred regional development 
agencies in the mid-1980s; now there are at least ten times as many. (Lovering, 1999, 
p. 390)  
 
                                                 
65 Lompe, Blöcker, Lux, & Syring (1996) conclude in their case study, for example, that the regionalisation of 
economic development and structural policies provided the basis for the innovation strategy of the Lower 
Saxony region in Germany being modelled as a transport competency region in the 1990s. They also placed 
special attention upon the regional development agency ‘reson’ within their analysis of the region, in which the 
automotive manufacturer Volkswagen (VW) is a dominant factor of the economic production regime. 
In addition, Klee & Kirchmann (1998) also report that the process of a regionalisation of structural policies 
constituted a paradigm change in regional policies. Furthermore, Raines (2002b, p. 159) reports of cases of 
cluster development, namely in Limburg, País Vasco, Scotland and Styria, that ‘could be said to be part of a 
regionalised industrial policy’, while making out ‘a clear trend towards the decentralisation of regional 
development-policy-making’ (Raines, 2002a, p. 33). Koschatzky (2003) also identifies a ‘regionalisation of 
innovation policy’. Finally, Waniek (1993, p. 469 in particular) further describes developments towards a 
‘decentralization of economic development policies’ in North Rhine-Westphalia, while Hassink (1992, pp. 153 
and 158) speaks about ‘regionalisation of innovation policies’ within this German State that has had a ‘positive 
impact’. 
66 The EU, for example, has supported the forming of ‘Regional Technology Plans’ (RTPs), ‘Regional 
Innovation Strategies’ (RIS), and ‘Regional Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures’ (RITTS) 
including regional institution-building since 1994 as well as more recently encouraged regional knowledge 
transfer among local innovation stakeholders via the PAXIS programme under FP6 since 1999, and regional 
knowledge development models towards ‘regions of knowledge’ (Know-REF) since 2004 in order to promote 
regional economic development. 
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However, building up regional governance capacity does not just rely on creating institutional 
structures such as civic assemblies, integrated regional offices, regional development agencies 
and so on, but also very much relies on the way how these institutions are build. Amin & 
Thrift (1995, p. 56) stress in this respect that an ‘open, inclusive way’ is ‘more important […] 
than the actual institutions themselves’. The underlying dynamics of this process is elaborated 
in more detail later on when the institutionalist perspective is presented. 
 
The rediscovery of the regional economy 
The interest in regional governance accompanies the growth in conceptualising economic 
development at the regional level and is an undeniable essential contributor to the ‘regional 
salience’ (cf. Lagendijk, 2001, p. 139); although  critical explanatory ‘stories’ have been put 
forward (Lagendijk, 1997b, 2001; Lovering, 1999). Indeed, the editors of Regional Studies 
state in their special issue ‘Rethinking the Regions’ (Vol. 37, Issue 6&7) that it might be 
argued that we have entered ‘the new age of regions’ and that ‘it seems that regions have re-
emerged as key arenas of socio-economic life’ - ‘as the industrial economy has rapidly given 
way to the rise of a “knowledge-driven”, service-orientated, information- or post-industrial 
globalized economy’ (The Editors [of Regional Studies], 2003, p. 545).  
 
The geographical turn by the concepts of the New Economic Geography 
The rationale behind this ‘hierarchy of regions’, for example, (Hassink, 1992, p. 11) has its 
roots in the striking empirical feature that not only regional economic development in general 
is uneven, but also that the economic activity of many specialized industries is geographically 
concentrated (or clustered) in particular locations.67  
                                                 
67 For instance, Knox & Agnew (1998) provide a comprehensive historical overview of the rise of core 
economies in part 2 (chapters 4-7) of their book on the Geography of the World Economy. 
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However, it was in particular the empirical rediscovery in the 1980s – e.g. by Piore & Sabel 
(1984) and others (see J. M. Simmie, 2001, p. 23) - of ‘new industrial spaces’ (Benko & 
Dunford, 1991; A. J. Scott, 1988) and successful neo-Marshallian industrial districts (cf. 
Harrison, 1992; Landabaso, 1996, p. 5; Le Galès & Voelzkow, 2001, p. 10; Ron Martin, 1999, 
p. 71; Park, 1995; Storper, 1995, p. 193) in the ‘most civic regions’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 97)68 of 
the so-called ‘Third Italy’ (notably Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna), and in southern Germany 
(with Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg), that contributed to the revival of interest in the 
traditional conceptual models of industrial agglomeration and theories of business location 
concerning the organizational dynamics of firms in space (industrial organization). These 
‘dense vertically disintegrated districts […] were said to be manifestations of a resurgence of 
the region as the centre of “post Fordist”, “flexible”, “learning-based”, production systems’ as 
Storper (1995, pp. 191-192) reports. 69 
 
The rise in conceptualising economic development at the regional level emanates from a 
‘geographical turn’ in economics (Ron Martin, 1999, p. 67) that is foremost associated with 
the ‘new economic geography’ and its rediscovery of increasing returns and spatial 
agglomeration.  
 
                                                 
68 Putnam (1993, p. 97) describes Italy’s ‘most civic regions’ such as Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany – in contrast 
to ‘hierarchical patron-client networks’ - as strong civic communities in which ‘citzens are actively involved in 
all sorts of local associations –literary guilds, local bands, hunting clubs, cooperatives and so on. 
69 Webb & Collis (2000, pp. 857-858) comment in this respect more critically - on what Lovering (1999, p. 380) 
calls ‘the historico-empirical claim that “the region” is becoming the “crucible” of economic development’ - by 
stating the following: ‘This [‘supposed transition from Fordism to post-Fordism’ with the ‘prolonged 
accumulation crisis of the 1970s’] signalled the re-emergence of “the region” as, conceptually, the system of 
flexible specialization encouraged spatial clustering and integration at the regional level whilst, empirically, the 
most dynamic post-Fordist economies just so happened to be those regions or “new industrial spaces” (A. J. 
Scott, 1988) which had successfully responded to the crisis of Fordism by adopting the system of flexible 
specialization (Sabel, 1994).’ 
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Traditional location and agglomeration theory towards the industrial organisation of the 
Marshallian industrial districts 
 
According to Alfred Weber’s (1909; 1929) traditional Theory of the Location of Industries 
(cf. also Grichting, 1976, p. 44; Kappler & Rehkugler, 1991, pp. 220 following; Schätzl, 
2001, pp. 37-48; Wienert, 1998, p. 39), there are three main factors that influence production 
costs and hence a firm’s constituent decision where to (optimally) locate: above all 
transportation costs (see also Isard, 1956, 1960), but also labour costs, and agglomeration 
advantages and disadvantages.70 
 
It should be noted, however, that localized industries also give rise to some agglomeration 
disadvantages (negative externalities) with ‘centrifugal force’ (Fujita & Krugman, 2004, p. 
156) that can negate the above-listed advantages of agglomeration. Marshall pointed already 
(1947, pp. 272-273) to increasing factor prices (i.e. wages and office spaces) and housing 
prices (for workers) as examples, but they also comprise pollution, traffic congestion and so 
on.71 
 
Turok (2004, p. 1075) describes these agglomeration economies as the classical concept that 
‘emphasizes the “positive externalities”, or external economies of scale, scope and 
complexity, that follow from co-location of many businesses’. Here, businesses gain 
                                                 
70 A wider selection of location factors that feature in the literature would include issues concerning land, 
property and buildings; raw materials, operating resources and manufacturing supplies; finance, taxation and 
subsidies; and regulations. One should not forget in this respect that the choice of location for firms is a complex 
problem since it is a constituent decision, which is difficult to revise and which has far- and long-reaching 
consequences (Kappler & Rehkugler, 1991, p. 217). 
71 From the subjective viewpoint of an individual business, one could superficially or wrongly add the factor 
‘increasing competition’ to this list. However, in the long run, increasing competition is not only conducive to 
the aggregated economy from an Schumpeterian perspective but most likely also to the individual business – as 
it may spur it on to innovate and prevent it from becoming complacent. 
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advantages from localization and urbanization economies that are external to the individual 
firm. Regarding the first, advantages stem from a ‘specialized’ infrastructure, services and 
skills concerning specific sectors, while latter economies derive from ‘generalized’ urban 
assets such as the all-important classical motorway access 72, airports (of particular relevance 
to MNCs), educational institutions such as universities (as the new ‘must have’ for regions 
(Charles, Perry, & Benneworth, 2004; Kanter, 1995) in attracting inward investment) and so 
on, that serve all industries (Turok, 2004, p. 1076).73 More lately, universities and public and 
private research institutions have gained in importance as determining factors of localization 
and regional economic development not only because they are a potential source of 
knowledge spillovers but also because, as educational institutions, they create the absorptive 
capacity within firms (cf. Schätzl, 2001, p. 228). 
 
Krugman’s New Economic Geography 
 
According to Krugman (1991, pp. 8-9),  ‘space matters’ and therefore, there is a need ‘ to 
bring geography back into economic analysis’. The most significant argument for the 
(re)discovery of regional economies in the recent body of literature is that ‘[r]egional 
comparisons offer a huge, almost untapped source of evidence about how our economy really 
                                                 
72 In deed, access to the transport network represents one of the infrastructure factors (cf. Schierenbeck, 1999, 
pp. 43-44), which affects competition and thus attractiveness of a location for investment. It is not only one of 
the most important components for transportation costs and delivery times (‘just-in-time’) in terms of 
distribution location, but it also affects the location’s potential supply of human resources in terms of catchment 
population (cf. Schierenbeck, 1999, pp. 19-32). Therefore, it is not surprising that ‘highway accessibility’ was 
most frequently identified to be an ‘important’ site selection factor according to the 1998 US Corporate Opinion 
Survey with 288 respondents by the Area Development Magazine, December 1998, pp. 40-82, as quoted in 
KPMG’s (1999, p. 57) report ‘The Competitive Alternatives – A comparison of business costs in North America, 
Europe and Japan’. In total, 91.5% of respondents considered the factor ‘highway access’ to be either ‘very 
important’ or ‘important’. 
73 See Porter’s distinction between ‘generalized’ and ‘advanced’ factors.  
 60 
works’ (1991, p. 99), hence providing an ‘intellectual and empirical laboratory’ (ibid. 1991, 
pp. 8-9) - as Krugman writes in his Lecture Series on Geography and Trade. 
 
Besides the externalities and increasing returns from the inherent advantages of specialization 
(comparative advantage in inter-industry trade), Krugman (1991, p. 11) also makes out 
transportation costs and market demand as driving forces for the ‘cumulative process of 
regional divergence’.74 He (1991, p. 26) also states in this respect that ‘[t]he circular 
relationship in which the location of demand determines the location of production, and vice 
versa, can be a deeply conservative force, tending to lock into place any established center-
periphery pattern.’  
 
Similarly, Porter (1998b, pp. 73 and 124-125) also believes that ‘chance events’ play an 
important role in the emergence of successful industries and in shifting competitive advantage 
within industries.75 In this respect, Krugman (1991, p. 64), for example, emphasises non-high-
technology factors (research park, venture capital) in the agglomerative process of high-
technology clusters. This view that allows for considerable uncertainty and suboptimal 
patterns (cf. Ron Martin, 1999, p. 70) with multiple equilibriums. 
 
                                                 
74 Fujita & Krugman (2004, p. 156) also present a list of forces affecting geographical concentration (centripetal 
forces) and dispersion (centrifugal forces). These forces go back to Nobel Prize Laureate Gunnar Myrdal’s 
(1957) notion of ‘backwash effects’ and ‘spread effects’, respectively (cf. Schätzl, 2001, p. 163). Swedish 
Gunnar Myrdal and Austria-born UK citizen Friedrich August von Hayek jointly received the Sveriges Riksbank 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1974 “for their pioneering work in the theory of 
money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social 
and institutional phenomena”. See http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1974/index.html 
75 Accordingly, ‘chance’ represents one of two additional variables that influence Porter’s interactive ‘diamond’ 
system of national advantage Porter (1998b, p. 124) lists the following important examples of ‘chance events’ 
that can influence competitive advantage: acts of pure innovation, major technological discontinuities (for 
example, biotechnology, microelectronics), discontinuities in input costs such as the oil shocks, significant shifts 
in world financial markets or exchange rates, surges of world or regional demand, political decisions by foreign 
governments, and wars. Regarding latter, the Greek philosopher Heraklit of Ephesus, for example, expressed his 
understanding of changeability with the phrase ‘war is the father of all things’ (Microsoft Corporation & 
Bibliographisches Institut & F.A. Brockhaus AG, 1995). 
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However, as Martin (1999, p. 76) criticizes, ‘the treatment of history in the new economic 
geography is more metaphorical than real’. It inadequately theorises (cf. also Amin, 1999, p. 
368) the degree and pattern of ‘path dependence’ as a kind of sequence of parameter 
outcomes, thereby neglecting the - what Krugman calls - ‘messy’ factors that influence 
agglomeration advantages and spatial economic development, namely the ‘real, complex, 
locally-embedded and emergent socio-historical process of technological, institutional and 
social evolution’ (Ron Martin, 1999, pp. 75-76). 76 
 
Porter’s regional shift 
 
Besides Krugman (1991, p. 99), Porter (1994, p. 38; 1998a, pp. 228-230; 1998b, p. 158; 2003, 
p. 550) has also stressed specifically the enhanced economic importance of the regional level 
in order to understand how and, in particular, why industries move to and succeed in 
particular places. 
 
While acknowledging the importance of geographic concentration, Porter himself raises the 
question whether the nation is the relevant unit of analysis already in his earlier work (1990; 
2nd ed. in 1998b) – to which it is referred here as ‘Porter I’ . Indeed, he states that ‘[t]he 
conditions that underline competitive advantages are indeed often localized within a nation’ 
and that his diamond model ‘can be readily extended to explain why some cities or regions 
are more successful than others’ (Porter, 1998b, pp. 157-158 and cf. pp. xxiv-xxv). 
                                                 
76 With regards to technological evolution, one should make a reference here to the earlier discussion of 
characteristics of technological knowledge and innovation. The there- mentioned ‘technological trajectories’ 
(Dosi, 1988, p. 225; Nelson & Winter, 1977, pp. 56-60) may represent also to some extent bottlenecks (or 
opportunities) for a narrowly (locked-in) specialized industrial district. 
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Accordingly, he agrees that the concept can be downsized as he introduces the notion of ‘the 
competitive advantage of cities and regions’.77  
 
Indeed, Porter gives the regional meso level a much more prominent role in his later work 
(Porter, 2003; Porter & Ketels, 2003, p. 27; Porter, Monitor Group, ontheFRONTIER, & 
Council of Competitiveness, 2001), which is labelled here as ‘Porter II’. Following his 
analysis of US regional economic performance between 1990 and 2000, he acknowledges the 
substantial differences of regions within virtually every nation and the ‘striking importance of 
regional economies to the overall performance of nations’ (Porter, 2003, pp. 550 and 571). 
This shift also led Porter (2003, p. 571) to call for ‘much of economic policy to be 
decentralised to the regional level’ adding that policy should ‘be attuned to traded clusters’, 
‘focus on upgrading the productivity of all clusters’ of meaningful position instead of 
migrating to ‘desirable’ ones, and finally to foster ‘building innovative capacity’.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that there has been a ‘resurgence’ of regional governance and a 
‘resurgence’ of regional economies, which serves to answer the question: Why regions? The 
discussions in the following chapters present some of the underlying conceptualisations that 
form the basis of the understanding that economic activity is geographically concentrated and 
specialized as well as how they evolve.  
                                                 
77 Porter (1998b, footnote 26 on pp. 158 and 791) refers in this respect to the work of Jacobs (1984), which 
highlights the role of cities in economic development. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EVOLUTIONARY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTUALISATIONS 
OF TERRITORIAL INNOVATION MODELS  
 
Lagendijk (1997b, p. 2) writes that ‘[s]ince more than a decade, economic geography has been 
dominated by a new orthodoxy built around an emphasis on the region, networking and 
resource-orientation, labelled by some as “New Regionalism”.’ At its core, he (1997b, p. 3) 
sees the concepts of industrial districts, innovative milieu, regional innovation systems and 
clusters (Table 3 on page 68), which with common ‘cross-referencing’ share ‘an interest in the 
role of innovation and economic success (“competitiveness”) at the level of the particular 
regions […], by a discursive style of argumentation and by an emphasis on the institutional, 
cognitive and cultural dimensions of regional development.’ Jones (2005, p. 186) also directly 
connects the emergence Lovering’s (1999) notion of the ‘new regionalism’ with ‘growing 
overlap between studies of economic geography and innovation’. 
 
Storper (1995, p. 199) ascertained that agglomerations ‘constituted industrial communities 
where endogenous dynamics of knowledge and technology development [or ‘technological 
innovation turns’] occurred’, and for which not just market co-ordination and localization but 
also ‘appropriate communication rules’ are important. Hence, he succinctly argues circulatory 
(ibid., pp., p. 199) ‘that the “institutional arrangements” of agglomerations (Cooke & Morgan, 
1990; A. J. Scott & Storper, 1991; Storper & Scott, 1989) - that is the nexus of transactions 
and their economic performance – were themselves outcomes of broader institutional 
environments, and themselves generators of future choices for pathways of development.’  
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Three lines of analysis in the resurgence of regional economies  
In an article, Michael Storper (1995, p. 192) identifies three main schools in the debate on the 
resurgence of regional economies, namely institutions; industrial organization and 
transactions; and technological change and learning, while he himself argues for a more 
convincing explanation that understands the ‘region as a nexus of untraded interdependencies’ 
(Storper, 1995, p. 191). 78 This grouping of the main schools is broadly adopted here as a 
guiding structure of analysis, with the various ‘territorial innovation models’ (TIM) and 
explanatory concepts (cf. Lagendijk, 2003, Fig. 1 on p. 722; Moulaert & Sekia, 2003, Fig. 1 
on p. 295) being discussed in - what is called here – the Economic Geography Triangle of 
industrial organization, innovation, and social-institutional environment. 79 (see Figure 2 on 
page 65 below).  
 
The thesis turns first to look at industrial organization as the founding corner of this 
Economic Geography Triangle. 
 
                                                 
78 Storper himself (1995, p. 192 and footnote 1 on p. 214) credits Dosi and Lundvall with the coining of the term 
‘untraded interdependencies’ though he points out that the idea goes back to the earlier writings of Perroux and 
Scitovsky. Indeed, Dosi (1988, p. 226) provides a neat elaboration of the term in his discussion on the nature of 
the innovation process and the ‘public’ characteristic of technology, which he ‘relates to the untraded 
interdependencies between sectors, technologies and firms and takes the form of technological 
complementarities, “synergies”, and flow of stimuli and constraints’. Dosi adds that ‘[a]ll of them represent a 
structured set of technological externalities which can be a collective asset of groups of firms/industries within 
countries/ regions (see, for example, Lundvall, 1984, and Chapter 17 of this book) and/or tend to be internalised 
within individual companies (see, for example, Teece, 1982, and Chapter 12 of this book; Pavittt, 1984c).’ 
Dosi (1988, p. 226) further stresses that ‘[t]hese untraded interdependencies and context conditions are, to 
different degrees, the unintentional outcome of decentralised (but irreversible) processes of environmental 
organisation (one obvious example is “Silicon Valley”) and/or the result of explicit strategies of public and 
private institutions.’ 
79 A good summery of the different school of thoughts can also be found in the discourses by Storper (1995), 
Simmie (2001), Schätzl (2001), Sternberg (1999), Lagendijk (1997b), and regarding an overview of strategy and 
competition literature see, for example, Budd & Hirmis(2004).  
Please note that, even though this study adopts Storper’s grouping of main schools, a different order of 
presentation was chosen. 
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Figure 2 A Selection of territorial innovation models and explanatory concepts in the economic geograpy triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own creation inspired by Moulaert & Sekia’s (2003, Fig. 1 on p. 295) and Lagendijk’s (2003, Fig. 1 on p. 722) conceptual genealogy of ‘territorial innovation 
models (TIM)’; crudely arranged along the three main schools (or lines of analysis) in the resurgence of regional economies as identified by Storper (1995, pp. 191-
192). Further influenced by the discourses of Simmie (2001), Schätzl (2001), Lagendijk (1997b); Sternberg’s (1999, Tab. 2 on p. 87) overview of concepts of regional 
economic concentration based upon Lagendijk (1996, p. 19); and the overview of strategy and competition literature by Pettigrew & Whipp’s (1993), Budd & Hirmis 
(2004, Fig. 1 on p. 1018).  
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Industrial organization 
Theories and conceptualisations of industrial organization comprise foremost the above 
introduced traditional neoclassical-orientated location and agglomeration theory (Marshall, 
1898; Weber, 1909, 1929) with the Marshallian ‘industrial districts’, and modern 
agglomeration theory with the ‘flexible specialization’ school (Piore & Sabel, 1984), ‘new 
industrial spaces’ (A. J. Scott, 1988), and Porter’s ‘clusters’ of competitive industries (Porter, 
1998b, p. 73 and cf. p. 149).  
 
The initially mainly mathematical formulised models of industrial organization and the 
modern eclectic non-formalised agglomeration models were complemented by empirically-
orientated approaches to economic geography that were informed by sociology, institutional 
economics, cognitive science, and other theories (cf. Ron Martin, 1999, p. 66). These 
influences marked an ‘institutional turn’ (Amin, 1999, p. 368) and an ‘evolutionary turn’ in 
economics, in so far as more account was taken of the role of the socio-institutional 
framework in regional economic development as well as it involved the incorporation of an 
evolutionary understanding of technical change and innovation. 80 
 
This led to more contemporary ‘territorial innovation models’ (Moulaert & Sekia, 2003) 
based upon a ‘network approach’ (Butzin, 2000a, 2000b) such as ‘innovative milieux’ by 
GREMI 81 (Aydalot & Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1988; Crevoisier, 2001; Kamann, 1997; 
                                                 
80 A good source of literature in this respect are two special issues of the journal Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsgeographie. One is Volume 44 (2000); Issue 3/4 guest-edited by Bernhard Butzin, which focuses on 
network approaches in regional development (‘Netzwerkansätze in der Regionalentwicklung’), the other being 
Volume 45 (2001); Issue 3/4 edited by Rolf Sternberg and Walter Thomi, which is dedicated to contemporary 
approaches on knowledge and innovation as possible new paradigms of regional development (‘Wissen und 
Innovationen als neue Paradigmen der Regionalentwicklung?’). 
81 GREMI is an abbreviation for Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs, which translates as 
Group of European Research on Innovative Milieux/Environments. According to Storper (1995, p. 203), ‘the 
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Maillat & Vasserot, 1988; Ratti, Bramanti, & Gordon, 1997), ‘intelligent regions’ (Cooke & 
Morgan, 1991; Landabaso, 1996)82 or ‘learning regions’ (Amin, 1999, pp. 369-370; Florida, 
1995; Gertler et al., 2000; Hassink, 2001; Hudson, 1999; Morgan, 1995; Pommeranz, 2000) 
and the ‘regional innovation systems’ strands (Braczyk et al., 1998b; Cooke et al., 1997; 
Cooke & Memedovic, 2003; Cooke & Morgan, 1994b; 1998, pp. 70-72; Morgan & 
Nauwelaers, 1999b; Santos, 2000). 
 
All in all, the territorial innovation models highlighted above in Figure 2 are also the key 
concepts in explaining the spatial concentration of economic activity, namely New Industrial 
Spaces, Industrial Districts, Innovative Milieux, Clusters, and regional and national 
innovation systems. The key characteristics and differences between these concepts are 
summarised and highlighted below in Table 3. 
 
As most of these conceptualisations of industrial organizations have already briefly been 
covered in previous sections, the attention of the discussion swiftly turns to the other 
‘triangle’ pillars of innovation and the social-institutional environment in the following 
sections. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
milieu is something like a territorial version of  […] the “embeddedness” of social and economic processes (M. 
Granovetter, 1985)’.  
82 Cooke & Morgan (1991, pp. 41-43) conclude in their research on industrial and institutional innovation within 
the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna that the ‘intelligent’ characteristics in the policy sphere include 
networking, informational competence, decentralised delivery, and social innovation. 
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Table 3 Theoretical concepts in explanation of spatial concentration of economic activity (a selection) 
 
Characteristics New Industrial Spaces Industrial Districts Innovative Milieux Clusters Innovations systems 
(national, regional) 
Core argument and 
hypothesis; main actors 
vertical disintegration 
causes spatial 
concentration of 
production 
local actors embedded 
in socio-cultural milieu 
a milieu as organisation 
of networked actors 
business strategies in 
dependency upon the 
‘diamond’ 
system of institutional 
ties 
Spatial reference full spectrum from 
centre to periphery 
mainly successful 
regions 
mainly successful high-
tech regions 
particularly 
competitive countries / 
regions 
broad spectrum of 
regions with innovation 
potential 
Processes of change 
over time due to … 
‘windows of 
opportunity’, lock-in 
effects, path 
dependency 
small enterprises 
embedded in a socio-
cultural environment 
entrepreneurship comparative 
advantage, interaction 
between ‘diamond’ 
elements 
long waves leading to 
path-dependency 
Causes of spatial 
concentration 
agglomeration effects, 
‘untraded 
interdependencies’ 
embeddedness and 
increasing flexibility 
causing strengthening 
of locational ties 
location-specific 
learning processes 
intraregional 
interaction of 
competitors, producers, 
consumers and so on 
space as a container, 
spatial proximity 
facilitates interaction of 
producers and 
consumers 
Role of networks neglectable Central central, especially 
intraregional 
important important 
Decisive actor rather large enterprises small enterprises local entrepreneurs, 
politicians 
rather large enterprises institutions and their 
systems, entrepreneurs 
Advocates Scott, Storper, Walker 
[from the so-called 
‘Californian School’] 
Sabel, Granovetter, 
Marshall,  
Brusco, Becattini 
Camagni, Aydalot, 
Maillat  
Porter Nelson, Lundvall, 
Freeman; 
Cooke, Morgan 
 
Source: Own translation of Sternberg’s (1999, Tab. 2 on p. 87) adaptation and supplementation (translated into German) based upon Lagendijk (1996, p. 19), altered 
here only slightly by some additions under ‘advocates’. Please note that a similar table can also be found in Sternberg (2001, Tab. 1 on p. 161) based upon Lagendijk 
(1997b, first version, p. 22), which listing is added by the concepts of the New Economic Geography and the New Growth Theory.   
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Innovation and proximity: the Evolutionary economics perspective  
While the characteristics of innovation have also already been discussed above, the focus is 
placed here on the relation between innovation on the one hand and spatial as well as later 
institutional proximity, on the other. 
 
To make the case for the relation between innovation and spatial proximity, one should refer 
to two differing approaches (cf. Schätzl, 2001, p. 202): the dynamic-cyclical approaches and 
to the dynamic-evolutionary approaches.83 While the latter focus on the factors conducive to 
innovation and technological change (e.g. learning, knowledge transfer, knowledge 
resources), the former looks rather at how industries evolve and how their development is 
bounded to geographical areas and includes the prominent product life-cycle concept.  
 
Product life-cycle and Kondratieff cycle  
 
The dynamic-cyclical approaches derive from the assumption that there is constant structural 
economic change, which is based either upon a microeconomic view of the product life-cycle 
theory, or upon a macroeconomic view of the ‘theory of long waves’ of so-called ‘Kondratieff 
cycles’, or indeed both (cf. Schätzl, 2001, p. 209).84 
 
 
                                                 
83 The dynamic view in these approaches basically looks at the processes and development over time and, 
therefore, contrast earlier static models that focus merely on factor endowment. 
84 For an overview of the dynamic-cyclical approaches , namely the product life cycle theory and the theory of 
long waves, with regards to spatial development, see e.g. Schätzl (2001, pp. 209-221).  
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Figure 3 Phases of the product cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes: 
 
PRODUCTION human capital intensive ? real capital or labour intensive 
 
 
INNOVATION product innovation  ? process innovation 
 
 
INVESTMENT R&D investments  ? rationalization/efficiency investments 
 
 
PRODUCTION small batch production ? mass production 
VOLUME 
 
MARKET  seller market   ? buyer market 
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Source: Schätzl (2001, Abb. 2.38 on p. 211), own translation. Confer also Grant (1998, see Figure 10.1 on p. 243 
and Table 10.2 on p. 247) 
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The concept of the product life-cycle goes long back to Kuznets (1930) and Burns (1934) - as 
Tichy (2001, p. 182) writes – as well as to Schumpeter’s (1939) analysis of business cycles, 
while Grant (1998, footnote 1 on pp. 262-263) mainly associates it in terms of corporate 
strategy with the later works of Rogers (1962) and Levitt (1965). It is based on the hypothesis 
that products have a limited life span, which can be grouped into the following four broad 
phases of development & introduction, growth, maturity, and decline (see Figure 3 above on 
page 70). Crucially, the model is thought not only to apply to the evolution of individual 
products but in generalisation equally to the evolution of their industries and – 
 in longer waves – to economies too.  
 
However, the key sources of competitive advantages for most products are seen to change 
with increasing product and industry maturity, for example, from a human capital intensive 
R&D investments, via quality focus, to more low-cost production. In consequence, the 
optimal production location shifts from high-income central agglomerations with specialized 
skills towards the lower-wage periphery. Accordingly, as Schätzl (2001, p. 213) points out, 
this embraces a ‘tendency to intraregional, interregional, and international decentralisation of 
production’, or in other words incorporates an understanding that industries move locations. 
 
These spatial shifts of industrial activity can be regarded as a driving force for general 
economic fluctuations of the particular regions and countries, where innovation is not just 
timely but also spatially concentrated.  
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Evolutionary theory of technological change and innovation 
 
In contrast to the dynamic-cyclical approaches, which analyse the life span of products and 
industries, modern dynamic-evolutionary approaches rather focus on the initial development 
phase. There is now an abundance of work on evolutionary economics (Boschma, 2004; 
Camagni, 2001; Coriat & Dosi, 1998b; Dosi, 1991, 2000; Dosi et al., 1988; Hodgson, 2002; 
McKelvey, 1997; Metcalfe, 1995; Nelson & Winter, 1982), which goes back to Nelson & 
Winter’s (1982) book presenting An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, and it builds 
upon the Darwinistic biology tradition of stressing the role of diversity in ‘natural selection’ 
(cf. Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 9; Porter, 1998b, p. 174)85, Schumpeter’s (1976b) notion of the 
‘process of creative destruction’ and Kondratieff’s (1926) long-term economic cycles caused 
by the bunching of significant innovations. 
 
At the centre of investigation of evolutionary economics are the conducive factors in the 
creation of innovation and technological change. Following the insights from new growth 
theory and cognitive sciences, they are not just regarded as an exogenously given impetus 
(e.g. knowledge resources), but instead viewed more as an endogenous outcome of knowledge 
transfer and learning processes – as depicted by Johnson (1992, p. 33). In accumulation, they 
thereby may initiate the emergence of new industries and/or regional structural change and 
economic growth. Storper (1995, p. 207) phrased this more eloquently as follows: 
 
                                                 
85 When discussing their ‘triple helix’ model, Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (2000, p. 112) point, however, in this 
respect to an important difference between cultural and biological evolutions. They state the following: 
‘Biological evolution theory assumes variation as a driver and selection to be naturally given. Cultural evolution, 
however, is driven by individuals and groups who make conscious decisions as well as the appearance of 
unintended consequences.’  
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The evolutionary school of technological change opened up the question of economic 
development as one of learning, or becoming, and of untraded interdependencies as a 
major feature of this process. 
 
Furthermore, the evolutionary school also comprises that ‘tacit capabilities are localised and 
embedded in individuals and organisational routines’, that ‘organisations display an awesome 
range of capabilities’ and ‘behavioural patterns’, and finally ‘that knowledge is spatially 
“sticky” and that tacit knowledge (…) is not easily communicated other than through personal 
interaction in a context of shared experiences (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Dosi et al, 1988; Dosi 
& Marengo, 1993; Lundvall, 1992; Storper, 1997)’. 
 
While the former propositions show the linkages to institutional economics (which is covered 
in the next section), the latter in particular highlights the importance of the role of 
geographical proximity for innovation. Studies have shown in this regard that business R&D 
tends to cluster in specific areas in order to exploit knowledge spillovers, and that 
geographical proximity favours both knowledge transfer and research collaboration 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2003a, p. 71). Gertler et al. (2000) also suggest that local 
context still exerts a significant influence on the nature and extent of innovative activities in 
the knowledge-based economy. Boschma’s insightful table - which is reproduced below 
(Table 4) - presents his five forms of proximity and also crucially provides possible solutions 
to the relevant problem of too little or too much proximity.  
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Table 4 Five Forms of proximity: some features 
 
 Key dimension Too little 
proximity 
Too much 
proximity 
Possible 
solutions86 
1. Cognitive Knowledge gap Misunderstanding Lack of sources 
of novelty 
Common 
knowledge base 
with divers but 
complementary 
capabilities 
2. Organizational Control Opportunism Bureaucracy Loosely coupled 
system 
3. Social Trust (based on 
social relations) 
Opportunism No economic 
rationale 
Mixture of 
embedded and 
market relations 
4. Institutional Trust (based on 
common 
institutions) 
Opportunism Lock-in and 
inertia 
Institutional 
checks and 
balances 
5. Geographical Distance No spatial 
externalities 
Lack of 
geographical 
openness 
Mix of local 
‘buzz’ and extra-
local linkages 
Source: Boschma (2005b, p. 71) 
 
It is clear that the region is the location to drive innovation as innovation is viewed here as 
being ‘geographically localised’. The thesis now turns to look at the remaining cornerstone of 
the ‘Economic Geography Triangle’, which is the socio-institutional environment. 
 
The Socio-institutional Environment 
The complementary of the relationship between geographical proximity and social and 
institutional proximity and its importance for the creation of knowledge and innovation has 
been stressed above. The close affinity between the two schools is summarised by Morgan’s 
(2001a, p. 18) following comment: 
 
                                                 
86 Boschma (cf. also 2005a, p. 43) suggests mechanisms that offer simultaneous solutions to the problems of too 
little proximity (by enhancing effective coordination and control) and too much proximity (by preventing actors 
becoming locked-in through ensuring openness and flexibility).  
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Evolutionary political economy rightly allots an important role to the institutions 
which shape, and which are in turn shaped by, these deep developmental processes. 
Like all structures, these institutions are both the medium for, and the result of social 
action: in other words they enable and constrain what firms and other agents wish to 
accomplish. 
 
To distinguish broadly between the main emphases of these affiliated schools of thought, it 
can be said in simplification that the evolutionary strand focuses on knowledge, learning and 
innovation processes as drivers of economic development, while the institutional perspective 
is rather occupied with the ‘collective or social foundations of economic behaviour’ (Amin, 
1999, p. 366), hence concentrating its attention on inter-personal and inter-institutional 
relationships, behaviour and dynamics. The latter focus is not an entirely new one, more a 
rediscovery, but the contemporary works of the ‘new institutionalism’ (cf. Raco, 1999, p. 952) 
provide more of an explanation of the underlying causes for these dynamics. 87 
 
While the previous section has rendered the propositions of the evolutionary strand, this 
section now looks at the main propositions of the institutionalist school. It argues that regions 
has to be also viewed as a ‘relational space’ (Morgan, 2001a, p. 25) not just as a geographical 
space and that in this respect ‘institutions matter’. 
                                                 
87 See also Blyth (2002, pp. 18-27) for his discussion of the different schools of institutionalism, namely 
Historical Instituionalism and Rationalist Institutionalism. For instance, Blyth (2002, p. 19) elucidates that ‘[f]or 
historical institutionalists, institutions “structure” individuals’ preferences, whereas for rationalists, the 
preferences of individuals “structure” institutions.’ 
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Institutionalist economics  
 
The ‘institutional turn’ (Amin, 1999, p. 368; Blyth, 2002, p. 18; Raco, 1999) in economics is 
based on a number of propositions from different strands such as sociology and anthropology, 
organizational theory (e.g. see Schwartzman, 1993) and so on. Accordingly, an institutionalist 
perspective is in effect a socioeconomic perspective (Grabher, 1993b) that comprises the 
following three main sets of ideas identified by Amin (1999, pp. 366-367):88 the recognition 
that the behaviour and decision-making of economic actors is that of ‘boundedly rational’ 
agents and not of perfectly rational ‘economic man’; Granovetter’s (1985, p. 506) description 
of economic behaviour being ‘embedded in networks of interpersonal relations’; and Karl 
Polanyi’s (1944) view of economic life as an ‘instituted process’ shaped by enduring 
collective forces (cf. Amin, 1999, pp. 366-367; Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 50; Blyth, 2002, pp. 
3-11). These three sets of ideas are briefly explained in the following. 
 
Firstly, the rejection of the idea of ‘economic man’ or ‘homo oeconomicus’ 89 means that the 
behaviour and decision-making of economic actors is instead regarded as one that is 
‘boundedly rational’ and influenced by habits and routines of individuals, groups and 
institutions (Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 51; Boschma, 2004, p. 1007) and by ‘perceptions of self 
                                                 
88 In an earlier paper, Amin & Thrift (1995, pp. 50-53) outline five main strands of work that contributed to 
‘socioeconomics’ (Grabher, 1993b) and rise of the ‘third way’ of associationism.  
89 The concept of the ‘economic man’ or homo oeconomicus (cf. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2002, p. 
15) embodies the idea or image of the human role within classical and neoclassical economic theory, that is of a 
rational thinking individual who will always act rationally in specifying his aims and then take optimal decisions 
which are consistent with the set objectives. This entails the presumption that the decision-maker is always 
aware of all alternatives, which, in other words, is the assumption of the transparency of markets by perfect 
information. As a logical consequence of the negation of the assumption of rational behaving actors, behavioural 
theory instead postulates that markets are not efficient. 
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interest’ (Boschma, 2004, pp. 99-100), i.e. beliefs and attitudes (Blyth, 2002, preface on p. 
ix).90  
 
This leads to a social constructivist view - meaning that markets are seen as being as socially 
constructed – which comprises, secondly, the idea of embeddedness (M. Granovetter, 1985).91 
It subsequently regards economic outcomes to be interactively ‘influenced by network 
properties such as mutuality, trust and cooperation or their opposite (Dore, 1983; Granovetter, 
1985; Grabher, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Misztal, 1996)’ as Amin (1999, pp. 366-367) states.  
 
This also links to the third idea of economic life as an ‘instituted process’ (cf. Amin, 1999, pp. 
366-367; Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 50), which basically refers to the view that the multiplicity 
of institutions (of which agents are part) shape the collective outcomes of an economic system 
(Coriat & Dosi, 2002, p. 99). According to Coriat & Dosi (2002, p. 98), the broad meaning of 
the term institution includes ‘formal organizations (ranging from firms to technical societies, 
trade unions, universities, all the way to state agencies); patterns of behaviour that are 
collectively shared (from routines to social conventions to ethical codes); and negative norms 
and constraints (from moral prescriptions to formal laws)’.92 These formal and informal 
                                                 
90 The assumption of the rational decision-making human is contested by institutional economics (Budd & 
Hirmis, 2004, p. 1017) and behavioural theory with the contrasting concept that M. E. Eliot Hurst labelled as 
‘noneconomic man’ (cf. Schätzl, 2001, p. 96). Behavioural theory instead argues that goals are imperfectly 
rationalized and rather the result of an interactive bargaining process between individuals and sub-groups (e.g. of 
managers in a firm). The inherent conflict between the various individual goals within complex organizations 
(e.g. in firms between the traditional profit-maximizing goal, production goals, sales goals and so on) is assumed 
to result in the overall goals being compromises (in the form of aspiration-level or satisfactory targets) rather 
than maximizing goals (cf. Pass et al., 1993, pp. 38-39 and 320). Behavioural theory thereby represents an 
alternative to the traditional, profit-maximizing ‘theory of the firm’. In this respect, organizational theorists also 
point out that this ‘satisficing’ behaviour (Pass et al., 1993, p. 484) is more likely to be the norm in larger, 
hierarchical organizations, while less likely to occur in small enterprises, where perhaps an individual 
entrepreneur is setting the objectives. 
91 See in this respect also Hay’s (2002, p. 206) discussion of different positions of constructivism (‘thick’ and 
‘thin’) and on the structure-agency debate (ibid., p. 54). 
92 Amin (1999, p. 367) only distinguishes between formal and informal or tacit institutions, thereby subsuming 
Coriat & Dosi’s (1999, p. 98) ‘negative norms and constraints’ under either of the two. Amin’s description of 
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institutions are itself seen ‘to be socially constructed and subject to slow evolutionary change’ 
(Amin, 1999, p. 368) as they are also regarded as ‘carriers of history’ (David, 1994) - thus 
coming round a full circle.93 
 
Gradations of institutionalism 
 
Coriat & Dosi (1995, pp. 98-101)94 discuss the dichotomies between an institutionalist view 
and the standard ‘neoclassical’ paradigm in which institutions are largely absent from the 
conceptualisations and actors are rather perceived as perfectly rational. They illustrate this 
dichotomy in a table (ibid., Table 6.1 on p. 100) reproduced below (see Table 5), which also 
provide a useful overview in this respect of the ‘different gradations of instituitionalism’, 
ranging from weak to strong. 
                                                                                                                                                        
formal institutions include ‘rules, laws and organizations’, while he names ‘individual habits, group routines and 
social norms and values’ as examples for informal or tacit institutions.  
For reason of clarity, this thesis here prefers to make a distinction between institutions and organizations. The 
term institutions is used here mostly to depict informal or tacit institutions ‘that pattern behaviour’, while an 
effort is made to use the term organizations when concrete, formal institutions such as firms and so are meant 
(cf. Cooke & Morgan, 1998, pp. 71-72). Cooke & Morgan (1998, pp. 71-72) also add that ‘[o]rganizations can 
be conceived as embedded in institutions in a process view of socio-economic change’. See also Edquist & 
Johnson’s (1997) useful chapter in this respect on ‘Institutions and Organizations in Systems of Innovation’. 
93 The various views on how human (agents) are interrelated with system structures also feature in the so-called 
agency-structure debate. In contrast to behavioural theories, theories of functionalism, structuralism and system 
theory all emphasise structural dynamics and decision-making, which is not sufficiently explained just by people 
and their actions (cf. Schmidt, 2002, p. 203). See also Samuels (1995) for a discussion of institutional 
economics.  
94 Coriat & Dosi’s (2002) updated version of an earlier paper published in French in 1995 (cf. asterix note in 
Coriat & Dosi, 2002, p. 117) is also republished (Coriat & Dosi, 2000) in Dosi’s (2000) compilation of selected 
essays.  
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Table 5 Weak and strong varieties of institutionalism 
  
‘Weak’ Institutionalism 
 
 
‘Strong’ Institutionalism 
 
1.   Role of institutions 
 
Parameterize system 
variables; contain menu of 
strategies 
 
 
Also ‘embed’ cognitive and 
behavioural patterns; shape 
identities of actors 
2.   ‘Primitives’ of the theory (Perfectly or boundedly) 
rational self-seeking agents; 
institutions as derived entities 
 
 
Institutions as ‘primitives’; 
forms of ‘rationality’ and 
perceptions of self-interest as 
derived entities 
3.   Mechanisms of  
      institution-formulation 
Mainly intentional, 
‘constitutional’, processes 
 
Mainly unintentional self-
organization processes 
4.   Efficiency properties Institutions perform useful 
coordinating and governance 
functions; may be considered 
equilibria in some selection 
space 
 
Institutions as ‘carriers of 
history’; reproduce path-
dependently, often 
irrespectively of this 
functional efficiency 
Source: Coriat & Dosi (2000, Table 6.1 on p. 100) reproduced in (1998a, p. 8; 2000, p. 352, both as Table 1.1)  
 
In summary, these ideas form the basis of a new understanding that recognises that the ‘dense 
social networks’ (cf. Boschma, 2004, p. 1006) or ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin, 1999, p. 
368; Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 53) have an ‘institutional impact’ (B. Johnson, 1992, p. 33) 
upon the embedded, collective and geographically localized learning processes (cf. Baptista, 
2000, pp. 530-531; Boschma, 2004, p. 1006; Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 6; Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999a, p. 9; J. M. Simmie, 2001, p. 24). Inasmuch, the region is sees not just seen 
as a territorial space but as a relational and institutional space too (cf. Morgan, 2001a, p. 26), 
as a ‘nexus of untraded interdependencies’ (Storper, 1995, pp. 191 and 192 ) and ‘learning 
processes’ (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 60). In consequence, ‘institutions count’ (Cooke & 
Morgan, 1998, p. 98) as ‘assets’ to local and regional competitiveness (Amin, 1999, p. 368; 
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Tödtling, 1999, p. 694). 95 Institutions matter insofar as they influence relational or social 
capital (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 7; Edquist, 1997, pp. 24-26; Iyer, Kitson, & Toh, 2005, 
pp. 1016-1017; Putnam, 1993, pp. 86-91)96, and have the potential to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour and negative effects of too much proximity (lock-in and inertia).  
 
The thesis has looked at how economies work, at the role of innovation in economic 
development, and at the rationale for focussing on regions and regional economic 
development, in which innovation plays a role. It has established that institutions and thus 
governance of the process of innovation constitutes part of the conceptual framework in 
understanding the process of regional economic development. The next chapter now turns its 
attention to innovation systems, which in conjunction with the cluster model serve here as the 
main conceptual models to look at economic governance. They bring together the themes 
discussed so far in the thesis.   
                                                 
95 Maskell and Malmberg (1999b, p. 9) similarly stress that ‘localized learning’ for innovation is ‘strongly 
influenced by the specific localized capabilities such as resources, institutions, social and cultural structures’. 
96 In the Regional Studies’ special issue (Vol. 39; Number 8: November 2005) on ‘social capital’, Iyer, Kitson & 
Toh (2005, pp. 1016-1017) provide a definition of social capital that ‘includes shared values and rules for social 
conduct including trust and civic responsibility’, hence mirroring the above-mentioned informal institutions In 
the same special issue Beugelsdijk & van Schaik (2005, p. 1061 and cf. p. 1053) analyse the differences in social 
capital and come to the preliminary results ‘that there is a positive and significant relationship between social 
capital and economic performance in a sample of 54 Western European regions’, while Cooke, Clifton, & 
Oleaga’s (2005, p. 1065) research on 12 UK regions more cautiously concludes that although the ‘conscious use 
by firms of “relational embeddedness” in markets’ is an important indicator of SME performance, this cannot be 
conclusively measured to be an important indicator of regional economic performance. Furthermore, Beugelsdijk 
& van Schaik (2005, p. 1062) interestingly state that ‘despite the extensive literature on social capital, no clear 
policy implications have yet emerged’. Yet, Tura & Harmaakorpi’s (2005, p. 1121) suggest ‘“network-
facilitating innovation policy” as a policy implication to promote creative social capital’ as an element in 
enhancing regional innovative capability. However, they also point to some problematic issues in the 
bidirectional relationship between innovative capability and social capital. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LINKING INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATION: THE CLUSTER AND 
INNOVATION SYSTEMS MODELS 
 
The above discussion of the institutionalist perspective has illustrated that the socio-
institutional environment in which firms are embedded has an effect upon their innovative 
performance. Similarly, the earlier discussion of patterns of innovation creation has shown 
that innovation and technical change is not be understood simply as a result of a linear process 
but instead the outcome of an interactive, cumulative process within a system of complex 
elements (cf. Edquist, 1997, p. 13). Both influences make up the systemic nature of the so-
called systems of innovation approach, the subject of this chapter. The analysis begins to 
explore the hypothesis of the thesis that current conceptualisations of regional innovation 
systems do not adequately capture the regional and in particular sub-regional governance 
dynamics, and thus are of little operational guidance to innovation policy-making. This thesis 
is tested empirically in following chapters in looking at the pattern of economic governance in 
the case-study regions. 
 
Innovation systems: linking institutions and innovation 
According to Lundvall (1992a, p. 2 ), ‘a system of innovation is constituted by elements and 
relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically 
useful, knowledge’. Furthermore, Edquist & Johnson (1997, p. 42) state that ‘[s]ystems of 
innovation are normally defined in institutional terms’, for which Nelson & Rosenberg’s 
definition (1993, p. 4) is representative. In the introductory chapter of Nelson’s (1993) 
influential book on ‘National Innovation Systems’, they (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993, p. 4) 
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define the term system in a way that ‘the concept is of a set of institutions whose interactions 
determine the innovative performance, in the sense above, of national firms’. 
 
The ‘common characteristics of the systems of innovation approaches’ have been outlined by 
Edquist (1997, pp. 15-29) and comprise the following nine aspects:  
 
1. Placing innovations and learning at the centre of analysis; 
2. Being holistic and interdisciplinary in encompassing a wide array of determinants of 
innovation; 
3. Taking an evolutionary perspective by recognising that history matters as innovation 
processes are often path-dependent; 97 
4. Rejecting the notion of optimality of systems of innovation and thus acknowledging 
the diversity of different structural set ups;  
5. Stressing that innovation is determined not only by the elements of the system, but 
also by the relations between them (i.e. their interdependence and interaction); 
6. Encompassing a wide definition of innovation to include process, product as well as 
organizational innovation; 
7. Emphasising the role of institutions in influencing innovation; 
8. Being associated with conceptual pluralism or ambiguity; and  
9. Representing a conceptual framework for the analysis of innovation and not a formal 
theory, despite its roots in various theories of innovation. 
 
In identifying the ideas that form the conceptual core of ‘approaches in the understanding of 
what constitutes successful regional development and policy’, Tödtling (1999, p. 694) also 
suggests that ‘innovation systems serve as an umbrella to some of these concepts’. According 
to Tödtling (1999, pp. 694-695), these concepts include viewing innovation and learning as an 
interactive process, which ‘occur in various kinds of networks’ that ‘are formed along 
                                                 
97 Confer also the earlier discussion of patterns of innovation above. 
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industry clusters’ (Porter, 1990) and which create ‘untraded interdependencies’ (Storper, 
1995, pp. 191 and 192 ) and ‘unique relational assets’.  
 
Despite these common characteristics, the ‘systems of innovation’ approach can be 
distinguished into different key strands of thought. Edquist & McKelvey (2000a)98 
differentiate between spatial delimitations – national and regional – and a sectoral perspective, 
to identify the following three-part categorization:99 
 
• ‘National innovation systems’100 (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1988, 1992b; Nelson, 1993; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997a, 1999b, 2002a; Patel & 
Pavitt, 1994); 
• ‘Regional innovation systems’ (Braczyk et al., 1998b; Cooke et al., 1997; Cooke & 
Memedovic, 2003; Cooke & Morgan, 1994b; 1998, pp. 70-72; Malmberg & Maskell, 
1997; Morgan & Nauwelaers, 1999b; Santos, 2000; Saxenian, 1996; Storper, 1995); and  
• ‘Sectoral and technological systems of innovation’. (Breschi & Malerba, 1997; 
Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Dahmén, 1988; Nelson, 1996), which also comprises the 
prominent ‘cluster’ concept (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1999c, 2001; Porter, 1990, 1998a, 1998b; Porter et al., 2001; Porter & Sölvell, 1998)   
 
These three integrative ‘systems of innovation’ approaches are yet all based upon common 
influences (see Edquist & McKelvey, 2000b) from ‘institutional theories’ (Cooke & Morgan, 
                                                 
98 Charles Edquist & Maureen McKelvey’s reference collection entitled ‘Systems of Innovation: Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment’ compiles articles and book chapters on national, regional, sectoral and 
technological systems of innovation as well as relevant case studies in the first volume (2000a), while the second 
volume (2000b) covers contributions regarding interactive learning and networks of innovation, evolutionary 
theories of innovation, institutionally theories, innovation and growth, and concerning the dynamics of 
government policy and firm strategy. The author highly recommends this reader to fellow researcher and 
students alike as a valuable introduction to the study on innovation systems. 
99 Please note that the references indicated for the three strands of ‘systems of innovation’ is not identical with 
the list of papers that appear in Edquist & McKelvey’s (2000a) reader. Although akin, the list of references here 
only comprises a conscious selection of them, which was enlarged by further key sources added by the author. 
100 The term ‘national system of innovation’ was coined by Lundvall (1992b), for which he names Friedrich 
List’s (e.g. 1885a) concept of ‘The National System of Political Economy as his source of idea (cf. Freeman, 
1995, p. 5). 
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1998; Edquist & Johnson, 1997; List, 1885a; Rosenberg, 1960; Zysman, 1994), ‘evolutionary 
theories of innovation’ (Dosi, 1988; B. Johnson, 1992; McKelvey, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 
1977; Schumpeter, 1976b) and those that highlight ‘interactive learning and networks’ 
(Asheim & Cooke, 1999; DeBresson & Amesse, 1991; Florida, 1995; Hassink, 2001; 
Henderson, 1998; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Lundvall, 1988; Malecki & Oinas, 1999; 
Malmberg & Maskell, 1999; Tödtling, 1999). The latter includes the notion of ‘innovative 
networks’ and ‘learning regions’, which are closely linked to the ‘regional innovation 
systems’ strand.101 
 
The last two of the common characteristics concern more the conceptual nature than its 
contents. In relation to the label ‘conceptual framework’ or approach as applied to systems of 
innovation, Edquist (1997, p. 28) points to the distinction between ““hard core” theories 
which are proven and not disputed’ and ‘formal models, conceptual frameworks useful for the 
generation of hypotheses, and empirical generalizations, etc.” 102 Cooke (1998, pp. 11-12; and 
very akin Cooke & Memedovic, 2003, p. 6) also differentiates between ‘operational’ and 
‘conceptual’ systems. The former ‘refers to a real phenomenon’, while the latter ‘represents a 
logical abstraction’.  
 
In regard to conceptual pluralism, it suggests that in taking such an approach means that we 
‘do not define the limits of the systems in an operational way’ (Edquist, 1997, p. 27). Nelson 
                                                 
101 The author wishes to highlight the special issue (Volume 7, Number 6, December 1999) of the European 
Planning Studies on ‘Innovation Networks, Collective Learning, and Industrial Policy in Regions of Europe’ 
guest-edited by Franz Tödtling, which comprises some valuable paper (e.g. Capello, 1999; Koschatzky, 1999; 
Lagendijk, 1999b; Tödtling, 1999; Tödtling & Kaufmann, 1999) on the topic of ‘innovative networks’. 
102 Edquist (1997, p. 28) also refers in this respect to Nelson & Winter’s (1982) distinction between appreciative 
theorizing that ‘tends to be close to empirical substance and empirical work’, which is interpreted and expressed 
verbally by abstract reasoning; and formal theorizing, which ‘at some intellectual distance from what is known 
empirically’ proposes instead ‘an abstract structure expressed in highly stylised form’ in order to check logical 
connections. 
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& Rosenberg (1993, pp. 4-5) also similarly acknowledge in this respect that ‘it provides no 
sharp guide to just what should be included in the innovation system, and what can be left 
out.’ However, Lundvall (1992a, p. 13) argues in favour of a broad definition to ‘be kept open 
and flexible’ in order to reflect ‘the importance attached to interactive learning as a basis for 
innovation’. Thereby, it maintains the systemic nature and avoids the alternative definition of 
the narrow ‘linear model of technical change’ and innovation. 
 
In consequence, the systems concept can rather be defined as an ‘analytical tool’; representing 
‘a specific methodological approach’ that is a common analytical framework and hence ‘is not 
itself a substantive theory’. By using this definition, it is not necessary to have ‘clear-cut 
boundaries’ but, therefore, it leaves the understanding of a system approach ‘open to flexible 
interpretation’. 
 
In order to overcome some of this ‘conceptual plurality’ and ambiguity that comes with 
applying such a broad, generic definition, Edquist (1997, p. 27) suggests that any attempts at 
specification is to be complemented by trying ‘to identify the core elements in systems of 
innovation, and focus on the relations between these.’ In this respect, Edquist (1997, p. 20) 
also highlights that ‘[c]omparisons are crucial for policy purposes; for the identification of 
problems that should be subject to intervention. Such comparisons between systems must be 
genuinely empirical and would therefore be similar to what is often called “benchmarking” at 
the firm level’. This is because it can be argued that there is no such thing as an optimal 
system (see also N° 4 above), which is partly due to the ‘cooperative, trust-dependent and 
associational character’ of innovation systems (Cooke et al., 1997, p. 490) that requires to 
 86 
 
take account of the individual idiosyncrasies. This would also reflect the apparent difficulty in 
researching the all-important systemic dimension, as reported by Cooke (1998, p. 2). 
 
The next few sections identify some elements of innovation systems. Since the thesis has 
already discussed the concept of a cluster and thus presented an industry perspective, it 
refrains from elaborating more on ‘sectoral and technological systems of innovation’ here, 
and instead focuses in the next few sections on the spatial delimitations, especially upon the 
regional innovation systems strand. Thus, although the concept is arguably open-ended, there 
are some distinct models but as the thesis hypothesises these current conceptualisations of 
regional innovation systems do not adequately capture the regional and in particular sub-
regional governance dynamics. This section begins by looking at national innovation systems. 
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National innovation systems  
 
In line with the explanations given above, Lundvall (1992a, p. 2) defines that ‘a national 
system encompasses elements and relationships, either located within or rooted inside the 
borders of a nation state’. It, therefore represent a social and dynamic system, which is 
determined by the national-cultural and the state-political dimensions, and therefore differs 
across national economies ‘regarding the structure of the production system and regarding the 
general institutional set-up’ (Lundvall, 1992a, p. 13). 103 These ‘complex combination of 
institutions that support learning processes and technological accumulation’ are what 
determine national systems of innovation (1997, p. 236). 
 
The basic international differences in terms of ‘historical experience, language, and culture’ 
are viewed by Lundvall (1992a, p. 13) as to reflect the ‘national idiosyncrasies’ in the 
following elements of the national innovation system: ‘internal organisation of firms; 
interfirm relationships; role of the public sector; institutional set-up of the financial sector; 
and, finally, R&D intensity and R&D organisation.104 In an attempt to measure national 
innovation systems, Patel & Pavitt (1994, p. 81) provide a narrow, very linear, delimitation 
that mainly focuses on the key organisations, namely business firms, universities, and 
educational institutions. 
 
                                                 
103 For a very brief overview on national systems of innovation, see also Malecki (1997, pp. 235-237). 
104 Chris Freeman (1995, p. 7) also indicates that ‘many features of the national systems of innovation which are 
at the heart of contemporary studies’ were already analysed by Friedrich List’s (1885b) work on the ‘National 
System of Political Economy’, and that he also stressed already the ‘governmental responsibility for education 
and training and for developing an infrastructure supporting industrial development’ (Lundvall, 1992a, p. 16).  
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While Morgan (2001a, p. 19) disapproves the concept’s ‘silence on sub-national institutions’, 
Cooke & Morgan (1998, p. 27) especially criticize the mainstream literature on national 
innovation systems for the ‘little room’ it provides for what they call ‘intermediate 
institutions, be they sectoral organizations (like trade associations) or territorial bodies (like 
local chambers and regional technology transfer centres).’ 105 Hence, they add ‘intermediate 
institutions’ to their own, more contemporary and broader defined, list of six key elements for 
an effective national system of innovation (ibid., pp. 25-27). The five remaining elements are 
the role of R&D, the ensemble of education and training institutions, the financial system, the 
network of user-producer relationships, and finally social capital as an intangible asset.  
 
Regional innovation systems: from conceptualisation to construction 
Cooke first coined the term Regional Innovation Systems (1992; cf. 1998, p. 2) but the 
concept became popularised through the influential edited book by Braczyk, Cooke & 
Heidenreich (1998b). Cooke provides a very useful and detailed summary to their so-named 
theoretical and empirical construct, which he (1998, p. 2) traces back to the work on national 
innovation systems, naming the writings in Lundvall (1992b) and Nelson (1993) as key 
influences. Furthermore, Cooke (1998, p. 2) also acknowledges that it builds upon the various 
earlier conceptualisations that are linked to what has been referred to elsewhere (Moulaert & 
Sekia, 2003) as ‘territorial innovation models’. 
                                                 
105 According to Cooke & Morgan (1998, p. 71), the ‘full panoply of innovation organizations’ constitutes a 
(regional) innovation system.  
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Decoding Regional Innovation Systems 
 
The regional innovation systems (RIS) concept can be decoded and analysed by dividing it 
into its three separate terminological parts, which serve as key underlying explanatory 
features. Accordingly, the concept comprises an understanding of the predominance of the 
‘regional’ level, the ‘innovation’ focus, and a ‘systemic’ view.106  
 
To elaborate, the regional innovation systems approach conceptualises regions as ‘types of 
collective order’ that are ‘sub-central administratively and cohesive culturally’ (Cooke, 1998, 
pp. 16 and 24). It also embraces an evolutionary and systemic understanding of innovation107 
- very much like that presented earlier in this thesis. In addition, it also makes use of the 
systemic approach, which sees innovation as ‘the result of social interaction between 
economic actors’ in ‘an open system, which interacts with its environment’ (Cooke & 
Memedovic, 2003, p. 5). Thereby, it stresses the importance of the institutional environment 
(as outlined before from an institutionalist perspective) and takes an associative view, which 
sees learning, innovation and change ameliorated by cooperation and relational proximity.  
 
In consequence, Cooke (Cooke, 1998, pp. 24-25; Cooke et al., 1997, p. 490) defines the 
regional innovation systems concept ‘in terms of a collective order based on micro-
constitutional regulation conditioned by trust, reliability exchange and cooperative 
interaction’ (see also Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 71). Malecki (1997, p. 262) sees the concept 
                                                 
106 Similarly, Nelson & Rosenberg (1993, pp. 4-5) also introduce the concept of national innovation systems by 
discussion the three terms: national, innovation and system. 
107 Cooke (1998, p. 9) succinctly states the following: ‘If we remember that innovation is defined as the 
commercialization of original knowledge, as distinct from invention, which is the original knowledge itself, then 
the need for rapid response becomes obvious’. 
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comprising ‘the local institutions that support learning in firms and workers’, while stressing 
that ‘many of the greatest challenges’ for the network ‘are people-related’.108 
 
It becomes obvious that the concept relies heavily upon the linkages and dynamic 
relationships between the devolved individual conceptualisations of a region, innovation and 
of a system. Several questions can be asked concerning these linkages such as whether 
regional innovation exists or whether it is systemic (cf. Cooke, 1998, p. 3). These questions 
influenced the analytical framework for the empirical work in this thesis, which is discussed 
in the chapter on the research methodology.109 As suggested, the models do not adequately 
capture the regional and in particular sub-regional governance dynamics. 
 
Cooke et al. (1997, p. 489) point out that systemic innovation ‘implies the loose coupling of 
subsystems’ – regarding which they ‘have identified finance, learning and productive culture 
as key subsystems’.110 However, the focal point of this strand becomes clearer when the 
                                                 
108 In the German literature and policy programmes, the regional innovation systems concept is often also 
presented as a concept of ‘regional competence centres’ (regionale Kompetenzzentren) defined as the spatial 
agglomeration of innovation actors (cf. Boekholt, Clark, Sowden, & Niehoff, 1998; Roland Berger & Partner, 
Fraunhofer Management GmbH, & Willoughby, 1998, p. 8; Schätzl, 2001, pp. 234-238) with a particular 
emphasis on innovative businesses and science excellence at universities. 
109 By looking at each combination of the ‘three dimensions to the debate’ (i.e. region-innovation, region – 
system, and innovation – system) from both angles, this study identifies the following six particular sets of 
questions that can be posed. First, with regards to the ‘region-innovation’ combination, the questions are: Does 
the region has an innovation agenda, and which level of governance is the most active and/or most targeted 
concerning innovation policy? Where does innovation practically happens (e.g. at the regional level)?. Secondly, 
with regards to the ‘region-system’ combination of dimensions, the questions are: Does the region aims to 
provide for a system (policy)? Is the present system anchored at the regional level, or does it include important 
actors or sub-systems at other levels? Finally, with regards to the ‘innovation-system’ combination: Are 
innovation mainly driven by systemic influences? Is the system foremost geared towards innovation? Yet, due to 
the focus of this study on governance, not all of these are raised. 
110 According to Cooke et al. (1997, p. 488), the productive ‘cultural aspects most closely linked to “systemic 
quality” in an innovation system’ comprise the following list: culture of cooperation; associative culture; 
learning culture; experience and ability to carry out or incorporate institutional changes; coordination and public 
/ private consensus; productive culture (labour relations, cooperation at work, company commitments to social 
well being, and productive specialisation); existing interface mechanisms (in the scientific field, in the 
technological field, in the productive field, and in the financial field; different types of learning capacity; social 
valorisation of the use of science; university linked to the productive system; non-bureaucratised educational and 
training system linked to the productive system. 
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proclaimed ‘key pillars in the “systems house” of regional innovation are investigated (Cooke 
& Morgan, 1994b; Körfer & Latniak, 1994)’, which according to Cooke (1998, p. 3) are 
‘business networking, technology transfer and vocational training’.  
 
Cooke (1998, p. 19 and cf. p. 21) sees in particular ‘the governance infrastructure and the 
business superstructure’ as constitutive key dimensions of innovation activity, which to some 
extent are described as alluding to the key elements of ‘systemness’ and ‘clusteredness’. 
Cooke (1998, pp. 19-24 ) has presented a classification of different modes of regional 
innovation systems concerning both dimensions, for which the main characteristics are 
summarised in tabular form below.  
 
The governance dimension (see Table 8) corresponds to ‘modes of regional technology 
transfer’ (i.e. the nature of providing a soft infrastructure of enterprise innovation support’), 
namely: grassroots, network, and dirigiste as proposed by Cooke (1992). The latter business 
innovation dimension (see Table 7) refers to ‘modes of business interrelationship’ (i.e. the 
extent to which innovation activities are geographically localized or globalized), for which 
Cooke & Morgan (1994a) have proposed the localist, interactive, and globalized modalities.  
 
However, it is argued here that such a typology of regional innovation systems does not 
adequately capture the governance dynamics within regions. First of all, it is believed that in 
reality regions have far to many particularities as to allow regional governance systems of 
business and innovation support to be put into a straightjacket of just three idealised 
modalities. Secondly, as a result of the key argument of this thesis, it is believed that most 
categorisations of regional innovation systems (such as North Rhine-Westphalia in Figure 4) 
do not bear close examination due to underlying differing governance dynamics at the sub-
regional level. 
 92 
 
Table 6 Governance infrastructure - Three modalities of regional technology transfer 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Grassroots RIS 
 
 
Network RIS 
 
 
Dirigiste RIS 
 
    
Initiation process of 
technology transfer  
Locally organized Multi-level Animated by central 
government policies  
Funding 
 
Diffuse mix of local 
banking, local 
government, possibly 
chamber of 
commerce capital, 
grants and loans 
Guided by agreement 
among banks, 
government agencies 
and firms 
Centrally determined 
(perhaps at 
decentralized agency 
locations)  
Research competence 
 
Highly applied or 
near market 
Mixed, with both 
pure and applied  
Basic or fundamental 
System coordination  Supra-local High Potentially high 
Specialization 
 
Low (generic 
problem-solving) 
Flexible  Likely to be high 
 
Source: Own creation solely based upon Cooke (1998, pp. 19-21); modalities of regional innovation systems 
(RIS) initially proposed by Cooke (1992) 
 
 
Table 7 Business superstructure - Three modalities of business interrelationship 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Localist RIS 
 
 
Interactive RIS 
 
 
Globalized RIS 
 
    
Domination 
 
Large enterprise, 
either indigenous or 
inward investment 
Balance between 
large and small firms 
Global corporations, 
often supported by 
clustered supply 
chains of dependent 
SMEs 
Research reach of 
firms 
 
Not very great; local Varies between 
widespread access or 
regional research 
resources to foreign 
innovation sourcing 
as and when required 
Largely internal  
Public and/or Private 
research activity 
 
Major public but 
smaller private R&D 
resources  
Mix of public and 
private R&D 
resources 
Highly privatistic 
rather than public 
Degree of 
associationalism 
 
Reasonably high Higher than average  Heavily influenced 
by the needs of larger 
firms 
 
Source: Own creation solely based upon Cooke (1998, pp. 21-24); modalities of regional innovation systems 
(RIS) initially proposed by Cooke & Morgan (1994a) 
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The regional innovation systems (RIS) concept hence can be seen as a ‘governance approach’ 
that can ‘assist in understanding of the differences and similarities in terms of level and 
degree of institutionalization of the RIS, the extent, by implication, that “systemness” can be 
said to be present, even (on the basis of case studies) whether “regional innovation” is a 
meaningful notion in concrete instances’ (Cooke, 1998, p. 19). For this purpose, Cooke 
combined the classificatory schema of both dimension to propose a typology of regional 
innovation systems, which then was applied to the empirical case studies that featured in the 
book (Braczyk et al., 1998b). The result is reproduced in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4 Regional innovation systems: towards a typology 
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Source: Cooke (1998, Figure 1.2 on p. 22) 
 
By providing a ‘conceptual model of an innovation governance system’(Cooke, 1998, p. 25), 
the approach certainly overcomes the national system of innovation literature ‘silence on sub-
national institutions’ (Morgan, 2001a, p. 19). Cooke (1998, p. 17) basically outlines the 
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essential elements and processes (‘key nodes and flows of information, authority, advice and 
so on’) to the ‘functioning of an innovation support architecture’.  
 
In contrast to the national innovation system (see Lundvall, 1992a, pp. 12-13), however, the 
regional conceptualisation is a more ‘narrow’ orientation, not just spatially, but also as a result 
of the objective to ‘be more operational’ (Cooke et al., 1997, p. 489). Nelson & Rosenberg 
(1993, pp. 4-5), in their understanding of [national] innovation systems, do not presume that 
the system is ‘consciously designed, or even that the set of institutions involved work together 
smoothly and coherently’. Cooke (1998, pp. 17-18) on the other hand seems to suggest that it 
is consciously designed and aims to provide an operational guide to the construction and 
governance of ‘regional enterprise innovation support system’ by presenting an adaptation of 
the formal conceptual model after Joanneum Interreg (1995) (see Figure 5 below). The 
question remains, however what operational guidance it offers. The diagram implies that a 
cooperative forum and a steering committe are to be established, a technology agency to be 
created (if not existent already), research to be carried out, and reporting and coordination 
measures to be introduced, but it does not offer any guidance for how to achieve an inclusive 
participation of stakeholders or how to overcome vested interests and inter-institutional 
conflicts that are regarded here as key determinants of regional and subregional governance 
dynamics.  
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Figure 5 A regional enterprise support system for innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cooke (1998, Figure 1.1 on p. 18) after Joanneum Interreg (1995) 
 
 
Cooke & Morgan (1998, p. 71) also regard a regional innovation system as an advanced form 
of a regional learning system, in which ‘upstream [or inventive] and downstream or applied 
research is integrated into regional industry’. The following quote illustrates this view neatly: 
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Regions which posses the full panoply of innovation organizations set in an 
institutional milieu where systemic linkage and interactive communication among the 
innovation actors is normal, approach the designation of regional innovation systems. 
[…] Moreover, they should demonstrate systemic linkages through concertation 
programmes, research partnerships, value-adding information flow, and policy action 
lines from the governance organizations. These are systems that combine learning with 
upstream and downstream innovation capability and thus warrant the designation 
regional innovation systems. (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 71)111 
 
Cooke & Morgan (1998, pp. 72 and 71 respectively) add that ‘[r]egional innovation systems 
of the upstream variety will approximate to Porterian (1990) “clusters”’ in that interactions 
are ‘close to the point of origination of the invention or idea’. However, a distinction needs to 
be made between clusters and regional innovation systems. This point is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
In summary, it can be concluded that the regional innovation systems approach regards 
regions an economic space (i.e. geography matters in industrial organization), as relational 
space (i.e. institutions matter), as well as a location to drive innovation (i.e. proximity in a 
wider sense matters for learning and innovation). However, the question is, the extent to 
which such a model adequately captures the totality of regional and in particular sub-regional 
governance dynamics. The thesis turns to look at cluster models. 
 
                                                 
111 The omitted passage lists examples of such innovation organizations. It (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 71) states 
the following: ‘The organizations can be expected to consist of universities, basic research laboratories, applied 
research laboratories, technology transfer agencies, regional public and private (e.g. trade associations, chamber 
of commerce) governance organizations, vocational training organizations, banks, venture capitalists, and 
interacting large and small firms.’ Elsewhere, Cooke (1997, p. 362) provides a broad categorization to this long 
list of organizations by stating that ‘[a] regional innovation system […] is composed of economic (e.g. firms, 
private research institutes), institutional (e.g. education institutions, government departments, chambers of 
commerce), technological (e.g. technology transfer agencies) and social sub-systems, which interact 
continuously with each other and operate as a system.’ 
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Clusters and Regional innovation systems compared 
The regional innovation system concept can be viewed as emanating from the convergence 
between the concept of the cluster and the national systems of innovation theory (see Cooke, 
1998, p. 24). Indeed, when introducing his concept, Cooke (e.g. 1998, pp. 5 and 10) makes 
particular reference to Porter’s cluster concept. However, he (ibid., p 10) stresses clearly that 
his interest lies in the ‘systemic rather than simply aggregate nature’ of the cluster 
phenomenon. Cooke et al. (1997, p. 476) further distinguish their approach by stating that 
they rather take a regional instead of a sectoral ‘lens through which to observe the ways in 
which different sectors or even clusters interact with the regional governance and innovation 
support infrastructures as well as the national and global levels.’112  
 
Cooke & Memedovic (2003, p. 21) also state that ‘globally competitive regional and local 
industrial clusters […] are often telescoped versions of regional and even national innovation 
systems, especially where science-based, as with biotechnology and ICT’ are concerned.113 
Hence, they see (ibid., p. 2) ‘clusters as specific sub-systems operating within regional 
innovation systems settings’. In this view, as seen before, the cluster represents the business 
superstructure dimension of the regional innovation system (cf. also Landabaso, 2002, p. 22). 
In return, competitive industries tend to cluster in a particular system of determinants, which 
                                                 
112 Cooke et al. (1997, p. 476) have thus made the important distinction between sectors and clusters, since 
Chechire & Malecki (2004, p. 259) rightly point out that the cluster concept is [w]idely misapplied in the 
regional literature as merely the collection of sectors that have traded interactions, indicated by input-output 
linkages’.  
113 Although akin, both models have to be distinguished clearly, even if one is seen as a sub-system of the other. 
For clarification, the distinction is put here in different words. On the one side, the cluster model is seen as a 
particular model of industrial organization theories that describes a potentially favourable situation for firm’s 
growth in a particular spatial setting. Basically, it helps to classify and to explain how a competitive advantage of 
firms as well as of locations (for firms) arises and thus focuses more on interfirm competition. While, on the 
other side, an innovation system is seen here more as a classification model and a modular construction system 
for policy-makers in order to achieve a favourable, associative business environment and superstructure with 
effective linkages to firms, which may lead eventually to a forming of, or sustaining of, clusters. 
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for Porter (1998b, pp. 148-149) is the ‘diamond’ competitive model while it is for Cooke the 
collaborative ‘regional innovation system’. While the cluster concept arguably focuses on 
interfirm relationships and on competitive factor conditions, the regional innovation systems 
concept places an emphasis on learning, collaboration and its systemic facilitation or 
governance of the ‘support system for innovation’ (Cooke & Memedovic, 2003, p. 2).114 This 
perspective is also illustrated by Cheshire & Malelecki’s following comment: 
 
[S]maller scale systems [than the national system of innovation (NSI)] are variously 
called clusters, territorial production complexes, productive systems, territorial 
systems, milieus, and local systems [but] can nevertheless be seen to belong under the 
umbrella of regional innovation systems. (P. C. Cheshire & Malecki, 2004, p. 258) 
 
The following section elaborates on the concept of cluster, as the ‘business superstructure’ 
dimension of regional innovation systems. The next chapter then addresses operational policy 
aspects. 
 
Porter’s cluster of competitive industries  
 
Michael Porter’s theory of national competitive advantage ‘constitutes one facet’ of Porter’s 
systemic ‘diamond’ model of national competitive advantage (Porter & Ketels, 2003, p. 27) 
that comprises an understanding of industrial organisation characterised by competitive 
clusters of industries. Porter (1990; 2nd ed. in 1998b, p. 131 and cf. also p. 148) states that 
‘competitive industries are not spread evenly through the economy’ but instead ‘are connected 
                                                 
114 Cooke & Memedovic (2003, p. 2) also add that ‘[r]eference is made both to the support systems for 
innovation, from the private actions of the market to the interventions of governments, and to the ways in which 
well-functioning systems and clusters may have their own formal or informal governance.’ 
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[…] in clusters consisting of industries related by links of various kinds’.115 He defines 
(1998b, p. xxii of the preface) the concept of clusters as ‘groups of interconnected firms, 
suppliers, related industries, and specialized institutions in particular fields that are present in 
particular locations’.116  
 
The geographical proximity of rival firms, customers, suppliers, institutions, and so on, is 
supposed to spur competition and hence promotes efficiencies and specialization (cf. Porter & 
Ketels, 2003, p. 27). It enables companies, for example, to gain quickly from external 
economies of scale by benefiting from the process of innovation and upgrading that occurs in 
its surrounding environment (Grichting, 1976, pp. 77-79 ; Porter, 1998b, p. 144), which 
includes universities located nearby that are regarded as sources of new ideas and as 
providing demand stimuli (Porter, 1998b, pp. 159-160). Therefore, it ‘increases the 
concentration of information’, and also ‘acts as a strong magnet to attract talented people’ 
(ibid., p. 157).117 
 
The cluster concept comprises a clear intra-firm strategic management perspective that views 
innovation as key to inter-firm competitiveness as well as to some extent recognises the role 
of the socio-institutional environment as influencing factor condition that goes beyond the 
pure phenomenon of accumulation of firms in specific locations based upon agglomeration 
advantages. Clusters further ‘improve incentives’ and enhance the formation of new 
                                                 
115 Porter (1998a, see Table 7-1 on p. 262 and pp. 284-287) himself provides a neat extensive bibliography of 
cluster initiatives, and cluster-based reports and case studies for the years between 1990 and 1997. 
116 Thereby, Porter acknowledges the role of the business support superstructure, even though specialized 
institutions such as universities are rather regarded - in a static way - as a factor endowment grouped under 
knowledge resources (see Porter, 1998b, p. 75). However, Porter (1998b, p. 134) nevertheless attributes to them 
being a potential source of dynamic factor creation as a result of industry-research relationships. 
117 Porter’s notion of the ‘magnet’ obviously resembles the ‘centripetal force’ (Fujita & Krugman, 2004, p. 156; 
Myrdal, 1957) of Marshall’s (1947, p. 271) ‘industrial district’ of ‘groups of skilled workers’. 
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businesses as well as ‘create collective assets in the form of information, specialised 
institutions, and reputation, among others’ (Porter, 1998b, pp. xxii-xxiii of Introduction). 
 
Figure 6 Michael Porter's diamond model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Porter (1998b, p. 127)  
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to Enright, it is this, mix, which gives the cluster an advantage over, in contrast to, dispersed 
industries. Moreover, Rosenfeld (1997, p. 9) stresses that ‘[i]n a cluster the social ecology is 
as important as the agglomeration economies.’  
 
However, Porter’s cluster concept and other conceptualisations of industrial organization and 
transactions lack an explanation of the underlying dynamics within socio-institutional 
framework in regional economic development as well as of how innovation evolves.  
 
Critical reflections - Deconstructing clusters?  118 
 
The notion of clusters was not new neither its conceptualisation. Indeed, it builds very much 
upon Schumpeter’s ‘swarming’ or clustering of industry (cf. J. M. Simmie, 2001, p. 16) and 
resembles, to some extent, the earlier ‘growth poles’ (pôles de croissance) concept of Perroux 
(1955), who captured thereby the ‘clustered imbalances (in sectoral and geographical space) 
that result form the adoption of innovation, as Lasuén (1973, p. 164) points out (cf. also 
Malecki, 1997, pp. 254-255; Schätzl, 2001, pp. 182-189).119 Porter’s cluster concept is to be 
seen as a description of specific industrial grouping, or concentration, with a competitive 
advantage (which was derived from a firm’s perspective) that is portrayed as the outcome of a 
particular conducive (‘diamond’) system of determinants (cf. Porter, 1998b, pp. 148-149). 
While Porter conceptualises this grouping mainly within a national perspective or system, 
                                                 
118 The title hints to Martin & Sunley’s paper (2001; 2003) entitled ‘Deconstructing clusters: chaotic concept or 
policy panacea?’ 
119 In a presentation entitled “Clusters: A chaotic concept leading into a spacious policy cul-de-sac?” (at a 
conference on “Cluster Policies and Local Enterprise: Benefits to You”, held on November 28th 2002 by the 
Mercia Institute of Enterprises as part of the EnterpriseFest 2002 at the European Research Institute at the 
University of Birmingham), Ray Hudson of Durham University quoted, for example, also a White Paper of 
Regional Development in the North East (known as The North East Study) from 1963 to point out that the ideas 
about clusters are not new. 
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others like Enright (1998, p. 315) or Cooke (1998, pp. 10-11) do so at a regional (subnational) 
level or within a regional system of determinants fostering competitiveness and innovation.120  
 
Porter (1990; 2nd ed. in 1998b, p. xiii in the preface and p. 173) himself acknowledges that 
his theory of national competitive advantage and his cluster model ‘draws on and spans 
several fields’ meaning that it is a ‘holistic approach’ (cf. also Porter's late account of 
historical and intellectual antecedents in 1998a, pp. 206-208). His diamond model hence has 
been labelled as being rather ‘eclectic’ (Clark, 1999, p. 152), but Rugman & D’Cruz (1993, p. 
20), and similarly Raines (2002b, p. 176), for example, see it as a special achievement having 
brought these different ideas together as holistic determinants of the ‘diamond’ framework 
(cf. Schierenbeck, 1999, pp. 10-18). 
 
On the other hand, Martin & Sunley’s (2001, p. 11) base their strong criticism and attempt to 
‘deconstruct’ the cluster concept exactly on this aspect as they label it as a ‘metaphor’ being 
‘deliberately vague and sufficiently indeterminate’ instead of ‘[r]ather being a model or 
theory to be rigorously tested and evaluated’. Martin & Sunley point out that ‘clusters, it 
seems, have become a world-wide fad, as sort of academic and policy fashion item’ (ibid., p. 
4) that ‘have gate-crashed the economic policy arena’ due to its ‘seductive’ nature (p. 5).121 
                                                 
120 Porter (1998b, pp. 148-149) states that ‘[t]he systemic nature of the “diamond” promotes the clustering of a 
nation’s competitive industries.’ The resulting industrial grouping can take the form of an industrial districts, 
which Porter (1998a, footnote 5 on p. 269 regarding p. 204) views as ‘a special case of clusters’. This is 
supported by Enright (1998, p. 315), who accordingly states that ‘[r]egional (subnational) clusters include 
geographically concentrated industries (including so-called “industrial districts”) and differ from business 
networks (which involve communication and cooperation among firms that need not to be located in close 
physical proximity)’. 
121 Raines (2002a, p. 22) also addresses the questions ‘that have been consistently raised about whether the 
cluster concept has simply “hijacked” economic development policy discourse by re-labelling existing policy 
approaches with little added value, or “piggy-backed” it by extending the existing policy concepts through the 
introduction of novel frameworks, targets, instruments and processes of policy intervention.’ In short, it’s the 
question whether cluster policy exist (‘as an autonomous, distinctive area of public sector endeavour’) as Raines 
title indicates. In response to this question, Raines (2002a, p. 29 and cf. p. 30) seems to partly prefer the ‘piggy-
backed’ label. While obviously agreeing to the ‘considerable debt of current cluster policy to previous policy 
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They describe the model as a ‘chaotic concept’ (ibid., p. 11) and conclude that its definition 
‘seems intentionally opaque and fuzzy’ (p. 13).122  
 
In consequence, this ‘fuzziness’ obviously leads to different interpretations of clusters and it 
has been labelled as an ‘adaptable approach’ with regards to policy-making (Raines, 2002b, p. 
176). Despite the criticism it has received on some of its conceptual shortcomings and limits, 
it can be argued that the cluster concept can be used as an analytical tool.123 It can be argued 
that some of the ‘fuzziness’ also derives from this adaptability, meaning that the cluster 
concept’s interpretation in effect has also evolved by incorporating different new influences. 
These changes have been adequately outlined by Lagendijk’s (1999a, p. 4) Table as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                        
traditions’ and its proximate boundaries to other policy portfolios, he notes - with reference to Mariussen (2001) 
– the cluster concept’s ‘ability to re-combine related but hitherto autonomous policy traditions’. See also the later 
section on the cluster concept’s policy relevance or contribution.  
122 In a presentation in 2002 (see footnote 119), Ray Hudson also called the cluster concept ‘chaotic’ due to its 
‘conceptual fuzziness’. Raines (2002a, p. 22) also reports that ‘[t]he fuzziness of the target of clusters policies is 
reflected in the portfolio of working definitions used for a “cluster”, ranging from simple commercial networks 
to traditional sectors to more sophisticated inter-sectoral, business-academic groupings.’ 
123 The author of this study wishes to acknowledge here his affinity to the cluster concept. This affinity as well as 
similarly the earlier refusal to denounce the, though abstract, notion of regional competitiveness (see earlier 
discussions) may be grounded in the author’s strategic management study background.  
 104 
 
 
Table 8  Six changes in the conceptualisation of 'clusters' identified by Lagendijk 
 
1. Perceiving of clusters as an analytical model, derived from observations of the 
dynamics of co-located interrelated industries (Porter’s Competitive Advantage of 
Nations). 
2. Associating clusters with spatial agglomeration (introducing the concept among 
geographers). 
3. Linking clusters to concepts of innovation (notably to the notion of ‘systems of 
innovation’, moving the concept further into the area of policy-making. 
4. Building a bridge between clusters and an associative approach to economic 
development (toning down the ‘rivalry’ element in the original cluster approach). 
5. Gearing cluster approaches towards the development of SMEs (inciting a close 
marriage with the notion of networking), introducing the concept into the area of 
business development. 
6. Inserting the cluster concept in various concept in various ongoing debates, such as the 
‘learning economy’, ‘trades’ vs. ‘untraded’ linkages, the local-global nexus, and issues 
of regional specialisation; here the difference between clusters as analytical model and 
policy strategy is increasingly blurred. 
 
Source: Lagendijk (1999a, Table 1 on p. 4) 
 
Identifying clusters  
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that there are problems concerning the cluster concept, 
especially regarding identifying clusters for policy development. However, the key problem 
issue is not so much the non-excluding feature of it in admitting a wide range of 
specialisations and determinants, as Martin & Sunley try to suggest (2001, p. 11), but instead 
the non-definition of a critical mass, on what a cluster constitutes, which rather represents the 
other side of the same coin. To be more precise here, it is more the definitional 
incompleteness of scale not just scope that is often problematic. Yet, on the aspect of scale, 
Porter (1998b, pp. 739-744) has actual provided a methodology to identify or measure 
(national) industrial clusters, which is predominantly based on comparative export data.124  
                                                 
124 In order to prepare national cluster charts, Porter (1998b, p. 739) proposes to mainly use the United Nations 
International Trade Statistical Yearbook together with national data on FDI and services trade as a basic source. 
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Based upon Porter’s methodology, the European Cluster Observatory provided in June 2007, 
for the first time, a consistent quantitative cluster mapping analysis of European clusters 
based on employment data.125  
 
It can be argued that Porter’s ‘cluster chart’ methodology identifies a kind of ‘minimum 
efficient scale’ for a dynamic ‘outward-orientated cluster’ (Porter, 1998a, p. 227) in terms of 
competitive firms.126 However, this methodology is limited and static in that it only identifies 
industrial sectors with a comparative performance, while it is not capable to provide clues for 
future potential nor to outline key ingredients and competencies of a cluster. Rosenfeld (1997, 
pp. 10-12) ascertains that the key to the synergy and competitiveness of a geographical cluster 
is not just the ‘concentration and critical mass of related firms’, i.e. size and capabilities (cf. 
                                                                                                                                                        
To derive the ‘basic raw material’, he suggests to identify all three-, four- and five-digit SITC industries ‘in 
which the nation’s share of the world market economy exports in the industry equalled or exceeded the nation’s 
average share of world trade in the year (referred to as the nation’s cutoff).’ In simple words, it’s the 
identification of all those national industries that exhibit an above-average national export performance. From 
this ‘raw material’ list of industries, Porter (1998b, pp. 740-741) proposes then to eliminate those industries, 
which display a negative trade balance - that is where the industry’s imports are higher than the exports - (unless 
they have a high world export share); which are dominated by foreign companies as part of their global 
manufacturing strategy; and those for which their trade was mainly with neighbouring nations. To arrive at the 
final cluster chart, he also suggests supplementing the list by those industries, which undertook substantial FDI, 
and by service industries. Porter (1998b, p. 741), however, points out that in particular the statistical ‘data on 
foreign investment and services trade are highly incomplete’ and hence preparing a cluster chart may need a 
researcher’s ‘judgment’ (e.g. based on field interviews). Furthermore, there are, of course, also some statistical 
limitations in using such an approach. The industrial classification of the statistical data (SITC, SIC) may, for 
example, not capture accurately cluster activities that span across different sectoral classifications. A European 
Commission publication (2005e) compiled by the Enterprise and Industry DG entitled ‘EU sectoral 
competitiveness indicators’ also provides a good source of statistical data on the competitive performance of EU 
industry (i.e. competitiveness),sector by sector, going back as far as 1979. The report is available at http://europa 
.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/competitiveness/doc/eu_sectoral_competitiveness_indicators.pdf 
125 The results are available at http://www.clusterobservatory.eu 
126 Porter (1998a, p. 227, emphasis added) distinguishes between ‘outward-orientated clusters’ (which can be 
regional clusters) that ‘account for a major share of the economy within a geographic area as well as an 
overwhelming share of the outward-oriented activity (for example, exports to other locations and investments in 
other locations by locally based firms’ and two other types of local clusters, namely ‘localized industries and 
clusters that do not compete with other locations (for example, restaurants, entertainment, logistical services, real 
estate, and construction); and local subsidiaries of competitive firms based elsewhere that primarily serve the 
local market (for example, sales of offices, customer support centers, branch offices, and assembly plants)’. 
Please also note that normally, the term minimum efficient scale (MES) is used - in a different context - for the 
scale of the individual enterprise ‘at which unit costs cease to fall’ (Pratten, 1988, p. 18). 
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Porter, 1998a, pp. 198 and 240), but equally the presence of ‘active channels for business 
transactions dialogue, and communications’, which determine the ‘dynamics of a clusters’. 
Hence, it can be argued that Porter does not take sufficient account of the way how clusters 
evolve and decline – even though he outlines the different cluster stages of development and 
conducive factors (1998a, pp. 204 and 237-245; 1998b, pp. 159-173 and 545-546).127  
 
Instead, the regional innovation systems concept can be considered as model which focuses 
more on these aspects and, therefore, places more of an operational emphasis on how clusters 
evolve and how they, perhaps, can be created and supported by the governance of enterprise 
innovation support. Nevertheless, it is not the intention here to imply that the cluster concept 
has not of any value in developing a suitable policy. Far from that, this thesis argues that the 
cluster concept should certainly remain part of this process. It is seen here as being particular 
useful in order to improve the understanding of the individual characteristics and dynamics of 
the business superstructure, which represents one dimension of the regional innovation 
systems. Insofar, it presumes that dynamic clusters shape the overall functioning of their 
regional innovation systems and that, vice versa, effective regional innovation systems shape 
the composition of their dynamic clusters of industries, i.e. give rise to new clusters and 
sustain and/or alter existing ones.  
 
Indeed, there is a clear consensus in the literature that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ best-
practice policy model or ‘blueprint’ to economic development policy in general, and to 
promote innovation, clusters, and innovation systems in particular (e.g. Burroni & Trigilia, 
2001, p. 78; Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 25; den Hertog, Bergman, & Charles, 2001a, pp. 413-
                                                 
127 Indeed, Feldman, Francis, & Bercovitz (2005, p. 130) criticize in general the current literature for their 
‘limited understanding of how clusters emerge, take hold and transform regional economies’. 
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414; Martin & Sunley, 2001, p. 42; Nauwelaers & Morgan, 1999, p. 236; Piore & Sabel, 
1984, p. 15; Raines, 2002b, p. 166). Instead, regional policies, for example, ought to be 
geared towards the idiosyncrasies of the individual region, taking into account the 
composition, structure and strength of the production system; its main drivers; the political, 
social and cultural peculiarities; the nature of research activities, cooperation and 
competences; and so on (see, for example, the characteristics outlined in Table 8 and Table 9) 
in order to become a more effective. An in-depth understanding of the particular production 
system or cluster is therefore pivotal to the success of policies. Hence, the next section 
elaborates on the different views on clusters.  
 
Cluster characteristics 
 
The above-mentioned notion of a ‘critical mass’ is often made in discourses on clusters (e.g. 
Ache, 2002, p. 27; Advani, 1997; Boekholt et al., 1998, p. 3; Porter, 1998a, pp. 198 and 240; 
Schätzl, 2001, pp. 234-235 and 239; Temple, 1998, pp. 266-268; van den Berg, Braun, & van 
Winden, 1999, p. 15).128 Proposing to define a critical mass of a cluster, to some extent, 
subliminally assumes that clusters are all alike and one particular phenomenon. However, the 
literature seems to be in accord with the view that this is not the case. This study refrains here 
from providing a litany of the different definitions brought forward of what a cluster 
constitutes (cf. instead the examples drawn by De Propis, 2005, p. 198; Martin & Sunley, 
2001, Table 1 on p. 15) and, hence, contents itself with Porter’s definition stated above.129 
                                                 
128 Boekholt et al. (1998, p. 3), for example, define the critical mass of regional high-tech clusters or 
‘Kompetenzzentren’ as ‘the [unspecified] number of institutions, firms and people working in a particular 
technological area [that] is sufficient to create synergy effects and economies of scale’. See also Footnote 137.  
129 In addition to the different definitions applied, different terms have also been used interchangeably to 
describe clusters, or specific cases of it (such as industrial districts). For instance, Boekholt et al. (1998, pp. 1 
and 3) refer to the German term of Kompetenzzentrum (see Footnote 137). Martin & Sunley (2001, p. 18) point 
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Instead, it presents a list of some basic common characteristics that clusters are suppose to 
exhibit as well as a congregation of different typologies of clusters. While the former list 
obviously highlights the similarities, latter supports the view that clusters (of competitive 
industries) can take different forms and be based upon different competitive advantages.130  
 
Rosenfeld (2002, p. 6) succinctly identifies the basic distinctive characteristics of clusters. 
His outline is borrowed and recited here in very brief form: 131 
 
• Clusters are based on systemic relationships among firms. 
• Clusters are geographically bound. 
• Clusters have life cycles. 
• Clusters are not defined by organisational membership. 
• Clusters produce externalities 
• Clusters are defined by relationships. 
 
Cooke (1998, pp. 10-11) also mainly differentiates between the notions of ‘innovative 
regional cluster’ and ‘innovative industrial cluster’ (depending on whether they are 
geographically defined or not). Thus, the former rather represents a geographically localized 
and the latter a globalized, more virtual version of a cluster. This later more virtually defined 
cluster to some extent reflects various contributions (Clark, 1999, p. 154; Dunning, 1993, p. 
105; Rugman & D'Cruz, 1993, p. 34) towards the conceptualisation of what is termed here 
                                                                                                                                                        
out that French analysts (e.g. Crouch et al., 2001; Crouch & Trigilia, 2001, p. 213 and cf. index) rather refer to 
‘local production systems’ (LPS). This, of course, potentially causes confusion and misinterpretations, increasing 
the ‘fuzziness’ of the conceptualisation..  
130 Nonetheless, it could alternatively also be argued that, in contrary, the typecasting is born out of conceptual 
polyphony. This alternative view, however, is not shared here. 
131 Elsewhere, Rosenfeld (1997, p. 9) also distinguishes between networks and clusters with a tabular 
juxtaposition. 
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‘international industrial clusters’, which highlight the influence of multinational business 
activity (MBA) and hence the potential multinational nature of clusters. 132 
 
In addition, often in the more practical policy-maker’s domain, references are made to local 
‘clustering’ or swarming of similar business in the same neighbourhood. 133 It can be argued 
that this co-location represents more the classical case of pure agglomeration. Yet, also Porter 
makes reference to ‘local clusters’ (1998a, p. 228 and cf. p. 227) and ‘microclusters’ as 
‘narrowly defined clusters’ (1998a, p. 267), while Crouch et al. (2001) conceptualise ‘local 
production systems’ as the concentration of manufacturing activities that are identified on the 
basis of ‘travel to work area’ (TTWA) data. 134 David Campbell’s  notion of ‘micro cluster 
groups’ also seems to go beyond cases of pure agglomeration of firms.135. Campbell refers to 
                                                 
132 This study coins the term ‘international industrial clusters’ as a label for these contributions, while not being 
aware that any of the authors provided a notion of such term. However, Rugman & D’Cruz (1993, p. 34) refer to 
international competitiveness and the double [national] diamond, while Dunning (1993, p. 105) and Clark (1999, 
p. 154) point to the influence of multinational business activity (MBA) on Porter’s (1998b, p. 127) diamond.  
133 For instance, Diane Rayner from the Federation of Small Businesses gave the example of ‘antique shops’ that 
often appear to ‘cluster’ in a presentation given during a session on ‘Cluster Policies and SMEs’ at a conference 
on ‘Cluster Policies and Local Enterprise: Benefits to You’, held on November 28th 2002 by the Mercia Institute 
of Enterprises as part of the EnterpriseFest 2002 at the European Research Institute at the University of 
Birmingham. One can obviously think of many other examples of co-location of certain businesses in close 
proximity such as ‘diamond quarters’ or ‘caravan sales streets’ and so on. This co-location basically produces 
simple agglomeration advantages in terms of reputation and marketing. 
134 Unfortunately, local production systems (LPSs) were not defined consistently in the different national studies 
compiled by Crouch et al. (2001) but they ‘were usually identified with industrial districts’ (Crouch & Trigilia, 
2001, p. 212-213). Burroni & Trigilia (2001, Footnote 2 on p. 47) define a local production system as ‘a Travel 
to Work Area which has a percentage of persons employed in manufacturing activities higher than the national 
average’. For the different methodologies of identifying LPSs, compare Burroni & Trigilia’s (2001, p. 51 
including Footnotes 4 and 5) use of the ‘Location Quotient’ (LQ) indicator; Glassmann & Voelzkow’s (2001, p. 
80 and see Notes 2 and 3 to table 4.1 on p. 83) use of the Gini coefficient and localization coefficient; Aniello & 
Le Galès’ (2001, p. 129 and cf. also p. 149) list of indicators; and Crouch & Farrell’s (2001, pp. 160, 164, and 
173) methodology of distinguishing ‘empirical clusters’ of SMEs.  
135 David Campbell, Director of the Regional Centre for Clustering in North Tyneside entitled ‘Regional Service 
for Clustering’ (RSC, see www.clustering.org.uk) has elaborated their RSC cluster development approach and 
his notion of ‘micro cluster group’ in his presentation entitled ‘Creating Innovative Clusters’ at a Conference on 
‘Employment creation through support for sectors and clusters’, held on December 9th 2003 by the Institute of 
Local Government Studies, School of Public Policy, The University of Birmingham, at Garth House, University 
of Birmingham Conference Park, Birmingham. David Campbell highlighted in particular their ‘Bit of a Do’ 
Wedding Cluster (www.bitofado.com) as a successful best practice model.  
Please note that this study made reference to this initiative purely on the creative aspects. The author abstains to 
comment further on this as no evaluation of the cluster development programme and funding has been 
undertaken due to the limits of this study. Interested readers may turn instead to Lagendijk’s (1999a) AL 
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them as networks or groups of small businesses that create quickly economies of scale by the 
pooling of marketing and research activities as well as by complementing each other’s 
production range. The difference here is that these groups involve a collaborative dimension 
towards the formation of (fee-paying) specialised business clubs. They are created or policy-
led in that the cooperation is reactively and proactively brought together by a regional 
business support service, which not only provide the partner matching and searching services 
but also business advice (mainly concerning marketing and accounting). Although this 
approach is regarded as a viable business support approach, it is viewed here more as a 
horizontally integrated business network than a cluster. Nevertheless, it can be argued – as 
Campbell does - that, potentially, ‘micro cluster groups’ could initiate a cluster development 
and turn into ‘macro clusters’. However, in most cases this will remain ‘wishful thinking’ 
judging from the rareness of cases where consensus has been reached that they constitute a 
real phenomenon of a successful ‘working clusters’.136 The success of such transformation 
arguably depends upon conditions that are external to the group. The innovativeness and 
potential of the network to span advantages over to other sectors as well as its linkages to the 
wider business superstructure and specialized institutions are likely to be key in reaching a 
competitive advantage (that is difficult to copy and imitate) and a critical mass to constitute a 
cluster in Porterian sense. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ADAPT report, which incorporates an analysis of SME cluster policy initiatives in Tyneside, North East 
England, including reference to the RSC. Interestingly, the European Commission’s regular publication 
European Innovation (formerly Innovation and Technology Transfer) in its September 2006 issue (p. 19) has 
also reported upon a potentially similar policy example of the Brainstorming Innovation Group (BIG) project at 
Technology Enterprise Kent, in England, in setting up a “wedding ring” in which a ‘wedding service supply 
chain’ promotes ‘each other’s services and hence increase sales. 
136 While Porter (1990; 1998b, p. 149) indicates that industrial clustering is more of a common phenomenon, he 
also points out in his later work (Porter & Ketels, 2003, p. 28) that ‘[o]nly a small number of clusters tend to be 
true innovation centres. Others may tend to specialise in products aimed at particular market segments, or be 
manufacturing centres.’ a later other authors have pointed out that successful, self-sufficient working cluster are 
a much rarer real phenomenon.   
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Moreover, different drivers of clusters can be identified and form the basis of a typology. 
Boekholt et al. (1998, pp. 4-5) from Technopolis compared internationally successful cases of 
regional high-tech clusters or ‘Kompetenzzentren’137 - the German term they used for it - and 
mainly distinguished three different types depending on whether they were science & 
technology-led (which includes the classical entrepreneurial cases of Silicon Valley and Route 
128 near Boston)138, industry-led (but in cooperation with academic research)139, or policy-led 
(i.e. rather artificially planned and brought together by policy).140 Regarding the first-
mentioned, Feldman et al. (2005, p. 130) actually refer to the typical case stories of Silicon 
Valley and Route 128 rather as ‘innovative industrial clusters’, which they contrast to their 
model of ‘entrepreneurial cluster’ (ibid., p. 132). Latter can be depicted as an interconnected 
and reinforcing system of the dimensions of entrepreneurs, government policy, and local 
environment. Ann Markusen’s (1996, p. 293) typology of industrial districts as ‘sticky places 
in slippery space’ 141 also differentiates according to ‘firm configurations, internal versus 
                                                 
137 Boekholt et al. (1998, pp. 1 and 3) refer the concept of Kompetenzzentrum also to a type of ‘centre of 
excellence’ (or Competence Centre) and define it in its broadest sense as ‘a regional agglomeration that manages 
to created added value through a well networked “value chain” ranging from knowledge creation to 
commercialisation and diffusion, in one or more technology based markets. This value chain contains the 
elements basic research, applied research, development commercialisation and diffusion.’ This definition can be 
criticized for its mainly linear view of innovation. 
138 Porter (1998a, footnote 6 on p. 269 regarding p. 204) points out that university-centred clusters are sometimes 
also termed as technopoles and science cities, giving Advani (1997) as an example. 
139 Another distinction is made in this respect by Birkinshaw & Hood (1997, pp. 9-10 and abstract), who 
distinguish two polar types of industry clusters depending on the level of foreign investment. One the one side 
they define the leading-edge cluster as one that is ‘based on innovation and knowledge, with historically low 
levels of foreign ownership’, while on the other side the branch plan clusters refer to industry clusters that 
emerged ‘on the basis of market-access or low-cost, and with historically high levels of foreign ownership’. 
140 In addition to this typology, Boekholt et al. (1998, pp. 103-105) also point out that the development of 
regional high-tech clusters or ‘Kompetenzzentren’ follows different phases in the technology life cycles. See also 
Crouch & Farrell’s (2001, pp. 175-198) distinction between industrial districts, policy-stimulated clusters and 
market driven clusters. Roland Berger & Partner et al. (1998, pp. 10-11) similarly differentiate five types of 
‘Kompetenzzentren’ or technopoles, namely industrial complexes of high-technology firms; science cities; 
technology parks of high-technology production firms driven by government or university initiatives; 
metropolitan types; and virtual types. 
141 With her phrase of ‘sticky places in slippery space’, Markusen (1996, pp. 293 and 294) describes the puzzling 
feature of certain places that ‘are able to sustain their attractiveness to both capital and labour’ and ‘maintain 
relatively high wage levels, social wages, and quality of life’ although the ‘production space’ (especially in the 
advanced capitalist countries) ‘has become increasingly “slippery”, as the ease to capital of moving plants grows 
and as new competing lines are set up in lower-cost regions elsewhere.’ industrial districts According to 
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external orientation, and governance structures’. Besides the traditional ‘Marshallian 
industrial district’ and its ‘Italianate variant’ linked to ‘flexible specialization’ - normally 
referred to as ‘new industrial district’ (e.g. Markusen, 1996, p. 294) or ‘Post Marshallian 
industrial district’ (Hanson, 2001, p. 44), Markusen (1996, p. 293 and see Table 1 on pp. 298-
299 and Figure 1 on p. 197) adds three additional types: ‘a hub-and-spoke industrial district, 
revolving around one or more dominant, externally orientated firms; a satellite platform, an 
assemblage of unconnected branch plants embedded in external organization links; and the 
state-anchored district, focused on one or more public-sector institutions’ (e.g. military bases, 
universities). 
 
Porter (1998a, p. 204 and footnote 5 on p. 269) further differentiates the nature of clusters 
according to their industrial structures. He distinguishes between clusters that ‘consist 
primarily of small- and medium-sized firms’ (referring to the Italian ‘industrial districts’ and 
footwear cluster and to the North Carolina home furniture clusters) and those clusters that 
‘involve both large and small firms (for example, Hollywood or the German chemical 
clusters).’ This latter mix of large and small firms can be distinguished further into ‘hub-and 
spoke industrial district’ and ‘satellite platforms’ according to Markusen’s (1996, see Figure 1 
on p. 197) above-mentioned typology. Similar to Porter, Crouch et al. (2001) distinguish three 
types of local production systems (LPSs), namely industrial districts of ‘networks of 
SMEs’142; networked firms characterized by ‘large customer firms’ involved in 
‘subcontracting relations with SMEs’; and empirical clusters of SMEs with ‘a lower level of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Markusen (1996, p. 294), ‘[s]tickiness connotes both ability to attract as well as to keep, like fly tape, and thus it 
applies to both new and established regions.’ 
142 Crouch & Farrell (2001, p. 163) neatly state that ‘[a]ll industrial districts will be examples of clusters, but not 
all clusters will form industrial districts.’ Hence, as stated before, industrial districts represent one special case of 
a cluster or local production system. See also Burroni & Trigilia (2001, pp. 47-48) and Le Galès & Voelzkow 
(2001, pp. 10-11) for a more detailed definition and elaboration of industrial districts. 
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horizontal integration in comparison to industrial districts’ (Crouch & Trigilia, 2001, pp. 213 
and 221-224; cf. Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, p. 41). 143 
 
This list of different typologies of cluster presented here is certainly not exhaustive, yet it 
covers most of the important characteristics or criteria - labelled here as typology dimensions 
- according to which clusters can be classified.144  Table 11 provides a useful summary to this 
discussion.145   
 
The next chapter looks at governance and policy aspects including how to build successful 
innovation systems by facilitating cluster development and constructing institutional 
thickness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
143 These three types are all distinct ‘from local systems characterized by one or more traditional large firms (for 
instance, the “one company town” model)’ as Crouch & Trigilia (2001, p. 213) add. These local systems are 
instead labelled as ‘large-firm dominated regions’ (Crouch & Farrell, 2001, p. 193) as they do not constitute a 
cluster (of interconnected firms). Crouch & Farrell (2001, pp. 160, 164, and 173 respectively) distinguish 
empirical clusters of SMEs (according to their comparative sectoral concentration of manufacturing employment 
and number of firms) into industrial districts; concentrated clusters and weak clusters; and simple clusters. 
144 This study abstains here from making a distinction, for example, between ‘traditional’, ‘modern’ and ‘high-
tech’ clusters (cf. Boekholt & McKibbin, 2003, p. 10; Crouch & Farrell, 2001, p. 184; Crouch & Trigilia, 2001, 
p. 217) because of its misleading potential to underestimate the role of innovation in traditional sectors as 
indicated by Porter (1998b) and Scott (1999) and since clusters often involve ‘both traditional and high-tech 
industries’ (Porter, 1998a, p. 204).  
145 The applied categorization in the table is simplified in the way that many notions of types of clusters fall not 
only into one category but can be listed under several typology dimensions. An attempt was made, however, to 
categorize according to priority and avoid duplicated notions for reasons of aiming to provide clarity to an 
already complex illustrative overview. In consequence, the table’s according limitation has to be acknowledged. 
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Table 9 Typologies of clusters 
Typology dimension Types of Clusters Sources/Advocates (e.g.)
Sectoral/Industrial Sectoral clusters;  
Innovative industrial clusters 
  (i.e. globalized, more virtual and not  
  particularly geographically defined);  
[International industrial clusters] 
Lasuén, Perroux; 
Cooke; 
Rugman, Dunning, Clark 
[National] clusters; 
Mega-cluster  
Porter I, Porter II; 
den Hertog et al. 
Regional [meso-level] clusters; 
Innovative regional clusters 
Enright, Porter II;  
Cooke 
Geographical/spatial 
delimitations 
Local clustering, swarming; 
Marshallian industrial districts, 
  agglomerations; 
Local clusters, Microclusters; 
Local production systems 
Schumpeter; 
Marshall, Markusen, 
Gordon & McCann;  
UNCTAD, Porter II, 
Crouch et al. 
Competitive clusters; 
Vertical clusters; 
Industrial complex model of clustering;
Innovative clusters; 
Concentrated clusters 
Hanson; 
Arndt; 
Gordon & McCann; 
UNCTAD, Simmie; 
Crouch et al. 
Associational clusters; 
Integrative networks; 
Network (or club) model of clustering; 
Micro-clusters, Micro cluster groups;  
Organized clusters; 
New industrial districts (Italian type) 
Hanson; 
Arndt; 
Gordon & McCann; 
Crouch et al., Campbell;  
UNCTAD; 
Markusen, Hanson 
Modes of cooperation/ 
Degree of associationalism 
Informal / Simple clusters (of SMEs); 
Marshallian industrial district 
UNCTAD / Crouch et al.;
Markusen, Hanson 
Embryonic, growing, mature, and 
  decaying clusters 
Rosenfeld, Boekholt et al., 
Martin & Sunley, Porter  
Working, latent, potential, and ‘wishful
  thinking’ clusters 
Enright, Rosenfeld, 
Martin & Sunley 
Evolutionary/ 
Development stages 
Absorptive, self-sufficient, knowledge  
  intensifying, and self-creating clusters
van den Hove et al. 
Science-led clusters; 
University-centred clusters, 
  technopoles, science cities 
Boekholt et al.; 
Porter II, Martin & 
Sunley, Advani 
Industry-led / Market-driven clusters Boekholt / Crouch et al. 
Policy-led / Policy-stimulated clusters; 
Artificially constituted clusters;  
State-anchored industrial districts 
Boekholt / Crouch et al.; 
UNCTAD; 
Markusen 
Driving factor/ 
Modes of governance 
Entrepreneurial clusters Feldman et al. 
Clusters of SMEs, industrial districts Porter II, Crouch et al. Industrial structure/ 
Firm configurations Clusters of large and small firms Porter II, Crouch et al. 
Source: Own creation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INNOVATION POLICY: FROM THEORY TO STRATEGY 
 
The previous chapter discussed the regional innovation system strand and the concept of the 
cluster. This extends the understanding of both the conceptualisations and the tools for 
identifying industrial organization and competitive environments that is pivotal to the forming 
of suitable and successful policy. The thesis now turns to governance aspects of clusters and 
regional innovation systems; in particular, what policies are pursued, and by whom. It looks at 
institutionalist policy suggestions for constructing institutional thickness as well as the flaws 
in policy. It maps out what is currently theorised as being part of the regional innovation 
system, as a prelude to the empirical investigation. The findings from the case studies 
challenges the assumptions made about regional innovation systems, in particular the 
governance aspects. 
 
The starting point for discussing policy interventions is the role that is attributed to the state. 
For instance, Cooke & Morgan (1998, p. 17) point out that, while there is a consensus in that 
‘the state has a legitimate duty to set the basic framework conditions – law, security, social 
and economic infrastructure, and so on’, which, in a broad sense, includes the basic 
infrastructure provision of ‘such public goods as education, training, and basic research’ 
(ibid., p. 18) – there is ‘little or no political agreement as to what role the state should play on 
economic development’ (ibid., p. 17).  
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Rationales for policy intervention: Market failures versus government failures? 
 
The rationale for policy intervention must be explained by the need to offset certain market 
failures such as market power (e.g. monopoly), information problems (e.g. uncertainty 
concerning investment risks and quality standards), imperfect private capital markets, 
externalities and public goods (e.g. free-rider problem) (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2003a, pp. 63-66; Navarro, 2003, p. 3; Pelkmans, 2001, pp. 273-277; Stubbs, 2001, pp. 144-
145).  
 
The ideological shifts that have taken place (following the Second World War) in this respect 
have been widely reported (e.g. Cooke & Morgan, 1998, pp. 17-24; Morgan & Nauwelaers, 
1999b, pp. 11-12), with three main traditions being outlined: the Keynesian interventionist 
state, neo-liberalism with a view of the state with only ‘limited nightwatchman functions’ 
(Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 18), and the currently emerging ‘third way’ of an associational 
conception.146 The new policy focus moreover appears to be on creating ‘good business 
climates’ (Cooke, 1998, p. 3) for all ‘existing and emerging clusters’ (Porter, 1998b, p. xxvii 
of Introduction).147 The emphasis is therefore more on (the government’s role as animateur) 
facilitating clustering, cooperative behaviour and cluster formation instead of directly 
                                                 
146 The first dominant conceptualisation was that of a dirigiste, ‘Keynesian state’, perceived to be ‘a benign force 
in promoting and regulating economic development’ (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 17); which was succeeded by 
the opposite ‘neoliberal traditon, which seeks to substitute the market for the state wherever possible’ (Morgan 
& Nauwelaers, 1999b, p. 12) and which perceives the state as a ‘malign force which had to be rolled back to the 
limited nightwathcman functions it performed in the nineteenth century’ (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 17). 
Morgan & Nauwelaers (1999b, p. 11) write that ‘the state is gradually being rehabilitated as a necessary and 
legitimate agent in economic development, after a period when it was denigrated […] as a “dead hand” on social 
and economic progress.’ 
147 However, whether we have seen in consequence a withdrawal from industrial policy ‘in large measures’ as 
Cooke (1998, p. 3) suggests, is doubted here. The first-mover advantage in emerging technologies for firms and 
in consequence for regions is - as it is believed here without providing prove - still a too tempting policy 
objective to focus upon many governments. For instance, Raines (2002b, pp. 172-173) reports of ‘some cases’ 
where the cluster approach has been used as a medium for ‘a risky strategy to develop […] the kind of “wishful 
thinking” clusters discussed by Enright (2000)’. 
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supporting or subsidising existing clusters. How to do this in practice is generally not covered 
by any of the two models. 
 
The most widely accepted implication upon policy however is that the public sector ought to 
‘organise publicly funded R&D or to enhance the incentives of private firms to invest in 
knowledge creation’ (Navarro, 2003, p. 3). Thus, the rationale behind the advocacy of 
government financial support for R&D, or technology policy goes back to the particular 
characteristics of innovation. Arrow (1962b) has famously outlined the attributes of 
uncertainty, indivisibility, and inappropriability, which ‘make it inadvisable to leave the 
allocation of resources for invention (and, by implication, technological progress) to the 
market mechanism’ (Stubbs, 2001, p. 143).148 Instead, government ought to pool the risks, 
remove obstacle and provide additional incentives to undertake and utilize R&D because its 
knowledge output is assumed to spill-over and thus provide a higher social return than just the 
individual private return of investment (cf. Department of Trade and Industry, 2003a, p. 68; 
Navarro, 2003, pp. 3-4; Stubbs, 2001, pp. 143-146).  
 
Providing a basic innovation infrastructure 
 
The advocacy of investment in the basic infrastructure provision of such public goods builds 
upon the insights form the ‘new growth theory’ (NGT). While traditionally the focus of 
economic development policies was on the accumulation of capital, the findings of the new 
growth theory placed a particular emphasis upon the role of human capital, knowledge and 
learning for economic growth. In this respect, Haas (1995, pp. 77-92) suggests there is a need 
                                                 
148 In explanation (cf. Stubbs, 2001, pp. 144-145) this is due to the associated high risks involved in undertaking 
research, the unwillingness to contribute to the costs of developing freely available public goods (i.e. free-rider 
problem), and the difficulty in protecting the new ideas or technology from imitation. 
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to maintain investment support but that it should focus upon innovation and education 
policies, while also arguing generally in favour of a supranational research and technology 
policy.  
 
The conceptual framework ‘for the policy terrain for a generalised national system of 
innovation’ of the 2nd edition of the Oslo Manual (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development & Eurostat, 1997, pp. 18-24) outlines three broad categories of factors that 
‘shape innovation at the firm level’ (representing the fourth category referred to as the 
“innovation dynamo”), namely the broader framework conditions (i.e. the surrounding 
environment of national institutions, legal arrangements, macroeconomic and educational 
settings); the science and engineering base; and factors for the transfer and absorption of 
technology, knowledge and skills. The following diagram (Figure 9) illustrates these four 
domains within the innovation policy terrain as outlined by the OECD149: 
                                                 
149 With its footnote 10, the Oslo Manual (ibid., § 76 on p. 19) aacknowledges that ‘[t]his approach to mapping 
innovation policy issues has its antecedents in a method discussed in Department of Industry, Science and 
Technology (1996), Australian Business Innovation: A Strategic Analysis – Measures of Science and Innovation 
5, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 
 119 
 
Figure 7 The innovation policy terrain - a map of issues 
 
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development et al. (1997, Figure 1. on p. 19). 
 
 
 
Innovation Policy towards Building Innovation Systems: Facilitating cluster 
development and constructing institutional thickness 
 
It can be argued that innovation policies need to be geared towards building successful 
innovation systems, which at its core is in effect a twofold strategy: facilitating cluster 
development and constructing institutional thickness. A third, horizontal, axiom is that 
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innovation policy needs to become a holistic paradigm that dominates the policy discourse 
and infiltrates all policy fields with it agenda and vision.  
 
As such the latter very much concerns the interactive way in which policy-making takes 
place. The consequent systemic-ness or coherence of this process is here under particular 
spotlight in this thesis, and not just the institutional set-up of the innovation system, the latter 
being seen here as a contributor to the former. Quite apart from the normative aspect, this 
thesis suggests that these processes are inadequately conceptualised. That they are would lead 
to policy and process failure. This thesis further argues that the role of inter-institutional and 
inter-personal dynamics and obstacles are underestimated and widely neglected in the 
literature. 
 
This suggested policy agenda is reflected in the structure of this chapter. The next section first 
discusses the potential success factors and policy suggestions brought forward by the cluster 
and institutional literature, before turning to common policy obstacles and flaws/pitfalls. It 
begins by asking what is innovation policy. 
 
What innovation policy? 
Innovation policy is defined here not in a narrow sense, meaning all those policies that are 
directly aimed at fostering innovation performance of businesses, but more in a wider sense 
comprising a whole range of economic development policies that are geared in a strategic 
approach towards favourably influencing - directly or indirectly - the conditions of businesses 
to innovate and thus compete successfully on a global scale. 
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However, since innovation policy draws heavily upon other policies such as education, 
research & technology, regional, industrial, start-up support, SME, and cluster policy (see 
also Figure 10), the question can be raised whether innovation policy per se actually exists.150 
The thesis returns to this issue later on. It looks at what is generally argued to be the success 
factors for innovation. 
 
Success factors for innovation and how government can influence them 
 
The UK Government’s Department of Trade and Industry, (2003a, pp. v and 22-23; 2003b, 
pp. 18 and 25), among others, has identified seven broad critical success factors for 
innovation performance, which thus determine the strength of innovation systems.151 They 
are: 
 
• sources of new technological knowledge; 
• capacity of companies to absorb and exploit new knowledge; 
• access to finance; 
• competition regime and entrepreneurship; 
• customers and suppliers; 
• regulatory environment; and 
• networks and collaboration. 
                                                 
150 Philip Raines (2002a), for instance, asked the same question concerning cluster policy.  
151 Alternatively, according to the variables of Pfirrmann’s (1991, pp. 186 and 256-258) PLS-model, innovation 
influencing factors comprise the following list: agglomeration (population density, share of services close to the 
production sector and of high-value, history/age of sector e.g. past employment in industry); labour market 
(share of skilled and highly-qualified employees, share of employment in production); innovation infrastructure 
(university and non-university R&D personnel); product life cycle (Unemployment, capital intensity in 
production, and spatial structure); density of R&D intense sectors (share of employment in R&D intense 
sectors); regional average firm size (in terms of employees); regional average firm age (years since 
establishment); R&D input (average number of employees and expenditure for R&D per firm, share of R&D 
employees of all employment); R&D output (number of patent applications and granted patents per firms); 
innovation output (turnover share of new firm products and totally new products to the market, turnover share of 
products benefiting from process innovation); and growth of the gross value added in production. 
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Figure 10 also illustrates the ways in which government policies influences the innovation 
performance of businesses. While these rather generic lists of factors may, to some extent, be 
useful for guiding an analysis of the strength and weakness of an innovation system, they 
nevertheless clearly insufficiently address governance aspects, and in particular how to create 
collaborative, and not just supportive, environments for innovation at the local and regional 
level. 
 
Figure 8 How Government policies influence innovation 
 
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (2003b, Figure 1.4 on p. 26) 
 
 
In their conclusion, Braczyk & Heidenreich (1998, pp. 438-439) also derive a set of strategies 
from the results of the 14 regional case-studies on ‘how to develop new regional cooperation 
and innovation networks within an established industrial and institutional order’. In shortened 
form, these strategies include: 
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 123 
 
• Dialogue-orientated economic policies that integrate different businesses into common 
innovative projects (possibly supported by a system of tax incentives for innovations); 
• the utilization of mutual producer-user communication and coordination processes 
within the innovation networks for knowledge and technology transfer; 
• encouraging staff mobility between the science and industry spheres (e.g. via training 
courses, traineeships, dissertations, etc.) by providing financial incentives and 
establishing science-industry linkages (university transfer and contact points); 
• developing new venture capital instruments;  
• reforming collective wage agreements and vocational training courses; and 
• supporting business export strategies through governmental or public advisory bodies 
abroad (e.g. by setting up foreign branches of chambers of industry and commerce or a 
foreign assembly plant for domestic supplier-consumer networks).  
 
Narrow business support outreach 
 
In addition, there appears to be significant shortcomings and obstacles to the efficient 
provision of advice and support for businesses. Morgan & Nauwelaers (1999b, p. 15), for 
example, report that enterprise support systems often represent a weakness of LFRs, with 
potential assets of local knowledge and social capital not being fully mobilised and exploited. 
The Green Paper on Innovation (Europäische Kommission, 1995b, p. 22) states in this respect 
that some 60-80% of SMEs are expected to be unable or unwilling to take advantage of these 
support services and external competence (within the maze of funding application procedures 
and different support services). According to Morgan & Nauwelaers (1999b, p. 15), the 
problem is ‘that enterprise support agencies in LFRs often lack the skills to engage in 
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interactive service provision’ (i.e. staff with more intimate knowledge of key sectors) that 
results in a ‘credibility problem vis-à-vis the private sector’. The challenge is illustrated neatly 
by their following quote: 
 
The challenge of interactive service provision, in which the aim is to design services 
with rather than for corporate clients so as to enhance the latter’s absorptive capacity, 
cannot be met through traditional supply-side regional policy; that is to say, 
technology centres and the like are not likely to resolve the innovation deficit in LFR-
based firms if the latter are unable to exploit these services – the ‘cathedrals in the 
desert’ syndrome. (Morgan & Nauwelaers, 1999b, p. 15) 
 
In line with Morgan & Nauwelaers’s critique, Lagendijk (1999a, p. 11) also declares that 
‘despite the proliferation of support initiatives […], the effectiveness of most business support 
is still questionable’. Indeed, he (ibid., p. 6) reports that ‘a large part of the regional business 
support services’ are characterised by a ‘lack of focus, depth and continuity, as well as 
fragmentation and internal rivalries’. Lagendijk (ibid., p. 11) makes reference in this respect 
to ‘a kind of support fatigue’ as reported by Hassink (1996), which reflects the consequent 
increasing mistrust and ‘disillusionment’ of SMEs with support agencies, that ‘had to sell 
their service’ to find interested clients. Similarly, Bentley & Gibney (2000, p. 221) warn of 
‘provoking “initiative fatigue”’ by too many new policies or programmes at any given time 
(cf. Burfitt et al., 2002, p. 29). 
 
As reasons for this ineffectiveness of the regional business support, Lagendijk (1999a, p. 12) 
identifies ‘the initial organisation of the support sector and the kind of philosophy employed’. 
The weakness of the support measures concerned in particular the overemphasis of 
technology transfer (of a ‘technology push’ model), which ‘suffered from two handicaps: a 
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lack of understanding of SMEs as organisations and a lack of proper demand identification’. 
Immanent in both handicaps is the lack of understanding of the capacities of SMEs, which are 
not just characterised by an ‘innovation deficit’ but more importantly by a lack of strategic 
management and learning capabilities, which in effect also means that SMEs often do not 
know, or are unable to articulate, their long-term needs for a competitive strategy (Lagendijk, 
1999a, p. 12). 
 
Towards a more strategic policy approach 
 
Hence, Lagendijk (1999a, p. 26) calls for ‘more interactive forms of business support framed 
within a strategic context’. He (1999a, p. 11) proposes a more ‘integral and cluster-orientated 
support’ approach, which can be interpreted as ‘reshaping the regional specialisation within a 
relational perspective, that is, with emphasis on the role of linkages between businesses and 
with the wider regional support infrastructure’ (i.e. ‘intertwining policy and business 
learning’). Lagendijk’s cluster policy suggestions, that he (1999a, pp. 4-7, 11-15, and 20-26) 
derived from his fieldwork, are summarised in the following comprised list: 
 
1. Improved holistic support measures for general business modernisation, that provide a 
more ‘demand-led’ technology transfer advice that ‘comes with a package of auditing, 
diagnosis and support in other areas such as funding and assistance with organisational 
change’, management and skills upgrading and so on (thus covering both 
technological and organisational dimensions of innovation).152 
                                                 
152 The Economist (2003), for example, reports that ‘governments, development agencies, academics, corporate 
executives and even venture capitalists give most attention to the riskiest and toughest to implement successfully 
– the creation of new knowledge’. In that way, according to the Economist, they appear to have a kind of ‘tunnel 
vision’, attracted by the ‘glamour of an R&D breakthrough’ and the ‘gambler’s dream of winning the jackpot’.  
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2. Shift from a routine to a more sophisticated, specialised business support, that 
involves a ‘certain degree of targeting’ (i.e. ‘cluster-as-target approach’) in order to 
provide advanced intelligence (e.g. technology or marketing watch) in support of 
strategic learning capabilities as well as the (re)shaping of related business activities in 
specific sectors.153 
3. Improved streamlined organisation and communication between support service 
providers and with its business clients, e.g. with a so-called ‘one-stop-shop’ as point of 
referral and/or strategic coordinators, in order to efficiently provide a full range of 
tailored expertise of the wider business support network].154 
4. Instil collaborative attitudes by encouraging inter-firm learning and by tailoring 
support to groups of related firms (i.e. ‘cluster-as-method approach’), e.g. by 
‘intertwining policy and business learning’ with the development of ‘club goods’ (e.g. 
relational assets, institution building, specialised infrastructure, and so on).155 
 
Raines (2002b, p. 175) similarly outlines the following five key principles underlying a 
cluster policy framework or potential paradigm. According to Raines (2002b, p. 175), spatial 
development and cluster policy should:  
 
 
                                                 
153 The difference in this cluster targeting as opposed to traditional industrial policy is that support measures, 
though specialised, are likely to be rather indirect facilitations (and not direct subsidies) and less exclusive in 
their application. 
154 Confer also Skambracks (1999, pp. 46-50) suggested development of a ‘one stop-agency’ and Bentley & 
Gibney’s call for ‘a more “joined up” approach to both strategic and inter-organisational processes and day-to-
day management of RDA business (Roberts; and Shutt, chapters 3 and 4)’. 
155 Regarding the latter promotion of the supply of local and regional public goods, Martin & Sunley (2001, pp. 
38-39) identify ‘four main varieties’. These strategies of cluster policy include ‘creating co-operative networks 
and encouraging dialogue between firms and other agencies’; ‘collective marketing of an industrial specialism’; 
the ‘aim to provide local services for firms such as financial advice, marketing and design services’; and to 
‘attract investors and business to fill’ the gaps or ‘weaknesses in existing cluster value chains’. 
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1. be skewed towards economic specialization; 
2. be less ‘vertical’ and (in sectoral terms) generic and more ‘horizontal’ and sector-
specific;156 
3. target networks rather than individual firms;157  
4. allocate responsibility for developing policy responses to cluster development to the 
level of governance at which the cluster operates;158 and 
5. be founded on a long-term approach to economic development.  
 
In practice, these strategic directions may comprise the following actions or ‘strategic axes’ 
(see Table 10), which Nauwelaers & Morgan (1999, Table 12.1 on p. 232) identified. 
 
However, the practical development of cluster and networking orientated strategies towards 
the creation of holistic and systemic innovation support systems appear not be a straight 
forward task but instead is seen to face several obstacles, to be discussed later on. 
                                                 
156 This means an ‘increasing desegregation of policy fields, so that measures arising from training, innovation 
and business development policy areas could be easily combined and tailored in support of specific clusters’ 
(Raines, 2002b, p. 175). 
157 Hence, this is expected to lead ‘to a reduction in direct incentive-based support for businesses and a more 
clearly-defined role of the public sector addressing target market externalities within each cluster. (Raines, 
2002b, p. 175).’ 
158 This ‘could lead to greater autonomy for, and resources allocation to, regional/local public authorities’ 
(Raines, 2002b, p. 175). 
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Table 10  Major strategic axes defined in RTPs and similar operations 
 
Strategic Axes for Regional Innovation Policies 
 
 
Bridge the gap between HEIs and industry 
Identify and support clusters of enterprises 
Raise demand for innovation in SME’s 
Increase demand for skilled people in SME’s 
Increase supply of adequate human resources for innovation 
Build a permanent Advisory Board of policy 
Provide adequate finance for innovation 
Raise awareness of innovation 
Adapt training and further education to SMEs’ needs 
Organise co-operation between supply organisations 
Foster the attractiveness of the region for high-tech companies 
Support external orientation of SME’s 
Strengthen the technology transfer offer (in Objective 1 regions) 
Develop support tools for the observation of SME’s needs 
Develop non-technical support to innovation 
 
 
Source: Nauwelaers & Morgan (1999, Table 12.1 on p. 232). 
Note that RTPs are Regional Technology Plans, pilot projects and precursor of the Regional Innovation 
Strategies (RIS) financed under Article 10 of the ERDF (cf. Landabaso & Reid, 1999, p. 32) 
 
 
Cluster policy for innovation systems 
As a result of the paradigm change towards the realisation of its importance, innovation has 
gained practical policy relevance. Policy-makers at multiple levels of governance have started 
to refocus their business support policies towards helping businesses to innovate. Indeed, 
policies to foster innovation have become a growing part of economic development policies 
and certain structures and policies have been designed that are supposed to favour the 
innovation process.  
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Practical Policy relevance of cluster policy  
 
Raines (2002a, p. 21) reports that the cluster approach ‘has been promoted by international 
organisations, such as the European Commission [(e.g. European Commission, 2003e; S. A. 
Rosenfeld, 2002)], OECD [(e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2002a, pp. 63-66; 1999c, 2001)] and UNIDO [(e.g. Cooke & Memedovic, 2003)]’, which has 
also contributed in raising its profile (see also Raines, 2002c, pp. 1-2).  
 
Furthermore, Raines (2002b, p. 176) concludes that ‘[t]he clear value of the cluster approach 
has been less in generating a new policy framework than in providing significant tools for 
making the existing policy frameworks operate more effectively’.159 Raines has used the 
metaphor of a ‘prism in reverse’ to depict this kind of streamlining of different policies, e.g. 
‘industrial policy (including SME policy), regional development policy, and science and 
technology policy’ (Boekholt & Thuriaux, 1999, p. 384; cf. Raines, 2002a, p. 30). The 
following quote and Figure 9 illustrate this in more detail: 
 
Cluster policy frameworks have demonstrated how measures drawn from different 
policy fields can be combined to enhance their overall effectiveness. In effect, the 
cluster approach has acted as a prism in reverse – a device for bringing together 
different policy elements and discussing them on particular parts of the economy. 
(Raines, 2002b, p. 176, emphasis added) 
 
 
                                                 
159 It’s not surprising then, that Raines (2002b, p. 166) finds ‘a clear degree of operational continuity in most of 
the case studies’. 
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Figure 9 Raines' reverse cluster prism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own creation based upon Raines (2002b, p. 176) and influenced by Raines (2002a, p. 30). 
 
 
 
Providing specialised and advanced public goods for clusters 
 
Closely linked to this institutional ‘practical agenda’, are supply-side measures (Amin & 
Thrift, 1995, p. 55) of an industrial policy in support of or in ‘building clusters’ (Amin, 1999, 
p. 370). According to Amin & Thrift (1995, p. 55), they concentrate on the ‘circulation of 
information and skill formation (training)’, thus creating what Le Galès & Voelzkow (2001, 
p. 1) call sector-specific ‘local collective competition goods’ and what is otherwise known or 
described as ‘collective assets or public goods’ (Porter, 1998b, pp. xxii-xxiii of Introduction), 
‘club goods’ (Lagendijk, 1999a, p. 15), ‘regional economic commons’ (A. J. Scott & Storper, 
2003, p. 587) or ‘public knowledge commons’ (Antonelli, 2003, p. 596) that provide 
‘untraded interdependencies’, synergies, and ‘super additive gains’ (cf. Dosi, 1988, p. 226).  
 
In effect, they represent a form of agglomeration advantages that reduce transaction costs, 
provide economies of scales and specialization, knowledge externalities and so on. They 
mostly ‘are associated with proximity and interfirm exchange’ (Amin, 1999, p. 368), but 
 
Cluster policy 
Policy element A 
Policy element B 
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which a pure market governance model often fails to sufficiently provide for (cf. Le Galès & 
Voelzkow, 2001, p. 7). 
 
These ‘“club goods” occupy a bridge position between business support structure and client 
groups of related businesses” and thus ‘are crucial to the intertwining of policy and business 
learning’, which - according to Lagendijk (1999a, p. 11) – ‘makes “intelligent clusters”’. 
 
This sort of cluster policy involves the setting up of efficient knowledge-transfer networks 
and an enterprise support system that provides institutional support, incentives and input for 
innovation such as market intelligence, finance and so on (Amin, 1999, p. 370; Amin & 
Thrift, 1995, p. 55) in a geographical and sectoral context.160 The creation of such ‘club 
goods’ includes both creating assets of ‘more conventional nature’ (e.g. specialized 
infrastructure) and of ‘associational nature’ (e.g. relational assets, institution building, and 
intelligence gathering) (Lagendijk, 1999a, p. 15).  
 
Consequently, aligning the type and development phase of clusters to policy should follow a 
strategic and integrative approach. According to Ache (2002, pp. 14-15; and cf. Raines, 
2002a, p. 23), the various interrelated ‘networks contribute to the working’ of the ‘local 
innovative milieu’ and clusters (or innovation systems, in the rubric used here) by performing, 
what he labels, ‘the search-selection-signalling-transcoding-transformer-control – or SSSTTC 
                                                 
160 Following their empirical studies on the regions of Baden-Württemberg, Emilia-Romagna, Wales and Basque 
Country, Cooke & Morgan (1998, p. 7) have argued in this respect that ‘the regional governance and enterprise 
support system plays an increasingly active role in the pursuit of economic development’. 
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– function’ of the all important ‘response capacity’ to change.161 These functions are seen as 
‘the “glue” which keeps a cluster together’(Ache, 2002, pp. 15 and 10). 
 
These functions, that are strung together in sequence, very much mirror the policy actions of 
the different phases of the cluster policy life-cycle (see Figure 10) as discussed by Raines 
(2002b, pp. 160-172) and others (e.g. Benneworth & Charles, 2001, pp. 390-396; Lagendijk, 
1999a, pp. 20-22). Raines’ three broadly identified policy phases - diagnostic, prescriptive 
and operational – are similar to the policy cycle used within policy evaluation research (cf. 
Wollmann, 2002b, p. 380) and basically represent the core elements of a strategic 
management process (strategic analysis, strategic choice and strategy implementation) as, for 
instance outlined by Johnson & Scholes (1997, see Figure 1.4 on p. 24 for a summery model).  
                                                 
161 This SSSTTC function includes policy intervention as ‘information broker’ (search function) or as 
‘technology monitor’ (i.e. ‘lighthouse’ signalling function) and certain decision-making routines, e.g. for 
selection and control functions (Ache, 2002, pp. 14-15; Raines, 2002a, p. 23). 
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Figure 10  The different phases of the cluster policy life-cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Raines (2002b, Figure 11.1 on p. 161) in slightly adapted form, which was based in part on Benneworth 
& Charles (2001, Figure 1 on p. 392), itself going back to Hogwood (1987).  
 
 
 
Table 11 provides an overview of some of the ‘good practice recommendations’ for SME 
clustering policy initiatives as summarised by Lagendijk (1999a, p. 8).162  
 
                                                 
162 Confer also drivers for success and failure in cluster initiatives as outlined by the cluster management guide 
published by CLOE (2006, pp. 11-12) - a pan-European network of cluster regions. 
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Table 11  Good practice in clustering 
 
Do Don’t 
• facilitate clusters 
• use clusters as demonstration models 
• encourage firms to submit new 
funding applications 
• strive for broadening of the clusters 
(e.g. through association building) 
• assess carefully the (potential) 
position of regional businesses in the 
global market 
• engage with large firms, support 
agencies in/outside the region, etc. 
• build clusters 
• see clusters as ‘static’ end goals 
• be committed to the survival of firms 
or clusters 
• fund single clusters in the long term 
• provide unfocussed 
support/intelligence 
• focus on innovation when the key 
issue is modernisation 
• compete with other business support 
agencies 
 
Source: Lagendijk (1999a, Table 2 on p. 8) 
 
 
Raines (2002b, pp. 166-170) also classifies the following three particular holistic cluster 
policy measures: 
 
1. Supporting specific linkages and projects (i.e. encouraging ‘interactions between 
different cluster agents’ including business networking and university-business 
linkages).163 
2. Improving common resources (i.e. public goods as ‘the collective sources of the 
cluster’s competitiveness’ such as general or specialised infrastructure). 
3. Promoting community-building (i.e. cluster ‘identity-building’ by encouraging more 
frequent and prolonged communication via cluster fora, websites, newsletters and so 
on; as well as ‘identity projecting’ by collective marketing exercises and ‘branding’, 
for which visibility is enhanced by geographical concentration). 
 
                                                 
163 Lagendijk’s (1999a) suggested measures concerning encouraging linkages and cooperation, as discussed 
earlier (see p. 125), seem to rightly take a wider view in that they also comprises the policy dimension besides 
businesses and university research. 
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Rosenfeld (2002, p. 15 and see elaborations on pp. 16-31) also suggests a menu of actions to 
support clusters in less favoured regions (see Table 12), which provides a long list of policy 
recommendations that cover a wide range of economic development goals. 
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Table 12  Menu of Actions to Support Clusters in Less Favoured Regions 
 
Menu of Actions 
 
A. Actions for understanding and benchmarking regional economies 
• Identify clusters 
• Model and map systemic relationships 
• Benchmark against competitors 
 
B. Actions for engagement  
• Recognise or, where an unmet needs exist, create cluster associations 
• Formalise communication channels 
• Foster inter-firm collaboration 
 
C. Actions for organising and delivering services 
• Organise and disseminate information by cluster 
• Establish one-stop cluster hubs 
• Form cross agency cluster teams 
• Create cluster branches of government 
• Facilitate external connections 
 
D. Actions for building a specialised work force 
• Qualify people for employment 
• Use clusters as context for learning 
• Establish cluster skill centres 
• Form partnerships between educational institutions and clusters 
• Create inter-regional cluster alliances 
 
E. Actions for stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship 
• Invest in innovation and business start-ups 
• Support cluster based incubators 
• Encourage entrepreneurs’ networks 
• Innovation networks 
• Establish cluster-based technology hubs 
 
F. Actions for marketing and branding a region 
• Target inward investment 
• Promote clusters 
• Form expert networks 
• Look for opportunities to brand regions 
 
G. Actions for allocating resources and investments 
• Give incentives or set aside funds for multi-firm projects only 
• Invest in cluster R&D 
• Fund critical foundation factors 
 
Source: Rosenfeld (2002, p. 15 and see elaborations on pp. 16-31 including Benchmarking Guide on pp. 18-19) 
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Institutionalist policy suggestions for constructing institutional thickness 
Although the ‘cluster-as-method’ approach already stresses the need for ‘instilling 
collaborative attitudes’ and creating ‘club goods’ (Lagendijk, 1999a, pp. 6-7 and cf. pp. 15 
and 22-23), institutionalist policy suggestions place a focussed emphasis upon these 
objectives and especially how they should be addressed and implemented. However, it is 
argued here that much of the cluster literature does not sufficiently address implementation 
issues. 
 
Amin (1999, p. 368) has derived five general axioms of economic governance as a ‘set of 
“orientations” to economic success’ (Amin & Thrift, 1995, pp. 54-56) from the new 
institutionalist understanding, namely that policy action should aim to ‘strengthen networks of 
association’, to encourage voice and negotiation as part of a participatory and inclusive 
institution-building process - that is ‘filling-in’ and not ‘hollowing out’ (Amin & Thrift, 1995, 
p. 55) -, to ‘mobilize a plurality of autonomous organizations’, and to build up a ‘broad-based 
local “institutional thickness” (Amin, 1999, p. 368). The final, kind of horizontally 
overlapping, axiom is that all of the policies ‘have to be context-specific and sensitive to local 
path-dependencies’, which in more simple words means to gear policy towards regional 
endogenous strength and weakness, capacities and capabilities. All in all, the institutionalist 
perspective favours ‘bottom-up, region-specific, longer-term and plural-actor based policy 
actions’ (Amin, 1999, p. 366). 
 
At the core of these policy proposals is the regional institution-building process with the aim 
to eventually construct an ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin & Thrift, 1995, pp. 54 and 55) that 
facilitates the transfer of knowledge and collective learning processes (cf. Boschma, 2004, pp. 
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1006-1007), with regions ‘becoming’ (Storper, 1995, p. 192) intelligent ‘learners’ (Hudson, 
1999, p. 69).164 Accordingly, the interlinked enterprise support system would constitute a 
functioning regional innovation system. 
 
At the same time of creating ‘reciprocal routines’ (cf. Meyers, 2004b, p. 486), the institution-
building process still needs to incorporate an ‘institutional reflexivity’ and adaptability 
(Cooke, 1995, pp. 240-241). This means that regions need to display critical anticipative 
foresight function (cf. also Amin, 1999, p. 371), in order for regions to successfully embark 
upon the ‘high road’ to regional economic success, of ‘learning, reflexivity and associative 
governance’ (Cooke, 1995).165 In order to ‘alter the economic trajectory’ of regional 
economies (Amin, 1999, p. 368), local governance (i.e. social or political arrangements) first 
has to ensure that a flexible and responsive ‘institutional capacity’ (Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 
                                                 
164 See in this respect also the BEST project expert group report on improving technology transfer published by 
the European Commission (2004c) and Boschma’s (2004, p. 1007) comments on knowledge transfer. There is an 
obvious affinity between the notions of intelligent ‘learners’ (Hudson, 1999, p. 69), ‘intelligent region’ (Cooke & 
Morgan, 1991; Landabaso, 1996), and ‘intelligent clusters’ (Lagendijk, 1999a, pp. 15 and 26). 
165 The importance of institution-building has also been recognised at the highest level of the European Union 
not only for democracy but for economic development to. For example, the Madrid European Council stressed in 
December 1995 the importance of adapting the applicant countries’ administrative structures to create the 
conditions for a gradual and harmonious integration, in addition to the formal accession criteria of the European 
Union – known as Copenhagen criteria. 
The Copenhagen European Council or Summit, as it is often referred to in the media, defined in June 1993 the 
sine qua non conditions for accession to the European Union. In short, an applicant country wishing to join the 
European Union has to fulfil the following three criteria (cf. Despondt, 2005, pp. 68 and 139): political stability 
(with stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for minorities), 
economic stability (that is a functioning market economy), and the legal criteria (of having to incorporate the 
acquis communautaire - which is the body of Community law -, and to subscribe to the objectives of the EU). To 
explain latter, the acquis communautaire means basically the Community law in a broader sense, which thus 
comprises ‘all the rules constituting the Community legal order, including general principle of law, Court of 
Justice case law, law stemming from Community external relations, and supplementary legal provisions 
contained in conventions and similar agreements concluded between Member States giving effect to the treaties’ 
(European Commission, 2005q, p. 34). 
Putnam (1993, p. 84) also stresses that it is a very established empirical generalisation that ‘effective democracy 
is correlated with socio-economic modernization’ 
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54)166 is existent or build up, that allows a region ‘to upgrade, transform or restructure specific 
institutions (such as specific laws)’ (Boschma, 2004, p. 1008).  
 
This institutional capacity forms an essential part of less-favoured regions (LFRs) being able 
to absorb effectively financial support for innovation projects, for example by the EU’s 
Structural Funds.167 Morgan (2001a, p. 25) has stressed, for example, that in particular lagging 
regions, where the need for these resources is greatest, often lack such an ‘absorptive 
capacity’.168 Oughton, Landabaso, & Morgan (2002, p. 98) have labelled this problem as the 
‘regional innovation paradox’.169 This was tackled by later generations of EU innovation 
policy with the Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) programme. The European Commission 
acted as an ‘animateur’ as Landabaso & Reid (1999, p. 19) argue and aimed to develop ‘an 
adequate level of “social capital” in the less-favoured regions, to complement the massive 
investments in infrastructure by the Structural Funds’ (ibid., 1999, p. 20 ).  
 
                                                 
166 Although in the framework of Development Cooperation, External Assistance and Aid Delivery, the concepts 
paper and guidelines of the Project Cycle Management (PCM) with regards to ‘Institutional Capacity 
Assessment’ by EuropeAid (European Commission, 2004i, pp. 95-99; 2005h) make an interesting read and may 
serve as a source of ideas concerning institutional capacity. See also Alphametrics & Applica (2002, pp. 133-
149).  
167 For instance, Rosenfeld (2002, pp. 9-10) lists the following barriers facing clusters in less favoured regions: 
deficits in physical infrastructure, lack of access to capital, weak technology institutional structures, regional 
insularity and lock-in, lack of skills and opportunities to acquire them, and cluster hierarchies (i.e. dominance of 
branch plants or few large companies, with the effect that not all small companies benefit from clusters). 
168 As a very simplified example illustrating the importance of absorptive capacity, one can think of government 
policy promoting the information society, e.g. aiming to increase IT skills amongst young pupils. In pursuit of 
such goal, it is not enough to just endow schools with a set of new computer equipment and Internet accesses, as 
this becomes only valuable once teachers would be trained and have acquired themselves the IT skills to utilize 
the equipment and, more importantly, to be able to teach computer-related skills. This example is particular 
useful as it also illustrate thereby the necessary order of investment. First, priority ought to be given to the 
training of teachers (serving here as a comparative example for institutional capacity, otherwise some value of 
the investment is wasted as unused equipment is becoming obsolete due to the short economic value half-life of 
computers. Similarly, any policy measures ought to evaluate first whether a critical mass of expertise, businesses 
as well as linkages between the both are present before committing scarce resources to over-ambitious short-term 
targets. 
169 According to Oughton, Landabaso, & Morgan (2002, p. 98), ‘[t]he regional innovation paradox refers to the 
apparent contradiction between the comparatively greater need to spend on innovation in lagging regions and 
their relatively lower capacity to absorb public funds earmarked for the promotion of innovation and to invest in 
innovation related activities, compared to more advanced regions.’ 
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This was by means of building a relational infrastructure in the socially inclusive process of 
developing regional strategies for innovation (Morgan, 2001a, p. 25). However, Morgan 
(2001a, p. 25) concludes that the RIS programme remained only ‘modest’ as it was ‘too small 
to have much strategic impact’ (especially in regard to regions lacking existing governance 
structures).170 Amin (1999, p. 375) also highlights that some of the institutionalist axioms are 
especially conceptualised for old industrial regions that are ‘characterized by certain 
impediments to economic renewal’, and hence are not necessarily applicable to all type of 
regions in the same way. 171 
 
The regional practical policy agenda (Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 50; Raines, 2002a, p. 24) 
emphasises the setting-up of networks of intermediate institutions (organisations) as a ‘third 
way’ of governance (between market and state) in ‘attempts to produce associative 
economies’ (Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 54; Le Galès & Voelzkow, 2001, pp. 5-9).172 Building 
‘economies of association’ (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 79) that provide ‘club goods’ (Cooke, 
                                                 
170 A key reference with regards to the RIS programme is the edited book by Kevin Morgan and Claire 
Nauwelaers (1999c) entitled Regional Innovation Strategies : The Challenges for Less-favoured Regions. In it, 
Morgan & Nauwelaers provide a chapter on the theoretical background to the ‘regional perspective on 
innovation’ (Morgan & Nauwelaers, 1999b) as well as a summery chapter with an outlook (Nauwelaers & 
Morgan, 1999), while Landabaso & Reid (1999) describe the development process of the programme at the 
European Commission in order to animate regions. The remaining chapters report empirically on the experience 
of various European regions in creating regional Innovation Strategies, such in Limburg; Lorraine (Nauwelaers, 
1999); Wales; Central Macedonia; Castilla y Léon; South Brandenburg (Boekholt, 1999); on the prospects for 
building Technology Policy in Central and Eastern Europe; as well as draw in experience from the United States 
(S. Rosenfeld, 1999) and Quebec, Canada. 
171 Amin (1999, p. 375) lists as ‘impediments to economic renewal’ the following: ‘fragile small-firm 
entrepreneurship; domination by externally owned or controlled firms with poor levels of local economic 
integration; restricted diversification, innovation and learning capacity; and state dependency and institutional 
closure’. He also highlights in this context that, for example, lagging rural regions face a different set of 
impediments’ than the one listed here that is more typical for old industrial regions.  
Furthermore, Amin (1999, pp. 366 and 375) also draws attention to the need to sustain macro-economic support 
for the less-favoured regions (LFRs), as otherwise in its absence, ‘the “new regionalism” will amount to very 
little’. 
172 Le Galès & Voelzkow (2001, pp. 5-9) elaborate on the different modes of governance. With reference to 
Hollingsworth & Boyer (1997a, p. 9) they do not just differentiate between the markets (horizontal co-ordination 
by competition), the state (hierarchical control), and associations (‘concertation’ of interest by negotiations) as 
possible models of social order and components of a governance system, but also list the community 
(coordination by solidarity among members) and the vertically integrated firm (organizational co-ordination of 
agents by hierarchy). 
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1997, p. 365) and ‘institutional thickness’, entails connecting the various sectoral and other 
enterprise support organisations, political institutions and social citizenship (Amin, 1999, p. 
368) such as trade associations, sectorally-based service centres, lobbying groups, university 
technology transfer units, trade unions, chambers of commerce, local authorities, regional 
development agencies and so on, in order to ‘consolidate local ties and encourage continual 
upgrading and capacity-building across sectoral networks of horizontal and vertical 
interdependencies’ as suggested by Amin (1999, p. 371).  
 
It is argued here however, that in practice such institutional thickness or capacity is difficult to 
find and therefore not many regional innovation systems may be using their full innovation 
potential. 
 
Limitations of the institutional turn 
 
These new orientations marked an ‘institutional turn in regional development studies’ (Amin, 
1999, p. 368, emphasis added) and policy-making, contributes to overall rise of regional 
conceptualisations of the economy (e.g. innovative milieu, learning region, regional 
innovation system). Amin identifies two main conceptual strands that have incorporated 
insights from institutional economic theory. One strand is the ‘new economic geography’ with 
the cluster concept and its ‘renewed interest in endogenous growth theory, which 
acknowledges the economic externalities and increasing returns to scale associated with 
spatial clustering and specialization (Krugman, 1995a; Porter, 1994)’, the other strand is 
‘economic geography’ with the concept of ‘learning regions’ that emphasise ‘local social, 
cultural and institutional arrangements’ (Amin, 1999, pp. 368-369). 
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However, some clear words of caution have been raised regarding the ‘institutional turn’ in 
‘new regionalism’. Morgan (2001a, p. 24) highlights that ‘it may be a planner’s conceit to 
think that “institutional thickness” is always necessary for successful innovation’ as 
innovation is in some prosperous technology districts mainly driven by clusters of leading-
edge firms instead of being induced by supporting institutions – and which actually appear to 
be ‘under-populated’ in these cases such as Silicon Valley for instance. Institutions matter 
concerning the innovation process, but Morgan (ibid., pp., p. 24) points out that ‘the recent 
“institutional turn” in economic geography is wont to give the [wrong] impression that 
supporting institutions matter as much, if not more than, the firms at the heart of the 
innovation process, when the causality tends if anything to run the other way’ (cf. Cooke, 
1998, p. 18; Martin & Sunley, 2001, pp. 43-44).173 
 
Amin (1999, p. 375) similarly points to flaws in the ‘belief that building local capabilities 
might be sufficient for establishing a privileged position within global networks’. First, there 
is the potential detrimental institutional lock-in that can reinforce ‘path-dependencies which 
are inappropriate for economic renewal’, and secondly, it neglects the superiority of the 
importance of ‘the ability of places to anticipate and respond to changing external 
circumstances’ over the ‘intrinsic supply-side qualities’ and simple presence of institutional 
arrangements. Hence, this also stresses the region’s wider external connectivity as a source of 
variety (Boschma, 2004, p. 1006). 
 
                                                 
173 Morgan’s caution is, for example, supported by Martin & Sunley (2001, pp. 43-44), who stress that ‘[w]hile 
institutions and a networked semi-public sphere may often be necessary for innovative and dynamic firm 
performance, such factors are unlikely to be sufficient.’ See also Cooke (1998, p. 18), who in a more contained 
form points out that the ‘crucial innovation business is carried out above and beyond it [i.e. the mere ‘public-
private consortium domain of an RIS’], in the real economy’. 
 143 
 
Even though institution-building should not be overstated and not be seen as a panacea to 
economic development, it still remains one of the strategic options that regions need to have 
in order to improve their business superstructure or ‘innovation system’. Every region still 
needs to evaluate, whether it is a suitable (existing resources, capabilities and environment), 
feasible (financially, time horizon) and acceptable (to stakeholders, i.e. ability to avoid 
‘localist sentiment’) strategy to pursue. 
 
The nature of the regional policy- and decision-making process 
As already emphasised before, essential for this process is its ‘broadening’ (Amin, 1999, p. 
373), meaning that decision-making is participatory, open and extended by involving a 
plurality of independent representative associations and perhaps also by drawing in experts 
and representative (e.g. through specialist committees) as Amin (1999, p. 373) suggests (see 
also Eisfeld, 2002; Holzinger, 2002; Wollmann, 2002a).174 According to Morgan & 
Nauwelaers (1999b, p. 17), this requires ‘more robust multi-level partnerships [..], in which 
the regional actors are genuinely empowered to develop bottom-up initiatives that draw on 
their local knowledge’.175 The key to the success of this ‘broadening’ is that such a process 
‘does not degenerate into localist sentiment’ (Amin, 1999, p. 373) and alienates some of key 
influential actors. Thereby, if successful, a process of institutional reform may limit the over-
dominance of vested interest and ‘capture’ by elite coalitions (cf. G. Bentley & J. Gibney, 
2000, pp. 222-223; Pelkmans, 2001, p. 277; Schmidt, 2002, p. 203) and the consequent 
‘institutional sclerosis’ (Amin, 1999, p. 373) that results from it. It is likely, however, that this 
                                                 
174 Nauwelaers & Morgan (1999, pp. 231-232) state in this respect that ‘[l]etting neutral observers write analyses 
of the regional situation […] has proved to be an excellent means of starting the process’ of the regional dialogue 
because it ‘(often for the first time)’ provides ‘an objective assessment’ and ‘germs for discussion’.   
175 Morgan & Nauwelaers (1999b, p. 17) add, however, that these bottom-up initiatives ‘need to be prosecuted 
alongside more supportive top-down measures form the “higher” levels of the member states and the [European] 
Commission.’ 
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process of change will at the same time face ‘institutional pressures’ (cf. Raines, 2002b, pp. 
173-174 in a different context) to keep the status quo.  
 
It is argued here that much of the literature neglects the likely opportunism in institutional 
change. Therefore, the axioms of an inclusive, participatory policy-making – although highly 
advocated – are not seen here as a simple policy panacea. Hence, one concern of this thesis is 
how these obstacles to change can be overcome successfully, and how a process of 
institutional reform can be facilitated to tackle structural economic change, and one that 
involves a ‘broadening’ and participatory process but also achieves to keep all main 
institutional actors on board. Hence, an emphasis is placed upon institutional (in the meaning 
of organisational) structures and their possible effect upon the various agents as well as upon 
people as the mover and shakers of networks and initiators (cf. Malecki, 1997, p. 262). 176 
This would make the link between regional strategy and policy-making, on the one hand, and 
institutional structures, capabilities and behaviour on the other. 
 
Correspondingly, such an approach has the inherent tendency to please too many 
stakeholders. Due to the consensus threshold, it is thus likely to achieve agreements, after a 
prolonged process, only on a minimum common denominator (Schultze, 2002, p. 259). In 
practice, this interlocking of interests perhaps could even lead to decision-making based at 
lest partly on exchange of favours, package deals, and so on, which all contribute heavily to 
inertia of the system and prevent effective and efficient policy-making. In a way, the price for 
the ‘broadening’ of the process could be sacrificing the newly advocated prescribed policy 
aim of ‘strengthening the strength’ (Raines, 2002b, p. 172; Schätzl, 2001, p. 239). Therefore, 
                                                 
176 For a managerial more corporate view on ‘structures for a changing environment’, see for example Rickards 
(1985, pp. 72-76 including Fig. 4.1 on p. 73). 
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it has to be at least questioned whether this process actually leads to a more regional strategy 
and approach as envisaged. This also leads to a number of conflicts over goals. 
 
Secrecy versus openness 
 
Among the conflict over goals is over secrecy (and openness) in decision-making. Even 
though there are some incentives for secrecy, as hidden information is potentially valuable 
and it, for example, can provide a tactical advantage in the political bargaining game, 
generally, an open government approach is to be favoured, as Stiglitz (1998, pp. 15-17) points 
out. Secrecy is more likely to result in government failures (e.g. destructive competition) and 
to distort the flow of information and public perception as it can exacerbates biased and non-
realistic media reporting. Consequently, openness instead facilitates to establish credible 
commitments. 
 
Expertise versus democratic values 
 
In recognition of the non-scientific tone of political discourse among the electorate and its 
difficulty in being able to properly evaluate scientific expert arguments, independent agencies 
have been established in many areas at all levels (local, regional, national and 
supranational177). This has moved some critical parts of the decision making away from the 
political scene.178 
                                                 
177 At supranational level, the European Union has over the years set up a number of Community agencies in 
various fields in order to accomplish a very technical, scientific or managerial task. Prone to some confusion, the 
Community agencies have been designate different terms (such as Centre, Foundation, Agency, Office, 
Observatory, Authority or Institute). The all have their own legal personality and are distinct from the common 
European Community Institutions (Council, Parliament, Commission, etc). There are currently around 20 
European community agencies, for which a list can be found at http://www.europa.eu.int/agencies/index_en.htm 
178 Similar to Stiglitz’s suprise of the non-scientific tone of political discourse and the subsequent difficulty by 
the electorate in evaluating expert arguments (1998, p. 17), the author of this study was equally surprised by the 
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Even though there is ultimately a political responsibility for these agencies, there is a clear 
lack of direct democratic accountability. While for some areas, it may be preferred that these 
agencies are at distance from political pressure (i.e. collecting and reporting statistics), this 
may not be the case for others such as macroeconomic policy and its trade-off between 
inflation and employment, as Stiglitz (1998, p. 17) rightly pointed out. Hence, the choice 
between the externalisation of decision-making to experts and maintaining democratic 
accountability represents the second goal conflict. 
 
Adversarial versus consensus system 
 
Similar to the recognition that market economy involves both competition and cooperation, 
the political process exists of a similar mixture of a ‘adversarial and consensus system’ (J. E. 
Stiglitz, 1998, pp.18- 20). The open consensus approach is clearly favoured by Stiglitz, who 
illustrates the greater likelihood of improvements by discussing the following three contrasts 
between the two systems concerning the difference between dialogue and debate, national 
versus private interests, and the settlement of issues. Regarding latter, for example, Stiglitz 
argues that mutual acceptable agreements in a consensus system are more likely to stay 
closed, while in an adversarial system an issue is never over. 
 
However, Stiglitz admits that ‘consensus-based rhetoric sometimes only lightly clothed an 
underlying adversarial process’ (J. E. Stiglitz, 1998, p. 19). Therefore, despite its merits, the 
aim ought to be not an obligatory consensus-based approach but to attain efficient policy-
                                                                                                                                                        
lack of knowledge about the current academic discourse by policy-makers interviewed. This is covered in more 
detail later on. 
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making – whether consensus based or not. This follows from the argument presented her that 
that individual policy actors follow their own rationales and that therefore it cannot be 
expected that widespread national or regional utilitarianism will be found. 
 
Nauwelaers and Morgan (1999, p. 225) also state that experience from the EU’s Regional 
Technology Plans (RTPS) and similar exercises in North America have ‘showed that targeting 
consensus might end up in constructing feeble strategies, which would gather a wide, but at 
the same time weak and meaningless support.’ They point out (ibid., pp., p. 225) that ‘[a] 
search for consensual vies on each elements of the regional innovation strategy is a utopian 
task’, but that instead ‘higher degrees of transparency and inclusiveness’ in the policy-
building process can be achieved, e.g. by the ‘institutional innovation’ of the creation of a 
Steering Committee (this was made compulsory for the RTP/RIS scheme).  
 
Similarly, Shutt (2000, p. 72) also indicates that the building of a ‘regional consensus’ (by 
RDAs) often involves the ‘general acceptance of many long-standing economic development 
strategies and initiatives that are failing’. Thus, existing strategies and priorities are not 
questioned and critically reviewed, and hence unlikely to take a risky approach by stimulating 
‘experiment and debate’ (Shutt, 2000, p. 87). Accordingly, developing an ‘integrated 
approach to regional economic development’ and dealing with a range of ‘wicked issues’ – 
that ‘tend to cut across traditional policies, boundaries, funding streams and departments’ – 
may well be difficult (ibid., p. 62 and cf. pp. 69 and 87). 
 
‘In order to open and foster’ a high-quality regional dialogue, Nauwelaers & Morgan (1999, 
pp. 226-227) have identified the following three necessary key ingredients: 
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1. The presence of a well-endowed and legitimate animateur, stimulating and organising 
the multilateral dialogue179 
2. The need to overcome rigidities o institutions and individuals 
3. The need for an innovative and strategic capacity within the public sector itself 
 
Overcoming opportunism 
 
This shows that there are several potential conflicts and tensions between various diverging 
vested interests over aims (cf. G. Bentley & J. Gibney, 2000, pp. 222-223; Nauwelaers & 
Morgan, 1999, p. 225), different political targets and different policies such as between the 
aims of economic and employment growth, and the aim of narrowing regional inequalities (cf. 
Raines, 2002b, pp. 173- 174). With regards to cluster policy, Benneworth & Charles (2001, 
pp. 396-397) also identify these goal conflicts, as illustrated by the following quote: 
 
There is an intimate interrelation between the policies used to initiate and support 
clustering and the (successful or otherwise) experience of governments with particular 
industrial sectors. At the heart of the problem experienced by governments is the 
tension between the need for government to represent all its constituency (which is 
easily done in welfare and education policy areas) while supporting excellence without 
favouritism. (Benneworth & Charles, 2001, pp. 396-397) 180 
 
                                                 
179 With regards to the possibility of the role of animation being delegated to external bodies, Morgan & 
Nauwelaers (1999, p. 226) point out that a consultancy-led exercise (such as in South Brandenburg) ‘was seen to 
be a danger, since it could easily weaken the commitment of regional actors and their sense of ownership of the 
whole exercise.’ 
180 Akin, Martin & Sunley (2001, p. 40) state, for instance regarding a UK cluster mapping exercise (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2001a, 2001b), that ‘there is an obvious tension between mapping significant industry 
clusters wherever these happen to be on the one hand (and many are in South East England), and ensuring an 
even spread between the various Regional Development Agency areas, on the other.’ 
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It can also be argued that these goal conflicts comprise the overall trade-off dilemma between 
cohesion policy (for ensuring political harmony), on one hand, and economic development 
policies (for ensuring competitiveness and maximising economic growth), on the other. While 
the former policy is more likely to support an even spreading of competencies and excellence, 
the latter would probably advocate a bundling instead. 
 
Furthermore, Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn (2005, p. 6 and footnote 1 on p. 25) report the 
difficulty in achieving joint decision-making, coordination and cooperation because of 
opportunism, while DeBresson & Amesse (1991, p. 368) also show that the functioning of 
networks depends upon opportunism. 
 
Morgan & Nauwelaers’ (cf. 1999, p. 237) work has shown that innovation-orientated regional 
policies, that aim to foster regional development by building a favourable milieu for 
innovation, rely heavily on its proper management and ‘human qualities’ of its actors. In this 
context, Bentley & Gibney (2000, p. 222) also highlight that ‘[e]ffective political 
organisational co-operation at regional level (between the RDAs and other business support 
organisations) and at local level (including local authorities, which are charged to varying 
degrees with designing and delivering economic development initiatives) is essential.’ As 
critical operational issues, they have identified (ibid., pp., p. 222) the following four themes: 
vested interests and ‘creative space’; integration and co-operation; core functions and human 
resources; financial resources. 
 
Akin to the cluster policy cycle outlined above (Figure 10) and the menu of action (Table 12), 
Landabaso (2002, Annex III on p. 37) has provided a schematic overview of the Regional 
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Innovation Strategy (RIS) work programme and methodology that is reproduced below in 
Table 13 in simplified form. The development of the RIS programme at the European 
Commission was inspired by the regional innovation systems literature and funded under 
Article 10 of the ERDF since 1994 (cf. Europäische Kommission, 1995a; European 
Commission, 1999a, 2002j; Landabaso & Reid, 1999; Morgan, 2001a, pp. 25-26; Morgan & 
Nauwelaers, 1999c; Oughton et al., 2002, pp.104-108). The programme has been ‘defined as a 
“social engineering” action at the regional level whose main aim is to stimulate and manage 
co-operation links among firms and between firms and the regional R&TDI actors, which 
may contribute to their competitive position through innovation notably by facilitating access 
to “knowledge” sources and partners’ (Landabaso, 2002, p. 25).  
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Table 13  Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) work programme and methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Simplified and slightly altered version of Landabaso’s (2002, Annex III on p. 37) schematic presentation  
Phase 1: Regional RIS forum: ‘coalition development’, establishment of a Public-
Private Partnership 
• ensure broad-based input into steering committees 
• network creation,  
Phase 2:  Research into Regional Innovation System 
• Regional Innovation System Analysis [with the following Research Tools:]  
o SWOT analysis 
o Technology and Market Trends assessment 
o Technology Foresight and Assessment 
o Regional Benchmarking 
o Regional Innovation System assessment 
• Needs Assessment (Innovation Audits/Interviews in SMEs) 
• Steering Committee selects critical issues for increasing coherence and 
efficiency of the Regional Innovation System 
Phase 3: Assessment of innovation support infrastructure 
• Regional organisations supporting innovation promotion 
o Effectiveness and coherence of activities 
o Evaluation of innovation/technology schemes 
• Extra-regional agencies supporting innovation already active in region 
o Comparison between own and firms assessment of effectiveness  
• Identification of potential extra-regional providers of innovation support 
services pertinent to industrial needs 
Phase 4: Steering Committee decides on key issues for scenarios arising from phases 
2&3 
• Strategic Panels, Working Groups, Seminars, External experts 
• Overall coherence = capacity for delivering services and potential for 
synergies through co-operation 
o Available resources  
o Missions 
o Feasibility 
Phase 5: Strategy Formulation by steering Committee and Action Plan 
implementation. 
• Strategy formulation and action plan implementation  
o Launch actions coherent with Structural Funds and private sources of 
funds  
o Identify means for continuing of mobilising of local and extra-regional 
actors & agencies 
o Regional mechanism for co-ordinating and evaluation & monitoring 
innovation action 
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The Systemness of the triple helix of university-industry-government relations 
 
Given the reported problems in the governance and functioning of innovatin systems in 
general, the dynamics or extent of systemic-ness of the varieties of institutional arrangements 
and policy models within innovation systems need to be analysed. In order to so, Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff’s (2000, pp. 111-113) ‘triple helix’ model of university-industry-government 
relations (cf. also Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhardt, & Terra, 2000, pp. 314-315) can be a very 
useful tool.181 The model particularly focuses upon ‘the units of operation that interact when a 
system of innovation is formed’ and thereby aims to capture the complex ‘interacting 
subdynamics’ and ‘emerging overlay of communications, networks, and organizations’ 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, pp. 112-113). 
 
Lundvall (1992a, p. 9) points out that ‘if innovation reflects learning and learning comes from 
routine activities, innovation must be rooted in prevailing economic structure’. Indeed, as 
shown above, it is the current normative policy interest to attain such a ‘triple helix’ 
configuration of university-industry-government (see Figure 13 below) that goes beyond the 
mere encompassing or linking of the three different institutional spheres or helixes (see 
Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 111; Etzkowitz et al., 2000, p. 315). Its great attraction is 
that it is supposed to feature dynamic intersections which generate ‘a knowledge 
infrastructure in terms of overlapping institutional spheres, with each taking the role of the 
other and with [tri-lateral networks and] hybrid organizations emerging at the interfaces’ 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 111). 182 Often, these ‘[t]rilateral networks and hybrid 
                                                 
181 In this context, Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (2000, pp. 109 and cf. 113) also state that ‘[t]he institutional layer 
can be considered as the retention mechanism of a developing system’. 
182 Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (2000, p. 112) indicate that currently ‘[t]he common objective is to realize an 
innovative environment consisting of university spin-off firms, tri-lateral initiatives for knowledge-based 
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organizations are created for resolving social and economic crises’ and, therefore, they 
epitomize the social structure of ‘dynamics of change’ in innovation and production systems 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 115). Their advantage is seen in ‘serving to 
institutionalise and reproduce interface as well as stimulate organizational creativity and 
regional cohesiveness’ (Etzkowitz et al., 2000, p. 315). 
 
The creation of these hybrid institutions in clusters and milieus is regarded as a way to 
establish a ‘wide coalition amongst stakeholders’ by ‘building bridges between different 
elements of a societal space’, as Ache (2002, p. 18) indicates. He also concludes in this 
respect that the region is the main arena for this ‘social engineering’ of an ‘institutional fix’ 
(2002, p. 19). Raines (2002a, p. 24) agrees by stressing that ‘it is particularly regional 
institutions that are regarded as having a strong policy rationale’. According to Cooke & 
Morgan (1998), ‘institutions can act as “animateurs” of local innovation systems, not only 
identifying the points in the regional economy where self-sustaining innovation can be 
activated, but also becoming major actors in promoting the creation of networks’ (Raines, 
2002a, p. 24). Hence, proposed policy measures often include setting up ‘cluster fora’ 
(Raines, 2002b, p. 169) or ‘steering committees’ supported by strategic panels, working 
groups, seminars, and external experts (Landabaso, 2002, Annex III on p. 37). Yet, it is 
argued that this alone is not enough.  
                                                                                                                                                        
economic development, and strategic alliances among firms (large and small, operating in different areas, and 
with different levels of technology), government laboratories, and academic research groups.’ Regarding the 
‘triple helix’ configuration of university-industry-government relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, see Fig. 
3 on p. 111), this study obviously refers to the ‘Triple Helix III’ variant and not to the ‘etatistic’ model (‘I’) and 
neither to the ‘laissez-faire’ model (‘II’). 
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Figure 11 The Triple Helix Model of University-Industry-Government Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (2000, Fig. 3 on p. 111) 
 
 
This is different from the regional, and in particular, the national system of innovation 
approach and there is an important difference in the conceptualisation of the ‘triple helix’ by 
Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff as opposed to the regional, and national system of innovation 
approach (Lundvall, 1988, 1992b; Nelson, 1993), in that the university is attributed a much 
more important role in technology and knowledge transfer for industrial innovation ‘as a 
knowledge-producing and disseminating institutions’ in a knowledge-based economy 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 109; Etzkowitz et al., 2000, pp. 314-315).  
 
While the national innovation systems strand in general provides ‘little room for ‘intermediate 
institutions’ (Cooke & Morgan, 1998, p. 27), the regional innovation systems strand instead 
comprises the ‘full panoply of innovation organizations’ (ibid., p. 71) including universities. 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
 
Industry 
Academia 
Tri-lateral networks and 
hybrid organizations 
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Yet, it can be argued from the earlier discussion that the regional innovation systems strand is 
preoccupied with the two dimensions of industry (or business superstructure in Cooke’s 
rubric) and state (or governance). Hence it can be seen that the triple helix model places an 
additional spotlight on the university sphere.  
 
While it is argued in this thesis that the plurality of these ‘trilateral networks and hybrid 
organizations’ is conducive to a given innovation system, a potential bottleneck of a policy 
approach in creating additional business support organisation is the potential existence of an 
already ‘complex organisational landscape’ (Harris, 2005, p. 9) or ‘institutionally congested’ 
governance structure as the new organisations (here referring to RDAs) are hardly entering a 
‘regional institutional “desert”’ as Roberts (2000, p. 50 and cf. p. 39) remarks (cf. G. Bentley 
& J. Gibney, 2000, p. 221). In this case, institutional innovations are likely to be needed in 
order to improve coordination and coherence and avoid fragmentation. 
 
Competitive bidding as an effective tool of pooling resources of excellence 
 
In recognition of the importance of ‘tri-lateral networks and hybrid organizations’, an 
advocacy of supporting measures fostering the university-industry-government interactions 
can be found in the literature. However, it is predominantly focussed upon the university-
industry dimensions.  
 
As an operational strategy of bringing together different partners from business and research 
sectors, competitive bidding for funding appears to be an effective tool for the pooling of 
resources of excellence as Burfitt, Gibney, & Schierenbeck (2002, pp. 32-33) conclude from 
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their research into the German ‘centres of competence’ (‘Kompetenzzentren’) or ‘networks of 
competence’ (‘Kompetenznetze’183) support scheme (see Bührer et al., 2002; 
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 1999, 2000; Bundesministerium für Bildung 
und Forschung, 2002; Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2003a, 2003b). There was 
a particular focus upon the ‘Competence Centre for Minimally Invasive Medicine and 
Technology’ in Tübingen-Tuttlingen (MITT) in Baden-Württemberg. 
 
There are some obvious advantages that derive from using a competition not just as a 
selection and funding allocation method (e.g. see Wels, 2005) but also as a tool in bridging 
the ‘different worlds’ of academia and industry. First, competitive bidding generally intends 
to give the impetus and provide the rewards ‘to be more imaginative and efficient’ (Turok, 
2004, p. 1072). Secondly, the monetary incentive of the funding prospect may overcome an 
existing scepticism or resistance of businesses towards collaborating with other businesses 
and university partners. It further may galvanise research actors that are perhaps normally 
less-driven by monetary objectives. Thirdly, in order to be successfully selected and to get 
most out of the potential collaboration, applicants themselves are expected to search by self-
interest for matching partners with the utmost level of excellence. Fourthly, a competition 
procedure bears an attribute of a potentially objective process of allocating scarce funding 
resources and can thereby help to overcome an existing tradition of funding distribution that 
may have appeared to rather satisfy vested interest of locations and/or actors. Finally, 
competition winners can be branded and easily marketed, helping to create a sense of identity 
for new networks. 
 
                                                 
183 Please consult also the English-version of the online platform ‘Kompetenznetze.de’ for the networks of 
competence at http://www.kompetenznetze.de/index.php3?aufl=2&sprache=2  
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Such an approach has, however, no universal application. Indeed, as Turok (2004, p. 1072) 
states there has so far only ‘been insufficient consideration of the circumstances in which 
competition is appropriate and where it is not’. As a first disadvantage of the competitive 
bidding, the application process and the involved formalities and bureaucracy can serve as an 
obstacle, failing to galvanise certain actors. Hence, it depends upon the initiative of movers & 
shakers with a sense of driving an idea forward. Secondly, supported networks are 
furthermore likely to remain at least initially somewhat exclusionary clubs, which 
consequently produces rather economies of scales and collective goods internal to the 
network. Thirdly, the survival of the supported networks and hybrid organisations is likely to 
be a sensitive issue, with the risk of becoming ‘“babies” of the facilitating organisation’ 
(Lagendijk, 1999a, p. 24) that receive perpetual assistance. Finally, the involved ‘adaptive 
costs of collaboration and cooperation’, as reported by Polenske (2004, pp. 1031-1033), has to 
be considered. Indeed as Burfitt, Gibney & Schierenbeck (2002, p. 29) report from their 
fieldwork, engaging SMEs in firm-to-firm collaboration is a difficult process. SMEs often 
fear exploitation (i.e. lack of trust) and are wary of the opportunity costs by committing (their 
limited time and resources available) to engaging in short-lived networks.  
 
Innovacracy 
Besides the cluster policy approach and efforts to construct institutional thickness, it is argued 
here that the predominance of innovation in all policy aspects is an essential third pillar in 
building innovation systems. To describe this predominance, the term innovacracy is coined 
here to refer to the governance of innovation.184 However, innovacracy is only understood 
                                                 
184 Inasmuch, the term innovacracy links the term ‘innovation’ (deriving from the Latin word innovāre) with the 
combining form of ‘-cracy’ (deriving from the ‘Greek -kratia, from kratos power’), ‘indicating a type of 
government or rule’ – cf. Collins English Dictionary (1994, pp. 798 and 370 respectively). 
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here as a paradigm in waiting, a proposal, since innovation has not yet become the 
predominant order towards which policy-making as a whole is geared to.  
 
In line with Lagendijk’s recommendations such a paradigm would involve a holistic policy 
approach that includes the recognition that an overemphasis on technical innovation while 
neglecting other aspects such as organisational innovation for business modernisation, can be 
detrimental for the business support system. 
 
In order to constitute successful economic development policy, the different policy fields such 
as education, research but also housing, environment, and so on all ought to be aligned with 
an underlying focus upon a common strategy for innovation and competitiveness. Assessing 
this alignment is however a difficult undertaking. In this respect it has to be acknowledged 
that the notion of innovacracy is a fuzzy description for a fuzzy concept. Whether indeed 
innovation policy as such, exists is therefore investigated by this thesis. 
 
Furthermore, appropriate and successful innovation policy does not necessary equal 
successful economic development as such and vice versa (cf. Benneworth & Charles, 2001, p. 
397). This is because other factors such as factor endowments or general regulatory 
conditions (at national level and that cannot be altered at regional level) have a more profound 
impact. As a result the thesis focuses attention upon the analysis of the systemic-ness of 
potential innovation systems, and in particular the inter-organisational dynamics. 
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Potential flaws in policy 
There are, on the one hand, examples of practical attempts at economic restructuring, cluster 
exercises, innovation policies unsuccessful that go underreported. The rareness of successful 
clusters and working innovation systems on the other hand, illustrates that securing structural 
change is difficult and that policy, if at all, only plays a limited part in contributing to this 
process.185 The thesis turns to look at the issues relating to policy failures. 
 
Lack of commitment 
 
The potential list of pitfalls in policy-making starts with a look at the issue of commitment to 
the task. Commitment is needed. However, policy makers may lack a sense of realism in 
terms of the availability of budgetary resources and the time span needed to achieve structural 
change. While, for instance, policies for radical economic structural change envisage rather a 
time horizon of around 25 years or so, this conflicts with the agendas of politicians, who want 
quantifiable results to present to the electorate within the period of office. The will affect the 
degree of commitment to policy ideas, as they will support the quick fix policy approaches. 
 
Everybody’s eggs in one basket: Biotech everybody?  
 
From a strategic management perspective it is generally accepted that if many economic 
actors in the business world opt for an apparently successful strategy, the profits will most 
likely only be marginal.186 A similar doctrine applies to regional development policy (and 
                                                 
185 The litany of policy pitfalls is underreported mainly because the majority of academic contributions highlight 
and focus upon success models and cases and not so much upon the deprived and failed cases. 
186 In this context, one could refer here to game theory or, better, to the cobweb theorem (cf. Pass et al., 1993, pp. 
71-72; Pollert et al., 2004, pp. 90-91), which is often illustrated at the example of the so-called ‘pig cycle’. The 
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thereby to the business environment, which regions have to offer). If most regions follow a 
similar regional innovation strategy, efforts to upgrade and establish centres of excellence in 
the same areas will counterbalance each other. This consequently implies the need for a more 
case-specific regional structural approach that would sit alongside a national structural 
approach or even a European approach.  
 
This way of thinking however may lead to the support for more adventurous or risky 
approaches (as for example demanded by the European Commission for the implementation 
of Innovative Actions) that are different from the current fashionable policy approaches. A 
key example of this is the drive to establish a strong presence in the new and upcoming 
growth sector biotechnology and nanotechnology. In doing this, there is a risk that regions 
will not opt for an innovative, endogenous strategy but instead will fall into the trap of 
following strategies that try to create fashionable clusters. Also they will simply copy policies 
of prosperous and successful model regions and industries, whilst neglecting other 
approaches. In particular, they will make the mistake of not following its own path-
dependency (Cooke, 1997, p. 362). Innovation policies which are set up fairly independently 
from the particular region’s composition of businesses, institutions and culture will be more 
likely to fail. Cooke (1997, p. 369) notes in this respect the difficulties, which peripheral 
regions from the Basque region of Spain to the Republic of Ireland have experienced (Cooke, 
1996; Cooke & Morgan, 1993).187  
                                                                                                                                                        
theory explains the oscillations in the prices of agricultural markets with the time lags with which supply reacts 
to prices (due to the delay between planting and harvesting). For economic development policy, the key would 
not be prices but perhaps industrial sectors or future technologies. The time lag here can just be the same, or 
more likely worse. For example, structural change is often given a mid-term time tag and 25 years are a rather 
realistic time horizon for harvesting the economic benefits of policy-making. 
187 The Basque case has shown that there is a need for prioritisation of sectors and technologies and for efficient 
monitoring and evaluation procedures for the industrial clusters policy. In addition, the specific political 
problems such as the threat of terrorism in combination with unfavourable economic features made it difficult 
for the regions to overcome its unattractiveness to foreign investors (Cooke & Morgan, 1993, pp. 179 and 181). 
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Having all one’s eggs in one basket: the competency trap  
 
Besides the potential pitfall of following fashionable but unsuitable strategies, there is also the 
danger of a region becoming locked-into the specialism of the locality and of the ‘strong ties’ 
(Grabher, 1993a). Capello (1996, see the 2nd explanation group in section 3.3) reports, in this 
respect, that the ‘cumulative concentration of material and immaterial resources in specific 
directions increases the risk connected to system irreversibility, yet in the presence of strong 
external turbulence and the need to change competitive strategies and conduct (Camagni, 
1995).’  
 
This institutional ‘lock-in’ means that while a region, for example, has become too specialised 
and good at doing something, at the same time it reduces its adaptive capacity to absorb new 
ideas. This is due to dominant organizations being opposed to change that may undermine 
their vested interests and positions (Boschma, 2004, p. 1004; Turok, 2004, p. 1076). In other 
more simple words: old habits die hard. 
 
Missing policy diagnosis and evaluation 
 
The importance of finding suitable strategies and focus areas or clusters becomes clear. 
Therefore, a more advanced pre-assessment and benchmarking of a region’s strength 
independent from general fashion is needed to find a successful trajectory for the development 
of a region. As Lagendijk (1999a, p. 20) reports, it is often not found in practice. However, 
this demands undertaking benchmarking exercises and the implementation of ongoing 
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performance indicators, which regions and its institutions are sometimes reluctant to 
introduce. This is often out of fear of being branded as an underperformer and the consequent 
public criticism following any publication of such results.188 
 
Big boys not raising the flags – Lack of signalling from the top/Lack of high-level support 
 
What is needed for a successful implementation of a holistic approach towards a regional 
innovation systems is not only the willingness and endorsement of the main actors (key 
players or ‘movers and shakers’) and bodies to collaborate but also the commitment of high-
profile policy makers to signal the importance and acceptance of relevant policies. This could 
be compared to the necessity for commitment to the implementation of new business 
management approaches in companies, such as TQM.189 This need may often be neglected or 
perceived as being of inferior importance to success but some examples indicate that failure is 
more likely once top-level involvement and commitment has faded or was absent. It is strange 
that there has been insufficient attention in the past to the involvement or commitment of top-
level policy makers and hence this thesis also looks into this aspect 
 
The majority of research studies related to cluster theory focus on specific sectors only. 
Although this is a useful approach to identifying the particular sector needs and the status quo, 
this kind of cluster thinking can tend to fall short in addressing a region’s underlying 
                                                 
188 An example for such reluctance might be the ending of North Rhine-Westphalia’s participation in the 
European Regional Competitiveness Benchmarking pilot project lead by EURADA. 
189 In the Eighties, many companies tried to copy the success of Japanese business culture models that placed 
quality at the centre of all management aspects. Yet, so many large businesses were reported to have failed, for 
instance, the implementation of Total Quality Management (TQM) approaches and execute a organisational 
culture change because they only selectively tackled a few aspects and did not whole-heartedly showcase and set 
an example from the top to all employees of what the new approach entails. Especially the lack of this signalling 
from the top was reportedly on of the key factors often missing that is necessary to overcome encrusted routines, 
beliefs and structures and carry out an institutional change.  
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problems and structure. It can neglect other clusters and linkages, e.g. same basic training 
needs and so on. 
 
The theory-practice gap and the consequent absence of theoretical influence in policy 
development 
 
In addition, policy failure occurs because many policy suggestions that feature in the literature 
are derived from the policy initiatives found in case-studies and thus do not reflect ‘pure’ 
academic thinking. Hence, theory may sometimes be rather led by policy rather than policy 
being theory-led (cf. also Lovering, 1999). This is an aspect that is worth further 
investigation. However, taking an opposite view, Landabaso (2002, p. 21) reports upon ‘an 
important “divide” between academic thinkers and regional planners’ in Europe, illustrated by 
the following quote:  
 
This has had as a consequence a relative detachment of academic thinkers from 
practical experimentation and evaluation of results, which in turn, has meant that many 
of the good economic theories and considerations put forward are of a ‘diagnosis’ 
nature rather than clearly identifiable policy recommendations and tools amenable to 
testing and evaluation of results. Moreover, in the absence of the necessary feed-back 
from practical policy experimentation to further policy theory reflection, much of the 
regional economic literature has had a descriptive nature of existing regional ‘success’ 
stories in an attempt at drawing a universal explanatory ‘model’, rather than to 
concentrate in helping planners to improve their policy making step by step in a 
realistic, effective and pragmatic way. (Landabaso, 2002, p. 21) 
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This apparent theory-practice gap appears to be fuelled from both sides. Wollmann (2002b, 
pp. 382-383) points out that knowledge utilization research (cf. U. Beck & Bonß, 1990; 
Krautzberger & Wollmann, 1988; Weiss, 1991; Wittrock, 1991) has shown that 
paradoxically, despite the popularisation of policy and programme evaluation and monitoring, 
the results of such exercises as well as of social science research do generally not immediately 
find their application in policy and administration practice. Hence, he points that the 
interaction and learning processes are only incremental at best.  
 
Business support: too many initiatives, too many organisations, no one-stop-shop 
 
Linked to the idea of ‘support fatigue’ noted earlier (Hassink, 1996; cf. Lagendijk, 1999a, p. 
11) and especially ‘initiative fatigue’ (G. Bentley & J. Gibney, 2000, p. 221), businesses are 
faced with too many initiatives, which are often set within a complex and fragmented 
organisational maze of business support organisations. Greenbaum & Bondonio (2000, p. 
331) also add, with reference to Lehman (2004), the potential trap of programmatic 
approaches, i.e. where the programme is spread, to gain political support; and through 
increased budgets. An improved ‘streamlined organisation and communication’ of the 
business support structure as suggested by Lagendijk is essential in this respect to increase 
inter-operability as well as visibility, and is best achieved by the setting up of a ‘one-stop-
shop’ as a first point of contact that coordinates and channels business advice. 
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Lack of systemic-ness of the governance of the innovation and business support framework 
 
The results from the 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) published by the European 
Commission (2005f) imply that to improve their innovative capability, countries ought to 
focus their policy endeavours on weak dimensions of their innovation system instead of 
further consolidating their strength (as discussed in chapter 3). It is argued here that these 
results potentially provide an argument for raising the importance of the systemic-ness 
between the different dimensions of the innovation system, of which ‘governance’ represents 
one.190 This perspective is extended by the view that the governance dimension itself also 
relies heavily on its own systemic-ness. This means that not only the important aspects of 
innovation need to be sufficiently interlinked but also the various actors and policies within 
the governance dimension of the innovation system too.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has outlined some of the normative policy strategies suggested in current 
theoretical conceptualisations. Furthermore, this chapter has presented some potential policy 
flaws and traps and thereby, illustrated that successful practical policy-making or policy 
implementation remains a difficult task. This thesis argues that in particular the systemic-ness 
of the governance of the innovation and business support framework plays an important role 
in contributing to the working of regional innovation systems. It is the particular objective of 
                                                 
190 In reiteration, the seven dimensions of innovation according to the 2005 EIS are (structural) innovation 
drivers, knowledge creation (i.e. R&D activity), innovation & entrepreneurship (at the firm level) – all grouped 
under innovation inputs -, application and intellectual property – both grouped as innovation outputs - (European 
Commission, 2005f, pp. 6-8), plus innovation demand and governance – added from the EXIS report (Arundel & 
Hollanders, 2005). 
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this thesis to ascertain how the systemic-ness influences its functioning. The next chapter 
outlines the methodology adopted in this thesis in investigating the issues. 
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CHAPTER 7 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the methodological approach employed in this thesis to reach its 
research objectives and to answer the research questions as outlined in the introduction. First, 
it elucidates why the specific research topic was chosen. Secondly, it presents the general 
epistemological perspective. Thirdly, it explains why a qualitative methodology was chosen 
in weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of a qualitative versus a quantitative 
approach. Fourthly, it presents the research focus and propositions. Fifthly, the research 
design is illustrated, which introduces the methods of information gathering and elucidates the 
reasons behind the selection of case-studies and the sampling of interviewees. Finally, the 
analytical framework is presented, which forms the basis for collecting the information. It also 
discusses some of the limitations of the research.  
 
Choice of research topic 
The initial question for discussion is why focus on governance aspects of regional innovation 
systems? At its core, this thesis argues that actual practical innovation and technology policy-
making per se has at large remained what Rosenberg (1982) called a ‘black box’, meaning 
that it involves some key factors and process that are less understood or underestimated.191 
This may seem odd considering the large amount of best practice models and case studies 
describing success stories of regional innovation systems or clusters (e.g. Boekholt et al., 
1998; Roland Berger & Partner et al., 1998; Saxenian, 1996 on Silicon Valley). However, 
                                                 
191 This standpoint is also supported by den Hertog, Oskam, Smith, & Segers (2003, p. 25), who classify 
‘implementing systemic innovation policies’ as a ‘black box’ in their preliminary assessment of the mismatch 
between ‘policy’ and ‘research’ themes - or central nodes of dynamic innovation. Following their classification, 
they believe that this is a theme that is not yet well covered in innovation research nor yet recognised and 
addressed in innovation policy. 
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despite the maturity of conceptual models, there still remains, first of all, a shortness of 
practical policy advice for developing and implementing a suitable and endogenous policy in 
less favoured areas, which actually differ or go beyond describing the deficiencies in 
comparison to the success stories or theoretical models. Furthermore, there is a need for 
explaining policy failures in other areas, which do not manage to build an efficient innovation 
system despite seeming to be not less favoured in terms of crucial factor endowment.  
 
It is the argument of this thesis that some processes in policy-making and implementation 
concerning policy strategy content and inter-institutional aspects of an innovation system are 
overlooked or misunderstood. While it can be suggested that most ingredients of a successful 
innovation system or a cluster have been identified (e.g. Braczyk, Cooke, & Heidenreich, 
1998; Lagendijk, 1999), it is argued however, that current models and their affiliated policy 
suggestions do not sufficiently take account of the dynamics of the relationships between 
these ingredients within an economic system. Accordingly, importance has been attached to 
these aspects in the research fieldwork. 
 
The thesis sees the apparent theory-practice gap as one potential contributor to policy 
shortcomings in reaching the EU’s so-called Lisbon objective of becoming by 2010 ‘the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2000, paragraph 5).192 If this is the case, the question must be raised, how this gap is 
fuelled – if it exists. It is potentially either fuelled by the unawareness and ignorance of 
                                                 
192 On the policy shortcomings see in particular the mid-term review report by the high-level expert group 
(HLEG) chaired by former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Wim Kok on the delivery of the Lisbon strategy 
entitled ‘Facing the challenge’ (European Communities, 2004, p. 6) that is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/index_en.html and the so-called Aho group report of another 
independent HLEG chaired by former Prime Minister of Finland Esko Aho was on recommendations for 
‘Creating an Innovative Europe’ (Aho, Cornu, Georghiou, & Subirá, 2006) that is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/action/2006_ahogroup_en.htm. 
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policy-makers and practitioners towards theory, or by the detachment of academics to the 
‘real’ practical world whose conceptualisations thereby misguide policy, or indeed both.  
 
Regarding the former, academics have indeed ‘noticed the difficulties of getting across the 
content of the concepts developed by economic geographers and regional scientists to policy 
makers and practitioners’ (Grabher & Hassink, 2003, p. 699) as, for instance, reported by 
Martin & Sunley (2001; 2003, p. 9), who single out only Porter’s cluster concept as one that 
has had an ‘impact on policy-makers’. 
 
Either way, policy strategies are seen here as to underestimate or inadequately consider the 
obstacles towards their successful implemention in terms of pre-requisites for the suitability, 
feasibility and stakeholders’ acceptability of regional economic and innovation strategies. 
Consequently, this thesis critically analyses the current main conceptual models upon which 
contemporary policies are based. This concerns foremost the regional innovation systems 
concept, which is reviewed to ascertain its value for policy development and implementation 
in particular concerning governance arrangements and dynamics.  
 
As the main conceptual reference model, this study emphasises the regional innovation 
systems strand and Porter’s cluster approach, as they are perceived here as being the concepts 
that have most significantly informed many contemporary policy developments. However, the 
analytical focus is placed mainly upon the regional innovation system concept, as it is viewed 
to comprise a ‘cluster’ perspective of the ‘business superstructure’ dimension in combination 
with a ‘governance infrastructure’ dimension (cf. Cooke, 1998, pp. 19-24) that is of particular 
interest to this thesis. As the concept considers governance aspects, which have increasingly 
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received more attention, it is arguably the concept with a slightly more operational policy 
focus. 193 Constructing institutional thickness and facilitating cluster development in a holistic 
approach are seen as key ingredients of innovation policy towards building successful 
innovation systems. 
 
Presenting the ontological and epistemological perspective 
The interpretative framework of this thesis for the accumulation of knowledge follows a 
reflexive, social constructivist approach. The epistemological perspective of social 
constructivism views reality as being ‘socially constructed’ by interactive and subjective 
interpretations, identities, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of various actors and the 
researcher itself (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991, p. 
24; Meyers, 2004a, pp. 455-456 and 463-464). 
 
This social constructivist paradigm is based upon a relativistic ontological presupposition, 
which means that the recognized reality or truth may differ between individuals or cultures. 
Accordingly, an abstract, subjective construct (such as an innovation system for instance) is 
only to be accepted when the actors (consensually) believe it does (cf. Meyers, 2004a, p. 456). 
Hence, social constructivism opposes the ontological position of ‘hypothetical realism’ - that 
features in the alternative positivistic and critical rationalist inquiry paradigms - which 
assumes that entities have a real existence separate from individuals, and that an universal or 
absolute reality is objectively recognizable, or respectively, subjectively at least partly 
recognizable (Kappelhoff, 1995, p. 32). Correspondingly though, social constructivism turns 
                                                 
193 This has also been fuelled by the ‘European Commission’-led push towards more bottom-up regional 
innovation and economic development governance stemming from the initiated process of developing Regional 
Operational Programmes for the implementation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and from 
the programmes supporting the development of Regional Innovation Strategies (RIS, RIS+ and others). 
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social science into ‘double hermeneutics’, in that it is regarded as the constructed 
interpretation of a course of individually constructed interpretations (Meyers, 2004a, p. 464). 
 
The thesis also took recourse to questions that are central to other epistemological 
perspectives that are more or less close to the social constructivist paradigm, namely 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, ethnomethodology, systems theory, and grounded theory (see 
Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 24; Patton, 2002, Exhibit 3.6 on pp. 132-133). The following 
table by Patton (2002, Exhibit 3.6 on pp. 132-133) provides an overview of the core questions 
that drive the various theoretical traditions for qualitative inquiry that is associated with the 
social constructivist paradigm.194 
                                                 
194 With regards to utilization-focused evaluations of programmes and projects, Patton also provides elsewhere 
(1997, see Menu 8.1 on pp. 192-194) an useful and extensive overview of different types of evaluations and their 
defining approach or questions.  
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Table 14  Variety in Qualitative Inquiry: Theoretical traditions 
  Perspective Disciplinary Roots Central Questions 
1. Ethnography Anthropology What is the culture of this group of people? 
2. Autoethnography Literary arts How does my own experience of this culture connect with and 
offer insights about this culture, situation, event, and/or way 
of life? 
3. Reality testing:  
Positivist and 
realist approaches 
Philosophy, social 
sciences, and 
evaluation 
What’s really going on in the real world? What can we 
establish with some degree of certainty? What are plausible 
explanations for verifiable patterns? What’s the truth insofar 
as we can get at it? How can we study a phenomenon so that 
our findings correspond, as much as possible, to the real 
world? 
4. Constructionism/ 
Constructivism 
Sociology How have the people in this setting constructed reality? What 
are their reported perceptions, “truth”, explanations, beliefs, 
and worldview? What are the consequences of their 
constructions for their behaviors and for those with whom 
they interact? 
5. Phenomenology Philosophy What is the meaning, structure, and essence of the lived 
experience of this phenomenon for this person or group of 
people? 
6. Heuristic inquiry Humanistic 
psychology 
What is my experience of this phenomenon and the essential 
experience of others who also experience this phenomenon 
intensely? 
7. Ethnomethodology Sociology How do people make sense of their everyday activities so as to 
behave in socially acceptable ways? 
8. Symbolic 
interaction 
Social psychology What common set of symbols and understandings has 
emerged to give meaning to people’s interactions? 
9. Semiotics Linguistics How do signs (words, symbols) carry and convey meaning in 
particular contexts? 
10. Hermeneutics Linguistics, 
philosophy, 
literary criticism, 
theology 
What are the conditions under which a human act took place 
or a product was produced that makes it possible to interpret 
its meaning? 
11. Narratology/ 
narrative analysis 
Social sciences 
(interpretative): 
Literary criticism, 
literary nonfiction 
What does this narrative or story reveal about the person and 
world from which it came? How can this narrative be 
interpreted to understand and illuminate the life and culture 
that created it? 
12. Ecological 
psychology 
Ecology, 
psychology 
How do individuals attempt to accomplish their goals through 
specific behaviours in specific environments? 
13. Systems theory Interdisciplinary How and why does this system as a whole function as it does? 
14. Chaos theory: 
Nonlinear 
dynamics 
Theoretical 
physics, natural 
sciences 
What is the underlying order, if any, of disorderly 
phenomenon? 
15. Grounded theory Social sciences, 
methodology 
What theory emerges from systematic comparative analysis 
and is grounded in fieldwork so as to explain what has been 
and is observed? 
16. Orientational:  
Feminist inquiry, 
critical theory, 
queer theory, etc.  
Ideologies: 
Political, cultural, 
and economic 
How is X perspective manifest in this phenomenon? 
Source: Patton (2002, Exhibit 3.6 on pp. 132-133). Note that ‘etc.’ was used her to replace ‘among other’. 
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By following a social constructivist approach, this thesis takes an institutionalist perspective 
in that the behaviour and decision-making of economic actors is regarded as being based upon 
beliefs and attitudes (Blyth, 2002, preface on p. ix) that are influenced by habits and routines 
of individuals, groups and institutions (Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 51; Boschma, 2004, p. 1007). 
This means in consequence that the collective outcome is shaped by an ‘instituted process’ 
(cf. Amin, 1999, pp. 366-367; Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 50; Coriat & Dosi, 2002, pp. 98-99). 
However, actors are not just seen to be responding to institutional structures and their 
contextual environment but, at the same time, also seen to ‘actively construct’ or ‘enact’ their 
environments (cf. Kappelhoff, 1995, p. 32; W. R. Scott, 1998, p. 140; Watzlawick, 1985; 
Weick, 1979, p. 132). Social constructivism places an emphasises on this reciprocal ‘co-
constitution’ (Meyers, 2004a, p. 464; Pettman, 2000, p. 11), i.e. the determining 
interdependence between the collective behaviour of actors and social structures (Meyers, 
2004a, p. 456). 
 
Importantly, social constructivism assumes in this respect the changeability and adaptability 
of actors, interests, processes and structures, which are ‘embedded’ in a specific historical, 
socio-economic, political and cultural context (M. Granovetter, 1985). Therefore, this thesis is 
based on the postulated possibility that systems full of conflictive behaviour and interactions 
can be transformed into cooperative associative systems (cf. Meyers, 2004b, pp. 482-484).195 
Accordingly, it rejects the perspective of power and competition as being a pure antagonistic 
‘zero-sum game’. Instead, cooperation is seen as possible not because of altruistic intentions 
that aim for the overall societal best for a region but instead due to boundedly rational 
calculated decision by actors, which are influenced by ‘perceptions of self interest’ (Coriat & 
                                                 
195 Thus, this study has recourse to conflict and cooperation theories (see Meyers, 2004a; Meyers, 2004b). 
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Dosi, 2002, pp. 99-100) and the assumed benefits resulting from cooperation.196 The interest 
of this thesis thus lies in how regional innovation systems are constituted and how do they 
function. 
 
Outlining the methodological research approach 
This thesis takes a qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) methodological research approach 
as it is regarded to be most suitable for gaining an in-depth insight and understanding of the 
complex dynamics, perceptions and relationships between actors within the governance and 
business support infrastructure of regional economies or regional innovation systems. 
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, pp. 21-32) juxtapose the positivist paradigm and associated 
quantitative methods of data collection with the phenomenological paradigm - from which the 
social constructivist paradigm derived (cf. ibid., p. 24) - and the associated qualitative 
methods, which are summarised in the following Table 15. This contrasting of strength and 
weaknesses of each approach illustrates clearly that for the purpose of this thesis a qualitative 
methodology is best. 
 
This thesis has taken a phenomenological, qualitative fieldwork method to study networks of 
organisations in different social settings in order to arrive at an in-depth understanding of the 
meanings that people place upon interpersonal and inter-organisational behaviours, 
relationships, and processes (cf. Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 37). A quantitative 
                                                 
196 This entails that actors interdependently adjust their behaviour towards a common objective or that of other 
actors in the hope of mutual benefits. Meyers’ (2004b) summary of theories of international cooperation and 
interactions includes an useful overview of the concept of (rationalistic) cooperation. As an explanation why 
cooperation occurs, he (2004b, pp. 484-485) refers to optimistic and pessimistic expectations about future 
behaviour of other actors. Hence, cooperation is driven by the optimistic expectations of future beneficial 
cooperative behaviour of other actors as a consequence from the current own cooperative behaviour, or by the 
pessimistic expectations of a non-cooperative ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984). 
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experimental research design would have found this difficult to grasp since it is – as Easterby-
Smith et al. (1991, p. 32) put it – ‘not very effective in understanding processes or the 
significance that people attach to actions’ (see also Table 15 below). 
 
Table 15  Advantages and disadvantages of competing methodological paradigms 
 
  Positivist paradigm and associated 
quantitative methods 
  Phenomenological paradigm and 
associated qualitative methods 
 
+ 
 
wide coverage of the range of situations 
 
+
 
ability to look at change processes over 
time 
+ fast and economical + ability to understand people’s meanings 
+ maybe considerable relevance to policy 
decisions (if aggregated from large 
samples) 
+ ability to adjust to new issues and ideas as 
they emerge 
– tend to be rather inflexible and artificial + ability to contribute to the evolution of 
new theories 
– not very effective in understanding 
processes or the significance that people 
attach to actions 
+ way of gathering data which is seen as 
natural rather than artificial 
– not very helpful in generating theories – data collection can take up a great deal of 
time and resources 
– they make it hard for the policy-maker to 
infer what changes and actions should 
take place in the future (because of the 
focus on what is, or what has been 
recently)  
– analysis and interpretation of data may be 
very difficult 
– may only provide illusions of the ‘true’ 
impact of social policies as Legge (1984) 
points out 
– qualitative studies often feel very untidy 
because its harder to control their pace, 
progress and end-points 
– most of the data gathered will not be 
relevant to real decisions although it may 
be used to support the goals to decision-
makers 
– problem that many people especially 
policy-makers may give low credibility to 
studies based on phenomenological 
approach 
 
Source: Shortened summary of Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p. 32).  
Note that a ‘+’ denotes an advantage and ‘–‘ denotes a disadvantage. 
 
 
The social constructivist paradigm and the qualitative research methods is particularly suited 
to this thesis, which furthermore aims to investigate subjective obstacles to systemic 
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cooperation and thereby explore possible alternatives, practically and theoretically. The 
research is not just pure theoretical research, which in reflection re-examines the regional 
innovation systems concept in different organisational and social contexts and thus 
contributes to theoretical developments; but it is applied research too since the inquiry aims 
to ‘explain what is happening’ and is guided by practical, applied questions (cf. Easterby-
Smith et al., 1991, pp. 6-7; Patton, 2002, Exhibit 5.3 on p. 224).  
 
Correspondingly, this thesis provides a critical interpretation of how and why systemic 
governance is constructed and thus identifies obstacles and enablers for policy practice. Yet, 
this thesis is not ‘problem-solving research’ but instead a kind of ‘testing-out research’ of 
propositions concerning the regional innovation concept in that it is ‘trying to find the limits 
of previous proposed generalizations’ and ultimately aims to improve it. Thus, as outlined in 
the introduction, the objective of the thesis is to focus on the question: What are the ways of 
making regional innovation systems work? However, the investigative focus this thesis asks 
‘how and why’ systemic governance – which is perceived as one of the key determinants for 
regional innovation systems – is, or is not, functioning. Therefore, the research equally 
involves a clear ‘explanatory’ dimension (cf. Yin, 1994, pp. 6-7). This allows for a case-study 
approach. This is because the ‘what’ questions are not ‘a form of a “how many” or “how 
much” line of inquiry’ and means that any of the five research strategies outlined by Yin 
(1994, pp. 5-6) can be used - including an exploratory case study.197 Thus, it is compatible 
with the explanatory ‘how and why’ questions, which favour the use of case studies as well as 
histories and experiments as research strategies (cf. Yin, 1994, pp. 6-7).  
                                                 
197 The alternatives for an explorative study are using the strategies of a survey, an experiment, an archival 
analysis and history. In contrast, the different type of ‘what question’ (in terms of ‘how many’ or ‘how much’) 
‘is more likely to favor survey or archival strategies than others’ (Yin, 1994, pp. 5-6). Confer also Philips & 
Pugh (2000, pp. 50-52). 
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A case-study approach to research strategy 
Undertaking case studies ‘is a way of investigating an empirical topic by following a set of 
pre-specified procedures’ (Yin, 1994, p. 15). Its inquiry thus benefits from the theoretical 
propositions that guide data collection and analysis. According to Yin (1994, p. 10 and cf. pp. 
30-32), the goal of the case study is to ‘expand and generalize theories (analytical 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)’. 
 
The sources of evidence for the case studies include primary documents, secondary 
documents, and systematic interviewing. Even though, in general, case studies can include 
quantitative evidence (cf. Yin, 1994, p. 14) they are overwhelmingly limited here to 
qualitative evidence. The following sections describe the research design of the thesis. 
 
Research focus and propositions 
In order to achieve its objectives and to answer the research questions the research approach 
follows in particular three dimensions to the debate, which scrutinizes the regional innovation 
systems model from a governance perspective as opposed to a business perspective (e.g. 
Evangelista, Iammarino, Mastrostefano, & Silvani, 2002).198 These dimensions correspond to 
propositions that can be decoded from the concept: the region, innovation, and the system: 
 
1. This thesis investigates whether the region is the appropriate unit to conceptualise an 
innovation system, especially with regards to the governance dimension.  
                                                 
198 Thereby, this thesis in a way is complementary to the different approaches of testing regional patterns of 
innovation and cluster, and their systemicness from business surveys such as the CIS (see e.g. Evangelista et al., 
2002, pp. 180-182). 
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2. The status of innovation is tested, i.e. whether it is in practice a dominating paradigm, 
meaning whether innovation is currently prioritised over other policy fields in a way 
that justifies the label of innovation policy. 
3. The systemic-ness of innovation systems is explored to identify contributing factors to 
governance coherence and cooperation.  
 
The following elaborates on these three dimensions in more detail and presents the 
propositions of this thesis concerning them. 
 
1. First, it is argued that the regional innovation system strand neglects important sub-
regional governance dynamics. It is argued that the amalgamation of the governance 
dimension and the business dimension implies that both dimensions are in a way aligned at 
the regional level. It is argued that this is not necessarily the case. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised that there are significant sub-regional dynamics within the governance of 
regional innovation systems that potentially do not justify the regional conceptualisation of 
innovation systems. If there are significant differences in sub-regional case-studies within the 
same regional setting in terms of governance arrangements, structures and systemic-ness, this 
gives credence to the hypothesis that there is not one homogenous innovation system and that 
the regional innovation systems concept is at least insufficient in describing the dynamics of 
the governance dimension. Indeed, the modalities of regional innovation systems by Cooke 
(1992; 1998, pp. 19-21) such as the grassroots, network and dirigiste types are regarded to 
insufficiently describe the complex realities of policy-making and thus are of little guidance to 
policy development. Furthermore, the question is raised of whether the region is the 
appropriate level of innovation policy-making and implementation and whether the sub-
regional or urban level ought to be attributed a more important role within the multi-level 
governance system of innovation systems. In consequence, this process also involves 
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considering the proposition of an alternative or complementing conceptualisation towards 
local or urban innovation system, at least in terms of the governance infrastructure dimension. 
 
2. Secondly, this thesis suggests that many policy shortcomings have been fuelled by a 
theory-practice gap. The thesis investigates the potential divergence between academic 
understanding and conceptualisations and policy-maker’s and practitioner’s perceptions, 
beliefs and understanding on what regional innovation policy is and what it should entail.199 
The following diagram (Figure 12) illustrates that an apparent gap is potentially widened from 
both sides either by the fuzziness, detachment and policy distance and thus lack of 
applicability of conceptual models (cf. Markusen, 2003a, p. 705) or by the insufficient 
knowledge or understanding of these models by practitioners and policy-makers. To identify 
any apparent theory-practice gap and poor theory transfer to policy-making practice and/or  
vice versa requires a good understanding of both perspectives. Thus, the thesis investigates 
the innovation focus of the conceptualisation of regional innovation systems. It is argued here 
that although innovation should be a paradigm for policy-making, it is not yet. Innovation is 
regarded as the underlying contributor to competitiveness and economic growth; yet, the 
question remains whether policies have been attuned fully towards this common realisation. 
Moreover, this raises the question of whether innovation policy as such actually exists. 
                                                 
199 More precisely following the social constructivist perspective taken by this study, the potential theory-
practice gap rather represents the gap between the researcher’s interpretation of how academics understand and 
conceptualise regional innovation policy, on the one side, and the researcher’s interpretation of policy-maker’s 
and practitioner’s perceptions, beliefs and understanding on the other. 
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Figure 12 The theory-practice gap 
 
 
Source: Own creation 
 
 
3. Thirdly, and most importantly, it is suggested that the systems dimension of the regional 
innovation system is not sufficiently specified. The fuzziness of the systems dimension means 
that the regional innovation system concept is prone to misguiding policy development, but it 
also limits the value of the concept as an analytical tool.200 The mere existence of elements of 
an identified system ‘as an enabler of local forms of competitiveness’ (Lagendijk, 1997b, p. 
23) gives the wrong impression that such a system is functioning or indeed existent. In this 
respect, it is suggested that of importance is not whether certain systemic parts exist, but 
whether they are connected or well-connected elements of an associational system, i.e. 
whether the actors of the governance system elements cooperate and are coherent in their joint 
overall strategic regional policy approach (cf. European Spatial Planning Observation 
Network, 2005, pp. 72-73). How to achieve this systemic-ness, is at the centre of the 
explorative investigation. Consequently, the question is raised of whether a region that is 
                                                 
200 Inasmuch this critique mirrors to some extent the critique addressed at the cluster concept (see Lagendijk, 
1997b, pp. 18-19; Martin & Sunley, 2001, 2003). 
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empirically valued as to encompass an insufficiently connected system of elements of the 
business and innovation support superstructure would still deserve being described as a (albeit 
weak) regional innovation system.  
 
The governance approach and the definition of systemic-ness  
The focus of this research is the system of business support and policy for innovation and 
regional technology transfer, which represents one important (but not omnipotent) feature of 
the regional innovation systems concept. Correspondingly, the emphasis is placed upon 
governance conditions, i.e. on elucidating the structures and relationships between the 
innovation actors. This comprises analysing the systemic-ness of the institutional governance 
framework, which is defined here as strategic and effective governance which encompass a 
‘well connected and functioning’ status of the structure and relationships between innovation 
actors that goes beyond its mere existence of an instititutional businesss support and 
governance superstructure. Insofar, it is supposed to actively facilitate the clustering or 
‘clusteredness’ of the business dimension of a regional innovation system. Certain conditions 
(or incentives) are assumed to be needed to constitute the ‘well connectedness and 
functioning’ of an innovation system, such as that key actors are being generally cooperative 
and coherent in an overall strategic approach which must be present. Before identifying 
certain criteria or success factors for such conditions these conditions, this thesis is first 
having recourse to the term of ‘good governance’ for some specification.  
 
While the notion of policy-making concerns foremost the formulation of action plans and 
programs by decision-makers201, the so-called governance approach (Le Galès & Voelzkow, 
                                                 
201 While policy-makers can, for example, comprise officials and politicians, practitioners, in contrast, are 
consequently rather seen as those actors that are involved in the implementation of policy-making, e.g. the 
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2001, pp. 5-6) consequently begs the investigation of the conditions, dynamics and 
institutional factors that influence the inter-institutional inclusiveness, coherence and 
cooperation of various stakeholders within the economic system (including practitioners).202 
Thereby, this approach addresses the questions of who makes policies, and how they could 
and should be done operationally. 
 
Accordingly, good governance at the local or regional level is basically the ‘cooperation and 
coordination between levels of government (vertical), between sector policies (horizontal), 
between territories and between governmental and non-governmental actors’ that provides 
‘integration and coherence between fields of competences, sector policies and spatial 
development approaches creating the conditions for collective and harmonised action’ 
(European Spatial Planning Observation Network, 2005, p. 72).203  
 
In its White Paper on European Governance, the European Commission (2001, p. 10) has 
furthermore outlined the following five principles of good governance: openness (i.e. active 
communication in clear and simple format), participation (i.e. inclusive policy chain – from 
conception to implementation), accountability (i.e. clear roles of responsibility and decision-
making processes), effectiveness (i.e. effective and timely delivery upon needs, objectives and 
                                                                                                                                                        
various actors in the organisational governance and business support infrastructure. Accordingly, this study 
defines the terms practitioner and (policy) practice in a wider sense while policy-maker and policy-making are 
interpreted in a more narrow sense.  
202 Following the European Commission’s (2002e, p. 21) definition of ‘governance (of innovation)’, this 
concerns all those stakeholders – such as scientists, industry, consumers and public authorities – that are 
involved ‘in the process of innovation policy design, implementation and evaluation’. 
203 In other words, good governance ‘comprises the capacity to (a) integrate and shape local/regional interests, 
organisations, social groups, as well as (b) to represent them to external actors, to develop more or less unified 
strategies in relation to the market, the state, other cities or other levels of governance’ (European Spatial 
Planning Observation Network, 2005, p. 73). 
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evaluation) and coherence (i.e. consistent approach within a complex system).204 These 
principles of good governance – though coming from a slightly different ‘European’ angle –  
are applied here also to the systemic-ness of innovation systems. 
 
As the systemic-ness of the governance dimension of regional innovation systems is under the 
spotlight here, businesses are not at the centre of this research - although they are the essential 
innovation actor.205 The thesis rather attaches importance to actors of the governance sphere, 
which are attributed an important facilitating role for regional innovation systems as sources 
of innovation input and as animateurs or mediators for collaboration and networking. 
However, by taking a regional perspective and concentrating on aspects of the governance 
system (see Figure 13 below), this study covers the business dimension indirectly. The case 
studies look at the relationships with business networks and associations, such as the 
chambers of commerce and industry, which serve as a kind of limited proxy for the business 
dimension. 
                                                 
204 The application of these five principles is further said to reinforce the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, which concerns the questions of whether activities are actually necessary, whether the choice of 
governance level for implementation is appropriate, and whether the selection of measures are proportionate to 
its objectives (cf. European Commission, 2001, pp. 10-11). 
205 With regards to the systemicness of the business dimension, see the list of key ingredients for systemic 
performance by Evangelista et al. (2002, pp. 180-182), which they applied to their analysis of data from the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Note that – besides the presence of innovative firms and their innovation 
expenditure – these key ingredients also include two further aspects with regards to the governance dimension. 
They are the relative importance attributed by firms to the favourable institutional context (i.e. systemic 
interaction with suppliers, customers, competitors, university) as well as to hampering factors to the introduction 
of innovation such as the lack of technological information and services, technical expertise, technological 
infrastructure, and legislative and regulatory constraints (as a proxy for the effectiveness of public policy).  
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Figure 13 Governance system 
 
Source: Own creation 
 
 
Limitations of the governance approach 
 
In consequence, the thesis does not make causal statements in terms of overall economic 
effectiveness or success of the regional innovation system, but only on its systemic-ness of 
governance. Neither business innovation output nor the causal linkages between innovation-
policy, innovation, and economic growth are evaluated in detail, this is beyond the scope of 
the thesis.206 Even if such evaluation were possible, innovation and economic growth are 
influenced by such a complex system of multiple determinants that it would be difficult to 
                                                 
206 Thus, it was not the intention to assess the economic success or existence of (regional) innovation systems as 
others (Evangelista et al., 2002) have done. 
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establish conclusive evidence for the effect, or causal relationship, that systemic policy has 
upon economic development.  
 
Accordingly, the analysis is not based upon regional economic indicators such as 
productivity, employment and other statistics. Rather the research is based on the postulate 
(i.e. unproven underlying assumption in the process of reasoning) that successful systemic 
innovation governance makes a difference to the innovativeness of businesses and economic 
development of its region(s). The extent to which policies and institutional systemic-ness 
influence the business innovation output is not investigated and remains an ‘open question’.  
 
This thesis also aims to avoid a kind of institutional ‘productivist’ bias that exaggerates the 
economic contributing role of organizations of regional governance and business support to 
the economy (cf. Lovering, 1999, pp. 385-386).207 Thereby, the institutional dynamics are not 
to be seen as the ‘driving influence of the regional economy as a whole’ as it is only one 
complementary part of the regional economy, which is ultimately driven by its business base.  
 
In consequence, the institutional dynamics and governance structures are not judged on the 
economic success of their regional economies. The relationship between output and outcome 
in this respect is a complex one, and confusing them easily done.208 Even so, there is 
                                                 
207 Lovering (1999, pp. 385-386) actually criticizes the exaggerated and partial economic claims with a 
‘“productivist” bias that is manifested in the habit of assuming that the driving influence on the regional 
economy as a whole can be understood by an analysis of only one type of industrial actor’. In addition to this 
‘tendency to act out “Sayer’s error” as Lovering (1999, p. 384) calls it, that is to make the ‘classic error of bad 
geography, namely, confusing development in a region with the development of a region (Sayer, 1985)’, 
Lovering (1999, pp. 384-389) also names the philosophical and methodological looseness (i.e. ontological and 
epistemological fuzziness) and the lack of attention to the political sociology of regional development (i.e. the 
reduction of ‘culture and the absence of power) as problem areas of the New Regionalism package. 
208 Economic development, for instance, is seen to be based upon an array of influencing factors, of which the 
governance dimension is one contributing one. In effect this means that any success or failure in terms of 
economic development cannot be conclusively attributed to policy endeavours alone. Furthermore, with multiple 
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consensus at least among the institutionalist approaches of the new economic geography and 
the learning regions strand that regional-level institutional arrangements play a critical role in 
securing economic success in a globalizing economy (cf. Amin, 1999, p. 370).209 However, 
Amin (1999, p. 375) points that building local institutional capacity and capability is not a 
sufficient route for establishing a privileged position within global networks. It is not just the 
presence of institutions and institutional advancement but their anticipative capabilities with 
regards to change. 
 
Method of generalisation 
The thesis does not follow a hypothetico-deductive approach of empirical hypothesis testing - 
that is associated with critical rationalism (Kappelhoff, 1995, p. 14) and the dominant 
scientific paradigm associated with quantitative research methods (see Patton, 1997, Exhibit 
12.3 on p. 299) -, but an inductive inquiry approach (cf. Patton, 1997, p. 279) that investigates 
and contrasts subjective interpretations of a construct and thus aims to capture its inherent 
dynamics. Consequently, this thesis uses an exploratory approach of naturalistic inquiry (see 
Patton, 1997, pp. 277-279), which objective is to generate theory rather than its verification. 
As Patton (1997, p. 279) writes, ‘[q]ualitative researchers ask questions rather than test 
hypotheses.’  
                                                                                                                                                        
levels of governance involved, this means that, for example, policy-making at sub-national level – even if judged 
as ‘good’ could be overshadowed by general systemic conditions (of the innovation system) that are set at the 
national level. Consequently, the effect of policies for areas with high structural unemployment, for instance, 
have to be judged carefully, avoided pointing the finger to easily at policy.  
Not so much the success of the policies as such is analysed but more the success of the policy-making process. 
The evaluation of the former would in any case be a difficult undertaking as it is difficult to assess the output and 
especially its influence upon the economic development (in comparison to situation where none policy activities 
would have been present). Since there are many influencing determinants to it, it is hard to single out the effect 
of just one factor. 
209 Nelson & Winter (1982) have called such an approach that treats some variable as important ‘appreciative 
theorizing’ as Edquist (1997, p. 28) points out. This is also based on the understand that the dualism of 
theoretical and methodological perspectives of ‘new’ economic geography ‘encompasses both qualitative versus 
quantitative ways of knowing, and cultural versus economic explanations for regional growth’ (Plummer, 2003, 
p. 688). 
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Nevertheless, the clear-cut distinction between inductive and deductive method may well be 
‘overstated’ in research practice. Markusen (2003, pp. 748-749), for instance, contests both 
the notion of ‘purely deductive theorizing’ as well as that of ‘purely inductive thesis’ and 
argues that there is no such thing as ‘the posing of causal relationships without insight from 
experience or reading other people’s work’ and she views research questions in a way as the 
‘deductive propositions one brings to the inductive exercise’. This seems to be true for this 
research. While this thesis started from an inductive approach to the fieldwork, the writing-up 
has appeared to follow much more of a deductive format.  
 
Inherent to an inductive approach is that it is not possible to reach a conclusive proof for the 
findings. Observations are selective and bound to their specific context and milieu only and 
thus do not allow easily for making generalisations. To overcome the ‘problem of induction’, 
Karl Popper (1959) suggested looking for ‘disconfirmatory evidence’ (cf. Easterby-Smith et 
al., 1991, p. 39)., i.e. to apply methodological falsification (see Kappelhoff, 1995, pp. 14-15).  
 
A method of ‘analytical generalisation’ is adopted, which means that ‘a previously developed 
theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study’ 
(Yin, 1994, p. 31). While case studies are not (statistically) generalisable to populations, they 
are to theoretical propostions and thus can help to expand and (analytically) generalise 
theories. In this context, Yin (1994, pp. 10 and 31) points out that ‘[i]f two or more cases are 
shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed’ For this reason, the selected 
conceptual research model (i.e. regional innovation system) and subsequent propositions were 
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outlined and, accordingly, a suitable type of case-study design chosen, which is described 
next. 
 
Case study design 
A comparative case method was chosen to scrutinize the regional innovation systems concept 
with regards to the propositions concerning sub-regional dynamics of governance. In order to 
investigate if there are significant differences of sub-regional governance dynamics within 
regional innovation systems, four case studies of city-regions (at the urban, sub-regional 
level) were selected within a homogenous setting of the same uniform region, the German 
Federal State (Land) of North Rhine-Westphalia. In logical consequence, these homologous 
city-regions are expected - by ‘literal replication’ (cf. Yin, 1994, p. 46) - to yield similar 
results in terms of governance characteristics, structures and dynamics.  
 
However, the overall research design can be said to be also semi-embedded because this thesis 
furthermore draws insights from multiple units of analysis.210 Although this admittedly 
complicates the research design, there are insights that can be gained from it as these 
additional units of analysis concern multiple spheres of governance. First, this comprises a 
pilot case study that was done of the small city of Ratingen, and revealed that the local level 
(i.e. sub-unit of the city region of Düsseldorf) was inadequate to investigate innovation 
policy-making due to the apparent lack of a critical mass of institutional capacity and 
innovative activities to constitute an innovation system. As a result of these findings, the 
                                                 
210 The label of ‘semi-embedded’ is sued here to indicate that the other, multiple units of analysis do not follow 
the replication logic that was maintained for selection of the four holistic case studies of the city-regions (as 
introduced later on), e.g. due to taking recourse to the triple helix model for the sampling approach. 
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research design was modified to study city-regions.211 Secondly, the thesis also investigates 
the dynamics at multiple levels of governance, at the wider regional (Land) level of the 
Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia (i.e. the supra-unit of city-regions). Finally, the 
national level is also looked at, for contextualisation of the idiosyncrasies of the overall 
national innovation system. Figure 16 illustrates these complex connections.212 
 
Figure 14 Multiple units of analysis and spheres of governance 
 
 
 
Source: Own creation. 
 
                                                 
211 The small city of Ratingen lies in the non-metropolitan county (Kreis) of Mettmann near Düsseldorf in North 
Rhine-Westphalia. The choice of Ratingen as the pilot study was further influenced by the author’s earlier 
comparative MBA dissertation (Schierenbeck, 1999) on the competitive advantage of a New Town (Telford) in 
the English West Midlands, which formed an initial intention to undertake a comparative analysis between them 
and their regional settings. While some similarities could be observed between Ratingen’s and Telford’s efforts 
of business support and general economic development policy (with infrastructure and local business taxation 
issues prevailing), specific policies to build clusters and to foster innovation, however, cannot said to be found. 
Hence, the search for innovation governance and thus the unit of analysis turned to larger cities and city-regions, 
where it was hoped to find such policies. 
212 Herrschel & Newman (2002, Figure 5.1 on p. 117) provide a very useful comparative glossarial juxtaposition 
of the different spheres of government between Britain and Germany, which the reader can find reproduced in 
the appendix IV. It helps to find the closest equivalent comparative terminologies for the different levels of 
government and governance.  
National, Federal level 
Germany 
Regional, State (Land) level 
North Rhine-Westphalia 
Sub-regional (meso) level of city-regions 
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Selection of research setting: The German Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia 
 
The German Federal States (Länder) are the example of a form of decentralised regional 
government with the widest ranging powers as they have elected parliaments with budgetary 
and legislative powers. 213 By looking at different sub-regional cases within such an 
established decentralised and regionalised system, it can be suggested that it is possible to get 
insights in how to govern and coordinate a system with a more strategic, endogenous 
approach.  
 
North Rhine-Westphalia was chosen because first, the researcher knows the region. Secondly, 
North Rhine-Westphalia is often portrayed as microcosms mirroring the diversity of Germany 
as a whole. It comprises well-off areas and deprived areas (with high unemployment) as well 
as so-called traditional industries and modern industries and services. It also reflects the 
overall political landscape in Germany. Thirdly, North Rhine-Westphalia is reported to have 
followed a (sub-) regionalised policy approach (e.g. see Grabher, 1993a, p. 272; Heinze & 
Voelzkow, 1997). Lastly, it is a region that is lagging behind in terms of economic 
performance, especially in comparison to other West German Länder.214 It is a former heavily 
industrialised region that was once Europe’s coalmining and steel-producing powerhouse and 
it has a long history in attempting to execute structural and institutional change.215 Thereby, 
                                                 
213 The Austrian Länder and the Belgian provinces are the other key examples of federal states in Europe. 
214 Within the EU-27 however, North Rhine-Westphalia is depicted, for instance, by the ESPON programme 
(European Spatial Planning Observation Network, 2005, pp. 27, 23 and 29 respectively) to have a ‘moderately 
below average’ or ‘average’ economic success and performance in relation to the aims of the Lisbon agenda as 
well as an ‘average’ efficient labour market . 
215 For example, the ZIM programme was already set-up in 1990.  
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this thesis is different from other case studies in that it investigates a region still struggling 
with industrial change. It does not investigate an economic growth (success) story 216 
 
Limitation of research design: alternative perspective 
 
The choice of North-Rhine Westphalia as regional setting can be criticised. It is a German 
Federal State with a population and economic power (GDP) equalling or exceeding that of 
many counties, which means it could be regarded as a near national innovation system. Also, 
it can be argued that North-Rhine Westphalia may not necessarily correspond to a sufficiently 
homogenous and self-contained region, or regional systems of innovation, as it is too 
extensive, economically heterogeneous and includes distinct local sub-systems within them 
(cf. Evangelista et al., 2002, p. 176). However, the latter is exactly what is of particular 
investigative interest. Therefore, North Rhine-Westphalia is seen here as a self-contained 
‘administrative region’, which includes distinct sub-regional sub-system (i.e. city-regions) 
within it. 
 
Moreover, the thesis does not make international inter-regional comparisons like others (e.g. 
Hassink, 1992; Hoppe, 2000). However, this is not the aim of the thesis; it focuses instead 
upon differences in the intra-regional sub-settings and governance dynamics.  
                                                 
216 In contrast, Baden-Württemberg, for instance, has very much been selected as a model region due to its 
continuous GDP growth after 1993 (see Glassmann & Voelzkow, 2001, p. 106).  
 192 
 
 
City-regions as the core unit of analysis 
 
The analytical focus of this thesis therefore is intra-regional governance dynamics at the 
overlapping meso level between the local level of towns and small cities, and the regional 
level of the Federal State (Land). In order to specify the core unit of analysis – and therefore 
of the cases (Yin, 1994, p. 21) – reference is made to concept of city-regions  (see Giordano & 
Roller, 2003; Herrschel & Newman, 2002; Parr, 2005; A. J. Scott, Agnew, Soja, & Storper, 
2001), which are viewed here as capturing this meso level. City-regions are conceptualised 
here as sub-regional entities below the State or Länder level and above the level of a town or 
small city; they ‘may be seen as comprising two distinct but interrelated elements: the city 
(sometimes a regional or national metropolis), possessing some specific functions or 
economic activities; and a surrounding territory, which is exclusive to the city in question’ 
(Parr, 2005, p. 556).217 In short, a city-region is an entity that is not merely a city or local 
level; yet that is smaller than a region, in fact a subset of it. 
 
Accordingly, this conceptualisation was employed for the selection of the four sub-regional 
case studies. In consequence, city-regions are seen to be epitomised by the German Kreisfreie 
Städte, which are ‘unitary urban authorities’ or ‘metropolitan districts’ with sub-regional 
                                                 
217 The term city-region points to an entity that consists of ‘a city within a wider territory, with which it is closely 
interrelated in a variety of ways’ (Parr, 2005, p. 556). Confer also Herrschel & Newman (2002, pp. 1-2). For the 
purpose of an analysis of regional per capita income growth, Cheshire & Carbonaro (1997, pp. 41-42) do not use 
administrative regions as their observational units but instead Functional Urban Regions (FURs) that are defined 
in terms of concentration of employment  and specified by the following: ‘To each concentration - or core – are 
added all spatial units from which more workers commute to the core in question than to some other core. This 
set of spatial units forms the hinterland of each core, so that each FUR consists of a city-core and its labour 
market sphere of influence’ (ibid., p. 42). Latter could thus also be called labour market hinterland. FURs are 
similar to the SMSAs concept by Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer (1992) as well as to ‘Travel to Work 
Areas’ but, as Cheshire & Carbonaro (1997, footnote 5 on p. 42) add, ‘FURs are typically more self-contained 
than Travel to Work Areas which have fixed levels of self-containment’. 
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functions (cf. Herrschel & Newman, 2002, Figure 5.1 on p. 117), together with their 
surrounding non-metropolitan counties.218 The following Figure 15 clarifies this 
understanding at the example of the city-region of Aachen. It further illustrates the existing 
multiple levels of administrative (i.e. functional) delimitations within the Federal State of 
North-Rhine Westphalia. 
 
City-regions are conceptualised here as having a kind of critical mass of institutional 
innovative capacity and infrastructure – in terms of education and training institutions 
(especially university), business support organisations and business base – in order to develop 
innovation policy or to constitute an innovation system. Using the triple helix model of 
university-industry-government relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) as a 
methodological tool to investigate the systemic-ness of systems, this thesis consequently lays 
down the prerequisite for meeting this critical mass that city-regions need to be endowed with 
a higher or further education institutions, seen as ‘unique resources’ or ‘urban assets’ of cities 
and city-regions in the global knowledge-based economy (Turok, 2004, p. 1071) and a key 
element of innovation systems since they play a major role in developing sectors with ‘strong 
scientific underpinnings to technologies’ (Nelson & Winter, 1977, p. 73).  
                                                 
218 Appendix V reproduces Herrschel & Newman‘s (2002, p. 117) Figure 5.1 that juxtaposes the different British 
and German government spheres. Please note that though that this overview takes foremost a British view with 
regards to the regional sphere. It thus can be criticized for presenting the region mainly as a ‘sphere of 
competitive influence by central and local government’ only. While this view may reflect the weak roles of 
central government-led Government Offices (GO) for the regions, and of Regional Development Agencies 
(RDA) in Britain, it gives the wrong impression that the regional level in Germany is of equally weak influence. 
Regional (State) governments in the German political system have in comparison clearly a much stronger 
regional role and powers as the decentralised Government Offices, Regional Assemblies, and the RDA quangos 
of the British system. 
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Figure 15 The city-region of Aachen and multiple administrative delimitations 
 
 
Source: Own creation, but see also Heinze, Voelzkow, & Eichener (1997, p. 18) for the delimitation of the 
regionalised structural policy in North Rhine-Westphalia and Herrschel & Newman (2002, Figure 5.1 on p. 117) 
for an overview of the different government spheres in Germany (see appendix IV). 
 
 
Selection of case studies of city-regions 
 
The case study areas were chosen for the following reasons. First, the size of urban centres of 
the city-regions were to be of at least around 250,000 people (cf. Parr, 2005, p. 564). 
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Secondly, the city-regions had to host a university, one of the key elements of an innovation 
system (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). Aachen was specifically selected for its renowned 
university and Dortmund for its supposedly innovative restructuring approach. Düsseldorf 
was primarily selected in order to include the city-region, which hinterland comprises the 
pilot case study of Ratingen. The selection of Duisburg was more arbitrary, but to help with 
the ideas that half of the case studies were within the geographically central and populous 
Ruhr area (Ruhrgebiet), while the other half were outside. 
 
The selection of four geographical areas, which are all sub-units of the same functionally 
administrative region, bears some analytical advantages concerning the economic and 
institutional contexts. These geographical areas are comparable as sub-systems in their 
functional and administrative role not only with each other but also in relation to their same 
higher-level region, i.e. in terms of regional-local interdependencies (cf. Herrschel & 
Newman, 2002, p. 1).219 Though economically heterogeneous, the geographical areas are 
similar in size and more importantly similar concerning the level of ‘influence of subjects, 
instruments and actions external to the defined space’ of the local sub-system level (cf. 
Evangelista et al., 2002, p. 176).220 
 
 
                                                 
219 In the introduction to their book on the Governance of Europe’s City Regions, Herrschel & Newman (2002, p. 
1) for instance write the following: ‘Only by looking at individual examples of city-regional governance can 
difference, unique features and similarities be identified, and the relevance of the specific circumstances – 
external and internal – be assessed. (…) Only in this way [of a comparative approach] does it seem possible to 
study the nature and workings of city regions under different conditions and evaluate the relative importance of 
(a) the general constitutional provisions for ‘regions’, institutional practices and arrangements as ‘external 
factors’, and (b) the relationship between cities, and cities and ‘their’ region.’ 
220 This ‘influence of subjects, instruments and actions “external” to the defined space’ of the local sub-system 
level normally tend to increase ‘as the size of the administrative region diminishes’ as Evangelista et al. (2002, p. 
176) point out. 
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Methods of data collection 
As argued, to look at the systemic-ness and dynamics of the innovation system involves the 
study of inter-organisational activities and relationships within social settings that are based 
upon the meanings and significances that individual actors place upon behaviours, structures 
and processes. Hence, a ‘fieldwork’ approach was chosen (cf. Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 
37) in order to understand these meanings and significances. The fieldwork comprised 
multiple sources of evidence. It included a detailed desk-study of secondary literature and 
documentation (such as written reports, administrative and other internal documents, formal 
studies, and newspapers articles), but is predominantly based upon 50 semi-structured in-
depth interviews with 47 practitioners, policy-makers, and academics within North Rhine-
Westphalia.221 To a low extent, direct observation from field visits about the conditions of 
technology centres, business parks, buildings or work spaces have also yielded some 
indications about the organisation’s or site’s climate (cf. Yin, 1994, p. 87). The triangulation 
of data concerning general case facts is also helped by the sampling strategy of interviewees. 
The research timeframe focuses upon the 2-year period between February 2001 and January 
2003 during which especially three extensive rounds of interviews were undertaken 
(winter/spring 2001, winter/spring 2002, and autumn/winter 2002/2003). The thesis also 
considers recent development since the fieldwork was undertaken. The methods of data 
collection are elaborated in the following.  
                                                 
221 Note that three people were interviewed twice. However, the author also wishes to acknowledge that his 
conceptualisation was to some extent also influenced and informed by two further initial interviews and desk 
research in the English West Midlands region, by an earlier Master dissertation (Schierenbeck, 1999) on the 
competitive advantage of a New Town in the West Midlands (Telford); by the fieldwork (that included 13 
interviews) for a research report on the infrastructure and public sector support (German national programme for 
regional ‘centres of competence’) for the medical technology industry in the German Federal State of Baden-
Württemberg (Burfitt et al., 2002); and by other research undertaken on the New Media Cluster in Cologne 
(Collinge & Schierenbeck, 2004), on the automotive industry in Baden-Württemberg (MacNeill et al., 2003; 
MacNeill et al., 2004; Schierenbeck et al., 2004), and on government initiatives to assist manufacturing industry 
in the West Midlands (Schierenbeck & Bentley, 2002). Further impetus came form numerous conferences, 
seminars and meetings attended by the author with varying degree of relevance to this study.  
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Sampling: Selection of interviewees 
 
The investigation of the systemic-ness and dynamics of the governance of a regional 
innovation system and its sub-systems, uses the triple helix model of university-government-
industry relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) as an analytical tool. The research 
proposition is that the systemic-ness of dynamics within the regional innovation system and 
sub-systems can be analysed by investigating the main organisational actors that are hybrid, 
intermediate or closely connected to the other helixes outlined by the model. Hence, the 
interviewee’s corresponding organisations included universities’ technology transfer units as 
university-industry interfaces, business support units or agencies of the political-
administrative actors such as the relevant government authorities, and business associations as 
a tentatively weak proxy for the business dimension. The sampling strategy can be said to be 
theory-based and purposeful (cf. Patton, 2002, Exhibit 5.6 on pp. 243-244). 
 
This applies a ‘positional approach’ (cf. J. Scott, 1991, p. 58) which involves a ‘formally 
defined position’, to define the target population of thesis. The alternative, a ‘reputational 
approach’ would mean that sample selection would have been nominees provided by 
informants. Applying a ‘positional approach’ gives internal validity (see J. Scott, 1991, p. 33). 
As Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky (1983, p. 22) point out: ‘it is scarcely informative to learn 
that a network (or interviews) constituted by a snowballing sampling procedure is well-
connected’ (cf. J. Scott, 1991, p. 58). The approach to sampling further represents a cross-
sectional design, which ‘involves selecting different organisations or units in different 
contexts’ (cf. Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 34) and thus is conducive to the holistic case 
study design and would enable critical assessment of the extent of systemic-ness. 
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Consequently, the samples for each case study city-regions consist of a homologous set of 
representatives from the key organisations of the governance and business support 
infrastructure. It includes interviewees representing – respectively – technology transfer units 
at universities, business associations or networks such as the chambers of commerce as a 
proxy for the industry dimension), and the local development agency (i.e. the city’s office and 
agencies charged with business development) as well as innovation and technology parks and 
support organisations, corresponding to the relevant crucial institutional and technological 
sub-systems (see Cooke, 1997, p. 362) and spheres of the triple helix model. This group was 
complemented by interviewees from the pilot study of the city Ratingen, wich represents the 
local level. Key organisations for business support and technology transfer at the wider 
regional and national level were also interviewed, reflecting the semi-embedded nature of the 
research design. While active staff of these key governance organisations were chosen so that 
feed-back on interinstitutional relations was likely, it has to be admitted that – in retrospective 
– board members of development agencies coming from the business sector could or should 
have enriched the list of selected interviewees by adding another business viewpoint on 
perceived governance aspects. 
 
Finally, a limited number of additional interviewees were added from non-selected case city-
regions that represent a best-practice model and the academic community. Their selection 
followed a ‘reputational approach’ (cf. J. Scott, 1991, p. 58) since they were recommended.  
 
The following table gives an overview of the interviewees. A list of interviewees can be found 
in appendix V.  
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Table 16  Overview of types and numbers of interviewed stakeholders according to level of 
governance 
 
Source: Own creation. Total number of people interviewed: 47. Total number of interviews: 50 
(*) Note that the numbers for the (external) regional level comprise here two interviewees from university 
technology transfer organisations as well as five academics, of which only one interviewees’ institution has an 
explicit regional reference. Although, they cannot be attributed to the higher, primary regional level, but rather 
correspond to external non-case study city-regions, they are included here for more simplicity of presentation. 
 
The sample can be criticised for being small but this is due to the general limitations in scope 
of the thesis and the fact that the interviewing process was time-consuming. However, the 
fieldwork fulfilled its purpose in gathering in-depth information in relation to the research 
questions. Furthermore, it can be argued that ‘[t]here are no rules for sample size in 
qualitative inquiry’ and as Patton says:  
Level of 
governance 
Government 
 
(Ministries 
and urban 
authorities’ 
offices 
responsible 
for business 
development) 
Government 
related 
organisations 
for business 
development 
 
(quasi-RDAs, 
LDAs) 
Chamber 
of 
commerce 
and 
industry 
 
(IHK) 
Business 
associations 
and 
networks 
Innovation 
& 
technology 
parks and 
support 
centres 
University 
technology 
transfer 
units 
Academics Sum 
(∑) 
National/Federal Level (external) 
Germany 1       1
Regional Level (external) 
North  
Rhine-
Westphalia 
3 4 0 0 2 2 
(*) 
5 
(*) 
16
City-Regions (internal) 
Aachen 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 6
Dortmund 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 9
Duisburg 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Düsseldorf 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 6
Local Level (internal) 
Ratingen 1 1 - 1 - - - 3
Sum (∑) 8 9 5 4 6 7 8 47
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 ‘it is necessary to place these small samples in the context of probability sampling. A 
qualitative inquiry sample only seems small in comparison with the sample size 
needed for representativeness when the purpose is generalizing from a sample to the 
population of which it is a part. (Patton, 2002, p. 244) 
 
Qualitative interviewing 
The thesis looks at the meanings and significance that actors in an innovation system place 
upon their and other actor’s behaviours and relationships, as well as on processes and 
structures. To investigate this, the qualitative research method of open-ended and semi-
structured in-depth face-to-face interviewing is particularly suitable.  
 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p. 74), semi-structured or unstructured interviews 
are appropriate when ‘it is necessary to understand the constructs that the interviewee uses as 
a basis for their opinions and beliefs about a particular matter or situation’; and when it is the 
‘aim to develop an understanding of the respondent’s “world” so that the researcher might 
influence it’ (i.e. action research). As Patton (2002, p. 348) puts it, ‘[t]he fundamental 
principle of qualitative interviewing is to provide a framework within which respondents can 
express their own understandings in their own terms. 
 
Confidentiality and sensitivity 
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p. 74) add that qualitative interviewing becomes especially useful 
when either a ‘logic is not clear’; the ‘subject matter is highly confidential or commercially 
sensitive’; or ‘when the interviewee may be reluctant to be truthful about this issue’. The 
latter applies where the sensitivity stems from issues around inter-organisational (and thus 
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also interpersonal) behaviour and relationships, which was a topic for the interview. The 
sensitivity was reflected by the hesitation or refusal by the majority of the interviewees to 
have the interviews tape-recorded. This perhaps high level of wariness may be explained by 
public scrutinity and press attention that some interviewees mentioned. One should bear in 
mind that the time period under investigation could be labelled as one of an economical and 
political struggle for economic change in general in Germany and and that in particular some 
of the city-regions with high unemployment in North Rhine-Westphalia may not be able to 
nor perhaps want to sell themselves as economic success stories. While tape-recording allows 
clear transcripts, interviewees are far more relaxed, open and willing to share information 
when not recorded. A bias of prioritising openness in the interview over accuracy in the case 
of wariness meant that there were only 12 fully tape-recorded interview transcripts, in 
comparison to 38 where extensive notes had to be taken.  
 
Confidentiality is important especially when interviewees are asked about their personal 
opinions and beliefs as well as about uncooperative or antagonistic inter-personal or inter-
institutional behaviour. As Oppenheim (1992, pp. 140-141) states, respondents are often 
‘perfectly willing to answer straightforwardly phrased questions about [sensitive] topics (…) 
once they are convinced that the information is relevant, that it will be treated confidentially 
(and preferably anonymously) and that the interviewer is non-judgemental.’222 This involves 
interviewing skills and the use of methods in order to obtain this trust and contributes to better 
quality and depth of data (see Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 77).  
 
                                                 
222 Please note that in his book, Oppenheim (1992, p. 140) primarily refers to ‘embarrassing’ questions that ask 
about ‘socially “taboo” topics’ or ‘socially disapproving behaviour’. 
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In order to gain trust, the purpose of the research was explained at the start of the interview. It 
was also explicitly stated that the concern was not with the success of individual organisations 
but rather the systemic-ness of the wider governance dimension.223 Moreover, interviewees 
were assured that their comments were to be anonymised (see Yin, 1994, pp.143-144). The 
need for sensitivity also heavily influenced the sequencing of questions within the semi-
structured open-ended interviews. Patton’s advice (2002, pp. 352-353) was followed ‘to begin 
with questions about non-controversial present behaviour, activities, and experiences’, while 
in the following questions about opinions and attitudes as well as some knowledge questions 
were asked. The most sensitive questions on cooperative relationships were asked at the end 
of the interview.  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of interviews 
 
Face-to-face interviews can have the advantage of being ‘targeted’ and ‘insightful’ with 
regards to ‘human affairs’; but are prone to ‘common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor 
or inaccurate articulation’ (Yin, 1994, see Figure 4.1 on p. 80, and p. 85).224 Thus, Yin (ibid., 
pp. see Figure 4.1 on p. 80, and p. 85) suggests that it is necessary ‘to corroborate interview 
data with information from other sources’ (cf. also Oppenheim, 1992, p. 143).  
 
                                                 
223 The efforts of gaining trust begin already before the interview, as Easterby-Smith et al., (1991, p. 77) stress. 
This includes the process of arranging interviews (they favour phone calls as a first contact) and the preparations 
of the interviewer for the meeting, e.g. researching information about the interviewee and his organisation prior 
to interview. 
224 For instance, Yin (1994, see Figure 4.1 on p. 80) gives poorly constructed questions as a reason for bias as 
well as reflexivity, where the ‘interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear’. Oppenheim (1992, pp. 138-
143) also highlights the ‘social desirability bias’ in this respect that is generally greatest for face-to-face 
interviews and states that non-factual questions and responses ‘are generally much more sensitive to bias by 
wording, by response sets, by leading, by prestige and by contextual effects. 
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Oppenheim (1992, p. 102) also says that interviews are much more ‘expensive and time-
consuming to conduct’; while they ‘have a higher response rate’ and give the interviewer the 
‘opportunity to correct misunderstandings or to probe, or to offer explanations or help’ to 
questions. Regarding latter, Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p. 79) list the following seven 
probes, which can help to reduce the degree of ambiguity: 
 
1. The basic probe (e.g. repeating the initial question if interviewee is wandering off) 
2. Explanatory probes (e.g. What did you mean by that?, or What makes you say that?)  
3. Focused probes (e.g. What sort of…?, in order to obtain specific information)  
4. Silent probe (e.g. simply pause to encourage an answer)  
5. Drawing out (e.g. Tell me more about that?, or What happened then?) 
6. Giving ideas or suggestions (e.g. Have you thought about…?, or Did you know 
that…?) 
7. Mirroring or reflecting (e.g. forcing the respondents to rethink by expressing in own 
words what they have said, like What you seem to be saying/feeling is…)  
 
These techniques were adopted in the interviews. 
 
Type and content of questions 
 
In line with the exploratory character of this research, semi-structured focused interviews were 
undertaken. They broadly followed a certain set of questions, while they also remained of an 
open-ended nature.  
 
Indeed, the broad guiding questions (see appendix VI) predominantly consist of open 
questions as opposed to pre-coded, closed (i.e. fixed-response) questions. Open-ended 
response formats include their usefulness ‘for testing hypotheses about ideas or awareness’ 
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(as opposed to specific hypotheses), and they allow for freedom and spontaneity of answers 
(cf. Oppenheim, 1992, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 on p. 115). Disadvantages concern the subsequent 
post-interview coding process, which is time-consuming and can be unreliable. 
 
The type of questions included ‘factual’ questions with regards to activities, structures and 
processes that were in place, but the focus was on a set of non-factual questions concerning 
opinion and beliefs, attitudes, awareness and knowledge (cf. Oppenheim, 1992, p. 143). In 
this context, Patton (1997, p. 279) points out that ‘closed-ended questionnaires require 
deductive constraints while open-ended interviews depend upon inductive analysis’. 
 
An important distinction was made between two groups of interviewees from the universities. 
While representatives from university technology transfer units were regarded as active 
practitioners of the university-industry interface in the innovation system, pure academics are 
treated here more as passive, scientific (theory-focused) actors. Hence, the nature of interview 
differed for this second group from the first. While interviews for the first group were similar 
to those with other policy-makers and practitioners, interviews with academics were carried 
out with a more open-ended and unstructured format and with a different set of questions, 
although the broad themes were identical (see appendix VI). 
 
Quality of data and supporting tools 
 
There is an issue about the veracity of information collected. The aim however was to gain the 
trust of interviewees and to overcome their reluctance to respond to sensitive issues. It can be 
argued that this was achieved, as respondents gave confidential reports or off-the-record 
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information, which were important to gain an in-depth insight.225 In so doing, it can be said 
that interviewees can be considered to have not only been respondents but also played a role 
of an informant (cf. Oppenheim, 1992, p. 147; Yin, 1994, p. 84). Yet, this means that 
respondents might not be telling the ‘truth’ with regards to factual questions, i.e. ‘concurrent 
validity’ (see Oppenheim, 1992, p. 144) as interviewees may want to exploit the interview 
situation for their own objectives (cf. Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 80). 226 
 
However, it is possible to gain clues to the openness of the interviewee and potential 
deceptive communication by looking for positive and negative signs in body-language and at 
the choice of words in face-to-face interviews (see, for example, Keila & Skillicorn, 2005, pp. 
2 and 4). Notes should be (and were) added to the transcripts when it was thought that 
respondents might not be telling the truth. In general, the ‘attitude of respondents’ and 
consequent ’level of confidence felt about data’, should be noted at interviews. These are 
useful in the process of data analysis (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 108). 
 
In any case, it should be stressed that there is no one universal truth, not just concerning 
attitudes but also with regards to facts or behaviours (cf. Oppenheim, 1992, p. 147). It can be 
argued that qualitative research involves academic educated (inductive) guesses, in which 
                                                 
225 Due to the sensitivity of some of the issues (that result from the governance sphere being organisationally 
and individually contested) and confidentiality being assured to interviewees, it was not possible to reveal all 
sources of information (e.g. as ‘confidential’ classified consultancy reports classified as ‘confidential’ which 
were gratefully provided) nor all given background information and opinions (e.g. ‘off the record’ remarks). 
They have nevertheless, influenced this study’s analysis.  
226 As with documents, the critical interviewer should always ask why he was, or was not, given certain 
information and whether respondents were telling the ‘truth’ with regards to factual questions. 
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accuracy strongly depends upon the interpersonal communication and research skills of the 
researcher (see Yin, 1994, pp. 55-59).227 
 
There are techniques which can be used to improve this process and support the interview, 
which were used. At the end of the semi-structured questions, interviewees were handed a 
pre-coded ‘show-card’ matrix (see Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 113; Oppenheim, 1992, pp. 
140-141) and were asked to map out inter-organisational relationships according to the degree 
of cooperation and level of governance on this matrix (see appendix VI). They were also 
asked why they chose particular mapping classifications. (cf. protocol analysis in Easterby-
Smith et al., 1991, p. 91). This mapping exercise was designed to serve as a kind of internal as 
well as an external check with respondent’s data, thus potentially improving reliability and 
validity of questions (cf. Oppenheim, 1992, pp. 144-146).228 The checks however only 
concern the explanatory (i.e. how and why) and not exploratory questions. (see J. Scott, 1991, 
p. 33; Yin, 1994, p. 33).  
 
Exploratory questions are those such as: ‘What are the ways of making innovation policy and 
support more effective?’ Assessing the reliability and validity of answers to these questions is 
more difficult. The exploratory aspect of this qualitative case-study approach with in-depth 
                                                 
227 As desired skills of a case study investigator, Yin (1994, p. 56 and cf. pp. 55-59) names, for instance, that the 
investigator should be able to ask good questions; be a good listener; be adaptive and flexible; have a grasp of 
the issues being studied; and be unbiased by preconceived notions. 
228 Oppenheim (1992, pp. 144-145) explains reliability and validity as concepts that try ‘to assess how well each 
question, or group of questions [‘as measures’], does its job’. While reliability refers to ‘repeatability’ or 
‘consistency’ (i.e. ‘the probability of obtaining the same results again if the measures where to be duplicated’); 
the degree of validity instead gives an indication ‘whether the question, item or score measures what it is 
supposed to measure’. Besides this standard notion of validity, Yin (1994, p. 33 and cf. pp. 32-38) further 
distinguishes three different types of validity that were summarized by Kidder & Judd (1986, pp. 26-29), namely 
construct validity (i.e. ‘establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied’), internal 
validity (i.e. ‘establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, 
as distinguished from spurious relationships’), and external validity (i.e. ‘establishing the domain to which a 
study’s findings can be generalized’). Furthermore, see also Patton’s (2002, Exhibit 9.1 on p. 544) overview of 
alternative sets of criteria for judging the quality and credibility of qualitative inquiry. 
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interviewing of experts has allowed for an ‘inside-looking out’ perspective of regional 
processes and social systems, that strives to understand the beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of 
interviewees, and how they perceive innovation policies, systems and governance dynamics 
(cf. Meyers, 2004a, p. 460). Benneworth (2006, p. 4) however criticises such ‘grounding’ of 
knowledge through peer review visits ‘remains at best a tangential activity, removed from the 
real work of both government and academics’. 
 
The following table by gives a brief overview of the key questions concerning of reliability, 
validity and generalisability. This thesis takes the phenomenological viewpoint.  
 
Table 17  Different perceptions of reliability, validity and generalisability 
 
  Positivist viewpoint 
 
Phenomenological viewpoint 
 
Validity 
 
Does an instrument measure what it 
is supposed to measure? 
 
Has the researcher gained full access 
to the knowledge and meanings of 
informants? 
Reliability Will the measure yield the same 
results on different occasions 
(assuming no real change in what is 
to be measured)? 
Will similar observations be made 
by different researchers on different 
occasions? 
Generalisability What is the probability that patterns 
observed in a sample will also be 
present in the wider population 
from which the sample is drawn? 
How likely is that ideas and theories 
generated in one setting will also 
apply in other settings? 
 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p. 41) 
 
 
Another way of supplementing interviews, is the critical incident technique (see Easterby-
Smith et al., 1991, p. 83). This approach was used here to ask respondents for explanatory 
statements about past behaviour, e.g. for barriers to cooperation or systemic-ness of the 
governance system.  
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It also needs to be pointed out that the limitation of the qualitative case study approach is that 
the results cannot be easily generalised. The implications and lessons learned do not simply 
transfer to other regions and contextual settings. However, by investigating regional 
governance aspects, the thesis can still conclude whether there are indeed important sub-
regional governance dynamics in the case studies. Having applied a ‘replication logic’ in 
designing the multiple, holistic case studies, the thesis at the same time is striving analytically 
(as opposed to statistically) to ‘generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory’ 
(Yin, 1994, pp. 10 and 36) viz. regional innovation systems. Consequently, some inference 
can be made if significant differences and results are to be found amongst the case-study 
areas.  
 
Methods of data processing and analysis 
The data gathered consists of factual data and a mix of different types of social data (see J. 
Scott, 1991, p. 2). These were ‘attribute data’ (which relate to attitudes, opinions and 
behaviours of individual agents), ‘relational data’ (which relate to ties and connections 
between agents), and ‘ideational data’ (which describe the meanings, motives and so on). The 
interviews produced a large amount of data to be analysed. 
 
Analysis techniques 
 
As Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p. 35) point out, there are difficulties in analysing ‘large 
amounts of non-standard data produced by qualitative studies’. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, 
pp. 108-113) suggest the following seven stages to analyse the transcripts of unstructured in-
depth interviews, which were followed in analysing the data produced from the interviews: 
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1. Familiarisation 
2. Reflection 
3. Conceptualisation 
4. Cataloguing concepts 
5. Recoding 
6. Linking 
7. Re-evaluation 
 
There are also different methods for analysing the content of data, office coding as opposed to 
field coding was applied here as a method of interpretation (see Oppenheim, 1992, p. 116) to 
reveal patterns and themes.229 Following this process, a ‘cross-setting pattern analysis’ was 
applied to describe the various structures and activities at the (supra) regional Land level as 
well as in particular amongst the same processes in different settings of the comparative case 
study city-regions (see Patton, 2002, p. 439; and cf. Yin, 1994, pp. 106-110).  
 
For this purpose, a content analysis was undertaken that comprised analysing interview 
transcripts and primary documents for recurring themes and meanings. Yet, this process was 
an ‘open coding’ in that it remained open to the data (cf. Patton, 2002, p. 453) so that themes 
found through content analysis were still considered for analytical success factors to be 
investigated by the cross-setting pattern analysis. Insofar, the qualitaitive analysis involved 
both inductive and deductive analysis. After the first step of deducing a theory-derived 
hypothesis and propositions, an analytical induction was undertaken where the data were 
examined on the basis of the existing theoretical frameworks of regional innovation systems 
                                                 
229 The NUD*IST Vivo qualitative research support software, for instance, can be a very helpful tool in the 
process of coding and by easing the subsequent linking, exploring and comparing of electronic rich text 
documents (transcripts).  
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and the sensitizing concept of systemic-ness, yet with an inductive analysis to find 
undiscovered patterns and emergent understandings of the complex governance dynamics of 
regional innovation systems. 
 
The following table gives an overview of the categories used in the data processing and 
analysis process for highlighting specific issues, but not by numbers and frequency. 
 
Table 18 Codebook for content analysis applied for interview data processing and analysis  
 
E  Environmental factors which affect support (cultural, size…) 
 
S  Support/Strategies/Programmes/Projects/Initiatives (ad-hoc, sectoral...) 
A  Advice / involvement of consultancy 
 
BP  Best practice/ideas  
 
T  Targeted businesses? (Size, sector, innovative, struggling?) => Mismatch? 
 
U-I Innovation (their perception / understanding) 
U-IS Innovation System (their perception/ understanding) 
U-IIS Ideal Innovation Support (their perception/understanding of best practice) 
U-O Own Organisation (their perception/understanding) 
 
M&S Driving force/initiator & key people (mover & shakers) 
N  Networking/Communication/Relationship (informal <> formal) 
X  Cooperation & organisational conflicts => Overlapping of responsibilities? 
 
P  Problems identified & reactions 
CP  Critical incident/change process (critical path) => Flexibility? Mismatch? 
 
O  Organisational set-up (Who defines aims? How financed?) 
G  Governance/power 
 
U  University linkages 
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In addition, the analysis of the explanatory questions (i.e. concerning critical incidents), was 
based on ‘a distinction between “observations” and “perceived impacts” that the respondents 
stated (Patton, 2002, p. 508). This meant distinguishing between the cause and (reactive) 
effect of reported behaviour, activities and relationships. 
 
Relational data concerning the connected-ness between organisations of the governance 
system were analysed by using sociograms and mapping overlapping relationships in the 
framework of social network analysis (Scott, 1991, pp. 31-32). For this, the data from the 
supporting interview ‘show-card’ matrix tool were used. Interviewees were asked to map out 
inter-organisational relationships according to the degree of cooperation and level of 
governance on this matrix (see appendix VI).  
 
A general tendency could be observed in that interviewees tend to rarely rate relationships 
with other organisations as purely competitive in the matrix tool even if strong competitive 
behaviours and conflict was reported in interviews. Therefore, there is at least some reason to 
believe that a classification of a relationship to another organiston as being a mixture between 
collaboration and competition should perhaps be interpreted slightly in a more negative 
connotation as being not (purely) collaborative.  
 
It should be noted that a few corrections were made to some completed matrix configurations. 
This was necessary to ensure a consistent presentation as some interviewees applied a flexible 
interpretation of the ‘level of involvement’ of organisations in the matrix. The ‘level of 
involvement’ of actors was intended to indicate the core operating level of organisations with 
whom the interviewee cooperates. Some corrections – which are indicated by stars (*) in the 
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reporting tables – were therefore made to the final aggregate matrix configurations. This 
comprised the deletion of duplicated entries of organisations on the basis of probes and the 
consistent allocation of organisations to the appropriate level of ther core operating level. The 
changes were possible to make as interviewees had been asked to enter the names of the 
organisations in the matrix tool.  
 
Criteria for analysis of the systemicness of governance 
 
The thesis sought to assess the systemic-ness of governance. Questions were asked relating to 
the nature, quality and structure of the milieu (i.e. environment) and its actors and their 
interests, objectives. The importance of conflict or cooperation in explanations of the 
behaviour of actors and for the development of certain structures is stressed as it can provide 
further clues in this respect (Meyers, 2004b, p. 482). These were analysed by using concepts 
in the framework of social network analysis (Scott, 1991, pp. 31-32) that describe the quality 
of relations within interpersonal networks.230 These are reciprocity (i.e. mutuality of 
appreciation or friendship), intensity (i.e. strength of obligations involved in relations in terms 
of direction, frequency and intensity), durability (i.e. how enduring relations are and whether 
they are constantly activated), density (i.e. connectedness and actual present completeness of 
networks), and reachibility (i.e. ease of spread of information and limited number of steps 
necessary in contacting another). However, one could also add here the dimension of 
outreach, which could be seen in the context of this study as comprising the connectedness to 
other (rather as external regarded) networks or systems of governance (e.g. other levels of 
                                                 
230 The social network analysis (Schubert, 2002, p. 322) is based on the postulate that the features of networks 
(i.e. independent variable) are a major contributor to the behaviour of network actors and to the result of their 
interactions (i.e. dependent variable). 
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governance or other aggregate national networks of associations), which are likely to act as 
sources of variety and thus increase the quality of innovation systems. 231  
 
In the analysis of the data, there was an awareness of the role of influential actors, so-called 
‘movers & shakers’, within the governance system. These often act as active spreader of 
information and are central recipients and distribution nodes. The important assumption from 
social network analysis into organisational behaviour (Heer, 2004) is that people who 
communicate with only few people with people of lower hierarchy are not important 
communication hubs (cf. also Dambeck, 2005).232 
 
The analytical framework 
Turning now to the analytical framework for the fieldwork, it is useful to recall that the aim of 
the thesis is to look at the dynamics and structures of the governance of a regional innovation 
system. It is clear from the analysis in the foregoing chapters that the argument is that current 
conceptualisations of regional innovation systems do not adequately capture the regional and 
in particular sub-regional governance dynamics of innovation systems, and thus are of little 
operational guidance to innovation policy-making. The empirical work looks at the systemic-
ness of the governance of the innovation system in North Rhine Westphalia.   
  
In order to do this, a set of intangible success factors of systemic-ness, which are thought to 
characterise the dynamics and structures of the governance system, was derived from theory, 
                                                 
231 This partly follows Granovetter’s (1973) concept of the ‘strength of weak ties’, which states that not the many 
close, overlapping ‘strong’ ties in a network may be well-suited for ensuring the spread of information between 
contacts, but are unlikely to be the source of new information from distant parts of the network. This instead is 
more likely to come from the relatively ‘weak ties’ of less frequent contacts to people from different work 
situations (cf. J. Scott, 1991, p. 36). 
232 Yet, one should not forget about the potential ‘strength of weak ties’ (M. S. Granovetter, 1973).  
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discussed earlier (cf. also Brosza, 1993, p. 89; European Spatial Planning Observation 
Network, 2005, p. 73). These factors serve as analytical criteria and were used to analyse and 
compare the fieldwork results, and to explain differences. The factors that are thought to 
signify evidence of systemic-ness include the following: 233 
 
1. whether there is a strategic and theory-informed policy orientation;  
2. whether there is organisational connectedness, cooperation and coherence;  
3. the extent of inclusiveness;  
4. the extent of participatory and an open policy-making process, and support for 
coordination; and finally 
5. the extent of opportunism.  
 
To elaborate, first, the connectedness, coherence and cooperation of different business support 
and policy actors within the overall regional organisational structure are seen to be the key 
features of strategic and effective ‘good governance’ that denotes ‘systemic-ness’. This 
involves support services and initiatives that complement one another and that are streamlined 
at certain level of governance, thereby reducing duplication and fragmentation within a 
system. Secondly, the coordination of different actors in an inclusive, participatory and open 
process of interaction (as opposed to dirigiste and intrusive) is, it is suggested conducive to 
systemic-ness. It limits opportunistic behaviour and gives room for innovative ideas for policy 
                                                 
233 See also the list of important aspects of governance as outlined by ESPON (European Spatial Planning 
Observation Network, 2005, p. 73), which are proposed as a basis for approaches to measure differences in the 
capacity of governance. They comprise the areas of existing institutional settings including government 
structures (e.g. satisfaction with actual government, number of public employees, and openness in terms of cross 
border activities); economic governance (e.g. network activities expressed by the number of regional cluster, e-
government, and regulatory burdens); civil society (e.g. participation, trust, and information & communication 
patters, and ‘attachment to region’ as an indicator of decentralisation); and space (e.g. ‘flow’ characterising 
relations and exchange between different regions, interdisciplinarity and multi-level composition of actors 
involved in governance processes. Furthermore, also consult the ‘Explorative Innovation Scoreboard’ of the 
EXIS report (Arundel & Hollanders, 2005), which features data for the governance dimension. Moreover, confer 
Hoppe’s (2000, pp. 232-233) reference criteria for the detection of system immanent strength and weaknesses of 
implementation procedures of information and support structures.  
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development. The following table illustrates the different dimensions of this conceptualisation 
of systemic-ness. They are to be viewed as mutually reinforcing, where one dimension has an 
effect on another. 
 
Table 19 Drivers and characteristics of systemicness of the governance system   
 
Drivers of systemic-ness of the 
governance system 
 
Characteristics and activities 
Policy measures (and funding) - Strategic policy programmes and instruments  
- An outlined holistic, unified strategic orientation  
- Effective analysis informing policy (considering 
different needs and objectives of actors) 
Organisational structure (and policy 
links) of the governance system 
- Connectedness and exchange between actors 
(ensuring density and completeness of the 
network and thus avoiding fragmentation) 
- Clear-cut allocated responsibilites between actors 
(avoiding overlap) 
- Coordination of tasks amongst multiple actors 
with collective and streamlined activities and 
common representation (ensuring coherence 
between complementary competences and 
avoiding duplication) 
- Existence of hybrid organisations (PPP) 
- Existence of dynamic business base 
Relationships (and cooperation ties) 
between actors 
- Cooperative attitudes / behaviour and mutual trust 
(as opposed to insular objectives and conflict 
from competitive attitudes, opportunism or 
antagonism) 
- Identifiable lead organisation as a main 
communication or strategy hub 
- Identifiable key actors acting as animators and 
drivers (movers & shakers) or mediators  
Processes (and decision-making) - Intensity (strength) and durabily (consistency) of 
interactions that support effective coordination 
- Inclusiveness of stakeholders, i.e. participatory 
and open approach (as opposed to dirigistive and 
intrusive) 
- Openness / outreach to external actors 
(communication) 
Perceptions (and innovative ideas) 
of innovation policy 
- Theory-derived policy measures and informed 
actors 
- Awareness of good practice models 
Source: Own creation. 
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A set of questions, which serve as guidelines for the analysis of the results of the fieldwork, 
that corresponded to the research objectives was derived. These were more precise five key 
analytical questions and were used to compare and to identify similarities and differences in 
the dynamics and structures within the governance structures of the regional innovation 
system, and between its sub-systems of city-regions. These ‘filter’ questions loosely 
correspond to what are argued to be the success factors that could expected to be found in a 
functioning regional innovation systems and that deserves the mark of systemic-ness. The key 
questions (highlighted in bold) followed by a set of secondary questions are: 
 
1. What are the policy measures and instruments? What is the content and objectives 
of programmes, projects and initiatives? At which level of governance are they 
developed and implemented? Do the multiple levels of governance coordinate their 
activities? Can a common strategic, holistic and collective policy approach be 
identified? Is the influence of a theory recognisable (e.g. has cluster policy guided 
them)? Was policy development informed by diagnostic and comparative analytical 
studies? 
2. What are the regional and sub-regional governance structures? What is the 
organisational set-up of individual and hybrid business support and policy actors? Are 
the business support organisations connected and coherently coordinated (e.g. 
existence of an ‘one-stop-shop’ business support contact point) or instead fragmented? 
3. What are the relationships between the different innovation governance actors? 
Who or what were the obstacles and enablers to the policy-making and its measures? 
What is the extent of opportunism (as opposed to trust), and cooperation for, policy 
development? What is the level of participation? Who are its animateurs and drivers 
and who can be identified as key actors or mover & shakers? 
4. What are the processes of interactions between the various stakeholders of 
governance actors? What is the extent of network activities? What is the nature of 
information and communication processes? Is the policy development process 
coordinated? Is it inclusive?  
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5. What are the perceptions of the individual actors attached to current innovation 
policy-making and what is their ideal form of innovation policy-making? Do they 
reflect current academic thinking? By whom and how is innovation policy created and 
supported? Who are the active players in the development of policy measures and 
initiatives? Which are the influencing sources of ideas for new policy development?  
 
These analytical questions form the framework for the empirical work and enabled the 
examination of the extent of the systemic-ness of the innovation system. The thesis 
contributes to an increasing awareness of how intraregional and intrainstitutional dynamics 
and structures can affect the building and functioning of innovation systems.  
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CHAPTER 8 
FIELDWORK FINDINGS: INSIDE THE REGIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEM OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA  
 
This chapter presents the main fieldwork findings from the investigation of the innovation and 
business support systems of North Rhine-Westphalia and the four case studies of the city-
regions of Aachen, Dortmund, Duisburg and Düsseldorf. The first part of the chapter starts 
with an introduction of the German National Innovation System, providing an overview of 
structural strengths and weaknesses, policy approaches and important actors at the national 
level. It briefly adds a supranational perspective with a description of complementary policy 
fields pursued at EU level. 
 
The second part follows a similar structured description of the innovation system of the 
Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia, in which all of the individual case studies of the 
city-regions are located. It introduces policies and actors at the Federal State (Land) level and 
the meso level, which concerns especially the wider Ruhr area where two of the city-regions, 
Dortmund and Duisburg, are found.  
 
The third part presents a description of the policies and strategies, business and innovation 
support, key actors for policy-making and implementation, as well as of some of the dynamic 
governance aspects that influence the working of the innovation system in each of the case 
studies of the city-regions of Aachen, Dortmund, Duisburg and Düsseldorf.  
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The subsequent chapter provides a comparative analysis of the case studies and presents the 
main conclusions with regards to the research questions set out in the introduction. 
 
The German national innovation system 
Using Kuhlmann’s (1997, p. 443) definition of an innovation system as ‘the functional cluster 
of industrial innovation activities, research system, education system and related policy-
administrative structures’, this section looks briefly at the main elements of Germany’s 
national innovation system, keeping in mind the triple helix of university-industry-
government. In looking at structures, it sets the parameters of the similarities and differences 
of the dynamics within the governance of a regional innovation system and its sub-systems - 
this in terms of strategic policy measures, organisational set-up, relationships, processes, 
perceptions and sources of ideas - one of the key questions in the thesis. It enables 
consideration of who are the enablers and obstacles to innovation policy, what lessons can be 
learned in terms of organisational structures and processes, how policy evolves and what 
impetus is needed.  
 
Economic performance of the German innovation system  
Betwen 1980 and 2000, Germany had displayed only modest economic growth. An average 
annual GDP growth rate of just 1.8 % was achieved despite the reunification demand push (cf. 
Abelshauser, 2004, p. 293). Prior to the period under investigation, the GDP growth rate 
slowed down from a 2.9% peak in 2000 to 0.8%, 0.2% and -0.1% in 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
respectively.234 Nevertheless, Germany stagnated at a relatively high level of economic 
performance, which in terms of GDP (25,580 Euro per capita in current prices in 2002) 
                                                 
234 The GDP growth rate is calculated in constant prices of 1995. 
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remained slightly above the average (24,250 Euro) of the EU-15 countries (cf. Statistisches 
Bundesamt et al., 2004, p. 440). Germany retained its competitive position with a continuous 
strength in export performance in high-quality and specialised products (cf. Keck, 1993, p. 
136). 
 
Yet, this period of slow economic growth was accompanied by a continuous high level of 
structural unemployment (cf. Abelshauser, 2004, p. 448), with a rate of 8.6% in 2002 above 
the EU-15 average of 7.6% for the same year (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, & Zentrum für Umfragen, 2004, p. 438 
and cf. pp. 96-120).235  
 
The economic difficulties and the rise in (and fear of) unemployment created political and 
social pressure for change that caused Germany’s Federal Government – led by Social 
Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schröder – to implement during 2003 and 2004 the drastic 
reforms for growth and employment of the comprehensive agenda 2010 (Die 
Bundesregierung, 2003), which are most prominently associated with the reforms concerning 
the labour market and social security system known as Hartz IV.236 The system inherent 
problems addressed by the agenda 2010 (including a lack of flexible wages) are very similar 
                                                 
235 The equivalent average rate of unemployment in 2002 in the EU-25 was 8.8% and in the Eurozone 8.3%. 
These figures were measured according to the ILO concept. If calculated alternatively in relation to the 
dependent civil labour force, Germany’s unemployment rate for 2002 is 10.8% with a total of just over 4 million 
being unemployed (Statistisches Bundesamt, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, & Zentrum für 
Umfragen, 2004, pp. 114 and 438-439).  
236 The comprehensive German reform programme called Agenda 2010 comprises several measures in five 
subject areas, namely labour market and employment regulation; social security systems; business; finances; and 
education, vocational training and innovation (see European Commission, 2003, p. 53). The labour market 
reforms implemented in 2003 and 2004 by the German Federal Government (cf. Die Bundesregierung, 2003, pp. 
52-53) followed the recommendations of an expert group headed by the former head of human resources at 
Volkswagen AG, Dr. Peter Hartz. The reforms comprised four parts: the liberalisation of personnel service 
agencies; the introduction of mini-jobs and support for individual free-lance start-ups and those out of 
unemployment (Ich-AGs); the restructuring of the Federal Institute of Labour (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit); and 
most importantly far-reaching cuts within the social security system (Hartz IV) in order to enforce the seeking 
employment amongst the unemployed.  
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to those highlighted by Lahnstein’s agenda ’90 in 1982 (cf. Abelshauser, 2004, pp. 441-446). 
This illustrates the lack of sufficient reforms over two decades and the consequent tailback of 
necessary reforms as Abelshauser (2004, p. 446) rightly points out. Following the 
implementation of the agenda 2010 and benefiting from the economic effects linked to 
hosting the Fifa Football World Cup 2006, Germany appears to be in a more favourable 
economic situation in the recent years before the 2008 gobal financial credit crisis.  
 
However, there remain significant differences in terms of economic performance and 
unemployment between the 16 individual Federal States (Länder) within Germany (see 
Statistisches Bundesamt et al., 2004, p. 114). There is a big gap between the unemployment 
rates237 of Länder from the former West Germany (8.5% in 2002) and the “new” Länder from 
East Germany (19.2% in 2002) (Statistisches Bundesamt et al., 2004, p. 114). Secondly, there 
is a North-South divide amongst the West German Länder. While the southern States of 
Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria have Germany’s lowest unemployment rates of 6.1% and 
6.9%, respectively, the unemployment rates of the northern Länder, such as North Rhine-
Westphalia (10.1%), are above the average of the 11 West German Länder (Statistisches 
Bundesamt et al., 2004, p. 114). 
 
Innovation performance of the German innovation system  
Germany displays a strong innovation performance (Janz et al., 2001, p. 2) that contributes to 
its strong export performance and to maintaining its competitive position despite its 
comparative high wages and additional wage costs.238 Germany is part of the group of 
                                                 
237 The unemployment rate was measured in relation to the dependent civil employed persons as opposed to the 
ILO measure. 
238 See also the report on the technological performance and capabilities of Germany (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung, 2003). 
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‘leading countries’ in terms of innovation performance with a high Summary Innovation 
Index (SII) ranking 7th in the 2005 European Innovations Survey (EIS) (European 
Commission, 2005a, pp. 3-4).239 
 
This is first and foremost based upon the innovation activities and R&D spending of its 
businesses (European Commission, 2002a, Annex Table B on p. 24; Keck, 1993, p. 138).240 
In terms of knowledge creation – as one of the key drivers of innovation –, the 2002 European 
Innovation Survey (EIS) shows gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) in Germany being 2.52% 
of GDP, which is well-above the EU-15 average of 1.95% (European Commission, 2002a, p. 
24).241 Business expenditure on R&D (BERD) amounts to 1.80% of GDP in contrast to the 
1.28% average of the EU-15 Member States.242  
 
However, there are strong regional differences in innovation performance among the German 
Länder. While the southern “model” States of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg are among the 
top ten leading European regions as identified by the 2002 European Innovation Scoreboard 
(European Commission, 2002a, p. 4), the northern West German Länder (such as North 
Rhine-Westphalia) display regional innovation performances that are just above the European 
                                                 
239 Germany is also amongst the best 3 ranking overall sector innovation leaders for both industry and services, 
and Germany is among the leaders in 15 sectors out of a total of 25 sectors (European Commission, 2005a, pp. 
23-25) for which data were available from 15 European countries (EU-15 except Ireland and the UK, plus 
Norway and Iceland). 
240 To some surprise, the 2005 Innobarometer (European Commission, 2005k, pp. 2-4) shows an unfavourable 
innovation demand in Germany. According to these results, citizens in Germany together with those in Poland, 
Latvia and Finland are least ready to embrace innovation. As the EIS indicates (cf. European Commission, 
2005f, pp. 15 and 27-28), this relative reluctance to innovation ‘could be an explaining factor for the differences 
in the transformation of innovation inputs into innovation outputs’ (ibid., p. 28). However, Germany’s high 
innovation output ‘may indicate that the drivers for innovation do not lie in the public demand but rather come 
from the side of the firm’ (ibid., p. 28). 
241 The Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) is calculated by adding the Public expenditure on R&D to the 
Business expenditure on R&D (BERD). 
242 Germany also exhibits a Public expenditure on R&D (GERD – BERD) of 0.72% of GDP that is just above 
the EU-15 average of 0.67% - according to the 2002 EIS (European Commission, 2002, p. 24). 
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average but below the average national innovation indicators when indexed to Germany’s 
mean (European Commission, 2002b, pp. 10 and 16).243  
 
Public administrative structures in the German Federalism  
The Federal Republic of Germany is characterised by a (tripartite) horizontal and vertical 
separation of powers and is a democratic and social federation according to Article 20 of the 
Grundgesetz – Germany’s basic (constitutional) law (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
2004).244 This implies a balance between the Nation State (Bundesstaat) and the individual 
Member (Federal) States (Bundesländer) (cf. Avenarius, 2002, pp. 45-47; Hesselberger, 2003, 
pp. 181, 186-188; von Lennep, 2004, p. 11).245 However, even though each of the Länder has 
its own State constitution (Landesverfassung), and sovereignty is shared between central 
government and the regional governments of the federal states, in practice competences of the 
Länder are much more limited (cf. Avenarius, 2002, p. 16).246 First of all, the national level 
has a dominating influence upon the decentralised system.247 Furthermore, municipalities 
(Gemeinden) within the Länder have the right to autonomous self-administration of their local 
                                                 
243 This index is called the Regional National Summary Innovation Index (RNSII). North-Rhine Westphalia 
scores a RNSII of 0.82 while Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg both score a value of 1.34. North-Rhine 
Westphalia’s Revealed Regional Summary Innovation Index (RRSII) – that also takes into account the region’s 
relative innovative performance to the EU mean – has a value of 87 (60th rank out of 148) that is just above 
average but still low in comparison to the valies of 151 and 146 of Bavaria (7th) and Baden-Württemberg (10th) 
or the value of 225 of Sweden’s leading Stockholm region. 
244 The tripartite horizontal separation of powers comprises the legislative, executive and judicative. 
245 The use of the term federation for the original term Bundesstaat refers to the Nation State or country. The 
possible literal translation of this German term into ‘Federal State’ is thus avoided as this term is used by this 
thesis to refer to one of the 16 individual States (i.e. regions or provinces) within Germany and thus instead 
refers to the German term Bundesland. Its shorter form Land (or in plural: Länder) is, however, the preferred 
terminology (synonymously for ‘Federal State’) because the terms ‘Federal government’ and ‘Federal Ministry’, 
for instance, refer in contrast to the national level (as opposed to ‘State government or ‘State Ministry’ for the 
Länder). Due to Germany’s federal political structure, legislative powers are shared between the National 
(Federal) Parliament, that is the Bundestag, and the regional parliaments of the 16 States (Länder). The Regional 
State Governments participate in the national legislation procedure and Federal administration with their 
representatives in the Upper House of the Federal Parliament, the Bundesrat.  
246 The performance of authority and the fulfilment of public tasks and duties (cf. von Lennep, 2004, p. 11) is the 
competency of the individual Länder according to Art. 30 of the German Basic Law - if no other Basic Law 
applies. 
247 National legislation takes precedence over individual Land legislation (Art. 31 Basic Law). 
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authorities.248 The German public administrative system is thus characterised by subsidiarity 
and decentralisation (Knemeyer, 2001, pp. 171-172) due to Federalism and multilayered 
regionalisaton (Herrschel & Newman, 2002, pp. 126-127). 
 
The following list distinguishes the three main tiers of public administration in Germany as 
outlined by Knemeyer (2001, p. 172), which incorporates his distinction of three further levels 
of administration within the local-authority tier:  
 
1. Federal administration; 
2. Länder administrations (16 in total including three city-states); and  
3. Local authority self-administration by:  
o 16,071 municipalities subordinated to a county (with an average population of 
approximately 4,850);249 
o 323 counties and 115 non-county (metropolitan) municipalities, i.e. larger 
cities with a status equivalent to that of counties; and  
o Regional associations of local authorities or intermediate administrative 
districts under a district commissioner. 
 
Allocation of competencies between the national level, Land level and self-administration of 
local authorities 
 
The question of allocation of competencies and responsibilities is closely linked to the 
question of financing, i.e. the allocation of taxation revenues. The following Table 20 based 
upon an illustration by Avenarius (2002, p. 57), provides a good overview of this. The 
                                                 
248 This right for autonomous self-administration is guaranteed by Art. 28 para. 2 of the National Basic Law, 
although only in those areas assigned to them within the State. Knemeyer (2001, p. 171) points out that the 
‘German concept of local “self-administration” is quite simply not the same thing as self-government in the 
British or American mould; however, it also differs quite substantially from the French or Swiss variants, and 
equally form the types of local self-administration found in the Scandinavian countries’.  
249 See also Wehling & Kost (2003, p. 14), who identify 13,844 municipalities within 323 counties.  
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allocation of functions varies between the Länder but, broadly, they include ‘education, 
highways and traffic management; hospital provision; police, public safety and rescue 
services; regional policy and planning’ (Barter, 2000, see Tables 1 and 2 on pp. 33 and 35). 
 
Of particular importance for the innovation system is that schools and universities fall under 
the competencies of the Länder (Avenarius, 2002, pp. 119-125), although universities 
nevertheless have the right to self-governance according to the higher education framework 
law (Hochschulrahmengesetz) set by the Nation State. The table also shows that the national 
level is mainly responsible for large research institutions and economic development. 
 
The tasks of local authorities are distinguished between voluntary self-administrative tasks 
(such as maintaining museums, sport facilities, parks and, of relevance here, economic 
development), obligatory self-administrative duties (such as maintaining roads, social 
services, water and energy supply), and obligatory delegated tasks (such as building control, 
registration of citizens, and public order) assigned by federal or Land legislation (Lehmann-
Grube & Dieckmann, 2001, p. 185; von Lennep, 2004, pp. 14-15; Wehling & Kost, 2003, pp. 
16-18).  
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Table 20 Allocation of fiscal revenues and competences according to level of government 
 
Important core tasks and responsibilities 
 
Municipalities 
 
Länder (Federal States) Nation State 
- water and energy supply 
- refuse collection 
- canalisation 
- social services (income 
support) 
- planning permissions 
- registrations 
- schools 
- universities 
- policy 
- administration of justice  
- health care 
- culture 
- property development 
- social security 
(retirement, 
unemployment) 
- defence 
- foreign affairs 
- transport infrastructure 
- monetary system  
- economic development  
- research (large research 
laboratories) 
 
Main sources of tax revenues 
 
Municipalities 
 
Länder (Federal States) Nation State 
- income tax share* (15%) 
- value-added tax share* 
(2.2.%) 
- local land tax  
- local business trade tax 
(levied upon working 
capital and profits) 
- minor taxes (e.g. dog tax, 
beverage tax, taxation on 
holiday homes) 
- income tax share* 
- value-added tax share* 
- corporation tax* 
- wealth tax 
- inheritance tax (estate 
duties) 
- motor vehicle/road tax 
- land acquisition/transfer 
tax  
- beer tax 
- casino tax 
 
- income tax share* 
- value-added tax share* 
- corporation tax* 
- tax on mineral oil  
- tax on spirits 
- tobacco tax 
- coffee tax 
- insurance tax 
 
Source: Alteration and own translation of an overview by Avenarius (2002, p. 57) with addition information 
from Lehmann-Grube & Dieckmann (2001, p. 191).  
Note that * denotes a shared (common) tax, while ** denotes some splitting of revenues. Furthermore, horizontal 
and vertical fiscal transfers (equalisation grants) exist between tax-rich and tax-poor Länder. 
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The German education system  
 
Freeman (1995, p. 6) states that ‘Germany developed one of the best technical education and 
training systems in the world’, which from the nineteenth century until nowadays ‘is the 
foundation for the superior skills and higher productivity of the German labour force in many 
industries’. However, while the dual system of vocational training 250 has long been hailed as 
a key strength of the German system251, it has arguably been inflexible in responding to new 
hybrid skill demands in emerging sectors (cf. European Commission, 2003d, p. 18; Heidegger 
& Rauner, 1997). Furthermore, ‘the higher education sector, once a showpiece of the German 
education system, no longer is so’ - as Keck (1993, p. 140) has pointed out. Indeed, this is 
very evident in the weak education indicators of the 2002 EIS (European Commission, 2002a, 
Annex Table B on p. 24) for: new science and engineering (S&E) graduates; population with 
tertiary education; and participation in life-long learning. 252 
 
The crumbling of these foundations of innovation drivers provides a huge challenge for 
Germany in the years to come (cf. Arundel & Hollanders, 2005, p. 28; Keck, 1993, p. 147).253 
Germany’s poor results in the OECD’s PISA study prominently brought this to public 
attention. The study identified the social exclusion of its migrant pupils as one of the crucial 
                                                 
250 The dual system of vocational training involves specialised ‘theoretical’ education at vocational schools (e.g. 
one week per month) that complements the practical training of apprentices in businesses and other 
organisations.  
251 The dual system was for instance identified as a best practice example by Ernst & Young (1998, p. 85).  
252 Germany’s low performance on these innovation drivers might, according to the EIS (European Commission, 
2005f, p. 15), ‘thus hamper the effect of increased efforts in other key dimensions on the overall innovative 
performance of the country’. 
253 The Exploratory Innovation Scoreboard from the EXIS report (Arundel & Hollanders, 2005) that 
complements the EIS also shows a below EU average performance of Germany for many of the EXIS themes, 
with the exception of innovation diversity. In particular the shortcomings concerning skills and investment are 
outlined as possible future problems for Germany (ibid., p. 28). 
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aspects in Germany’s failure to adapt its education and training system.254 The education and 
research system is pivotal for Germany’s ability to remain innovative and competitive as a 
high-wage country. 
 
Germany’s research and higher education infrastructure 
Public research funding is split into institutional funding and project funding that is mainly 
provided by Federal government support (Stubbs, 2001, p. 151), while the State governments 
funding of the Länder goes to the Fachhochschulen (or Universities of Applied Science) 
(European Commission, 2003d, p. 11). Specific research projects funds are, for instance, 
provided by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG in 
short). Its 1989 budget of around 600 million Euro (1188 mio. DM) was financed 68% by 
Federal Government and 38% by the Federal States (Keck, 1993, p. 141). The interwoven, 
mostly supra-regional, key actors of the institutional research system are briefly introduced in 
the following:255 
                                                 
254 The results from the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment, known as the PISA study, 
have found in recent years, for instance, that the impact of the parents’ socio-economic background on the school 
performance of teenagers was the highest for Germany, the UK and the US. Since publication of the 
unsatisfactory result, educational policy has become the focus of public debate in Germany. Here, attention has 
been particularly placed on the integration failure of children from immigrant families within the current pre-
school and school system. Germany’s PISA results can be found via the German Education Server (Deutscher 
Bildungsserver) at http://www.bildungsserver.de/ , or the institutes responsible for coordination of the German 
part of the PISA study, which were for the 2000 cycle: the Max-Planck-institute for education research (MPIB) 
in Berlin at http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/pisa ; and for the 2003 cycle: the Leibniz-institute for the pedagogic 
of natural sciences (IPN) in Kiel at http://pisa.ipn.uni-kiel.de/ . The Home Page of the OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) can be found at 
http://www.pisa.oecd.org/pages/0,2987,en_32252351_32235731_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
255 An illustrated institutional profile of Germany’s national innovation systems can also be found in various 
works (European Commission, 2003d, p. 3; Kuhlmann, 1997, p. 145; Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 1999b, p. 106; Reger & Kuhlmann, 1995, p. 12). 
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Public scientific research facilities 
 
The research activities of the Max-Planck-Society (MPG) institutes focus upon basic research 
and are closely linked to the universities. They are jointly financed by the Federal 
Government and Federal States (European Commission, 2003d, p. 10; Keck, 1993, p. 141). In 
addition, joint funding is provided for other public sector research establishments such as the 
‘Blue List’ Institutes under the umbrella of the Wilhelm-Gottfried-Leibnitz Association 
(WGL) and the Academies of Sciences (AoS). The Federal Government also provides 
institutional support for various ‘departmental research’ laboratories (Kuhlmann, 1997, p. 
444) and large National Research Centres, including those of the Helmholtz Association of 
German Research Centres (HGF) that carry out long-term basic research and focus on certain 
technologies (European Commission, 2003d, p. 4). The Helmholtz Research Centres are 
funded by the Federal Government (90%) and the Federal States (10%)  (European 
Commission, 2003d, p. 10). The Länder also support their own governmental laboratories 
(ibid.).  
 
Intermediary and private research facilities 
 
The ‘corporatist’ institutions of the Fraunhofer-Society (FhG) have close links to universities 
and are partly financed by institutional support (European Commission, 2003d, p. 10) that 
comes from the Federal Government (90%) and the Federal States (10%), and they carry out 
applied research on contracts with clients in industry (40%) and government (European 
Commission, 2003d, p. 11; Keck, 1993, p. 144; Kuhlmann, 1997, p. 444).  
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Besides these intermediary Fraunhofer institutions, that cooperate closely with industry, 
applied research is also carried out by laboratories and Institutes of Co-operative Industrial 
Research (Institutionen für Gemeinschaftsforschung, IfG in short) that are united in the 
Association of Industrial Research Institutes (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Industrieller 
Forschungsvereinigungen “Otto von Guericke” e.V., AIF in short). For their joint R&D 
activities relevant to SMEs, they receive funding from about 50,000 member SMEs and 
programme funding from the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour ‘BMWA’256 
(European Commission, 2003d, pp. 3 and 11) 
 
Business and innovation support infrastructure 
It is a characteristic of the German Research and Higher Education System that its universities 
are generally more research-focussed and as a result often lag behind in terms of technology 
transfer and business outreach activities, even though nearly all universities have technology 
transfer offices or units (Keck, 1993, p. 141). It is often said that Germany is failing to exploit 
its cutting edge quality research due to its inability to transfer it into innovation output. The 
reason for this is in the fragmented science and research system that suffers from ‘poor co-
operation, insufficient synergies, and obstacles to competition’ (Burfitt et al., 2002, p. 12). 
 
Overall, business support in Germany is more the role of institutions such as technology and 
start-up centres, chambers of commerce and consultancies that are complementary but mostly 
external to the system of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). Technology and start-up 
centres play a crucial role in the business and innovation support framework by assisting 
                                                 
256 Now the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi). 
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entrepreneurial activities and existing businesses through their facilities and support services 
in commercialising research knowledge. 
 
There are more than 200 business incubators in Germany (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 1999a, p. 49) – usually labelled as a ‘technology centre’ 
(Technologiezentrum) –research parks offering work premises to companies and research 
institutions, and may also offer support services and opportunities for cooperation (cf. Hilpert 
& Ruffieux, 1991; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999a, p. 51; 
Sturm, 1989, p. 165; Tamásy, 2001).257 
 
An important role in the business and innovation support system is played by the 83 chambers 
of commerce and industry (Industrie- und Handelskammer, IHK in short) and the 55 
chambers of handicrafts (Handwerkskammer, HWK in short) in Germany (cf. Hoppe, 2000, 
pp. 63 and 66). Although they are fairly similar, the chamber of commerce and industry are 
distinct in that membership is obligatory for businesses . The IHK is a self-administrative 
public body under the control of the Land Ministries for Economic Affairs (Hoppe, 2000, pp. 
63-64). Its main tasks – as outlined by Hoppe (2000, pp. 64-65) – comprise the following 
three areas: the execution of tasks delegated by the State; representing its business base vis-à-
vis public administration actors; and the provision of a wide range of – mainly free – services 
to its members. These services include advice and support on start-up activities, further 
education and training, financing and so on (e.g. see Vereinigung der Industrie- und 
Handelskammern in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2001). 
 
                                                 
257 Other labels for such incubation centres are innovation centre (Innovationszentrum) or start-up centre 
(Gründungszentrum). 
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In summary, these three types of business and innovation support organisations – university 
technology transfer offices, chambers of commerce, and business incubators –, together with 
the political-administrative bodies – the economic development units of local and regional 
authorities –, are regarded as the key intermediary actors within the business and innovation 
support system. Although there are other important actors, these four are regarded here as 
those who epitomise the homologous core set of organisations that are universally present in 
the individual sub-national and sub-regional settings of Germany.258 Furthermore, as 
described in the previous chapter, they represent the triple helix of university-industry-
government relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) within the innovation system. 
 
                                                 
258 For an extended list of important actors see Hoppe (2000, p. 82). 
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Programmes and instruments of the national innovation policy 
Keck (1993, pp. 145-146) writes that the federal government was hesitant in assuming ‘a role 
as manager of a national innovation system’ responsible for science and technology and that 
each of key higher education and research organisations ‘primarily looked after itself’.259 
Reger & Kuhlmann (1995, p. 15) also point out that a strategically focussed industry-related 
technology policy (like in France) is unlikely in Germany because of the decentralised 
research system, as outlined above, that stems from its Federalist structure. Yet, recent efforts 
by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology (BMWi) addressed some of these policy shortcomings and aimed 
to enhance the German innovation system (e.g. see Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie, 1999; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie & 
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2002). Some of the key aspects of this are 
described in this section.260 
 
Whilst the innovation policy measures and programmes of the BMBF focus upon the mobility 
of students and scientists, the financing of thematic R&D projects in both enterprises and 
public science bodies, and on activities and infrastructure of innovation and technology 
transfer and networking; BMWi’s innovation policies centre around improving the regulatory 
framework for competition and entrepreneurship, providing direct financial support to 
                                                 
259 The 2004 innobarometer (European Commission, 2004d) also provides an ambiguous message concerning the 
assessment of the success of public innovation support programmes to businesses in the EU. The broad message 
is that while the programmes across the EU have helped to support innovative firms to turn their innovations into 
commercial success, they have failed to raise the innovative capabilities of less innovative SMEs (cf. Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005). 
260 Specific reference is made in this respect to the excellent, comprehensive and detailed overview of innovation 
policy in Germany that features in the ‘country report’ for Germany from the European Commission’s (2003d) 
‘European Trend Chart on Innovation’ prepared by Christian Rammer from the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW). This report also provides a more detailed overview list of measures of German innovation 
policy (pp. 46-47).  
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enterprises for innovation activities including for cooperative R&D and technology consulting 
(through grants, loans and venture capital from the federally owned bank KfW Bankengruppe 
– see below) and providing infrastructure support to the enterprise sector (European 
Commission, 2003d, p. 6 and see Figures 3 and 4 on p. 7 and Figure 5 on p. 9).  
 
Financial support instruments for business innovation activities 
 
There are three main types of innovation financing for SMEs from the Federal Government 
and the federally owned ‘SME bank’ (KfW Mittelstandsbank).261 These include direct 
research grants within five thematic programmes, loans and venture capital 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung & Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie, 2001; European Commission, 2003d, pp. 35-36).  
 
The five thematic programmes that provide direct research grants for R&D projects are the 
largest programmes in terms of funding and comprise the areas of: natural sciences, climate, 
environment, and energy; new technologies; information and communication technologies; 
biotechnology, health, and design of working conditions; and transportation, space, and 
construction (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung & Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2001, pp. 5-31; European Commission, 2003d, p. 47). In 
addition, the Pro Inno programme (PROgramm “INNOvationskompetenz mittelständischer 
Unternehmen”) provides grants for SMEs to carry out cooperative R&D projects, either with 
                                                 
261 The former two federally owned banks, Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW), both merged in July 2003 to the KfW Bankengruppe, with their main SME support activities now being 
comprised under the branch name label of Mittelstandsbank (SME bank) (cf. European Commission, 2003d, p. 
13). 
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other firms or with research organisations (Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller 
Forschungsvereinigungen, 2002; European Commission, 2003d, p. 41).  
 
The ERP innovation programme (European Recovery Programme), which goes back to the 
Marshall plan, is the main loan guarantee scheme for innovation financing 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2001; Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, 2002, 
pp. 20-21).  
 
Finally, venture capital (including co-investors) is provided for innovation-related 
investments for technology-oriented start-ups and young firms through the BTU programme 
(Beteiligungskapital für kleine Technologieunternehmen), which since 2001 has been under 
the responsibility of the ERP (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2001, p. 
8). The BTU Early Stage programme (BTU-Frühphase) provides venture capital and 
mentoring for pre-seed and seed stages through the ‘tbg’ venture capital provider 
(Technologe-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft) belonging to the KfW (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, 
2002, p. 10). In addition, there is the FUTOUR 2000 programme specifically for technology-
orientated start-ups in Eastern Germany as well venture capital programmes of the ERP and 
the KfW (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung & Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2001, pp. 43-44; Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, 2002, p. 9; 
European Commission, 2003d, pp. 35-36; Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 2000). 
 
Whilst government support once also included tax incentives such as tax credits or allowances 
(Keck, 1993, p. 144), these measures were discontinued because they were believed to be 
ineffective as market pressure for innovation was seen to be sufficient (European 
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Commission, 2003d, p. 36).262 Instead of unspecific tax allowances (with the exception of 
investment allowances for East German enterprises), Germany provides special depreciation 
rates on certain types of investment in R&D, and certain subsidies to SMEs, e.g. for using 
IPRs (ibid., p. 36). Furthermore, the recent major tax reform of 2001 included a reduction of 
corporate tax to a uniform 25% (ibid., p. 36).  
 
Characteristics and trends of German innovation policy  
 
In their study on the ‘Infrastructure and Public Sector Support for the Medical Technology 
Industry in Baden-Württemberg’, Burfitt, Gibney & Schierenbeck (2002, p. 12) identify the 
recent trends in German Innovation and Technology Policy at the federal, regional and joint 
levels: 
 
• A focus on high-tech industries and firms 
• An emphasis on inter-firm and inter-institutional networking and collaboration 
• The regionalisation of Federal schemes 
• The use of competitive bidding to allocate public resources between regions263 
 
Furthermore, they (ibid., p. 12) identify that the emerging supporting forms of cooperation 
emphasised by this new approach are: 
 
• Open and flexible 
• Topic-focussed instead of instituion-focussed 
• Time limited 
• Inter-disciplinary 
 
                                                 
262 The strong performance in terms of business expenditure on R&D (BERD) as outlined before gives credence 
to this argument.  
263 The best ideas of submitted applications for competitions are granted (or winning) programme funding. 
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Similarly, Rammer identifies competition, bottom-up approaches and networking approaches 
as the new developments in German innovation policy in recent years (European 
Commission, 2003d, pp. 8-9). Furthermore, he (ibid., p. 19) identifies three ways in which 
regional aspects increasingly enter innovation policy.264 Firstly, that regional differences in 
innovation policy stem from this being a major activity of Länder governments, which gear 
their approaches towards their regional framework conditions. A second route is the particular 
attention to the characteristics of East Germany within the specific programmes. Thirdly, the 
rise of the regional dimension is evident in a number of innovation policy programmes that 
follow a regional focusing approach (e.g. by restricting support to certain winning regions). 
The latter is described below.  
 
Towards a national approach for regional cluster policy 
 
According to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999b, 
p. 88), Germany’s cluster-based policy is applied at the micro and meso level and focussed 
upon the concept of ‘similar firms and innovation styles’. It comprises the following 
components (ibid., p. 89): the provision of strategic information by technological foresight 
studies (FUTUR, former Delphi report); cluster development programmes (by regional 
development agencies); joint industry-research centres of excellence (competence centres); 
and platforms for constructive dialogue (German Council for Research, Technology and 
Innovation).  
 
                                                 
264 Indeed, the recent policy trend towards a regionalisation of economic and innovation strategies and policies 
has also been identified by others (see Dohse, 2001; Hassink, 1992, pp. 153 and 158; Heinze & Voelzkow, 1997; 
Klee & Kirchmann, 1998; Koschatzky, 2000, 2003; Lompe et al., 1996; Raines, 2002a, p. 33; Raines, 2002b, p. 
159; Sturm, 1997; Waniek, 1993, p. 469) as stated earlier by this study. 
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In their international comparison, Boekholt & Thuriaux (2000, pp. 6-8, 34-36 and 42-46) 
characterise the German cluster policy approach – together with those of Austrian and the 
Netherlands – as belonging to the Industry-Research Link Model. This cluster policy model 
‘focuses on “kick-starting” economic strength in emerging technologies’ by creating a critical 
mass of R&D capabilities and technology-based firms that is embodied in the ‘competence 
centre’ (Kompetenzzentren) approach (ibid., pp. 6-7). The collaborative partners for this type 
are ‘not defined as a product chain but rather as a knowledge chain, ranging from basic 
research to commercialisation’ (ibid., p. 34).  
 
Within the German innovation policy activities, a focus has increasingly been placed upon the 
promotion of clustering and cooperation by on supporting the establishment of regional 
innovation networks. The following programmes are examples of the recent trend of the 
incorporation of regional and sectoral clustering aspects in innovation programmes (Burfitt et 
al., 2002, p. 12; European Commission, 2003d, p. 28), i.e. a regional clustering approach. The 
programmes include (see European Commission, 2003d, pp. 23 and 28-29) InnoRegio, 
Innovative Regional Growth Poles, and NEMO (Netzwerkmanagement-Ost), all for Eastern 
Germany; the support for the ‘EXIST – university-based start-ups’ programme (Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research, 2001) 265; the programme Learning Regions; the 
successful biotechnology initiatives (such as BioRegio and BioProfile); the Networks of 
Competence and Competency Centre programmes. 
 
                                                 
265 Among the five regional networks that received funding was also one from North Rhine-Westphalia: the 
bizeps EXISTnetwork in the Bergisch-Märkische region ‘with the towns of Hagen, Remscheid, Solingen and 
Wuppertal as well as the Ennep-Ruhr district and the Märkisch district’ (Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research, 2001, p. 18) . 
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Common to all these programmes is the building of ‘regional and often sector-specific 
consortia (or at least a group of actors) that formulate a joint innovation strategy and provide 
funding for joint innovation efforts’ (European Commission, 2003d, p. 28).266 Furthermore, 
the consortia usually integrate various competencies and organisations from the different 
dimensions such as public and private R&D facilities, supportive public administration, 
venture capital institutions, lead customers and so on (ibid., p. 29). 
 
The BioRegio initiative was the first programme to focus on regional clustering even though 
its main objective was to develop a national biotechnology industry in Germany (European 
Commission, 2003d, p. 29). It was launched by the German government (cf. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999b, pp. 72-73) in 1995 as a competition 
amongst regions for funding of cluster initiatives to stimulate the formation of innovative 
collaborative university-industry networks in the biotechnology sector supported by public 
administration. It aimed to facilitate the transfer of scientific knowledge from university to 
industry and thus speed up the commercialisation of research into products and processes. It 
was presented by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1999b, p. 70) as good policy practice for promoting networking and clustering. In their 
UNIDO policy paper, Cooke & Memedovic (2003, p. 1) describe the initiative as ‘[o]ne of the 
clearest cases’ of a government approach of promoting regional innovation and cluster-
building.267 In his analysis of the BioRegio contest, Dohse (2000, p. 1111) concludes that it 
‘goes in the right direction by taking regions seriously and giving prominence to the well-
functioning interplay of the various elements of regional innovation systems’. However, he 
also states that this new policy instrument ‘cannot solve the fundamental information problem 
                                                 
266 Therefore, they show some influence or similarity to the Regional Innovation Strategy progamme by the EU. 
267 Among the winning regions was Cologne-Düsseldorf in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
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associated with government intervention into the process of technological change’.268 Yet, he 
(2000, p. 1119) sees the initiative’s strategy theoretically justified as it ‘promotes spatial 
clustering, rewards intraregional cooperation and stimulates interregional competition for 
technology’ 
 
Building upon the success of the BioRegio initiative, increasingly attention has been placed 
on the centres of competence programme (European Commission, 2003d, pp. 9 and 29).269 
The Competence Centre approach (Boekholt & Thuriaux, 2000, pp. 42-46; Burfitt et al., 
2002, pp. 13-15) was further influenced by the recommendations of a number of research 
reports. These include the study on clusters (Kompetenzzentren) in German technology 
regions, compared to some US clusters, presented by the Roland Berger consultants (Roland 
Berger & Partner et al., 1998) for the German Federal Ministry of Education, Science, 
Research and Technology (BMBF) as well as ‘an international comparative study on 
initiatives to build, develop and support “Kompetenzzentren” (clusters) by Technopolis 
(Boekholt et al., 1998) for BMBF.270  
 
                                                 
268 Dohse (2000, pp. 1118-1119) names three particular reasons why the consideration of the spatial dimension 
goes into the right direction, namely because technological change is path dependent; because of untraded 
interdependencies and due to the view of regions as the best suited governance level to internalise spillovers. 
However, Dohse (2000, p. 1119) also points out that ‘[a] major problem of sector specific policies is that 
intrasectoral spillovers seem to be of less importance than intersectoral spillovers (see Glaeser, Kallal, 
Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 1992 for empirical evidence), i.e. spillovers seem to be bund to a specific technology 
rather than to a specific sector of the economy. 
269 Compare also Sweden’s NUTEK Competence Centre Programme that has been highlighted by the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999b, p. 70) as a good policy practice for 
promoting networking and clustering in order to facilitate university-industry interactions. 
270 This first report (Roland Berger & Partner et al., 1998) discusses as a kind of benchmark success stories, the 
computer and micoelectronics industrial cluster in Silicon Valley (California, USA); its main competitor cluster 
along route 128 near Boston (Massachusetts, USA); the biotechnology cluster in the San Francisco Bay Area 
(North California, USA) and the biotechnology cluster in the State of New York. The Technopolis study 
(Boekholt et al., 1998) also covers the classical cases studies on as entrepreneurial clusters (Kompetenzzentren). 
It further discusses the science and technology-led clusters of information technology in Cambridge (UK) and of 
laser technology in California South Bay (USA), as well as the industry-led clusters in Eindhoven (Netherlands) 
and Gothenburg (Sweden), and the policy-led clusters of Silicon Glen in Scotland (UK), Kanagawa (Japan) and 
the Hsinchu Science Park (Taiwan). 
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The BMBF finances the building of these competence centres, which create a cluster 
infrastructure that bundles up horizontal (inter-disciplinary) competences and vertical 
competences (covering the whole value chain) by involving all the main actors in the 
innovation process. It thus embodies an especial emphasis on networking and inter-firm and 
inter-institutional co-operation. Their conceptualisation is described in more detail by Burfitt, 
Gibney & Schierenbeck (2002, pp. 13-15).271 The key focus of these bodies is on seeking to 
establish collaborative centres in which all the necessary components and competencies of the 
innovation and product development process for a given discipline or product area are present 
within a region. In this sense they seek to network universities, external research institutes and 
firms with a clear focus on producing new product developments. They therefore take the 
notion of networking one step further than traditional approaches by tying it to the core 
concept of product development and also by ensuring that all the necessary actors needed to 
see the process through to completion are in place. In addition to their product development 
role these centres also provide more generic networking and support roles for their members. 
 
Centres of Competence in various disciplines have been established throughout the German 
regions. These are run through a series of discipline-specific national competitions and 
funding is provided for a number of years to establish regional networks of excellence in 
particular areas such as nanotechnology. These bodies can potentially play a key role in 
regional cluster development not only by developing and networking existing strengths and 
capacities within regions, but also, through their focus on the entire innovation process, by 
ensuring that regions develop all the necessary capacities for innovation in particular 
disciplines. These innovation competencies may in turn have implications for innovation and 
                                                 
271 The following parapgraphs until the end of this section have already featured with only some minor 
alterations in an publication by Burfitt, Gibney & Schierenbeck (2002, pp. 14-15). 
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product development in other disciplines and clusters within the region. The focus of these 
schemes is therefore on supporting networking and on building on existing regional strengths 
and expertise to secure benefits both for individual regions and also the nation as a whole.  
 
The ‘competence centre’ programme covers a broad range of sectors, for which some interim 
evaluation reports are available.272 The BMBF has run several competitions for Centres of 
Competence focussing on a number of cutting edge technologies. The current list of areas 
includes biomaterials, biotechnology, education & training, environmental technology, 
genomics, industrial manufacturing, laser technology, maritime technology, material science, 
medical engineering, medicine, microsystem engineering, nanotechnology, optical 
technology, power engineering, telecommunications, and traffic & transportation.  
 
There are a number of these centres under each heading, each located in regions of excellence 
for their particular topic areas. Each centre adopts a specific ‘product focus’ within the 
context of these broad topic headings. In this sense competency centres and their supporting 
networks have very clear product development foci and consequently are tightly tailored to 
the capacities of regional firms and research institutions. 
 
                                                 
272 The interim evaluation reports include, for instance, the prognos (2001) report on the support measure for e-
commerce and the interim evaluation of the nanotechnology competence centres in the early support phases 
(Bührer et al., 2002). There is also the final report by the Institute for socio-economic structural analysis ‘Söstra’ 
(Berteit, Boje, Kowalski, & Ransch, 1998) for the German Federal Ministry of for Economic Affairs (BMWi) on 
the contribution of the research and innovation support for the industries in the East Germany, the new Länder. 
Furthermore, Burfitt, Gibney & Schierenbeck (2002) have also analysed the programme ‘Centres of Competence 
for Medical Technology’ by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research ‘BMBF’ (cf. 
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 1999, 2000; Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 
2003a). However, their report mainly focusses upon a single case study of a competence centre for minimally 
invasive medicine & technology in Tübingen-Tuttlingen (MITT), in Baden-Württemberg. 
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These various competency programmes are linked through a national network of competency 
centres and are marketed internationally through an online umbrella platform - 
kompetenznetze.de. The ‘networks of competence’ initiative (Bundesministerium für Bildung 
und Forschung, 2002; Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2003b) is complementary 
to the competence centre programme but is more virtually conceptualised. 
 
More recently in 2007 – outside the core research period timeframe – the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research (BMBF) 273 has held a ‘top cutting-edge cluster competititon’ 
(‘Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb’) awarding in September 2008 funding of up to 200 million 
Euro for the first five winners of the competition for cluster initiatives with critical mass and 
development potential. While it still remains to be seen though whether the selection process 
has been rigorous and non-political enough to avoid the ‘picking the winner’ mistakes of the 
past, this cluster competition has provided a substantial amount of funding for a limited 
number of projects. This limitation in terms of funded projects contrasts with the French 
‘pôles de compétitivité’ (competitiveness clusters) initiative, which has been somewhat 
criticized for having failed to focus government funding only on its competitiveness clusters 
with global reach or globally-orientation, by instead funding a total of now 71 
competitiveness clusters projects.274 
 
Together with the federal government inititiative for excellence in higher education (support 
for ‘elite’ universities) and the Competence Networks Germany campaing of the Federal 
                                                 
273 For information on the German ‘top cutting-edge cluster competition’ see http://www.spitzencluster.de 
274 The French State’s total budget for the ‘pôles de compétitivité’ initiative was set at a minimum of 1.5 billion 
Euros over 3 years (2006-2008), predominantly earmarked for R&D projects and tax breaks. Initiatially 67, then 
after some additions and mergers, 71 cluster iniatives were supported. Out of these 71 succesful applicants, 7 
were identified as global competitiveness clusters and 10 as globally-orientated competitivenss clusters which 
receive higher funding. For information on the French ‘pôles de compétitivité’ intiative see 
http://www.competitivite.gouv.fr/ 
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Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi), the emphasis clearly has been placed upon 
further supporting regional strengths as part of a comprehensive national Cluster Strategy (see 
Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16 The German government's Cluster Strategy 
 
Source: Die Bundesregierung, http://www.hightech-strategie.de/en/116.php, accessed 22.02.2009 
 
In addition, increasingly more and more Länder have also started their own cluster support 
programmes (see Figure 17), including the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, which in 2007 – 
outside the core research period timeframe – has also had its own first ‘RegioCluster.NRW’ 
cluster competition (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 2007).275 
                                                 
275 For more information about the RegioCluster.NRW competition see http://www.ziel2-nrw.de/ 
2_Wettbewerbe_und_weitere_Foerdermoeglichkeiten/2_Abgeschlossene_Wettbewerbe/RegioCluster_NRW/ind
ex.php 
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Figure 17 Overview of cluster and network support measures in Germany (1995-2008) 
 
Source: Meyer-Krahmer, F. (2008) ‘Innovationen durch modern Clusterpolitik’, plenary presentation by the 
State Secretary Prof. Dr. Frieder Meyer-Krahmer of the Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) 
given on 20.10.2008 during the German Cluster Conference in Lepzig, available at: 
http://www.clusterkonferenz.de/uploads/media/Praes_DCK_BMBF_Meyer-Krahmer.pdf 
Note: The upper part of the figure depicts initiatives of individual States/regions (Land level) while the bottom 
part lists initiatives at the Federal national level. However, some support programmes such as ‘Innovative 
regionale Wachstumskerne’ are only for the East German ‘New German Laender’.  
 
Strength and weaknesses of the German innovation system 276 
While Germany’s technological capabilities remain at the forefront with regards to advanced 
technologies where it has a long manufacturing tradition, it has fallen behind in many high-
technology areas and those that have recently emerged (Burfitt et al., 2002, p. 12; Keck, 1993, 
p. 146; Stubbs, 2001, p. 151).277 What Germany seems to lack is not the general capability to 
innovate but an innovativeness especially in the cutting edge lead markets that are the 
potential future growth markets (Abelshauser, 2004, pp. 449-450; Stubbs, 2001, p. 151).  
 
                                                 
276 A range of further studies concerning the German Innovation System can be found at the website of the 
Expert Commission Research and Innovaton (EFI) at http://www.e-fi.de./indikatorenstudien.html?&L=0 
277 For key indicators according to technological sectors, see for example the OECD’s Economic Surveys for 
Germany (e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003a). 
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This is also supported by the findings of the 2002 European Innovation Scoreboard (European 
Commission, 2002, Table 3 on p. 12 and cf. Annex Table B on p. 24), which shows, that in 
comparison to the other EU-15 Member States, Germany has a major relative strength in 
current patenting, business R&D (as a share of GDP), and employment in medium- and hi-
tech manufacturing, while displaying a major relative weakness in current innovation finance, 
manufacturing hi-tech value added, the trend of home internet access, and education.278 
 
To some surprise, the 2005 Innobarometer (European Commission, 2005b, pp. 2-4) shows an 
unfavourable innovation demand in Germany. According to these results, citizens in Germany 
together with those in Poland, Latvia and Finland are least ready to embrace innovation. As 
the EIS indicates (cf. European Commission, 2005a, pp. 15 and 27-28), this relative 
reluctance to innovation ‘could be an explaining factor for the differences in the 
transformation of innovation inputs into innovation outputs’ (ibid., p. 28). However, 
Germany’s high innovation output ‘may indicate that the drivers for innovation do not lie in 
the public demand but rather come from the side of the firm’ (ibid., p. 28). 
 
There is also a lack of specialised skilled personnel (Janz et al., 2001, p. 9), which is 
exacerbated by an apparent so-called brain drain of the highly-skilled ‘creative elite’ mainly 
to the US (Florida & Tinagli, 2004) and a perceived weakness of education and training of 
entrepreneurial skills (Sternberg et al., 2000, pp. 6 and 27). In addition, businesses also 
perceive the wider political and regulatory framework conditions very negatively (Sternberg 
et al., 2000, pp. 6 and 26), which irrespective of it actually being unfavourable, certainly acts 
                                                 
278 However, the country report for Germany from the 2000 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) highlights 
that businesses perceive positively the government’s emphasis and provision of programmes in support of start-
ups (Sternberg, Otten, & Tamásy, 2000, pp. 6 and 24-25). Anyway, venture capital appears not be an important 
barrier to industrial innovation as, for instance, Keck (1993, p. 144) infers from the small demand for it.  
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as a barrier to entrepreneurial activity. Indeed, bureaucracy is widely seen as a hampering 
factor to new start-ups (Skambracks, 1999, pp. 13-19) and particularly SMEs are seen to 
suffer in Germany from bureaucratic regulatory duties (Hacke, 2005). 
 
Overall, Germany’s decentralised political-administrative system is usually critically 
characterised as being ‘fragmented’, ‘consensus orientated’ and ‘corporatist’ (Abelshauser, 
2004, p. 449; Hoppe, 2000, p. 264; Humphreys, 1989, pp. 130-131). While the German 
corporatist market economy described as Rhine capitalism (Albert, 1993) is occasionally 
hailed for its economic and social superiority over the American pure market economy system 
(cf. Abelshauser, 2004, p. 449), it has increasingly being recognised to be suffering from its 
high consensus threshold due to its different level of governments. Scharpf’s (1976) classical 
description – of what he calls the ‘joint decision trap’ (Politikverpflechtungsfalle) – has 
shown that policy deadlock and political immobilism arises in the absence of ‘cooperative 
federalism’ and an almost universal consensus (cf. also Hoppe, 2000, pp. 263-264; 
Humphreys, 1989, pp. 130-131).  
 
In this given context, the increasing use of competitive bidding and the national approach of 
regional cluster policy (see also Figure 17) appear to be appropriate instruments for 
innovation policy in Germany. Yet, Germany appears to be somewhat lacking behind in terms 
of proactive application of the cluster approach given the comparative low percentage of firms 
that state to be active in a cluster-like environment (see Figure 18) according to the 2006 
Innobarometer (European Commission, 2006, p. 4).  
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Figure 18 Percentage of firms active in cluster-like environments 
 
Source: Innobarometer on cluster’s role in facilitating innovation in Europe (European Commission, 2006, p. 4) 
 
 
Yet, around a fifth of the roughly 2000 clusters in Europe identified in 2007 by the European 
Cluster Observatory on the basis of employment data are to be found in Germany (see Table 
21). Out of the total of 35 identified German strong ‘3-star-clusters’, traditional sectors such 
as production technologies (10), automotive (7) and metal (5) clearly dominate.279  
                                                 
279 The European Cluster Observatory’s simple three-star methodology is based on the measurement of the 
revealed effects in terms of employment that linkages and spill-overs have on the location decisions of 
companies, not on a direct measurement of such dynamic interactions between the driving forces of a cluster. 
The up to three stars – indicating whether the cluster has reached a certain critical mass – are allocated to cluster 
categories in regions according to their cluster employment size, the degree to which it is specialised and the 
extent to which the locality (the region) is geared towards and focused upon production in the relevant industries 
comprising the cluster. The total number of 2017 clusters have been identified from 9804 potential areas of 
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This applies even more so to North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), where the total of seven strong 
‘3-star-clusters’ are to be found in production technologies (3), metal (3) and building fixtures 
(1). 
 
Table 21 Cluster presence in Europe, Germany and NRW – Results from the European 
Cluster Observatory 
 
 3 star 
clusters 279 
2 star clusters 1 star clusters Total number of 
clusters  
(1-3 stars)  
EU-27 plus EFTA-4  
and Turkey  
155 524 1338 2017
Germany (DE) 
 
35 116 246 397
North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) 
7 24 35 66
- Arnsberg 2 4 5 11
- Cologne (Köln) 0 7 7 14
- Detmold 3 3 7 13
- Düsseldorf 1 7 10 18
- Münster 1 3 6 10
Source: Own counting of clusters identified by the European Cluster Observatory. ISC/CSC cluster codes 1.0, 
dataset 20070613 according to size, specialisation and focus of employment data (Germany 2006 data).279 
Note: The sub-categories for North Rhine-Westphalia are its five regional administrative districts (NUTS 2).  
 
This suggests that there is still a foundation of cluster strength in Germany based on 
traditional competencies and trajectories, while the perceived lack of cluster initiatives by 
businesses – that may have the potential to yield future cluster strength – could be seen as a 
crucial weakness of the German innovation system given the importance of cluster and cluster 
policy for innovation and competitiveness (European Commission, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
cluster development that is calculated by multiplying the 258 regions analysed at NUTS 2 level (within the EU-
27 countries, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) by the number of 38 cluster categories applied. 
These cluster categories excludes sectors such as local retail and other local services that mainly serve local 
markets because they are neither viewed as being exposed to direct competition across regions nor as tending to 
“cluster together”. For more information on the methodology and the different cluster concepts see European 
Commission (2008a) and the European Cluster Observatory’s website at http://www.clusterobservatory.eu/ 
 250 
 
Germany’s decentralised political-administrative system also means that the strength of its 
regional innovation systems and regional policies at Länder level become much more 
important than perhaps in other less decentralised countries such as France. 
 
Complementary EU support for facilitating the emergence of more world-class clusters  
At the highest level at the Brussels European Council in March 2008, heads of State and 
governments urged to better coordinate efforts in support of clusters and to facilitate the 
participation of innovative SMEs in clusters.280 In May 2008, the Council of the European 
Union also recognised ‘the importance of cluster policy in terms of fostering innovation and 
excellence and addressing the specific needs of SMEs, including innovative enterprises with a 
high growth potential’ and invited Member States, the European Commission and regions ‘to 
coordinate their efforts to improve framework conditions for innovation, such as science-
industry linkages and support services for innovation, including encouraging the growth of 
world class innovation clusters, and innovation clusters of regional importance and to ensure 
better governance of relevant policies throughout the European Union’.281 This emphasis on 
clusters follows the Conclusions of the December 2006 Competitiveness Council which 
included cluster development among the 9 strategic priorities for the EU’s broad-based 
innovation strategy.282 
 
In October 2008, the European Commission (2008b) responded by adopting for the first time 
a Communication on clusters entitled ‘Towards world-class clusters in the European Union: 
                                                 
280 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (13/14 March 2008) available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/99410.pdf 
281 The 2871st meeting of the Competitiveness Council of 29-30 May 2008 adopted the Council Conclusions 
10174/08 on the competitiveness and innovation of the European industry that are available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st10/st10174.en08.pdf 
282 The Council Press Release 15717/06 (Presse 337) on the conclusions of the 2769th Council meeting can be 
found at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/intm/92107.pdf 
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Implementing the broad-based innovation strategy’. This brief policy document outlines the 
Commission’s strategy aiming to contribute to creating a more efficient policy framework for 
cluster support in the EU in order to facilitate the development of more world-class clusters in 
the EU. It outlines and addresses in particular the challenges of: 
 
• improving cluster policies based on evidence-based policy-making (e.g. by 
considering the cluster mapping of the European Cluster Observatory283); 
• fostering trans-national cluster cooperation both at policy level (e.g. through the 
European Cluster Alliance) and at operational level between cluster organisations to 
ultimately support international cooperation of clustered businesses; 
• promoting the excellence of cluster organisations (through a pilot initiative with the 
aim of developing a European quality label for the excellence of cluster organizations 
that could also lead to the creation of a self-sustinabel non-profit European Cluster 
Manager Association); and finally of  
• improving the integration of innovative SMEs into clusters (especially through cluster 
organisations). 
 
The Communication is annexed by a longer Commission Staff Working Document (2008a) 
on the concept of clusters and cluster policies, which concludes that there is overall strong 
evidence suggesting a high importance of clusters, cluster policy and trans-national cluster 
cooperation for innovation and competitiveness.284 It further provides a more detailed 
description of the challenges addressed by the Commission Communication.  
 
                                                 
283 The cluster mapping of the European Cluster Observatory is available at www.clusterobservatory.eu 
284 The Communication (2008b) ‘Towards world-class clusters in the European Union: Implementing the broad-
based innovation strategy’ and the annexed Commission Staff Working Document (2008a) on ‘The concept of 
clusters and cluster policies and their role for competitiveness and innovation: Main statistical results and lessons 
learned’are both available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/clusters 
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The main EU cluster support initiatives are depicted in the following Figure 19 along the 
different development stages of cluster policy development (see Appendix III for a 
chronological overview of selected Community initiatives related to clusters). These 
inititiatves are mainly supported by the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) 
such as under the Europe INNOVA and PRO INNO Europe® initiatives, Cohesion Policy, 
and the Regions of Knowledge inititive for research-driven clusters implemented under the 7th 
Research Framework Programme (FP7).285  
 
Figure 19 Overview of current and planned EU initiatives in support of clusters 
Cluster 
support services
Trans-national 
cooperation
Cluster 
development
European Cluster Observatory
EU Initiative for Excellence  (CIP)
European Cluster Policy Group
Cohesion Policy (Structural Funds)
European Cluster Alliance
Regions for Economic Change Europe INNOVA (CIP)
Regions of knowledge (FP7)
Enterprise Europe Network
Policy learning
& cooperation
Analysis & 
Strategy
INNO-Policy TrendChart
 
Source: European Commission (2008a, p. 62) Staff Working Document that accompanied the Commission 
Communication (2008b) on clusters.  
 
                                                 
285 These initiatives are described in detail in the aforementioned Commission Staff Working Document (2008a). 
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The recent focus on excellence and transnational cluster cooperation is another cornerstone of 
the EU’s ‘broad-based innovation strategy’ (European Commission, 2006) as part of the so-
called ‘Lisbon agenda’ in view of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Council of the European Union, 2000, paragraph 5). This 
approach follows in the footsteps of the influential Green Paper on Innovation (Europäische 
Kommission, 1995; European Commission, 1995) and the previous emphasis on Regional 
Innovation Strategies (RIS), and Regional Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures 
(RITTS), and Innovative Actions in the 1990s as part of regional and structural policy 
(Europäische Kommission, 1995a; European Commission, 1999a, 2002k; Landabaso, 2002, 
Annex III on pp. 36-37; Landabaso & Reid, 1999; Morgan, 2001, pp. 25-26; Morgan & 
Nauwelaers, 1999b; Oughton et al., 2002, pp.104-108). The regional innovation strategies 
supported by the EU were aimed at encouraging greater cooperation and developing ‘social 
capital’ in the regions in order to stimulate the development of ‘clusters’ of competitive 
activities (European Commission, 1992, p. 79; Landabaso & Reid, 1999, p. 21). 
 
Having presented the wider German innovation system context and briefly indicated to some 
of the complementary policy fields pursued at supranational level, the following section 
sketches out the distinct characteristics of the regional innovation system of the Federal State 
of North Rhine-Westphalia.  
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North Rhine-Westphalia’s regional innovation system  
The regional innovation system of the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia has to be 
understood in the context of the wider German Innovation System, presented above. For 
instance, North Rhine-Westphalia is said to have a competitive disadvantage with regards to 
the national regulatory framework for taxation. Even though this is a problem at the national 
level, North Rhine-Westphalia is said to suffer particularly from tax holdings being situated in 
neighbouring countries such as the Netherlands.286 
 
North Rhine-Westphalia often receives some special attention, as it is perceived as a 
miniature version of Germany because of its diverse economic profile that mirrors to some 
extent the countries economic diversity. This point is elaborated in the following section that 
provides a general introduction of the economic profile of the region, including a discussion 
of the public administrative structure, the higher education system, a presentation of key 
programmes and policies as well as key institutional actors. 
 
General and economic profile of North Rhine Westphalia 287 
A Financial Times Survey on North Rhine-Westphalia rightly describes the Land as ‘a 
bellwether for the nation’ (Barber, 2002). For instance, when it comes to local or regional 
elections, analysts look at North Rhine-Westphalia in the hope of spotting overall political 
trends.288 Its representative nature stems not only from it being Germany’s most populous 
                                                 
286 Interviews No. 33, transcript pages 8-9, No. 29, transcript page 2, and No. 37, transcript page 3 
287 Parts of the following profile have already featured already in alteration in a report on the Media Cluster in 
Cologne by  Collinge & Schierenbeck (2004, pp. 7-8).  
288 Local, Regional and General (Federal) Elections are mostly carried out at different times. In North-Rhine-
Westphalia, for example, Local Elections were last held in September 2004, while Regional Elections were held 
in May 2005. Federal Elections were last held in September 2005. 
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Federal State (Land) with a population of just over 18 million inhabitants (in an area of 
34,0872 km²)289, but also because of its diverse, contrasting and hence somewhat 
characteristic composition of the Land. Thus, it can be argued that North Rhine-Westphalia 
does represent a very heterogeneous innovation system – even the Land level represents one 
political and policy-related homogenous setting. Heinze (1997, p. 13, own translation and 
emphasis added), for example, concludes that ‘this Land is all but a homogeneous spatial 
construct with a uniform development trend’. 
 
First, it consists of wide rural areas (e.g. East Westphalia) as well as of many large cities 
along the Rhine and the industrial densely-populated polycentric metropolitan Ruhr area 
(Ruhrgebiet) with a population of around 5.4 million (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, 
p. 3). Correspondingly, the Land in generalisation comprises both the more conservative rural 
population as well as the urban population with a tendency to electorally favour left-wing 
parties.290 According to NRW’s former Minister President Karl Arnold ‘North Rhine-
Westphalia is the social conscience of the Federal Republic’ (Hüwel, 2005b) with the Ruhr 
area also seen as the heartland of the Social Democratic Party. 
 
Secondly and closely linked, the Land is also composed of both wealthy parts and areas with 
high unemployment rates that are normally rather attributed to East Germany. This concerns 
in particular the former industrial powerhouse of the Ruhr area, which now hosts the city with 
                                                 
289 Data are from 2002 (Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2004, p. 58).  
290 Following a right-wing swing at the regional election (Landtagswahlen) in May 2005, the Social Democrats 
(SPD) lost however several urban constituencies to the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) such as 
Düsseldorf, Wuppertal and so on. With the exception of constituencies in Cologne (I, III, VI and VII), Minden 
(Minden-Lübbecke II) and Bielefeld (I), only the Ruhr Area remained a red Social Democratic stronghold in 
North Rhine-Westphalia (confer an election map, e.g. by Grobusch, 2005). The winning party for the cities at the 
centre of this study in these elections are as follows: Aachen city I+II and county I+II (CDU); Dortmund I-IV 
(SPD); Duisburg I-IV (SPD); and Düsseldorf I-IV (CDU). 
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the highest unemployment in West Germany: Gelsenkirchen with an unemployment rate of 
17.1 % in September 2002. 291  
 
Finally, it hosts agriculture and in particular a legacy of traditional industries such as coal 
mining, steel, chemicals and textiles but at the same time is breading high-tech businesses and 
industries.292 Obviously then, huge differences exist between the various counties, which to 
some extent mirrors the North-South and East-West divide in Germany. This makes it so 
interesting to investigate this Land.  
 
Figure 20 North Rhine-Westphalia in Europe 
 
Source: http://www.cordis.lu/nordrhein-westfalen/intro.htm  
 
After decades of arguably slow structural change following the general trend from an 
industrial towards a service and knowledge society, North-Rhine Westphalia’s economy is 
                                                 
291 The unemployment rate is given for 30.09.2002 as per centage of the total number of dependent civil 
employed persons comprising those obligatory to pay social insurance, officials and the unemployed (but 
excluding the self-employed and supporting family members). The statistics are taken from the annual sub-
regional compilation Kreisstandardzahlen (Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
2002), available via http://www.it.nrw.de/statistik/querschnittsveroeffentlichungen/index.html . Gelsenkirchen’s 
unemployment figure at the end of September 2007 was 16.3%. 
292 This legacy is likely also the reason why 22 headquarters of Germany’s 50 largest companies are located in 
North Rhine-Westphalia according to a presentation by GfW Nordrhein-Westfalen entitled “NRW – The 
economic powerhouse of Europe” of 07.10.2002, page 7. 
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now mainly driven by services, which nowadays contribute over 70% of the gross value 
added. 293 Yet, the region’s traditional industrial legacy in particular of the Ruhr area with 
mining, steel-working, and textiles is still reflected today in the region’s strength in classical 
industrial sectors such as the automotive, energy, chemical and mechanical engineering 
industry as well as metalworking and its production. This is also reflected in the cluster 
mapping from the European Cluster Observatory (see Table 21 on page 249), which identifies 
seven strong (‘3-star’) clusters for North Rhine-Westphalia, all of which in traditional sectors 
(production technologies, metal and building fixtures). However, there is a number of 
relatively new key sectors that have emerged within the last two decades such as media and 
telecommunications, especially in the Rhine axis of Düsseldorf, Cologne and Bonn (Collinge 
& Schierenbeck, 2004, p. 16), information and communication technologies (ICT); logistics; 
and biotechnology.294 
 
Rehfeld (1995, p. 93) also identifies new production clusters for the Ruhr area, which include 
automotive components production, the emergence of environmental technologies and waste 
management, and transportation services that are linked to the classical clusters of mining, 
steel industry, chemicals and electricity.295 Similarly, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
(1998, p. 5) identify the following six clusters or competency fields (Kompetenzfelder): 
                                                 
293 Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (accessed 27.05.2004) at 
http://www.mwa.nrw.de/wirtschaft/standort/daten/daten.htm 
294 For a more detailed socio-economic analysis of North Rhine-Westphalia see, for example, Bross & Walter 
(2000); the SWOT analysis featuring in North Rhine-Westphalia’s Objective 2 Single Programming Document 
(Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. XII-XIII and 189-216); the indicators by the EU’s third report 
on economic and social cohesion (European Commission, 2004b); Koschatzky’s study (2004) on innovation and 
future potential; and the report by Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (2001) identifying North Rhine-
Westphalia’s core competency fields. Furthermore, confer Interview No. 29, transcript pages 1-2 and 4-5 
295 Nearly a decade later, Rehfeld et al. (Institut für Arbeit und Technik, 2004) identify the following six strategic 
activity fields: materials and their applications, logistic system, medical and biotechnological applications, IT-
based system integration, knowledge-based services and sustainable resource management. 
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energy, transportation/logistics, information and communication, new materials, 
Microsystems technology, and medical technology. 296 
 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s public administrative structures 
The ‘hyphen State’ (Hüwel, 2005b) of North Rhine-Westphalia was created on 23rd of August 
1946 by the British Military government out of the northern part of the Prussian Rhine 
Province and the Province Westphalia, while the Land Lippe-Detmold joint a year later (Die 
Präsidentin des Landtags NRW, 1993, p. 4).  
 
The federal public administrative structure for Germany (see Knemeyer, 2001, p. 172) with 
shared sovereignity has already been outline above (cf. Table 20). It is characterised by 
subsidiarity and decentralisation to the effect that important functions such as education and 
regional policy and planning are allocated to the Länder and local authorities are being given 
the right for autonomous self-administration.  
 
Nowadays, there are in total 396 municipalities in North Rhine Westphalia, of which 23 are 
larger cities with the status of non-county (metropolitan) municipality (Kreisfreie Stadt), i.e. 
equal to and not subordinate to a county (see Die Präsidentin des Landtags NRW, 1993, p. 5; 
Kost, 2003, p. 198). The remaining 373 municipalities are subordinate to 31 counties (Kreis).  
                                                 
296 The study is available at http://www.mwmev.nrw.de/cgi-
bin/mwmev/lib/pub/object/downloadfile.cgi/Gesamttext_neu.pdf?lang=1&ticket=guest&oid=6726 
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Table 22 North Rhine-Westphalia’s public administrative structure 
 
Five governmental 
administrative districts 
(Regierungsbezirk) 
Düsseldorf Cologne 
(Köln) 
Münster Detmold Arnsberg Total 
number 
(for five 
districts) 
Metropolitan cities, non-
county municipalities 
(Kreisfreie Stadt) 
10 4 3 1 5 23 
Counties (Kreis), 
 
which include: 
5 8 5 6 7 31 
Cities (Stadt) 
 
38 56 43 49 57 243 
Municipalities 
(Gemeinde) 
18 39 32 20 21 130 
Total number of 
municipalities  
(excluding counties) 
66 99 78 70 83 396 
 
Source: Own creation based on the official administrative identification codes of the municipalities of North 
Rhine-Westphalia provided by the Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen (2002).  
 
According to Kost (2003, pp. 198-199), there were a total of 207 municipalities in North 
Rhine Westphalia in 1998 that can be labelled as cities (with a population above 20,000), of 
which 30 are larger metropolitan cities (with a population above 100,000). Cologne is the 
biggest of the metropolitan cities (with a population of 965,000), while the capital of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf, is the 4th biggest city (with a population of around 570,000). 
The population for the other relevant cities at the centre of this study are as follows: 
Dortmund (3rd biggest with a population of 594,000 just behind Essen with 606,000), 
Duisburg (5th biggest with 526,000), and Aachen (13th with 245,000). 297 
 
                                                 
297 See also Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (accessed 27.05.2004) at 
http://www.mwa.nrw.de/wirtschaft/standort/daten/daten.htm 
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North Rhine-Westphalia’s council legislation for local authority self-administration is 
classified as belonging to the North German type of council legislation – together with Lower 
Saxony. It is a British-based monistic system (Knemeyer, 2001, p. 175) that is characterised 
by a strong council and (lord) mayor, and a comparative weak head of administration 
(Wehling & Kost, 2003, pp. 10-11).  
 
Specific to North Rhine-Westphalia is that it is amongst the larger Länder, who have also an 
additional tier of regional associations of local authorities or intermediate administrative 
districts under a district commissioner that execute certain control functions for the Länder. 
There are five intermediary governmental administrative districts (Regierungsbezirke) in 
North Rhine-Westphalia, namely Arnsberg, Detmold, Düsseldorf, Köln and Münster (see 
Figure 21) – besides the two additional landscape associations of the Rhine land and of 
Westphalia-Lippe (cf. Kost, 2003, pp. 200 and 218).298 Although their existence is contested, 
they are said to relieve Ministries from some day-to-day duties (Wehling & Kost, 2003, p. 
16). There have also been some proposals (cf. Blotevogel, 2001; Hüwel, 2005a; Kost, 2003, 
p. 218) to restructure the intermediary level by creating only three intermediary regional 
associations, e.g. Rhine land (seat proposed to be located in Cologne), Ruhr area (Essen) and 
Westphalia (Münster). 
 
                                                 
298 A further intermediary governmental administrative district (Regierungsbezirk) of Aachen existed until 
01.08.1972, when it was resolved and integrated into the governmental administrative district of Cologne 
(Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2008, p. 30).  
 261 
 
Figure 21 North Rhine-Westphalia’s five administrative districts and the four case city-
regions 
 
Source: Own creation based on map provided by the ‘Nordrheinwestfalen Regionalstatistischer Online-Atlas 
NRW’ of the Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik, available at http://www.statlas.nrw.de 
Note: Colouring indicates population density of 2006. 
 
North Rhine Westphalia’s economic and innovation performance 
North Rhine/Westphalia is the most populated of the 16 German Länder with a population of 
roughly 17 million. Representing 21.9% of the total German population and 20.9 % of the 
German workforce, North Rhine-Westphalia produces around a fifths (22%) of Germany’s 
gross value added (Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
D      City of Düsseldorf 
DO     City of Dortmund 
AC     City of Aachen 
Cologne 
Arnsberg 
Münster 
Detmold 
Düsseldorf 
         Regional administrative district  
         (Regierungsbezirk) delimitation 
DU     City of Duisburg 
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2004, p. 58).299 It also has a similar representative share of Germany’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), which was 22% in 2002, and 21.9% in 2003, representing a total of 466.878 billion 
EUR at current prices. North Rhine-Westphalia exported goods and service in the value of 
113.7 billion EUR in 2002, 17.5 % of Germany’s total exports. 300  
 
Table 23 Regional gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Germany (1991 until 2007) 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (inhabitants) – in current prices (EUR) – Germany 1991-2007 according to Federal States 
Year BW BY BE BB HB HH HE MV NI NW RP SL SN ST SH TH D 
1991 23.430 22.724 18.427 7.660 26.838 33.845 24.419 7.470 18.890 21.184 19.301 19.231 7.597 7.139 19.304 6.625 19.186
1992 24.274 23.946 20.185 9.638 27.772 35.015 25.566 9.497 19.803 22.069 19.801 19.921 9.618 9.146 20.188 9.083 20.431
1993 23.729 24.012 21.545 11.758 27.900 35.848 25.663 11.550 19.981 22.035 19.588 19.561 11.784 11.319 20.463 11.215 20.872
1994 24.564 24.896 22.246 13.719 29.100 37.022 26.422 13.617 20.716 22.688 20.262 20.557 13.875 13.144 21.089 13.208 21.871
1995 25.358 25.523 23.024 15.036 29.805 37.977 27.146 14.965 20.858 23.443 20.940 21.527 15.287 14.038 21.800 13.933 22.636
1996 25.749 25.907 22.707 15.656 29.980 38.761 27.728 15.586 20.883 23.441 20.918 21.011 15.934 14.680 22.058 14.532 22.909
1997 26.180 26.472 22.560 16.017 31.081 40.010 28.117 15.940 21.186 23.929 21.277 21.484 16.087 15.261 22.359 15.167 23.346
1998 26.948 27.563 22.721 16.257 31.702 41.106 28.580 16.078 21.884 24.545 21.576 22.015 16.371 15.642 22.579 15.587 23.960
1999 27.700 28.405 22.970 16.822 32.083 41.493 29.720 16.605 22.197 24.802 22.108 22.383 16.871 16.041 22.859 16.232 24.511
2000 28.343 29.487 23.161 17.298 33.426 42.423 30.223 16.859 22.767 25.236 22.587 23.125 17.031 16.437 23.309 16.638 25.095
2001 29.309 30.090 23.244 17.695 34.419 44.403 31.204 17.342 22.904 25.622 22.531 23.566 17.731 16.937 23.775 17.212 25.664
2002 29.350 30.671 23.210 18.015 35.277 44.907 31.407 17.624 22.795 25.944 23.042 23.691 18.632 17.848 23.331 17.666 25.984
2003 29.521 30.797 23.035 18.213 35.892 44.980 32.145 17.906 22.961 26.073 23.165 23.938 19.188 18.166 23.544 18.221 26.221
2004 29.843 31.611 22.899 18.791 36.685 45.677 32.662 18.452 23.399 26.734 23.857 25.170 19.864 18.749 23.916 18.876 26.802
2005 30.102 32.155 23.295 19.122 37.191 46.869 33.261 18.609 24.091 27.074 23.896 26.416 20.001 19.084 23.995 19.118 27.219
2006 31.441 33.240 23.699 19.668 38.198 48.647 34.414 19.206 24.908 28.040 24.639 27.329 20.759 19.833 24.701 19.887 28.194
2007 32.840 34.716 24.536 20.678 40.014 50.557 35.701 20.352 25.864 29.396 25.791 28.782 21.828 20.988 25.489 20.926 29.465
 
Source: Working group "National income accounts for the regions" (Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder - VGR d L") of the National and Regional Statistical Offices (Statitstische Ämter 
des Bundes und der Länder), made available at http://www.vgrdl.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR/tbls/tab01.asp 
 
Note: Results according to ESVG 1995. Inhabitants as of 30.06.2007. Results for the Federal State of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NW) and for Germany (D) are highlighted in bold. The other Federal States are Baden-
Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BY), Berlin (BE), Brandenburg (BB), Bremen (HB), Hamburg (HH), Hesse (HE), 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MV), Lower Saxony (NI), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), Saarland (SL), Saxony 
(SN), Saxony-Anhalt (ST), Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Thuringia (TH). 
 
                                                 
299 North Rhine-Westphalia’s workforce was 7,620,000 in 2002 (Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des 
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2004, p. 58). 
300 Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (accessed 27.05.2004) at 
http://www.mwa.nrw.de/wirtschaft/standort/daten/daten.htm 
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In terms of GDP per capita (see Table 23), North Rhine-Westphalia ranks 6th most prosperous 
region amongst the 16 Federal States, behind the City-states of Hamburg and Bremen, the 
State of Hesse, and the southern States of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. However, since 
2001, North Rhine-Westphalia not only performs below the the average for Western Germany 
– excluding the new Länder – but also below Germany’s overall national average. 
 
Remarkable is North-Rhine-Westphalia’s share of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into 
Germany. Its central location and good infrastructure are amongst the reasons why NRW 
attracted around 35% of all FDI that came to Germany in the last years.301 There is a strong 
concentration of Japanese FDI in the Land and in Düsseldorf in particular (see Gesellschaft 
für Wirtschafsfördrung Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH, 2000; Legewie, 1995).302 
 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s overall economic performance and unemployment can be regarded 
as about average among the 16 individual Federal States (Länder) within Germany (see 
Statistisches Bundesamt et al., 2004, p. 114). Mirroring Germany’s recent general economic 
recession and persisting structural weakness in the labour market, North Rhine-Westphalia 
has to cope with a relatively high unemployment rate of 10.1 % in 2002 (Ministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2004, p. 58).303 While this rate was 
below the national average of 10.8%, it was well above the 8.5% average of the “old” Länder 
from the former West Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt et al., 2004, p. 114).304  
 
                                                 
301 Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (accessed 27.05.2004) at 
http://www.mwa.nrw.de/wirtschaft/standort/daten/daten.htm 
302 Confer also Interview No. 29, transcript pages 12 
303 Unemployment rate measured in relation to the dependent civil employed persons as opposed to the ILO 
measure. 
304 In comparison, the southern States of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria had Germany’s lowest unemployment 
rates of 6.1% and 6.9% respectively. 
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According to the institute for economic research ‘RWI’, R&D expenditure in NRW only 
amounts to 1.77 % of GDP in 2001 in contrast to 3.9 % in Baden-Württemberg, for example, 
and compared to the national average of 2.52% as outlined by the 2002 EIS (European 
Commission, 2002a, p. 24). The main reason put forward for this difference is that the core of 
NRW’s economy lies not in growing and R&D intense sectors (Schrörs, 2005). 
 
The German Patent and Trademark Office (Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt) identified a 
ratio of 43 patents per 100,000 inhabitants for North Rhine-Westphalia in 2004 (see Fischer, 
2005). Despite its 6th rank out of the 16 German Länder, North Rhine-Westphalia’s patent 
output was well below the national average of 59 patents per 100,000 inhabitants, mainly due 
to the high averages of Germany’s two technological leading regions of Baden-Württemberg 
(ratio of 121) and Bavaria (109). 305 
 
The 2002 European Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2002a) as stated earlier 
displays only a below average score of selected regional innovation indicators for North 
Rhine-Westphalia when indexed to Germany’s mean (European Commission, 2002b, pp. 10 
and 16).306 The 2006 Regional Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2006) also 
highlights the intraregional differences as it ranked 208 European regions according to their 
newly calculated Revealed Regional Summary Innovation Index (RRSII). Out of North 
Rhine-Westphalia’s five regional administrative districts, only Cologne (19th rank with an 
RRSII score of 0.69) and Düsseldorf (74th rank / 0.49) showed an above average innovation 
                                                 
305 Greif (1998, pp. 18, 125 and 148) identifies an average of 37.7 patent applications per 100,000 inhabitants for 
NRW for the period 1992-1994, representing the fifth rank amongst the 16 Länder and 22.3% of the total 
German patent applications. The gap to the leading regions and hence to the national average (38.1 for 1992-
1994) therefore seems to have widened in recent years. 
306 The RRSII is calculated as the unweighted average of the regional national summary innovatin index (RNSII) 
and the regional European summary innovation index (REUSII), which are the average indicator values indexed 
to the country mean or EU mean respectively. 
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performance, while Arnsberg (103rd / 0.43), Detmold (105th / 0.43) and Münster (117th / 0.41) 
only manage average scores. 307 
 
The midterm report of the ESPON programme (European Spatial Planning Observation 
Network, 2005) gives a useful indication of the Land’s economic and innovation performance 
in comparison to the EU-27 plus Norway and Switzerland. It comprises the following selected 
research results for North Rhine-Westphalia’s territorial development: 
 
? an ‘average’, and ‘moderately below average’, degree of economic success (in terms 
of GDP per capita in PPS in 2002, and GDP per capita growth between 1995 and 
2002) 308; (ibid., p. 27 and cf. p. 19) 
? an ‘average’, and ‘moderately below average’, degree of regionalised Lisbon 
performance (as an aggregate of five indicators309); (ibid., p. 23) 
? an ‘average’ degree of efficiency of labour market (i.e. seven indicators with regards to 
unemployment rates and employment distribution); (ibid., p. 29) 
? an ‘above average’ (i.e. strongest) degree of potential accessibility (i.e. five indicators 
concerning road, rail and air transport); (ibid., p. 33) 
? an ‘average’, and ‘moderately above average’, degree of spatial concentration (i.e. 
four indicators of settlement structures, e.g. population in agglomerated, densely 
populated or rural regions)310; (ibid., p. 43) 
 
                                                 
307 In comparison, the top innovating region of Stockholm and the 3rd placed Upper Bavaria (Oberbayern) 
reached RRSII scores of 0.90 and 0.79 respectively. 
308 The southwest of North Rhine-Westphalia displays an ‘average’ degree, while the northeast shows a 
‘moderately below average’ degree of economic success. 
309 The five indicators for the degree of ‘regionalised Lisbon performance’ – referring obviously to the EU’s 
Lisbon Strategy – used by EPSON (European Spatial Planning Observation Network, 2005, p. 22) are: 
productivity (GDP per capita employed in 2002); employment rate (employed persons per total population aged 
15-64 in 2003); expenditure on R&D (total of expenditure on R&D per total GDP in 2001); R&D Business 
Enterprise Sector (R&D BES personnel per total employment in 2001); and education level (highly educated 
population per total educated population in 2002). For more detail see also the EPSON programme website at 
http://www.espon.lu 
310 The southwest of North Rhine-Westphalia displays a ‘moderately above average’ degree of spatial 
concentration, while the more rural northeast shows an ‘average’, and in parts even a ‘moderately below 
average’, degree of spatial concentration. 
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While North Rhine-Westphalia’s overall economic and innovation performance can 
consequently be decribed as average, the ESPON (2005) midterm report nevertheless 
considers the functional urban areas of Düsseldorf and Cologne (Köln) as strong Metropolitan 
European Growth Areas (MEGA).311 The report classifies the two areas as being part of the 
second strongest MEGA category of 17 cities labelled as European engines that ‘are relatively 
large, competitive and often have a strong knowledge base, but tend to be weaker, either in 
terms of the number of inhabitants or accessibility’ (ibid.,2005, p. 20) than the first category 
of the two Global Cities of London and Paris as the strongest MEGAs.  
 
ESPON’s (ibid., pp. 55-58) thematic review on innovation and research development also 
highlights the stark divergence between the northeast and the southwest of North Rhine-
Westphalia in terms of innovation capacity and human capital.312 While the southwest – 
consisting of the administrative regions (Regierungsbezirke) of Düsseldorf and Cologne 
including the so-called ‘ABCD’ triangle of cities (of Aachen and the Rhine axis of Bonn-
Cologne-Düsseldorf) – exhibits a ‘high’ degree of importance of R&D, the northeast – 
                                                 
311 The EPSON programme (ibid., p. 18) investigated 1595 Functional Urban Areas (FUAs) – i.e. nationally 
defined Ravel to Work Areas (TTWAs) within 29 countries of the European urban system, of which the most 
powerful ones (measured by demographic mass, competitiveness, connectivity and knowledge base) are 
considered as Metropolitan European Growth Areas (MEGA). A total of 76 MEGAs are then further 
distinguished into the five categories according to their performance. Besides the two Global Cities of London 
and Paris as the strongest MEGAs, 17 cities were identified as European engines. 7 out of these 17 are based in 
Germany, namely Munich, Hamburg, Berlin, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Cologne and Düsseldorf (ibid. , p. 57). 
Together with Milan, Madrid, Barcelona, Rome, Geneva, Brussels, Amsterdam, Vienna, Copenhagen, and 
Stockholm, they form the core of the economically and functionally dominant so-called ‘Pentagon’ area 
(European Spatial Planning Observation Network, 2005, pp. 17 and 10) akin to the traditionally as ‘blue banana’ 
defined European agglomeration core (see Nerb, Reuter, & Russ, 1992, pp. 13-15; Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, p. 33). 
312 Although this divergence appears to be only displayed for the administrative regions, it is surmised that if the 
performance or importance of R &D would be displayed for Ruhr area (Ruhrgebiet) on its own, that it most 
likely would indicate a below average importance. The populous Ruhr area is not an own administrative region 
but split up into three parts that belong to the administarative regions of Düsseldorf, Münster and Arnsberg.  
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consisting of the administrative districts of Arnsberg, Münster and Detmold – instead displays 
only a ‘moderately below average’ importance of R&D (ibid., p. 57).313 
 
This economic divergence (within the region) is also captured by the following statement by 
an official of the State chancellery of North Rhine-Westphalia: 
 
‘North Rhine-Westphalia can be considered a ‘more prosperous’ region with an area 
still in need for funds to aid economic restructuring.’ 314 
 
Although this can be seen as a political statement (in the quest for more European funding), it 
gives out two clear messages with regards to how North Rhine-Westphalia perceives 
themselves: as a prosperous region in the process of economic restructuring. Indeed, North 
Rhine-Westphalia has a whole history in attempting to pursue the economic restructuring of 
its region with varying success. Some of the endeavours are described next. 
 
Research and education infrastructure (HEI)  
Investments in the research and education infrastructure are mainly the responsibility of the 
individual Länder (see Table 20 above) and it is an area which North Rhine-Westphalia 
seemed to have viewed as an investment in the future. North Rhine-Westphalia is host to a 
specialised and very dense landscape of further and higher education institutions that 
comprises around 50 higher education institutions of universities, polytechnics and colleges 
                                                 
313 The degree of importance of research and development is measured as an aggregate of two standardised R&D 
indicators: expenditure of R&D, and personnel in BES as percentage of total personnel. 
314 Introduction quote of a seminar presentation paper by Johannes Grotz of the State chancellery, Representation 
of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia to the EU (Staatskanzlei des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Vertretung 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen bei der Europäischen Union) entitled “North Rhine-Westphalia’s Preliminary 
Position on the Third Cohesion Report” distributed following the seminar on “The implications of the Third 
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion and regional policy reform for the ‘more prosperous’ regions: 
networking for growth” on the 9th of March 2004 in Brussels (at the South East England House). 
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(Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
1995). While only 5 universities existed in North Rhine-Westphalia in the 1950s (Körfer & 
Latniak, 1994, footnote 7), the number has risen to 15 by the 1990s (Ministerium für 
Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1995, pp. 421-
423). This can be an important asset of the region influencing the creation of knowledge and 
innovation as, for example highlighted by Collinge & Schierenbeck (2004, pp. 23-32) in the 
case of the media cluster in Cologne. The following figure illustrates this at the example of 
the depth of media-related course offered at the Land level.  
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Figure 22 North Rhine-Westphalia’s higher and further education lanscape for media  
 
 
* Note: The German Fachhochschulen can best be compared to the former British Polytechnics. They are 
specialised higher education institutions, which generally offer relatively focused and practical courses of study, 
in particular for areas of technology, social and natural sciences, and art. The German Berufskollegs or 
Berufsschulen are Vocational Schools or Colleges, who provide vocational training courses are part of what is 
known as the ‘dual education system’. Trainees follow a two or three year apprenticeship with practical on the 
job training, while they in parallel also attend study courses two days a week, or alternatively weekly blocks of 
seminars, at a Vocational College. At the end of the training period, trainees are awarded a Professional 
Qualifications following a final examination at the Chamber of Commerce (IHK) or Handicrafts (HWK). 
 
Source: Own translation and following explanations (as featured in Collinge & Schierenbeck, 2004, p. 26) to the 
legend of the diagram by the Ministerium of Labour, Social Affairs, Qulaifications and Technology of the Land 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Ministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2000, p. 19); while the image itself was taken 
from http://www.aim-mia.de/images/topics/aim/nrw-map.jpg at  
http://www.aim-mia.de/article.php?sid=916&mode=nocomments&catid=36&topic=1&auswahl=1  
 
Building up a knowledge infrastructure with the foundation of several new universities in the 
1960s and 1970s was part of North Rhine-Westphalia’s strategy in tackling structural 
economic change (Körfer & Latniak, 1994). However, while the Land is producing an over-
proportional share of nearly a third of all German graduates (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Mittelstand und Technologie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1995, see table 3.9 b on p. 
• Universities with 
media studies 
• Art colleges and 
academies with 
media studies 
• Polytechnics / 
Technical Colleges* 
with media studies 
• Vocational Schools / 
Colleges* with full-
time vocational 
training for media jobs 
• Further Education 
institutions for the 
media economy 
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414), critics point out though that it does so very much for other Länder too (Unknown, 
2001).315 The pattern of universal coverage of disciplines by many institutions of the higher 
education landscape and thus limited focus upon core competencies (and consequent 
shortness of universities with an elite status) has also been criticised. Yet, the Land’s share of 
students in Engineering sciences, for instance, was 33.15% (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Mittelstand und Technologie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1995, see table 3.9 b on p. 
414).  
 
In addition, North-Rhine Westphalia hosts several further research institutions. In the 1990s, 
there were three large research laboratories316, 11 Max-Planck-Institutes, 6 Fraunhofer 
Institutes, 41 university research institutes, 30 research and development centres that were 
complemented by an abundance of technology transfer institutions at universities, the 
chambers and individual technology and start-up centres (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Mittelstand und Technologie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1995, see pp. 424-427, 431-
437 and cover). By 2002, the number of Fraunhofer Institutes for applied research had risen to 
13. The following Figure 23 shows the density of NRW’s scientific and research 
infrastructure. 
 
Despite the density and scope of North Rhine-Westphalia’s research infrastructure, excellence 
appears to be lacking given the rather average transformation into regionalised innovation 
performance as measured by the 2006 Regional Innovation Scoreboard (European 
Commission, 2006) decribed above. 
                                                 
315 The share of North Rhine-Westphalia’s students in 1990/91 was, for instance, 30.31% of all German students 
(Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1995, see table 3.9 
b on p. 414). 
316 This includes the Jülich Research Center, the German Center for Aeronautics and Space (DLR) and the GMD 
Institute – Germany’s national research center for mathematics and information technology. 
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Figure 23 North-Rhine Westphalia’s scientific and research infrastructure 
 
Source: GfW Nordrhein-Westfalen, presentation entitled “NRW – The economic powerhouse of Europe” of 
07.10.2002, page 35 
 
 
North Rhine Westphalia’s innovation policy 
This section covers two main aspects of North Rhine-Westphalia’s innovation policy 
approach. First it presents a brief historic overview of economic development policies over 
the last 40 years that aimed to support the economic structural reform of the region. It thus 
presents strategies, programmes and instruments applied to support businesses activities and 
innovativeness. The second part highlights some of the key actors within the broad 
governance infrastructure that are involved in economic development and innovation policy 
formulation and implementation. 
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North Rhine Westphalia history of technology policy in attempting structural change  
 
North Rhine-Westphalia is often portrayed as ‘the classical Land’317 of the Rhine capitalism 
(Albert, 1993) or Rhine model of economy culture, i.e. the corporatist system of cooperation 
and consensus orientation (Abelshauser, 2004, p. 449; Hoppe, 2000, p. 264; Humphreys, 
1989, pp. 130-131). For instance, the evaluation (Brandherm, Hausmann, Müller, Notz, & 
Scholten, 1994, p. 75) of the operational programme for the Objective-2-areas in North 
Rhine-Westphalia (for the first phase of ERDF318 1989-1992) also states that the cooperation 
between the Land and relevant regional actors is a ‘constitutive element’ of the structural and 
labour market policies in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
 
This consensus orientation was epitomised by the self-proclaimed underlying leitmotiv of 
NRW’s former Minister President Johannes Rau during his twenty years of term in office (cf. 
Appendiy VII), which was ‘to reconcile not divide’ (“Versöhnen statt spalten”). This 
comprised the attempt to avoid a polarisation between the different heterogeneous territories 
and interests including, for instance, the iron rule that the four regions of the party districts are 
proportionally represented in the leading figures of the parliamentary part of the SPD (Seim, 
2005). This long-lasting overall consensus-orientated policy approach can be described to 
have at least partly been drifted into an inherent political institutional sclerosis. The 
parliamentary opposition (CDU) denounced this approach ‘consensus towards nonsense’ 
(“Konsens bis zum Nonsens”). 319 Other critics, have also rephrased Rau’s leitmotiv in a 
                                                 
317 Interview No. 29, transcript page 2 and cf. Interview No. 33, transcript page4 and  
318 ERDF is the European Regional Development Fund; the EU fund for support to EU regions. 
319 Interview No. 33, transcript page 4 
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derogatory way into ‘to spoil not divide’ (“Verwöhnen statt spalten”) 320, which depicts the 
long-lasting tradition of providing a broad spread of support and funding equally to 
everybody just like pouring water out of one’s ‘watering can’. 321 However, over the last 
decade there appears to have been a turning away from this principle, which the following 
section illustrates.  
 
North Rhine-Westphalia has a long tradition of innovation and technology policy measure as 
it has undergone a slow economic, social and ecological restructuring process as former 
heavily industrialised region. Following the arrival of economic problems in mining with the 
shut down of coal mines in 1957, the Land government established the first program of 
structural economic development policy for the Ruhr area ‘EPR’ (Entwicklungsprogramm 
Ruhr) in 1968 (Heinze et al., 1996, pp. 7-8 and 14-17).  
 
A number of programmes followed (see Heinze et al., 1996, p. 41; Körfer & Latniak, 1994) 
such as the North Rhine-Westphalia program (Nordrhein-Westfalen-Programm) in 1970, the 
‘technology program mining’ for the advancement of mining technology 
(Technolgieprogramm Bergbau, TPB in short) and the ‘technology program energy’ for the 
advancement of power generation (Technologieprogramm Energie, TPE in short) both in 
1974, and the ‘technology program steel’ (Technologieprogramm Stahl, TPS in short). Körfer 
& Latniak (1994, section 2, paragraph 7) summarise the focus of the policies until the mid 
1970s as being aimed at ‘supporting modernization processes by supporting infrastructure 
development [e.g. the founding of universities], by avoiding lowering social consequences of 
the decline processes [i.e. subsidies (see Heinze et al., 1996, p. 19)] and – as new step in the 
                                                 
320 Interview No. 33, transcript page 2. 
321 Interview No. 44, transcript pages 7-8 and Interview No. 22, transcript page 5 
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1970s- by supporting technological change within the core areas of industry (coal, steel and 
power generation).  
 
The ‘technology programme economy’ (Technologieprogramm Wirtschaft, TPW in short) was 
created in 1978, which supports individual or joint R&D project with a focus towards the 
market implementation phase (Bundesministerium für Bildung, 1996, pp. 201-206; 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 2000, p. 11 of supplemented annex). The ‘action program 
Ruhr’ (Aktionsprogramm Ruhr) followed in 1980 and the technology program for the 
advancement of ‘technologies of the future’ (Technologieprogram Zukunftstechnologien, TPZ 
in short) in 1984. This second wave of programmes widened its support to other sectors and 
SMEs as well as gave rise to founding of technology centres in the region with the 
Technologiezentrum Aachen being the first established in 1984 (Körfer & Latniak, 1994). 
 
A third wave of programmes, namely the ‘initiative for the future of the coal and steel 
regions’ (Zukunftsinitiative Montanregionen, ZIM in short) in 1987 and the initiative for the 
future of NRW’s regions (Zukunftsinitiative für die Regionen Nordrhein-Westfalens, ZIN in 
short) in 1989, introduced a new practice of a decentralised policy approach (Asheim & 
Cooke, 1999, pp. 163-164; Kruse, 1990, pp. 132-134). This so-called ‘regionalised structural 
policy’ approach involved the setting up of corporatist intermediary ‘regional development 
conferences’ (Regionalkonferenzen) consisting of a broad range of stakeholders. These were 
asked to develop and propose by consensus ‘regional development concepts’ (Regionale 
Entwicklungskonzepte, REK in short) for the localities at sub-Land administrative level (see 
Figure 24). There have been an active debate and diverging evaluations and assessments 
concerning the effectiveness of this approach (Heinze & Voelzkow, 1997; Kremer & Pfeife, 
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1993; Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 1992a, 1992b; Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand, Technologie und Verkehr 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1996; Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, 
Technologie und Verkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999; Ministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Mittelstand, Technologie und Verkehr Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999; D. Rehfeld, Baumer, 
& Wompel, 2000; Voelzkow, 1993).  
 
Figure 24 Spatial delimitations of the Regionalised Structural Policy in NRW 
 
Source: Ministry for Economc Affairs and Employment of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia at 
http://www.mwa.nrw.de/images/wirtschaft/regionalkarte.gif, taken from 
http://www.mwa.nrw.de/wirtschaft/strukturpolitik/regionen/regionen.htm 
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The main argument in favour of a differentiated regional structural policy is that the 
increasing complexity of determinants of economic development gave rise to divergent 
regional development dynamics, which require diverse policy approaches that consider the 
individual endogenous strength and weaknesses of localities (cf. Heinze et al., 1997, p. 13). 
While Waniek (1993) rejects the regionalised structural policy because it undermines the right 
for self-administration of municipalities and thus does not strengthen a decentralisation of 
structural policy; a different study by Efas is said to demand the institutional strengthening of 
regional conferences (cf. Heinze et al., 1997, p. 22).  
 
The Land government (Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Technologie und Verkehr 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 11-13) also provided a comprehensive review of 10 years of 
regionalised structural policy. (cf. also Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 265-
268). While the review concludes that the approach was able to mobilise various interests and 
develop a culture of dialogue as well as ameliorate the flexibility and implementation of 
policy measures, it also points out that there is the need for some changes. The critical aspects 
of the review highlight the need for more concentration on regional strength, for new sub-
level bodies as sources of new ideas, for more targeted policy measures, and for an integration 
of sustainable development aspects.  
 
Heinze (1997, p. 21) also rightly points out that a decentralised policy approach implicitly 
assumes that the actors at the lower levels of governance have the institutional capacity to act 
and to decide. Indeed, this study argues that there is a critical institutional mass in order to 
constitute a governance system capable of a cooperative and coordinated (i.e. systemic) 
provision of a holistic and strategic approach for business and innovation support.  
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The various regional action programmes noted above were followed over the last 15 years by 
a series of Objective 2 programmes, which mean that together with other EU funding (notably 
from the community initiatives Rechar and Resider) a total of 6 billion Euro has been spent in 
North Rhine Westphalia since 1989 on economic development policy (Jakoby, 2006, p. 
282).322 
 
Figure 25 North Rhine-Westphalia's Objective 2 area (for the period 2000-2006) 
 
Source: http://www.ziel2-nrw.de/start.php, under ‘Programm-Info > Fördergrundlagen > Fördergebiete’ 
                                                 
322 Rechar and Resider were both Community Initiatives that supplemented the EU’s Structural Fund dring 1988-
1999. While Rechar supported the adaption to industrial change in coal-dependent regions, Resider supported the 
adaption to industrial change in steel-dependent regions. 
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Following the above-mentioned reviews, structural policy in NRW has evolved into a fourth 
phase over the first decade of the new millemnium that saw a shift away from the consensus-
orientated policy approach to a more strategic cluster policy approach implemented through 
competitive bidding for funding, which the following section describes in more detail. The 
following table summarises the key strategic orientations for the different programme across 
four phases of structural policy in NRW over the past fourty years: 
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Table 24 Overview of programmes and strategic focus of fourty years of structural policy 
1968-1977 1978-1986 1987-1999 2000-2013 
Structural economic 
development policy 
for the Ruhr area 
(EPR) 1968-1973; 
North Rhine-
Westphalia program 
since 1970; 
Technology 
programs for mining, 
energy and steel 
(TPB/TPE/TPS) 
since 1974. 
Technology 
programme economy 
(TPW) since 1978;  
Action program Ruhr 
(Aktionsprogramm 
Ruhr) 1980-84; 
Technology program 
for the advancement 
of technologies of 
the future (TPZ) 
since 1984. 
Initiatives for the 
future of the coal and 
steel regions (ZIM) 
since 1987 and for 
NRW’s regions 
(ZIN) since 1989 
EU Structural 
Funds Objective 2 
and Community 
Initatives Rechar and 
Resider 1989-1999; 
Sectoral and 
technological Land 
initiatives; 
Start up and growth 
initiatives NRW 
‘GO!’, PFAU and 
‘MOVE’ 
EU Structural 
Funds Objective 2 
2000-2006 and 2007-
2013; 
Regional 
competitions; 
Cluster initiatives  
Support for 
modernisation 
processes in coal, 
steel and power 
generation; 
Founding of new 
universities,  
Subsidies to avoid 
stark social 
consequences. 
Initiating active 
structural change; 
Support to SMEs for 
individual or joint 
R&D projects with a 
focus on 
implementation/ 
Innovation; Founding 
of technology 
centres since 1984 
and setting up of the 
centre for innovation 
and technology 
ZENIT GmbH. 
Decentralised 
consensus-based 
regionalised 
structural policy 
(directed 
corporatism);  
Setting up of Inter-
municipal regional 
development 
conferences for the 
development of 
regional 
development 
concepts (REK); 
Emscher Park 
International 
Building Exhibition 
(IBA) 1989-1999; 
Sectoral initiatives, 
support for start-ups 
and to SMEs; 
Sectoral and cluster-
based policy as part 
of NRW’s innovation 
strategy based on 
competences 
(strengthening 
regional strength); 
Competitive bidding 
(directed 
competition) for 
projects in 
developing clusters 
or competency fields 
(Kompetenzfelder);  
Top-down setting of 
Projekt Ruhr 
GmbH and later 
replacement by the 
the regional 
development agency 
Ruhr metropole 
‘wmr’ under the 
Regional Ruhr 
Association (RVR) 
Source: Own creation but partly based upon a similar figure for programmes for the Ruhr area only by 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH (2000, figure 1 on p. 4). 
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North Rhine Westphalia’s strategic orientation for innovation and business support 
 
The over 500 pages long comprehensive Single Programming Document for the Objective 2-
Area of North Rhine-Westphalia for the phase 2000-2006 (Landesregierung Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 1999) provides a good source of information for the more recent strategic 
approach taken by the Land to achieve the programme’s main aim of ‘creating new and 
securing existing jobs, especially in SMEs, by the improvement of the region’s 
competitiveness’ (ibid., p. XV).323 The main beneficiary of the Objective 2-Area is the Ruhr 
area as Figure 25 shows.  
 
A strategic orientation on regional competences as part of a ‘growth pact’ agreed with the lord 
majors of the cities of the Ruhr area was the core behind the aim of reducing the area’s high 
unemployment. It seems a particular incentive for a more focussed approach stemmed from 
the realisation by policy-makers that the 2000-2006 phase would be “last big chance” to make 
a difference following the then expected phasing out of Objective 2 funding in 2006 
(Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, 2002).324 In order to do so, it focuses the 
Structural Fund support of 881 million Euro for the 2000-2006 phase (ibid., p. XXVIII) upon 
the following four core priorities (ibid., p. XVIII, own translation): 
 
                                                 
323 The Objective 2 of the EU’s Structural Fund concentrates upon ‘[s]upporting economic and social conversion 
in industrial, rural, urban or fisheries-dependent areas facing structural difficulties’ by providing territorial 
funding from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) (cf. 
European Commission, 2004l, p. 10). 
324 This expectation was also stated in the interviews and documents (e.g. Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA 
Consult GmbH, 2000, preface). However, North Rhine-Westphalia eventually received another contribution of 
1.28 billion Euro from the Objective 2 Structural Fund programme for the period 2007-2013. See the European 
Commission’s press release IP/07/799 of 12 June 2007, available at the Rapid database at http://europa.eu/rapid 
For more information about the EU’s Regional/Cohesion Policy see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm 
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1. Business and start-up finance 
2. Innovation and competence development 
3. Innovation orientated infrastructure development 
4. Target group orientated support 
 
The programme further outlines 12 strategic orientations for the implementation of 
programme measures, which include the following key concepts (ibid., pp. XIX and 258-276, 
own translation):  
 
1. Developing visions and formulate leitmotifs 
2. Initiative change of perception and mentality 
3. Concentrate upon SMEs 
4. Develop clusters/competency fields and sharpen regional profiles 
5. Bundle themes and integrate policy portfolios 
6. Achieve a comprehensive understanding of partnership 
7. Include private businesses  
8. Enable quality improvements through competition 
9. Maintain flexibility during programme implementation 
10. Embed sustainable development and equality as horizontal cross-cutting tasks  
11. Improve evaluation and monitoring 325 
12. Contribute to the European Employment Strategy 
 
A few of these strategic orientations have to be viewed as being very novel for policy-making 
in North Rhine-Westphalia. For instance, the introduction of competitive bidding for projects 
in developing clusters or competency fields (Kompetenzfelder) organised through the agency 
Projekt Ruhr GmbH created in 2000 by the Land government (ibid., pp. 417-418, to be 
discussed more later on) is to be seen as a clear turning away from the traditional consensus-
                                                 
325 See also Jakoby (2006) for more information on North Rhine-Westphalia’s history of evaluating policy. 
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based corporatist approach that was accompanied by a fairly equal provision of funding as 
with a ‘watering can’.  
 
This new approach of focussing upon endogenous strength and instead of following blindly 
the imperative of coherence is to be seen as courageous. Its introduction was thus 
unsurprisingly faced with some resistance by sub-regional actors fearing for their ‘fair’ share 
of funding. In a way, this appears to undermine the structures of ‘regionalised structural 
policy’, i.e. the intermediary and advisory ‘regional development conferences’ 
(Regionalkonferenzen) that were created to develop consensus-based regional development 
concepts (Regionale Entwicklungskonzepte, REK in short) for the sub-Land administrative 
areas (cf. Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 265-268). The clear cut distinction 
between the North Rhine-Westphalian model of ‘directed corporatism’ (Hoppe, 2000, p. 81 
and cf. pp. 78-80) and the British ‘directed competition’ (Hoppe, 2000, p. 200) seems to no 
longer exist. Instead, it is argued here that North-Rhine Westphalia seems to be slowly 
departing from its traditional legacy to moving towards applying more a model of ‘directed 
competition’.  
 
It seems that this trend has been maintained more lately since a large proportion of the 
expected 1.28 billion Euro from the Objective 2 Structural Fund programme for the 
succeeding period 2007-2013 was again foreseen to be allocated through competitions and for 
supporting NRW’s cluster strategy (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 2007, pp. 120-124 and 194) 
as part of the Land’s innovation strategy.326 
                                                 
326 See http://www.exzellenz.nrw.de/nocl/noth/clusterpolitik/bundes-und-eu-ebene/ and the European 
Commission’s press release IP/07/799 of 12 June 2007, available at the Rapid database at http://europa.eu/rapid 
The text of the operational programme for 2007-2013 for NRW is available at http://www.ziel2.nrw.de/1_Ziel2-
Programm/3_1_Programmtexte/index.php . The text of the Land government’s innovation strategy of 29.08.2006 
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The selection of competency fields or sectoral cluster, for which regional actors in the Ruhr 
area were asked to submit proposals for innovative projects (in the 2000-2006 phase), was 
build upon the recommendations and identification of six such clusters by the above-
mentioned study of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (1998, p. 5), which was 
commissioned by the Land Ministry for Economic Affairs, SMEs, Energy and Transport 
(MWMEV). The Projekt Ruhr GmbH has consequently developed the following 11 
Municipal Priority Development Areas in collaboration with the MWMEV (Aufsichtsrat und 
Innovationsbeirat der Projekt Ruhr GmbH, 2002):327 
 
1. Area of expertise: Chemical industry 
2. Area of expertise: Power technology 
3. Area of expertise: Industrial technologies and resources 
4. Area of expertise: Information technologies and resources 
5. Area of expertise: Logistics 
6. Area of expertise: Medical technology and healthcare 
7. Area of expertise: Urban development and quality 
8. Area of expertise: Ecological and urban renewal project “Emscher Landscape Park” 
9. Area of expertise: Tourism, Leisure and Culture 
10. Priority focus: Design 
11. Area of expertise: Land development for commerce, industry and the service sector 
 
Arguably, this set of priority development areas of expertise or competency fields seem to 
have been somewhat widened or watered down in comparison to the six fields or clusters 
                                                                                                                                                        
is available at http://www.innovation.nrw.de/objekt-
pool/download_dateien/innovationsland_nrw/Innovationsstrategie.pdf 
327 The translation was taken from the CORDIS Regional Service: Nordrhein-Westfalen: Spotlights: „Municipal 
Priority Development Areas in the Ruhr District“ at http:/www.cordis.lu/nordrhein-westfalen/spot.htm, last 
accessed 06.05.2003 
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identified in the study by Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (see above on page 257).328 The 
following figure shows the allocation of projects according to the different Municipal Priority 
Development Areas. 
 
Figure 26 Allocation of projects for the Municipal Priority Development Areas  
 
 
Source: Projekt Ruhr GmbH, formerly at www.projektruhr.de 
 
 
                                                 
328 However, the widening of areas for cluster initiatives is more evident in the later 2007-2013 period, where 16 
competence fields (Stärkefelder) and Landes-Cluster have been identified in the following areas: Chemical 
industry, machinery/production technology, automotive, plastics, biotechnology, energy economy as well as 
energy research, health economy, medical research, food, logistics, media, culture economy, ICT, 
environmemntal technologies, nano-/microtechnology, new materials. See 
http:/www.exzellenz.nrw.de/nocl/noth/clusterpolitik/nrw-clusterstrategie/  
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North Rhine Westphalia’s system of innovation and business support: programmes and 
initiatives 
 
The Objective 2 programme for the period 2000-2006 outlines 24 measures (ibid., pp. XIX-
XXVIII, 250 and 340-387) that are subordate to these four main priorities for the Objective 2 
area – which comprises the Ruhr area as well as some parts in East Westphalia and two areas 
near Aachen. These complement and strengthen several national and regional structural policy 
programmes already existent.  
 
With regards to national structural policy instruments, reference is made to the significant 
‘regional economic development programme’ (Regionales Wirtschaftsförderungsprogramms) 
of investment support through the national community initiative (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe). Its 
territorial support areas are nearly identical with those of the Objective 2 area (ibid., pp. XIX 
and 478-479). 
 
In addition, the Single Programming Document also points to the coherence of its measures to 
other existing regional structural policy programmes, which are available across the whole 
Land. First, the intention is explicitly named (ibid., pp. 479-485) to build upon the 120 
projects of economic, social and ecological restructuring with an investment of 5 billion Euro 
(ibid., pp. 480-481) of the Emscher Park International Building Exhibition (Internationale 
Bauaustellung Emscher Park, IBA in short), that ran in the Emscher subdistrict of the Ruhr 
area between 1989 and 1999 (see Kilper & Wood, 1995). The IBA Emscher Project can be 
described as a kind of ‘catalyst project’ as proposed by Amin (1999, pp. 373-374) in order to 
reconstruct local social capital and civic identities that were damaged by ‘economic hardship, 
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state-dependency, elite domination and so on’ as a result of a lock-in situation.329 While 
Kilper & Wood (1995, p. 230) describe the IBA project as a ‘remarkable experiment in 
creative restructuring processes’, they also point to some shortcomings such as the lack of a 
regional economic strategy as a basis for action and the paradox associated with ‘activities 
“from below” are to be stimulated “from above”’. Because of its ‘corporatist form of 
intervention’ and backing of strong players, they identified a bias ‘towards professionally 
organized planning’ as opposed to ‘projects being devised by citizen’s pressure groups’. This 
is important because the IBA project involved the attempt of changing mindset towards 
ecology and culture in the Ruhr Area (Bömer, 2000, p. 107). IBA saw itself as the “workshop 
for the future of industrial regions” (Müller, 2005). The ‘hard’ results of the various projects 
were an exhibition location in Oberhausen (Gasometer), a service centre in Dortmund-Eving 
on a former site of a coal mine (Zeche Minister Stein), the cultural centre Zeche Zollverein, 
and the nature park in Duisburg-Meiderich as well as 17 technology centres (Müller, 2005). 
 
Secondly, reference is made (see Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 481-483) 
to several technological and sectoral ‘Land initiatives’ such as for media (Landesinitiative 
mediaNRW), for future energies (Landesinitiative Zukunftsenergien), for the automotive 
industry (Verbundinitiative Automobil NRW, VIA NRW in short), for chemical industry 
(Initiative ChemSite), for textiles (Zukunftsinitiative Textil NRW), for food processing (Food-
Processing Initiative NRW), for construction (Zukunftsinitiative Bau) and for biotechnology 
(BioGenTec-Initiave). Some of these programmes have received particular recognition. One is 
the cluster-orientated industrial policy programme for the automotive production supply chain 
                                                 
329 Amin (1999, p. 373) defines such catalyst projects as those that ‘might focus on popular projects which 
restore a pride of place and belonging (e.g. festivals, the recovery of local public spaces, cheap and efficient 
public transport), community development programmes, schemes involving public participation, investment in 
the social infrastructure, civic educational programmes, and initiatives in marginalized communities designed to 
rebuild confidence and capability. 
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(VIA NRW initiative), which has been identified as a best practice example for the setting up, 
development and moderation of a technology network (Ernst & Young, 1998, p. 79; European 
Commission, 1999b, p. 62). In addition, the initiatives for the media industry and for 
biotechnology (BioGenTec) have also been identified as best practice examples of sectoral 
and innovation support (Ernst & Young, 1998, pp. 78 and 80). Finally, the ChemSite initiative 
has also been highlighted as innovative approach of turning a competitive disadvantage into 
an advantage with a sectoral infrastructure initiative that included the building of a propylene 
pipeline to address bottlenecks (see Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 482-
483).330 
 
Thirdly, the Land provides advisory and information support for entrepreneurial activities 
with the start up initiative NRW ‘GO!’ (Gründungsoffensive NRW) (see Hoppe, 2000, pp. 94-
109) as well as similarly for the growth of SMES with the initiative ‘MOVE’ (Mittelstands-
Offensive NRW) (see Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 483-484).  
 
Finally, the Objective 2 measures also build upon the consensus on vocational education 
(Ausbildungskonsens NRW), the 1997 master plan for tourism in the Ruhr area (Masterplan 
für Reisen ins Revier), and the action program women and profession (Aktionsprogramm 
Frau und Beruf) (see Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 484-485). 
 
It is important to make a clear distinction here though between the various ‘supra-regional’ 
Land initiatives (that usually apply to entire Land level) and the ‘regionalised’ structural 
policy (at the sub-Land level). Here, in this specific terminology, the term ‘regional’ 
                                                 
330 See also interview No. 33, transcript page 5 
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obviously does not refer to the Land level (as otherwise referred to by this thesis) but to sub-
Land intermediary administrative regions that consist of a group of municipalities.331 
 
Overall, the country report on Germany of the European Trend Chart on Innovation 
(European Commission, 2003d, pp. 19-22) also provides a broad list of selected innovation 
policy measures in North Rhine-Westphalia that complement the programmes outlined earlier 
at the national level.332 They broadly comprises measures, programmes and initiatives in 
support of the following: innovation orientated personnel mobility, technological consulting 
for enterprises, consulting in textiles industry (Textilberatung), the promotion of clustering 
and innovation cooperation with the technology programme mining (Technologieprogramm 
Bergbau, TPB in short) and for technology infrastructure, consulting for inventors 
(Erfinderberatung) for the protection of IPR, innovation finance by Land guaranties for 
investment capital offered through WIN (Wagniskapital für Innovationen NRW GmbH)333 , 
strategic R&D for the rational use of energy (Rationelle Energienutzung) and future energies 
(Landesinitiative Zukunftsenergien, LZE in short), the promotion of R&D projects by 
companies, and finally measure for intensified cooperation between research, universities and 
companies by supporting technology transfer, e.g. within EU-measures and with the free 
technological advice by the technology-transfer-ring handicraft (Technologie-Transfer-Ring 
Handwerk NRW).  
 
                                                 
331 Interview No. 29, transcript page 13. 
332 These policy measures are also described in more detail in the useful (national) guide on innovation support 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung & Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2001, 
pp. 67-68). 
333 See also Sunley, Klagge, Berndt (2005, pp. 262 and 268) for NRW’s venture capital programmes as part of ist 
regional policy. 
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Moreover, the Land Ministry for Education also established a programme awarding 
innovative ideas from graduates and providing financial support of university spin-outs, i.e. 
start-ups (Programm zur finanziellen Absicherung von Unternehmensgründungen aus 
Hochschulen, PFAU in short). 334 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that subsidies are still provided heavily to coal mining with 
an amount of roughly 2.5 billion Euro per annum, i.e. every job in mining being supported 
with 60.000 Euro (Mock & Steiger, 2005). Obviously, these funds that have been transferred 
to non-competitive industries over the last decades represent a source of opportunity costs as 
they could have been and could be spent instead on support for emerging and growing 
industries in gaining a competitive advantage. This can only be explained by what a policy-
makers has described as coal being a topic that is ‘emotionally charged’ and a social and 
regional policy problem, that otherwise is ‘not rationally explainable’. 335 
 
Main actors in the Governance of the business and innovation support system in North 
Rhine Westphalia 
In line with the broad definition of innovation, the governance infrastructure comprises the 
whole range of key organisations that conceptualise, influence and implement innovation 
policy. This involves policy-makers as well as practitioners, who provide business and 
innovation advice and support in a general, and thus includes not merely technology or 
innovation orientated services. 
 
                                                 
334 nrw media (accessed 27.05.2004) Initiativen in NRW: 3. Finanzierung , at 
http://www.media.nrw.de/initiativen/initiativen_druckansicht.php?rubrik=12 
335 Interview No 29, transcript pages 4 and 8. 
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In general, the main first points of contact for businesses with regards to advice concerning 
the above mentioned innovation support and funding programmes are the chambers of 
commerce and industry (IHK) and the ‘centre for innovation and technology in NRW’ 
(ZENIT). Besides these actors that play a crucial role in the implementation of policy 
measures (as practitioners), there are furthermore the core policy-makers at the Ministries at 
Land level and project coordinators closely associated with it, such as the ‘economic 
development corporation for North Rhine-Westphalia Ltd.’(GfW), the investment bank 
branch of the NRW.bank, and Projekt Ruhr GmbH. These are briefly introduced in the 
following.336 
 
ZENIT – Centre for innovation and technology in NRW 
 
The centre for innovation and technology in NRW Ltd. (Zentrum für Innovation und Technik 
in NRW, ZENIT GmbH in short) has also been identified as a best practice example of an 
institutional actor (Ernst & Young, 1998, p. 81). The ZENIT GmbH is the Land’s main 
regional agency, that has been described as ‘a good example of a “one-stop-shop” approach 
combining support for innovation and more general business support services’ (ibid., pp., p. 
81). It was founded in 1984 as a public private partnership (PPP), by the Land, by an 
association of SMEs (Trägerverein ZENIT e.V.), and by WestLB (now NRW.bank) to a third 
each, in order to provide sound advice and innovation support to SMEs (Kerlen, [1987(?)], p. 
16). The organisation has around 45 members of staff that besides technology consulting and 
also provides advice regarding strategic and operative management tasks including marketing, 
                                                 
336 This selection is not conclusive, but fitting for the focus of this study. There are alos other important actors in 
the general governance system such as the regional (property) development agency ‘LEG’ 
(Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft mbH), the limited corporation for innovative employment G.I.B. (Gesellschaft 
für innovative Beschäftigungsförderung mbH) and many others (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, p. 25). 
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joint representation and mentoring at international fairs and exhibitions, advisory functions as 
a (former) Euro Info Centre (EIC) and Innovation Relay Centre (IRC)337, as well as advice 
concerning funding opportunities (cf. also Hassink, 1992, pp. 94-96).338 With the recent 
creation of the full subsidiary ProVendis, a new task concerning the exploitation of patents 
from higher education institutions has been added to this list. ZENIT sees this first of all as a 
technology adviser, but also as an information broker and mediator as well as an information 
and feedback provider to the Land for its adjustment and conceptualisation of policy-
making.339 It thus occupies a double function, being programme coordinator and in a way 
assessor, while at the same time also being an advice and consulting institution for business. 
 
Chambers of commerce and industry 
 
The chambers of commerce and industry (IHK) also have this double function, which derives 
from its obligatory membership. This gives them a unique representative nature, which is at 
least potentially a valuable source of information for the policy development process. In 
addition, this probably also means that the organisation and its non-market support and advice 
services are much more well known than those of other actors. The key role and tasks of the 
chambers of commerce and industries (as well as the chambers of handicrafts) have already 
been outlined before in the discussions of the national governance level. They are fairly 
homogenous across the different settings across Germany and they are organised according to 
areas corresponding to sub-Land administrative region. Yet, they also have additional 
branches in other localities within these areas. However, a specific institution to North Rhine 
                                                 
337 The tasks of the former EICs and IRCs are now performed by the Enterprise Europe Network partners, which 
in NRW are currently ZENIT and the NRW.bank. See http://www.enterprise-europe-network.ec.europa.eu  
338 See section ‚Wir über uns’ at http://www.zenit .de 
339 Interviewee from ZENIT GmbH.  
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Westphalia is the ‘technology consultancy office Ruhr’ (Technologieberatungsstelle Ruhr, tbr 
in short), which by means of cooperation between six chambers of commerce (Bochum, 
Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Hagen and Münster), aims to enhance its technological 
knowledge and consequently provide specific technological advice to SMEs in the Ruhr area 
and acts as a mediator by referring them on to relevant research centres, if necessary (Hassink, 
1992, p. 94).  
 
Business incubators  
 
Technology and start-up centres are an important element of the public infrastructure for the 
support of entrepreneurial activities, as they not only provide an infrastructure but also access 
to a cooperation network (Neusser, Kutz, & Schröder, 2003, pp. 38-39). This can, for 
example, help to mobilise entrepreneurial activities from Higher Education and Research 
Institutions.  
 
Out of the previously named figure of roughly two hundred business incubators or technology 
centres in Germany, nearly one third are said to be situated in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999a, pp. 49 and 52) indicating 
a potential oversupply. Indeed, in addition to its dense Higher Education and Research 
landscape, North-Rhine Westphalia hosts also an abundance of technology and start-up 
centres with a total figure of 63 in 1997 as identified by Elle et al. (1997, p. II) that is 
exceptional even in international comparison.340 By 2001, this figure rose to 69. The 
                                                 
340 According to Tecworld (Neusser et al., 2003, pp. 38-39) the figure rose apparently to 91 in 2001. 
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following figure shows depicts the oversupply and dense network of technology centres or 
incubators in NRW. 
 
Figure 27 Overview of technology centers in NRW 
 
Source: GfW Nordrhein-Westfalen, presentation entitled “NRW – The economic powerhouse of Europe” of 
07.10.2002, page 33  
 
The technology centres of Aachen (operated by Aachen Corporation for Innovation and 
Technology Transfer, AGIT in short), Duisburg (Micro-Electronics Centre linked to the 
Fraunhofer Institute for Micro Electronic Switches and Systems ‘IMS’), and Dortmund 
(Technology Centre) have also been identified as a best practice example of innovation 
support (Ernst & Young, 1998, p. 82).  
 
 294 
 
Despite the density of technology centres and obvious success of some, not all are said to 
deserve the notion innovation or technology centre. Some have reportedly provided little more 
than a business park that due to lack of demand from technology or innovation-orientated 
businesses had to be filled at the end with any business – preventing the opportunity to create 
an environment conducive to innovation cooperation. This may be explained partly by the 
over-supply, but also as a consequence of the former hype around technology centres, where 
possibly such centres were set up irrespective of actual demand. The following comment by 
one actor illustrates this: 
 
‘There is clearly an over supply of technology centres, but you should not forget the 
history. The run or boom on technology centres was in the early 90s, end of the 80s, 
when numerous technology centres were set up. At that time, every mayor wanted to 
have a technology centre for entrepreneurs on a Greenfield site. The problem was, that 
one could not say no. At the end of it was then an oversupply of technology centres, 
which eventually did not attract those business tenants initially wanted, but some 
bakery or whatever. After 10 years there are now only a few ones, which from my 
opinion, do work very well. For instance, Essen and Dortmund; Remscheid as well, 
and Aachen anyway. But then there are other technology centres, which host sunbed 
studios. […] Nowadays, the talk is about internet portals, virtual networks, 
competency centres/clusters, competency fields, that are terms that circulate now. 
Again, every Land and every mayor want to now do a competence field in 
whatever.’341 
 
The latter comment can also be seen as an indication that the Land’s new strategic orientation 
(towards creating a leitmotif and focussing the policy approach on endogenous strength and 
competencies) may have been successfully communicated top-down. 
 
                                                 
341 Interview No. 35, transcript page 15 
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Furthermore, the Land’s advantage of this density of technology centres has also created a 
disadvantage in that the institutional actors become predominantly inward orientated and less 
open to cooperation with external actors that can serve as an important source of new ideas to 
a system. This intra-regional perspective and lack of inter-regional exchange is illustrated by 
the fact that the Land’s technology centres are generally not organised member in the 
international network of Business and Innovation Centres (BIC), because they are said to 
believe to be well-networked and able to exchange ideas amongst themselves. 342 
 
Policy-makers at the Land government 
 
The core institutional actors of the innovation system come from the various Ministries of the 
Land government, which host the main policy-makers that conceptualise and provide impetus 
for new initiatives and strategies. The concentration of North Rhine-Westphalia’s policy 
development and conceptualisation at the Ministries at the Land level is illustrated by the 
following quote of one interviewee. At the same time, it also shows that other stakeholders at 
least also play a part in this process by providing feedback and partial attempts to influence 
the outcome. 
 
Interviewer:  Were initiatives developed in-house, or were they developed elsewhere and you 
only provide the technological advice? 
Interviewee:  Yes. They were developed elsewhere.343 
Interviewer:  Have all initiatives been developed elsewhere? 
Interviewee:  Yes.  
Interviewer:  Were you integrated in this process? 
                                                 
342 Interview No. 29, transcript page 10 
343 Interview No. 35, transcript page 2 
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Interviewee:  Not directly, rather indirectly via feedback to […] the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs [of NRW] in Düsseldorf by telling them clearly what technological 
development or what technological level exist in this and that sector as well as 
what economic and social milieu there is; by means of formal quarterly reports, 
in general assemblies and supervisory board meetings – in whatever form. One 
meets up and talks, and from these talks and feedback to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, they actually develop the initiatives, which we sometimes 
also cannot understand. You can leave the tape on and I am saying this quite 
plainly. Either one does not understand us, or one interprets us wrongly. But 
we are not the only ones, who provide a feedback. There are enough lobbyists 
– while I am not describing us as lobbyists – and advisors […], who may 
whisper something into the ears of the some Ministries. 344 
 
A different stakeholder also mentioned the following: 
 
‘Economic development policy in a narrow sense is not done by us, that is the tasks of 
policy. There is the State Chancellery in North Rhine-Westphalia or the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs.’345 
 
This concentration of policy development and conceptualisation at the Ministries at the Land 
level also may partly explain the overall findings of this thesis that an awareness of academic 
theory and theory-derived models is widely lacking among practitioners implementing 
programmes, whereas it is evident at policy-maker level. 
                                                 
344 Interview No. 35, transcript pages 2-3 
345 Interview No. 43, transcript page 3 
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GfW – the economic development corporation for North Rhine-Westphalia. 
 
The ‘economic development corporation for North Rhine-Westphalia Ltd.’ (Gesellschaft für 
Wirtschaftsförderung Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH, GfW in short) can be seen as an externalised 
body of the Land government. It was founded in 1960 as a 100% subsidiary of the Land to 
look after potential investors from abroad interested to establish a presence in the region, i.e. 
attracting incoming foreign direct investment (FDI). This central activity (Gesellschaft für 
Wirtschafsfördrung Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH, 2000, pp 8-11) has over the last years been 
complemented by supporting the economic activities of its own businesses abroad, i.e. foreign 
trade activities (with support and advice regarding fairs, exhibitions, delegations and projects) 
and by supporting endogenous entrepreneurial activities and those of existing SMEs (e.g. with 
the programmes GO! and MOVE, see above).346 It is now closely linked to the Land’s own 
NRW.BANK (Macias, 2005). It has around 50 staff to undertake this holistic four-pronged 
approach to economic development support, which very much mirrors the three-pronged 
approach (without the trade dimension) that is followed by economic development units and 
agencies at the sub-regional and local level (e.g. clearly in Dortmund). Apart from its clear 
trade and investment related bridge function that in 2000 comprised two subsidiaries in Japan 
and Singaparoe and six representative offices in the US, Israel, South Korea, China (2) and 
Vietnam, there nevertheless seems to be at least some potential functional overlap concerning 
the supporting role for endogenous business potential between the GfW, ZENIT as well as 
Projekt Ruhr GmbH. 
 
                                                 
346 Interviewee from GFW, transcript page 1 
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NRW.bank – North Rhine Westphalia’s regional bank 
 
Following of the toughening of the guidelines for credit allocation due under – what is known 
as Basel II – a shortage of capital resources, in particular for SMEs persists. The region’s 
support bank NRW.BANK (formerly Westdeutsche Landesbank, WestLB in short) has gained 
a crucial role in this respect since it bundled up all support funding allocation activities, that 
have previously been spread out. It is hoped that by concentrating the management of support 
and financial instruments in one hand that the support programmes become less complicated 
and clearer. 347 
 
Projekt Ruhr GmbH 
 
Another 100% subsidiary of the Land government was the Projekt Ruhr GmbH (i.e. Project 
Ruhr Ltd.), which was set up as additional governance actor at the meso level in April 2000 
(see Hans H. Blotevogel, 2001, p. 20; Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 417-
418). It had around 25-30 employees after its official project start in 2001348 and an initial 
budget of around 15 mio Euro (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, 
p. 37).  
The main aim of Projekt Ruhr GmbH was to work towards structural change in the Ruhr area 
and thus to contribute to job creation. It focused its efforts to achieve this aim on supporting 
networking and especially on amplifying the endogenous strength of the Ruhr area. This 
follows the strategic orientations outlined by North Rhine-Westphalia’s Objective 2 Single 
                                                 
347 Interviewee from WestLB and Interview No 43  
348 Interviewee from Projekt Ruhr GmbH, transcript page 1 
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Programming Document (Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1999, pp. 417-418). As 
discussed earlier, the Projekt Ruhr GmbH developed the 11 Municipal Priority Development 
Areas (Kompetenzfelder, i.e. clusters or competency fields) in collaboration with the Land 
Ministry MWMEV (see Aufsichtsrat und Innovationsbeirat der Projekt Ruhr GmbH, 2002) 
and it was labelled as the ‘driving’ body in charge of overseeing and organising the 
competitive bidding process for the allocation of the Objective 2 funding for the Ruhr area.  
 
Thereby, it was hoped to ‘overcome the unilateral local and sectoral thinking’, which has been 
described by stakeholders as ‘church-clock-tower-thinking’ (‘Kirchturmdenken’) and ‘local 
egoism’.349 To limit the anticipated political and media opposition to this departure from the 
traditional consensus-based approach, emphasis was placed upon transparency, which means 
that unsuccessful applicators were allowed to look at the successful bids in order to 
acknowledge what were better applications and take their defeat in making an application 
more easily. Arguably a too cautious approach was followed with regards to public relations, 
which may have caused suspicion. Importantly, the organisational life span for this 
organisation was set out from the start to be only limited – with the plan to dissolve the 
‘project’ at the end of 2008.  
 
The organisational structural set-up of Projekt Ruhr GmbH was quite meaningful (see Figure 
28). The cabinet of the Land government was represented in the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) providing the broad direction and, at the same time, political backing from the 
                                                 
349 See information sheet ‘Kriterien zur Auswahl von Projekten der Projekt Ruhr GmbH’ of the Projekt Ruhr 
GmbH information pack (2001), Interviewee 3, transcript page 3, and Interviewee 33, transcript page 3. The 
information sheet ‘Aufgaben und Arbeitsweise der Projekt Ruhr GmbH’ also outlines the following criteria for 
the selection of projects of Project Ruhr GmbH: horizontal character and employment effect; regional 
importance and metropiltan character; rentability; quality and innovative character; sustainable development; 
communication results. 
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high-profile political elite – referred to by some stakeholder as ‘the enforcement argument’ –, 
which is seen as a major driver to reducing stakeholder’s inclination to oppose. This further 
implies that at least some indirect responsibility was taken. It thereby addresses the lack of 
political accountability and democratic deficit that accompanied the externalisation of certain 
functions to the quango-like Projekt Ruhr GmbH. The configuration of the supervisory board 
changed in 2001 in that it became more inclusive by an enlargement that included the CEO 
from the regional (property) development agency ‘LEG’ (Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft 
mbH), a CEO from the Dortmund software business MATERNA GmbH, the chairmen of the 
regional district representation of the Federation of German Trade Unions ‘DGB’ (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund-Landesbezirk Nordrhein-Westfalen) and high-level academic 
representatives from two universities.350  
 
In addition, 15 lord mayors and heads of county administrations representing the cities and 
local municipalities of the Ruhr area had an advisory function in the Innovation Advisory 
Body (Innovationsbeirat).351 It can clearly be assumed that this body served a participatory 
and integrative function giving the Project Ruhr GmbH quango a more democratic touch. For 
instance, the ‘growth and employment pact Ruhr’ was signed by this Innovation Advisory 
Body in 2001.352 
                                                 
350 See ‘Results of the second supervisory board meeting of the Project Ruhr GmbH’ in 2001, transcript provided 
by Interviewee. 
351 See information sheet of the Projekt Ruhr GmbH information pack (2001) and Interviewee from Projekt Ruhr 
GmbH, transcript page 2. 
352 The growth and employment pact expressed the objective of actors from industry, handicrafts, services, 
unions, and local and regional politicians to create 200,000 jobs by 2005 in 12 identified competence fields for 
the Ruhr area. It was also signed by the director of the Local Association for the Ruhr Area ‘KVR’. See KVR’s 
Regionalinformation Ruhrgebiet, August 2002 edition. 
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Figure 28 Organisational structure of Project Ruhr GmbH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own translation of Chart 10 of Project Ruhr GmbH of 07.05.2001 provided by Interviewee 
 
 
The organisational construct as depicted by above’s figure can be seen to illustrate the 
sensitivity of the ‘new’ top-down approach that bypassed the right of local authorities for self-
administration and brought in an element of insecurity about funding allocation. This is 
described in the explanation of one policy-maker with the following quote, which builds upon 
the experience of the (previous) association of the local authorities in the Ruhr area 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet), which it was said 
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‘was always weak and never played a significant role because the egoism of local 
authorities prevailed and there was never the willingness to cooperate and to work 
together’. […] We have tried it for a long time, but we leave it now. The local 
municipalities are not able and not willing to do that. Now there is an institution of the 
Land, which we name the Projekt Ruhr GmbH. In a way, we move from a bottom-up 
approach to a top-down approach and conduct and control more. […] This means 
that the reactively supporting Land, which waited for somebody to show initiative 
somewhere, now became an actor commissioning projects, for which funding one has 
to apply. […] Together with the study [(Roland Berger & Partner et al., 1998)], we 
aim to kindle a discussion in the regions or mainly the Ruhr area region. Well, we 
have recognised that due to this situation in North Rhine Westphalia, we would not 
easily manage such a paradigm change.’ 353 
 
Another regional stakeholder also provides the following initial assessment: 
 
Interviewee:  […] In the area of technology transfer from universities to SMEs, one can 
identify in which region there are active partners and which there is a dark 
spot. 
Interviewer:  Which region would you describe as a dark spot? 
Interviewee:  The Ruhr area. Just with a few exceptions, namely the university cities, but 
only Bochum and Dortmund. [On the other hand,] Essen and Duisburg are a 
very dark spots, while they cooperate at the moment regarding their 
universities. In my opinion, there is a total dark spot with regard to economic 
development support, innovation support, initiatives or activities. For some 
reason, they appear to also not increase their activities. That’s why Clement 
[(former) Prime Minister of the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia] set 
up last year the institution Projekt Ruhr GmbH in Essen. […] They are active 
and we have also contact with them. They have, so I believe, also a lot of 
funding to spur the region on, but that does not work. It must not be their fault, 
not at all, they have tried, yet for some reason it does not work there.354 
 
                                                 
353 Interviewee 33, transcript pages 3-4 
354 Interview No. 35, transcript pages 10-11 
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Indeed, it seems that the Projekt Ruhr GmbH was only able to provide a small output. 355 Yet, 
in terms of strategic orientation and approach it followed the new cluster-theory-influenced 
approach. On a critical note, however, there may have been a watering down of the focus of 
strategic orientation. The inclusions of horizontal action areas (i.e. ‘Urban development and 
quality’, ‘Ecological and urban renewal project “Emscher Landscape Park”’, and ‘Land 
development for commerce, industry and the service sector’) into the areas of expertise and 
the increase of areas of expertise from 6 competency fields to 11 Municipal Priority 
Development Areas (see Aufsichtsrat und Innovationsbeirat der Projekt Ruhr GmbH, 2002; 
Projekt Ruhr GmbH, 2002) at least hints such a likely development. Purely speculative, this 
could have been, if true, the result of Projekt Ruhr GmbH having to give in to political 
pressure.  
 
In any case, the implementation of the strategic tasks through a top-down approach did seem 
not to be easily manageable nor without opposition. Project Ruhr GmbH’s key organisational 
role for the Ruhr area virtually ended already prematurally in May 2005 when the State 
elections in North Rhine-Westphalia brought a change in government. The coalition 
agreement (CDU & FDP - Die Liberalen, 2005, p. 11) 356 between the two parties forming the 
new regional government (i.e. the conservative Christian Democratic Union and the Free 
Democratic Party – Liberals) stated that the Regional Ruhr Association ‘RVR’ 
(Regionalverband Ruhr)357 would be entrusted with the regional planning function for the 
Ruhr area while, at the same time, the Projekt Ruhr GmbH was to be dissolved. 
                                                 
355 For instance Interviewee 3, transcript page 3 
356 The coalition agreement is available at http://www.wirtschaft.nrw.de/500/5_Koalitionsvereinbarung.pdf 
357 The Regional Ruhr Association ‘RVR’ (Regionalverband Ruhr) geographically comprises the non-county 
(metropolitan) cities of Duisburg, Essen, Mülheim an der Ruhr, Oberhausen, Bottrop, Gelsenkirchen, Bochum, 
Dortmund, Hamm und Herne as well as the counties of Wesel, Recklinghausen und Unna, while its 15 member 
bodies also include the non-county city of Hagen and the Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis (county). More information on the 
RVR is available at http://www.rvr-online.de 
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Consequently, the tasks of the Project Ruhr GmbH were then gradually transferred to RVR, 
which until 01.10.2004 was known as the Local Association for the Ruhr Area ‘KVR’ 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet).358  
 
Later in January 2007, the RVR established the regional development agency Ruhr metropole 
‘wmr’ (Wirtschaftsförderung metropoleruhr GmbH) as a subsidiary with a Limited company 
legal status and allocated in agreement wtih all the municipalities the following tasks:359  
• National and international marketing of the Ruhr metropole location;  
• Initiation and accompanying of regional networks and competence centres; 
• Acquisition and advise for businesses concerning their location searches; 
• Provision of economic information about the region; 
• Mediation of networks and first local contact points; and  
• Coordination and specialist support for local authorities concerning funding 
applications. 
 
While wmr’s tasks appear to be similar to those by its predecessor, the previous potential 
overlap between tasks of Projekt Ruhr GmbH and those of KVR/RVR are eliminated by its 
organisational integration into RVR. 
 
While wmr’s supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) consist of the regional director and ten elected 
representatives of the economic committe of its parent organisation RVR, its advisory body 
(Beirat) comprises a total of 28 members consisting of representatives from the local 
development agencies of all of the 15 non-county (metropolitan) cities and counties of the 
Ruhr area, from chambers of commerce and industry (4) and handicrafts (2), as well as from 
                                                 
358 The KVR itself had been since 01.10.1979 the successor of the Settlement association of the ruhr coal district 
‘SVR’ (Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk), which itself already existed since 05.05.1920 (Kommunalverband 
Ruhrgebiet, 2001, pp. 74-75). 
359 Own translation of task describtion at http://business.metropoleruhr.de/wir-ueber-uns.html, accessed 03.03.09 
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the business associations Initiativkreis Ruhr, Pro Ruhrgebiet e.V. and 
Unternehmensverbandsgruppe Ruhr Niederrhein e.V. 360  
 
The organisational set-up of the regional development agency Ruhr metropole ‘wmr’ differs 
from that of its predecessor Projekt Ruhr GmbH in two important ways. First, the composition 
of the advisory body with mainly local development agencies instead of municipalities has 
now more of a practioners’s orientation than a policy dimension. Secondly, the top-down 
supervision of the Land’s government was replaced by a kind of self-administration by 
elected representatives, bottom-up from local authorities. The role of the cities and counties of 
the Ruhr area were strengthened. Whereas they were previously ‘only’ part of the all-
embracing advisory body of the Project Ruhr GmbH, they are now represented in the voting 
Assembly nicknamed ‘Ruhr parliament of wmr’s parent organisation, the Regional Ruhr 
Association ‘RVR’.361 This more democratically constituted assembly consists of 71 
Assembly Members and has a deciding function – arguably mirroring English Regional 
Assemblies.362  
 
                                                 
360 See links to Beirat and Aufsichtsrat at http://business.metropoleruhr.de/wir-ueber-uns.html, accessed 03.03.09 
361 See the RVR website at http://www.rvr-online.de/rvr/politik/politik.php, accessed 26/01/2009. 
362 For more information see http://www.rvr-online.de/rvr/politik/vv.php  
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The overall systemic-ness of institutional actors at the Land level 
 
In his book ‘The rise of the Rustbelt’, Cooke (1995, p. 236) highly praises North Rhine-
Westphalia for embarking on a ‘high-road-strategy’ of industrial policy, and attempting to 
transform itself into a ‘learning region’. In this respect he states the following: 
 
‘The region of regions that, on the face of it, has it all in terms of growing, 
successfully functioning networked innovation services, is North-Rhine-Westphalia.’ 
(Cooke, 1995, p. 236) 
 
The development report of the Land government in North Rhine Westphalia for the twelve’s 
legislature period also concludes that  
 
‘a working and applied technology structure has been set up in North Rhine-
Westphalia over the last years, which is unequalled in Europe. The grown connections, 
e.g. between enterprises, universities, ZENIT, technology centres, associations, 
chambers and unions, shall also be supported in the future and the technological 
development shall continue to be accompanied by a regional and social consensus.’ 
(Der Ministerpräsident des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1996, p. 28, own translation) 
 
Yet, despite the innovation support infrastructure and network, the Land has not been able to 
achieve an impressive overall innovation performance (as shown before). This has to be 
explained at least partly by the composition of North Rhine-Westphalia’ production structure 
with a comparative share of larger enterprises of traditional industries that are in 
generalisation less innovative than other sectors.  
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However, the consensus-based regionalised structural policy can be said to have failed as an 
instrument to deliver really innovative policy projects. Even though it has manged to 
institutionalise cooperation in some regions and most regions have continued the work on 
regional development concepts (REK), it appeared overall to have had only limited 
cumbersome success with some regions even having stopped the regionalisation processes 
completedly (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. XXXIV-XL of 
annex). The concepts were reported to have been rather similar and not enough geared 
towards regional strengths.363 
 
Furthermore, several regional stakeholders have reported a certain overlap between the 
various regional actors of the innovation and business support system and reported missing a 
more top-down Land policy implementation approach (e.g. by referring to a missing policy 
‘monopoly’ or at least ‘policy influence’). 364 Explicit reference was made by actors to the 
British regional development agencies (e.g. Scottish Enterprise), which were perceived as a 
best practice model due to their reported ability for central control of local economic 
development activities (due to their shares in these institutions). 365 Yet, because of the right 
of local municipalities for self-administration, it is acknowledged that such an approach is not 
possible in Germany. However, this thinking can be regarded, nevertheless, as a potential 
driving force for the introduction of competitive bidding for project funding allocation (under 
the Objective 2 programme) and the allocation of the organisation of this process to the 
Projekt Ruhr GmbH. They are seen here as a means by the Land to partly bypass local 
authorities due to the perception of their inability to focus their policy endeavours upon 
endogenous strength. This allows posing the question: Projekt Ruhr – a regional development 
                                                 
363 Interview No. 33, transcript page 1. 
364 For instance, Interview No. 43, transcript pages 6 and 7 
365 Interview No. 29, transcript page 7 and Interview No. 43, transcript page7 
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agency in disguise? This process appears to have been partly turned back following the May 
2005 State elections and the consequent demise of the organisation. However, the Project 
Ruhr GmbH should be regarded as an important step towards the creation of the undisguised 
regional development agency for the metropole ruhr ‘wmr’. 
 
Bachtler (2005, pp. 7-8) also provides an international comparison for the management of 
Objective 2 funding. He distinguishes between a differentiated approach, a subsumed 
approach and composite systems, representing a mix of the two approaches. The first 
approach to resource allocation with separate administrative structures has been established in 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK to deliver the Structural Funds. In contrast, in Austria, 
Spain and in parts of Germany and most new Member States, allocation of resources is 
channelled through national or regional ministries and agencies with a subsumed approach. 366 
 
One approach that is common to the different management systems is to outsource parts of 
programme administration to a separate secretariat as tradition in Belgium, the Netherlands 
and the UK. Recently, North Rhine-Westphalia also outsourced their programme management 
to a consultancy company. A new ‘Objective 2 Secretariat’ (Ziel 2 Sekretariat) ought to 
provide technical and administrative support, manage communication and, especially, 
improve coordination between the programme committees, different ministries and 
administrating agencies.  
 
In the succeeding funding period 2007-2013, the ERDF also provides the co-financing for 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s cluster management via an overall Cluster secretariat 
                                                 
366 A mixed approach can be found in Finland, France and Italy according to Bachtler (2005, pp. 7-8). 
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(Clustersekretariat) and the specific regional cluster initiatives under the umbrella brand of 
‘Exzellenz NRW – Cluster Nordrhein-Westfalen’ (Kompetenznetze Deutschland, 2008, p. 
52). This bundling of different initiatives is seen here as a positive development given 
previous criticism concerning the confusing conceptional profile of support programmes 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 49). Following the Land’s 
government change in 2005, a much more focussed emphasis on innovation and cross-
departmental cluster policy has emerged lately. This is not only visible in the title of the 
Land’s economics ministry being renamed Ministry for Innovation, Science, Research and 
Technology (MIWFT) but also in the Land’s innovation strategy agreed in August 2006 
(Ministerium für Innovation, 2006).367 
 
The following figure depicts the main actors in the governance of the business and innovation 
support system of North Rhine-Westphalia, while Table 25 further below indicates more 
potential overlap between different organisations. This concerns in particular the three main 
actors in the governance of the business and innovation support system at the Land level, 
ZENIT and GfW as well as Projekt Ruhr GmbH for the Ruhr area, vis-à-vis the local business 
and innovation support actors at the sub-regional level of the city-regions.  
 
While organisational relationships with ZENIT were mentioned most frequently and mainly 
regarded as cooperative by the interviewed local actors, a potential overlap with the tasks of 
the chambers of commerce and industry may yet exist. The relationships to both Projekt Ruhr 
GmbH and GfW were however viewed slightly more as a mix between cooperation and 
competition. For example, two local interviewees distinguished their assessments of the 
                                                 
367 The innovation strategy agreed by the Land government cabinet on 29. August 2006 is available at 
http://www.innovation.nrw.de/object_pool/download_dateien/innovationsland_nrw/innovationsstrategie.pdf and 
information on the cluster strategy at http:/www.exzellenz.nrw.de/nocl/noth/clusterpolitik/nrw-clusterstrategie/ 
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relationship according to the tasks that GfW carried out. One viewed its international trade-
related role as cooperative while viewing other general support tasks more as a co-opetition 
mix.368 Still, relationships between regional and sub-regional actors overall appear to be in 
majority cooperative. This is also reflected in the mostly cooperative assessment of the 
relationships to local actors by the main regional actors.  
 
Figure 29 Main institutional actors of NRW’s business and innovation support system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sourc: Own creation 
 
It can be crucially argued that the first point of contact and most frequent interaction that 
enterprises make with institutions from the innovation and business support system is mostly 
likely to be at the local level. Here, it is believed that local institutions in close convenient 
proximity are more likely to be known, and approached, by businesses or entrepreneurs 
seeking advice and/or support. Hence, following this argument, local innovation and business 
institutions are perceived here as the first and most important point of contacts for businesses 
                                                 
368 Interview No. 1 and 16. 
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– irrespective of the actual governance level that provided funding for activities and projects. 
These core actors are also seen to represent the intermediary institutions depicted by the triple 
helix of university-industry-government relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) as they 
comprise such organisations as branches of the chamber of commerce and industry, existing 
technology centres, local economic development agencies and the units of local authorities 
responsible for economic development and business support. Following this argument, the 
actors and their coordination and cooperation of the sub-regional (and local) level becomes 
much more important. Consequently, the governance dynamics, and thus the systemic-ness, 
of these innovation and business support systems at the sub-regional level are analysed in the 
next section.  
 
As a conclusion to the above and as a introduction to subsequent discussions, Table 25 
(influenced by Hassink, 1992, Table 5.1 on p. 85) provides an overview of the governance 
level(s) involved and targeted level(s) of activity for the different policy initiatives and 
actors.369  
                                                 
369 The KVR (2000, p. 27) also provides a good depiction of a geographical and functional delimitation for 
institutionas of the Ruhr area. 
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Table 25 Spatial level of activity for a selection of policy programmes, instruments and actors 
 
 Main targeted level(s) of activity 
 Local Sub-
regional 
Regional 
(Land) 
Nationa
l 
EU / 
Internat. 
Financial incentives for innovation 
 
• EU technology policy  
• National sectoral/technology policy 
• Thematic sectoral/technology  Land 
initiatives  
• National Competency Centres 
competitions  
• Regional Policy provided by multiple 
levels (incl. Objective 2 funding) 
• Regional (Land) Competency Field 
competitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
(in NRW)
X 
 
 
(X) 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
(X) 
virtual 
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Economic Development Policy Actors
 
• European Commission 
• Federal Ministries 
• Land Ministries 
• Regional economic development 
corporation GfW (externalised Land 
body with export & FDI orientation) 
• Projekt Ruhr GmbH (externalised 
Land body) 
• Regional conferences (regionalised 
structural policy) 
• Economic development unit of local 
municipalities  
• Local Economic development 
agencies (externalised, private, PPP) 
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X 
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X 
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Technology transfer (TT) and 
business support institutions 
 
• TT by chambers of commerce 
• ZENIT 
• University TT Offices 
• TT by local authorities 
 
 
 
X 
(X) 
X 
(X) 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
(X) 
X 
  
 
 
 
(X) 
Technology centres / business 
incubators 
X     
 
Source: Own creation inspired and influenced by Hassink’s (1992, Table 5.1 on p. 85) analysis.  
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The sub-regional level: case study findings from four city-regions and one pilot case  
This section looks at the governance dynamics, and thus the systemic-ness, of innovation and 
the business support systems at the sub-regional level. This thesis suggests that sub-regional 
governance dynamics are not sufficiently accounted for in innovation systems theory. After a 
brief overview of the economic and innovation performance of the four city-regions and an 
outline of general approaches with regards to local economic development policies, this 
section looks at economic development policy and dynamics at sub-regional level of four case 
studies, namely city-regions of Aachen, Dortmund, Duisburg and Düsseldorf and of the pilot 
case study of Ratingen. The results and the underlying causes of differences are discussed 
here on a case-by-case basis, while a comparative analysis of all four case studies of city-
regions follows in the subsequent chapter.  
 
For each case study, a short economic history and structure of the city-region is presented 
first. Secondly, specific characteristics of core governance actors are presented. This includes 
a discussion of the building of new core business and innovation support organisations and 
selected cluster organisations and networks. The overall structure and any explicitly identified 
coordination between actors, as well as decision-making processes and critical incidents that 
have changed behavioural routines or the interacting environment, are identified. Thirdly, 
formulised and non-formulised policies and strategic approaches are outlined. Finally, the 
nature of relationships and extent of cooperation between actors is described. A rudimentary 
social network analysis is presented to support the author’s analysis of each case study. This 
analysis is not representative as it is based on a low number of interviews of local 
stakeholders and the supporting interview matrix tool (see appendix VI) that they were asked 
to complete. Nevertheless, it provides an indication of the nature of relationships and helped 
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to avoid a reporting bias in cases where the depth and length of interview discussions varied. 
Due to the sensitivity of interinstitutional and interpersonal relationships reported in the case 
studies, the promised anonymity of interviewees and organisations mentioned has been 
preserved.  
 
Out of the four case studies, two cases have been given slightly more attention in the 
reporting. This was due to the additional strong university dimension in the case of Aachen 
and the particular nature of policy measures in the case of Dortmund, which both were 
thought to deserve a more detailed explanation. 
 
Local economic and innovation performance of the four city-regions 
A detailed economic and innovation profile for North Rhine-Westphalia is provided earlier. 
The following Table 26 provides an overview of key economic structural data for the four 
case study city-regions. It shows that in 2002, Düsseldorf was the only city with better than 
the Land-average key economic indicators, in terms of a slightly lower unemployment rate 
and a significantly higher GDP per employed person (78,979 € versus the NRW average of 
54,552 €) as an indicator of labour productivity. However, it should be noted that more 
recently in 2007, Düsseldorf’s unemployment rate exceeded that of the Land. In terms of 
patent density as a proxy for innovation performance, in 2008 the wider Düsseldorf area 
ranked a high 25th amongst the 97 larger German planning regions.370 Düsseldorf and its 
                                                 
370 It should be stressed that reliable and comparable secondary innovation performance data at a more granular 
level below or at NUTS2 level are difficult to find, including from the Coummunity Innovation Survey (CIS). 
The European Commission’s regional innovation scoreboard is amongst those efforts trying to capture the 
regional innovation performance. Measuring local innovation performance would require collecting primary 
data, which is out of the scope of this research, where it is not the aim to establish a direct causal relationship 
between innovation performance and governance dynamics, which would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish. 
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hinterland reached a density of 165 patents per 100,000 employees versus the German 
average of 136. 
 
Given that the formerly heavily industrialised Ruhr area usually displays a below-average 
economic performance, it is unsurprising that both of the case-study cities from the Ruhr area 
– Duisburg and Dortmund – had unemployment rates above the Land’s average of 10% with 
13.6% and 14.7%, respectively. In 2001, only Duisburg displayed a slightly above Land-
average GDP per employed person (55,781 €). However, it should be noted that over half a 
decade, Dortmund surpassed both the Land’s average (59,857€) and Duisburg’s level (61,672 
€) following a remarkable increase from 53,930 € in 2001 to 63,833 € in 2006. Both cities had 
a below-average patent density in 1998 with Duisburg ranking 53rd (97 patents) amongst the 
97 larger German planning regions and Dortmund ranking 64th (80 patents). Overall, their 
economic performance today has to be seen in light of their trajectories from former heavy 
industrialed economies, typical to the Ruhr area.371 
 
As a city-region with a similar history of industrial brown coal field (Aachener Revier), 
Aachen has generally been the city with the highest unemployment rate in the Land outside 
the Ruhr Area (Gersdorff, 2005; Unknown, 2005; Wels, 2005). In 2001, the city of Aachen 
had an umployment rate of 11.2%, while its surrounding county stayed below the Land 
average with a rate of 9.7%. While the city of Aachen and its surrounding county performed 
below the Land average in terms of labour productivity in 2001 with a GDP per employee of 
around 50,000 € – it also stayed below-average later in 2006 –, the city-region and its 
                                                 
371 After the first mentioning of coal mining in the 14th century in a Dortmund document, the Ruhr area vastly 
developed during the ‘black gold’ rush of the industrial revolution with the population of the Ruhr area 
increasing from 400,000 in 1850 to 3.8 million in 1925 (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, pp. 11-13). 
However, the mining crisis, which started in 1958, and the closure of steelworks following the world economic 
crisis of the mid-seventies heavily affected the Ruhr economy. 
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hinterland ranked a high 18th place out of 97 planning regions in Germany for patents density 
with 189 patents. This is clearly due to the competences associated with the location of the 
excellent technical RWTH university of Aachen.  
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Table 26 Key economic structural data for the case city-regions 
Administrative 
area 
Population 
2002    372 
Population 
2007    372 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
2002    373 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
2007    373 
GDP per employed 
2001 
(€ at market 
prices)374 
GDP per employed 
2006  
(€ at market 
prices)375 
Patent applications 
average 1992-1994, 
per 100,000 
inhabitants376 
Patents 1998 per 
100,000 employees 
(planning regions) 
377 
Germany 82,536,700 82,314,900
(2006) 
10.5% 9.5% . . 38.1 136 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
18,076,355 17,996,621 10.0% 10.0% 54,552 59,857 37.7 . 
Ruhr area 4,782,865 4,701,379 . . 52,692 59,340 . . 
Arnsberg, 
governmental 
administrative 
districts  
3,800,729 3,723,712 10.7% 10.3% 51,710 58,540 . . 
Dortmund, non-
county 
metropolitan city 
590,831 586,909 14.7% 15.5% 53,930 63,833 20.6 80 (64th rank)* incl. 
hinterland 
Düsseldorf, 
governmental 
administrative 
districts  
5,249,280 5,208,288 10.0% 11.0% 59,457 64,349 . . 
Düsseldorf, non-
county 
metropolitan city 
571,886 581,122 9.7% 11.4% 78,979 81,324 44.5 165  
(25th rank)* incl. 
hinterland 
Ratingen, city 
(belonging to the 
county of 
Mettmann) 
  91,967 
 
 
(508,703) 
  92,255 
 
 
(502,045) 
. 
 
 
(7.2%) 
6.8%* 
(July) 
 
(7.6%) 
 
 
 
(53,468) 
 
 
 
(59,113) 
 
 
 
(80.3) 
. 
Duisburg, non-
county 
metropolitan city 
508,664 496,665 13.6% 14.9% 55,781 61,672 17.5 97 (53rd rank)* 
(Duisburg/Essen 
incl. hinterland) 
Köln, 
governmental 
4,331,419 4,391,062 9.4% 9.9% 56,283 60,375 . . 
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administrative 
districts  
Aachen, non-
county 
metropolitan city 
247,740 259,030 11.2% 12.5% 49,896 53,904 83.4 
Aachen, county 
(excluding the 
city) 
309,223 309,929 9.7% 10.6% 50,922 56,940 26.9 
189 
(18th rank) 
* including 
Heinsberg, Düren 
and Euskirchen 
Detmold, 
governmental 
administrative 
districts  
2,069290 2,059,198 9.9% 8.1% 50,712 55,673 . . 
Münster, 
governmental 
administrative 
districts 
2,625,637 2,614,361 9.9% 9.1% 48,070 54,587 . . 
Administrative 
area 
Population 
2002    372 
Population 
2007    372 
 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
2002    373 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
2007    373 
GDP per employed 
2001 (€ at market 
prices) 374 
GDP per employed 
2006 (€ at market 
prices) 375 
Patent applications 
average 1992-1994, 
per 100,000 
inhabitants 376 
Patents 1998 per 
100,000 employees 
(planning regions) 
377 
                                                 
372 Population figures given for the end of the respective year (as of 31.12.). Source: Statistical Yearbook NRW from IT.NRW (“Information und Technik Nordrhein-
Westfalen”), available at http://www.it.nrw.de/statistik/querschnittsveroeffentlichungen/index.html 
373 The unemployment rate is given for 30.09. as a percentage of the total number of dependent civil employed persons comprising those obliged to pay social 
insurance, officials and the unemployed (but excluding self-employed and supporting family members). Source: Landesdatenbank Nordrhein-Westfalen from IT.NRW 
at http://www.landesdatenbank.nrw.de/. Note: Figures are not comparable due to the different method of registering the unemployed since January 2005 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe/Sozialhilfe). See Informationsfeld zur Statistik 13211. *Data for Stadt Ratingen (2007, p. 3), see www.stadt-
ratingen.de/01/3/zdf/zahlen_daten_fakten_2007.pdf 
374 Source: Kreisstandardzahlen 2003 by the Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen (2003), available at 
http://www.it.nrw.de/statistik/querschnittsveroeffentlichungen/index.html 
375 Source: Kreisstandardzahlen 2008 by the Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen (2008) available at 
http://www.it.nrw.de/statistik/querschnittsveroeffentlichungen/index.html. 
376 Source: Greif (1998, pp. 125, 135-136). 
377 Source: Greif (Fraunhofer-Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, & 
Niedersächsisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2000, p. 357; Greif, 2000). *Note: Patent data are given for Germany’s 97 wider planning regions 
(Raumordnungsregionen) which comprise cities including their hinterland/counties. 
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Regional innovation policy-making and local implementation  
 
The earlier section discussed North Rhine-Westphalia’s innovation policy. As it showed, the 
main policy-makers providing funding for municipalities are the Land government, the EU 
and the national government. Consequently, governance actors of the local innovation and 
business support system are to be viewed mainly as implementing policy (and funding), 
which is conceptualised by the Land and national (Federal) Ministries. The following quotes 
from local practitioners illustrate this: 
 
We do not have our own programmes, where we invest our own money in 
something.378 
 
With regards to support, local authorities have for example no opportunity to give 
financial support; that is the sole responsibility of the Land. And we can advise 
concerning financial support, general support, about programmes as such, which are 
developed by the Land and the EU. 379 
 
While this shows local governance actors may not conceptualise larger funding programmes, 
they still develop strategic approaches in order to achieve the main objectives of attracting, 
maintaining and creating businesses. Accordingly, the whole range of activities by local 
business and innovation support organisations comprise the following activities; it illustrates 
that their tasks are not limited to the classical provision of general advisory and information 
services: 
 
                                                 
378 Interview No. 16, transcript page 1 
379 Interview No. 22, transcript page 1 
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• Provision of newsletters and innovation briefings; 
• Organisation of information events, management fora, science days, congresses380 
• Provision of technological advice; start-up advice, business consolidation advice, 
problem-solving; 
• Initiation of networking to unite actors, i.e. regular round tables (lunches or social 
evenings) perhaps for certain sectors, applied user clubs; 381 
• Mediation and establishment of contacts between businesses and external consultants, 
capital providers and so on;382 
• Communication of a common leitmotif with marketing of trademarks at fairs and 
conferences, at universities to attract businesses, key people, entrepreneurs to the 
location383 
• Organisation of external workshops, economic marketing campaigns abroad;384 and 
• Organisation of competitions for awards, start-up funding (for business plans, perhaps 
according to sectors), employees, apprentices and so on. 385 
 
Furthermore, the tasks of local governance actors – just like regional, national and supra-
national actors – comprise working towards providing the best framework conditions for 
businesses to operate successful. The following discourse shows that many local actors 
endeavour to actively improve local conditions – e.g. in terms of a qualified workforce, 
sufficient production and office development sites – even though many governance tasks are 
out of their control. 
 
 
                                                 
380 Interview No. 44, transcript page 3 and Interview No. 16, transcript page 6 
381 Interview No. 22, transcript pages 2 and 7, Interview No. 16, transcript page 2, and Interview No. 44, 
transcript page 3 
382 Interview No. 16, transcript pages 1-2 and Interview No. 44, transcript page 3 
383 Interview No. 44, transcript page 3 
384 Interview No. 22, transcript page 11 and Interview No. 44, transcript page 3 
385 Interview No. 44, transcript page 3 
 321 
 
Local economic development policy 
 
Local authorities in Germany have the voluntary right to carry out self-administrative tasks 
with regards to economic development. Municipalities do so to varying degrees. Overall, the 
tasks comprise efforts (and responsibilities) across different policy portfolios to improve the 
location factors, i.e. their attractiveness to businesses. However, in recent years there has been 
a shift towards focussing upon the maintenance and development of the endogenous business 
base as well as increasing support to entrepreneurial activities (cf. Hoppe, 2000, p. 60). 
Together, these strategies represent the classic holistic tripartite approach of attracting, 
maintaining and creating businesses (cf. Henschel-Neumann, 1988, p. 38). By adding support 
for foreign trade activities, this becomes a four-pronged approach, although this latter aspect 
is more likely to be addressed by regional and not sub-regional actors. In any case, approaches 
differ and not all municipalities apply such a wide-reaching strategy, as for instance, shown 
by the pilot case study of Ratingen.  
 
Local economic development policy in the pilot case study of Ratingen 
The small city of Ratingen with a population of around 92,000 in 2002 is situated in the 
county of Mettmann (population of 508,000) and in close proximity to the larger metropolitan 
city of Düsseldorf (population of 572,000). It has seen a favourable economic development in 
the 1990s with a 32% increase in employment from 25,099 in 1989 to 33,013 in 1999 and 
with a lower unemployment rate than the regional NRW average and its ‘big’ neighbour 
Düsseldorf.386 A comparison of employment performance between the municipalities in the 
county of Mettmann by the chamber of commerce and industry hence labels Ratingen as a 
                                                 
386 See http://www.ratingen.de/23/2/zdf/zdf09.htm at http://www.ratingen.de/de/wifoe/index.htm, last accessed 
23.01.2001 
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‘star’ performer (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Düsseldorf, 1999a, p. 5 and table 1). 
While Düsseldorf lost 2.2% of employment between 1980 and 1998, its little neighbour 
Ratingen gained 39.8%. 
 
This positive development may partly be explained by the high share of the service sector in 
the local economy (68.5% in 1998). The inter-municipal retail concept of the county of 
Mettmann from 2000 (GWH Dr. Lademann & Partner, 2000, p. 171) shows that this share is 
nearly 10% higher of that of the Land at national level.  
 
The city benefits from a favourable infrastructure, good access to the motorway network, and 
from the close proximity to the Rhine-Ruhr agglomeration and in particular from the 
neighbouring city of Düsseldorf and its international airport (infas Sozialforschung, 1998; 
Stadt Ratingen, 2000, p. 4; 2001).387 Its comparatively lower level of local business tax of a 
400% tax collection rate (Stadt Ratingen, 2001a, p. 2 of supplement 'Figures, Dates, Facts') in 
comparison to neighbouring Düsseldorf (Stadt Ratingen, 2000, p. 4) of around 460% in 1999 
(Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Düsseldorf, 2000b, pp. 2 and 35) and other larger cities in 
the region is a key arguments for businesses to locate in the city .388 In this way, Ratingen is 
viewed to ‘profit’ from its neighbour as its population still benefits from access to services of 
the functional urban area of the Düsseldorf city-region such as cultural activities etc. 389 
Consequently, one interviewee pointed out that the city is a ‘special case’ in that ‘one can 
understand Ratingen only if one understands Düsseldorf.’390 
 
                                                 
387 Interviews No. 23, transcript page 1; No. 37, transcript page 1; and Interview No. 4, transcript page 2. 
388 This has been one contributing factor to the relatively high commuting level of the working population to and 
from the city. 
389 Interview No. 4, transcript page 2. 
390 Interview No. 29, transcript page 7. 
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Ratingen has shown a predominant focus on providing business land sites and office space for 
attracting businesses given the reported bottleneck in this area for future expansions (Stadt 
Ratingen, 2000, p. 7). Efforts by the city’s economic development unit to provide direct 
professional support to the existing business base were minimal – except for attempts of 
initiating round table networks in the 1990s. Due to staff limitations (i.e. two non-
management posts for covering 7,000 firms), the focus was on ‘passing on’ coordination and 
one-stop mediation functions.391 Innovation support was hence not provided and those efforts 
in support of (female) entrepreneurial activities were only of marginal relevance.392 This can 
be explained by a predominance of a mature business base and a high level of business tax for 
potential start-ups.393  
 
Another indication of the limited and narrow provision of economic development support 
with a lack of an innovation focus in Ratingen is the admitted absence of a formulised 
strategy for economic development policy by the Mayor’s administration office for economic 
development.394 Despite the lack of a formulated concept (Unternehmensverband Ratingen, 
2000, p. 2), a publicly stated focus on the New Technolgies & New Media/ICT location 
profile and securing the existing SME production base  and retail sector are present, together 
with strategic orientation towards the establishment of further education institutions (Stadt 
Ratingen, 2001b, p. 3). Cooperation between the University of Duisburg and large firms in 
Ratingen with regards to the mediation of internships and master theses also exist. The office 
                                                 
391 See also the leaflet entitled ‘Leistungsangebot der Wirtschaftsförderung’ that lists the services offered by the 
city’s office for economic development and real estate.  
392 More information on the working group on start-ups is available at http://www.ratingen.de/existenzgruendung 
393 Interviews No. 23, transcript page 2 and No. 37, transcript page 3. 
394 Transcript page 3 
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for economic development mediated this cooperation, which was apparently initiated by the 
University of Duisburg due to its desire to increase university-industry cooperations.395 
 
The local employer association ‘UVR’ (Unternehmensverband Ratingen, 2000, p. 3) called 
for the creation of an independent economic development corporation with extensive cross-
sectoral functions and competence by referring to the good practice example of the created 
public-private partnership in the city of Mühleim/Ruhr.  
 
All in all, this gives the impression that the city of Ratingen does not have the institutional 
capacity (due to its small size and budget) to carry out a more active and dynamic economic 
development policy. This, together with the absence of a university, research institutions 
(despite the proximity of those in Düsseldorf and Duisburg) and business incubators, leads to 
the preliminary conclusion that the particular case of Ratingen is lacking a critical mass to 
constitute a local innovation system as such at this lowest level of governance.396 This had 
implications for the methodology for the thesis and subsequently the case studies were 
selected at the slightly higher level of city-regions, as noted in the previous chapter. These 
case studies are presented in the following sections. 
 
                                                 
395 Interview No. 23, transcript page 2. 
396 Yet, there exist nevertheless some private in-business research centres and a vocational training school. See 
Interview No. 23, transcript page 3.  
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Local economic development policy and actors in the city-region of Aachen 
While, like the Ruhr area, Aachen struggled to complete structural change, it did not suffer as 
heavily from the decline of its industrial sectors. While the Ruhr area lost 12.6% of its 
employment base between 1979 and 1999 – and Dortmund and Duisburg 15.8% and 30%, 
respectively –, the labour market of Aachen managed to achieve a positive change of 10.7%, 
more than Düsseldorf’s 7.1% and the Land’s average of 3.5% (Landesarbeitsamt Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 2000, pp. 9-10).  
 
Following the closure of the last coal mine Sophia-Jacoba in Hückelhoven in 1997, Aachen 
saw a total jobs loss of 20,000 in (Sicking, 2000, p. 25). Due to its traditional industrial focus, 
the wider Aachen region remains characterised by a ‘services gap’ (Regionalkonferenz 
Aachen, 1999, p. 4) with a services share of only 48.7% in the chambers district in 1997 (van 
Eyll & Eschweiler, 2000p. 461 of the annex). The dominating manufacturing strengths in 
mechanical engineering & machinery and electrical & precisison engineering (Aachener 
Gesellschaft für Innovation und Technologietransfer mbH, 1996b, p. 4 of part A) can be said 
to be linked to the strong technical engineering focus of the city’s highly rated university. 
Other remaining traditional sectors include textiles, needle fabrication, glass, food and 
confectionary, and the paper industry (Eschweiler & Indetzki, 2000, p. 119; Sicking, 2000, p. 
26; Thomes, 2000, p. 13).  
 
Due to the lower growth potential of Aachen’s traditional sectors, its performance in terms of 
value added and GDP levels still lack behind (Sicking, 2000, p. 26). However, there was a 
convergence between 1982 and 1998, during which the gap to the Land average in terms of 
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gross value added and unemployment rate narrowed (Brösse, 2000, p. 65). While the change 
in employment between 1979 and 1999 was positive (Landesarbeitsamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
2000, pp. 9-10), a reverse trend occurred between 2002 and 2007 in terms of the 
unemployment rate, which increased further to 11.2% in 2002 (see Table 26 above). Therfore, 
the region’s structural change was seen to be arduous and incomplete.397 
 
These days, competencies within the Aachen economy exist in the key technology fields of 
new media, laser technology, environmental technologies, new materials, automotive 
technology and biotechnology (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Aachen & Rheinisch-
Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, 2001, p. I).  
 
Aachen’s research-driven excellence and cooperation promotion 
 
Aachen biggest assets are its leading-edge research institutions that host around 50,000 
students and 17,000 qualified staff that offer opportunities for spin-outs and R&D cooperation 
with firms (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Aachen & Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische 
Hochschule Aachen, 2001, p. III). That is also reflected in the city-region’s high scores in 
terms of patent applications and patents filed as described before (see Table 26). For instance, 
the wider planning region ranked a high 18th place out of 97 planning regions in Germany for 
patent density with 189 patents per 100,000 employees compared to 136 nationwide. 
 
The research infrastructure comprises, first of all, the renowned university of technology 
‘RWTH’ (Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule) and its 11 affiliated institutes as 
the biggest employer and educator in the region with a total budget of around €600 million 
                                                 
397 Interview No. 19, transcript page 2. 
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Euro in 2000. Excluding the medical institutions, the university’s total budget was about 330 
million Euro (over 657 million Deutschmark), of which just over a third came from external 
public and private third party funding (Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule 
Aachen, 2001b, pp. XV and XVI of the statistical annex). This is a reflection of the 
unversity’s highly ranked status (cf. Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, 
2001a, p. 8) also illustrated by the German Research Council (DFG) funding for 16 special 
research areas (SFB) – the highest number nationwide (ibid., p. 20).398 Comparing all 15 
universities in North Rhine-Westphalia (excluding their medical institutions), the RWTH 
Aachen had by far the highest budget in the Land – ahead of Bonn, Bochum, Cologne, 
Münster and Dortmund – with the big gap principally due to the high amount of third-party 
funding (ibid., p. 25). 
 
In the winter term 2000/2001, the RWTH alone employed a total personnel of 10,339 – 
including 410 professors and 1941 academic staff – and had 27,421 students in 9 faculties, of 
which 42% were registered for the highly rated engineering sciences (Rheinisch-Westfälische 
Technische Hochschule Aachen, 2001b, pp. 13, 21-22 and 67). Also in Aachen are the 
polytechnical university of applied science ‘FH’ (Fachhochschule Aachen) as well as the 
neighbouring (former nuclear) research centre Jülich ltd ‘FZJ’ (Forschungszentrum Jülich 
GmbH). The research infrastructure and competence have attracted foreign firms such as 
Ericsson, Ford, United Technologies and Mitsubishi which have located their research 
laboratories in the region (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Aachen & Rheinisch-
Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, 2001, p. V). 
 
                                                 
398 The DFG supports these ‘SFB’ (Sonderforschungsbereiche) to address complex subjects over a longer time 
involving interdisciplinary research groups.  
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The university’s non-profit technology transfer and continuing education office ‘BTW’ (Büro 
Technologietransfer und Wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung)399 provides transfer services 
through two units: one dealing with technology and innovation transfer and one with 
scientific further education. It has the tasks of information management of the RWTH’s 
scientific potential and industry-university mediation (e.g. concerning staff transfer, provision 
of the DACOR database for cooperation in research400, etc.) as well as inititiating and 
promoting start-up companies from the university as a member of the start-up region initiative 
(e.g. by providing advisory services to young entrepreneurs) even though this was reported 
not be pursued more strongly to due staff shortages.401 
 
Additionally, the BTW has important coordinating and cooperation functions both internally 
and externally. For instance, it is internally responsible for the executive offices of the 
university’s five interdisciplinary fora that were established in 1988/1989, namely the Forum 
Space Research, Forum Environmental Science, Forum Materials Science, Forum Information 
Technology, Forum Technology and Society.402 The participation of nearly every second 
professor in at least one of the five fora (Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule 
Aachen, 2000, p. 7) is a sign that the indisciplinary cooperation networks have become part of 
the university culture. This seems to not only foster research progress internally but is likely 
to be a key contributer to the high third-party funding the university receives and the recently 
awarded status of an elite university following a successful application with the concept 
                                                 
399 For more information on the BTW, see its technology transfer and www.nrw-wissentransfer.de leaflets and its 
websites http://www.gruendungen.rwth-aachen.de and http://www.money-study-go.de. 
400 The DACOR database for cooperation in research is available at http://www.dacor.rwth-aachen.de 
401 Interview No. H, transcript page 2. 
402 See the BTW’s technology transfer and www.nrw-wissentransfer.de leaflets and the website 
http://www.rwth-aachen.de/zentral/dez4_InterdiszipForen.htm  
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entitled ‘RWTH 2020: meeting Global Challenges – The Integrated Interdisciplinary 
University of Technology’.403 
 
Furthermore, the BTW is the executive office for two external between university institutes 
and businesses in the fields of information technologies and biotechnology. This concerns 
first of all the industry club/network of REGINA (Regionaler Industrie-Club Informatik 
Aachen e.V.)404 that in 1991 emerged out of the university’s interdisciplinary IT forum.405 
REGINA brings together 56 firms, 19 university departments & research institutions and 4 
technology transfer organisations to foster cooperation and clustering in the field of IT 
(Regionaler Industrie-Club Informatik Aachen e.V., 2001, pp. 22-31). This cooperation, for 
instance, led to a 250,000 Euro sponsorship of a new university IT chair by four firm 
members of REGINA (Schiffers, 2001). LifeTec Aachen-Jülich e.V.406, the other public-
private partnership for which BTW provides the executive office, is an umbrella network in 
the field of LifeSciences/biotechnology established in 2000.  
 
In addition, the BTW cooperates with the ‘competence centre automotive region Aachen 
Euregio Maas-Rhein’, in short car e.V., an independent, active network of companies and 
research institutions in the area of automotive engineering set up in 2001 (further explained 
later on).407 Another network linked to the university’s institute for plastics processing ‘IKV’ 
(Institut für Kunststoffverarbeitung) is the ‘INTRA’ network (Interessengemeinschaft 
                                                 
403 As a result, the university receives additional funding from the national excellence initiative competition 
(Ministerium für Innovation, 2006, p. 4). 
404 For more information on REGINA, see http://www.regina.ict-gmbh.de 
405 Interview No. 26, transcript page 6. 
406 LifeTec Aachen-Jülich e.V. was established in June 2000 out of the structures of the euregional working 
group on biotechnology (Arbeitskreis Biotechnologie) (Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, 
2001a, p. 8) More information is available at http://www.rwth-aachen.de/zentral/dez4_LifeTec_LifeTec.html 
407 For more information about car e.V. see http://www.car-aachen.de as well the Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith 
(2008) article evaluating the effects of (automotive) cluster promotion with the example of car e.V. 
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innovative Aachener Unternehmer der Kunstoffbranche e.V.), which brings together 20 firms 
in this interest group of innovative enterprises for plastics engineering in the Aachen region.  
 
The extent of the active external coordination and cooperation role of the university transfer 
unit is arguably more advanced than in other universities. This is also linked to cooperation 
agreements the BTW has with regional organisations for the promotion of trade and industry 
and the regional technology centres. A cooperation agreement between the university 
(RWTH) and the chamber of commerce and industry (IHK) has existed since 1981 and is said 
to have been influential in the establishment of technology transfer in the region (Pagel & 
Herwig, 2000, p. 82) and for the establishment of business networks or cluster organisations 
such as REGINA and LifeTec.408 However, the cooperation process had to overcome some 
hurdles at the beginning and required a change of the attitude amongst the university’s 
stakeholders that technology transfer concerned large international firms and not local SMEs 
(Eschweiler & Indetzki, 2000, p. 121). 
 
For a long time, Aachen seemed unable to develop effectively its enormous potential for 
technology transfer (Regionalkonferenz Aachen, 1999, p. 6). This is partly because the region 
is ‘too small to absorb high transfer ratios from this university of important international 
reputation’ and because students get ‘qualified out’ due to a ‘lack of sufficient adequate job 
opportunities’ (Fromhold-Eisebith, 1992, p. 282). Put simply, the high-profile university 
departments and institutes, as well as their students, are looking for connections to companies 
from outside the region. For instance, half of the 150 annual IT graduates are reported to leave 
the region according to the REGINA network despite the vacancy of around 800 IT posts in 
                                                 
408 Interview No. E, transcript pages 6-9 
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the Aachen region (Schiffers, 2001). A lack of ‘regional embeddedness’ or ‘regional 
responsibility’ amongst university actors was reported by two interviewees. Furthermore, two 
interviewees pointed to the more decentralised university system with strong outward-
orientated professors with a world reputation that are allocated parts of the acquired-third 
party funding (‘principalities’), which may mean that a desired policy towards a regional 
cooperation focus cannot always be enforced.409  
 
In order to facilitate industry-university cooperation, the chamber and university published a 
cooperation handbook (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Aachen & Rheinisch-Westfälische 
Technische Hochschule Aachen, 2001) and useful sectoral reference handbooks e.g. for 
environmental and textile technologies (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Aachen, 2001a, 
2001b) that list businesses and research institutions. 
 
The dynamic higher education infrastructure in Aachen has for a long time been 
complemented by innovative policy developments, presented in the following section. 
 
Aachen’s regional development concepts  
 
The city of Aachen is sometimes said to be North Rhine Westphalia’s master pupil or test bed 
for new policies and initiatives. Its wider region was the first to develop a regional 
development concept (REK) in 1991 and was amongst those that continued the process in a 
second round and presented an updated ‘foREK’ version (Fortschreibung Regionales 
Entwicklungskonzept) in 1999 (Regionalkonferenz Aachen, 1999). Its five strategic areas are 
depicted in the following Figure 30:  
                                                 
409 Interview No. 25, transcript page 8; No. 47, page 3; No. 19, page 4; and No. 9, page 4. 
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Figure 30 Central strategic areas of the regional development concept ‘foREK’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Regionalkonferenz Aachen (1999, p. 10), own translation. 
 
Placed at the centre of this second regional development concept is a desired cooperative and 
holistic approach to tackle economic, employment and qualifications issues. A number of 
activity fields have been outlined for the strategic area of ‘cooperative economic and 
employment support’ (ibid., p. 11). This comprises: 
 
• Regional economic support: development and support of the existing base, relocation 
marketing, start-ups, venture capital and support instruments; 
• Initiatives and special tasks: business cooperation, crafts, services, support to women; 
• Integrative structural, employment and qualifications policy: labour market, spatial 
and gender specific initiatives and basic jobs; and 
• Forward-looking education system: vocational and further eduction. 
 
Integrated research, 
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 333 
 
This strategic area is linked to the other strategic areas, most directly with a reduction of the 
urban-rural intraregional development gap and a better use of the region’s research and 
technology potential that is regarded as the most important factor condition.  
 
Two years after the last closure of a coal mine, the foREK stated that in order to become a 
‘technological competence region’, the region must ‘strengthen the strength, but also identify 
new strength’ because ‘real “world-class regions” create clustering along their core 
competences’ (ibid., p. 13). To do so, the concept suggested more cross-border cooperation 
within the Euregio Meuse-Rhine (EMR)410 in a selected number of common regional 
competency fields with growth potential such as ICT/multimedia, life sciences, and 
automotive & rail (ibid., pp. 13-14). Linked to these fields, it was planned to undertake 
international location marketing and the establishment of ‘(eu)regional’ business cooperation 
as specific priority measures (ibid., p. 12).  
 
In this respect, the foREK concept picked up some of the ideas and measures that the chamber 
of commerce and industry had tabled to the regional conference in 1998 with the IHK 
strategic paper entitled ‘The Aachen region 2015 – Competences for Europe’ (Drewes, 2000, 
pp. 117-118; Regionalkonferenz Aachen, 1999, p. 12). 
 
An EU-funded INTERREG project (2002-05) entitled ‘Heartbeat of Life Sciences in Europe – 
Meuse Rhine Triangle’411 is judged to have ‘managed to better connect academia and industry 
across borders’ in this field, while overall ‘cross-border collaboration [...] has not been 
                                                 
410 The Euregio Meuse-Rhine comprises the wider Aachen region in Germany, the Wallonian province of Liège 
(including the German-speaking community) and Flemish province of Limburg in Belgium, and the Dutch 
province of Limburg in the Netherlands that includes the city of Maastricht. For more information on the 
Euregio Meuse-Rhine see http://www.euregio/mr.org 
411 For more information on the project see http://www.heartbeatineurope.org 
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sufficiently developed’ and further potential for co-operative technology development exists 
also in other fields (Fromhold-Eisebith, 2007, p. 22). 
 
Besides these proposed measures, it is, however, hard to identify in the the foREK an holistic 
and focussed cluster strategy and systemic innovation support. Interestingly, the foREK 
concludes by pointing to a need for governance action with a call for an intraregional 
institutional reform and an intensification of the cooperation between the various (eu)regional 
partners such as chambers, universities and development agencies in order to successfully 
complete the region’s structural change (ibid., p. 14). Given the broad phrasing of this 
statement, it may well be not just directed at a an improved coordination between the regional 
actors and those of the Euregio Meuse-Rhine (see Breuer, 2000, p. 107) but also at 
intraregional institutional reform. Regarding the former, progress was made in that REGIO 
Aachen e.V. – the body representing the Aachen region in the Euregio – was merged with the 
regional conference for developing the regional development concepts.  
 
An improved internal coordination of the cooperation of technology transfer institutions was 
amongst the eight measures proposed by an earlier EU-funded ‘RITTS’ project for ‘regional 
infrastructures and strategies for technology transfer and innovation support’ (Aachener 
Gesellschaft für Innovation und Technologietransfer mbH, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d; 
Europäische Kommission, 1995a).412 The importance of political support and the dependence 
on the social process are mentioned as key success factors in this respect (Aachener 
Gesellschaft für Innovation und Technologietransfer mbH, 1996a, pp. 18-19).  
 
                                                 
412 For more information see http://www.ris-ritts.epri.org/library/lib_regional.html and http://www.ac-
regio.de/ritts/index.html 
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The preliminary RITTS analysis had indeed concluded that overall the ‘regional network of 
technology transfer and innovation support is organised around the Chambers of Commerce, 
AGIT [Aachen’s corporation for innovation and technology transfer further discussed below] 
and the RWTH; however the networking is rather low between the various types of 
organisations and there is no coordination in their activities’ (ibid.,1996b, p. 20 of part A) 
which ‘deprived the region from synergies and ends up with overlapping (the reasons are both 
institutional and personal)’ (ibid.,1996b, p. 20 of part B4). 
 
A comparison of the cooperation between the different technology transfer organisations 
showed that the chambers and some of the university’s technology transfer units were intensly 
networked, the R&D institutions were averagely networked, while technology and start-up 
centres, commercial transfer support and other groups were weakly networked with the other 
actors (ibid.,1996a, pp. 20 and 24). 
 
The suggested eight measures included the implementation of pilot projects for the support of 
business partnerships along the value chain for potential clustering, an improvement of 
venture capital provision, the introduction of innovation management techniques via 
technology transfer personnel and business mentoring – some of which are partly reflected in 
the foREK concept.  
 
In addition to the lack of an overall coordinated approach, the absence of an explicit focus on 
SMEs reported in the RITTS intermediate report (ibid.,1996b, p. 16 of part A) concerning 
technology transfer activities is noticeable within the foREK concept. 
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Aachen’s regional start-up initiative 
 
Given the indicated lack of cooperation and overall systemic technology transfer support 
offered, a partial success story can be seen in the coordinated approach of the ‘Aachen start-
up region’ initiative (GründerRegion Aachen 2000, 2001). Since May 1999, this initiative 
presents the different start-up support measures under an umbrella organisation and brand 
with the aim to increase the number of new ventures in the wider Aachen region covering the 
city and its neighbouring counties of Aachen, Düren, Euskirchen and Heinsberg.  
 
A contributor to the development of this initative was the increasing competition from other 
regions in the area of start-up policy measures – e.g. the NUK business plan competition 
launched in Cologne in 1997 being advertising beyond the city region 413– and a reported 
existing ‘discontent’, ‘oversupply’ and overlapping of similar events.414 The reported 
discontent was probably a reason why the initatitive was set up with ad-hoc financing of 
partners but without its own legal entity so that a the potentially difficult task of dissolving an 
association with assets was avoided in the case of failure of this initiative. 
 
With a broad focus on the four areas of technology, services and trade, crafts and business 
succession, the initiative aims to achieve the following: 
 
• Intensification of start-up support as an advisory offensive; 
• Increase of transparency of support; 
• Optimisation of the advisory tools; and 
• Awareness-raising amongst potential entrepreneurs through marketing and public 
relations. 
                                                 
413 For more information on the association for new entrepreneuship Rhineland ‘NUK e.V.’ (Neues 
Unternehmertum Rheinland) see http://neuesunternehmertum.de 
414 Interview No. F, transcript page 10, 13 and 15. 
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Although the initiative has a back office based at the location of Aachen’s chamber of 
commerce and industry, it effectively consists of a kind of virtual one-stop-shop, which 
groups the fragmented 40 advisory institutions for start-up support without centralising them 
within one organisation. A steering committee of representatives of two local banks, the 
chambers, AGIT and the economic development offices takes the decisions for the broad 
direction of the initiative, while a working group of advisors from the service providers has 
the taks to further its implementation.  
 
Since the set-up of a common seperate start-up hotline and internet presence in 1999 – that 
was advertised with a logo and phrase ‘we make entrepreneurs’ –, the initiative offers first 
contact phone advice from the chambers, provides information material, and channels 
requests for appointments to one of the participating organisations according to their specific 
competencies.415 
 
An information pack was developed in the second year of operation and 4790 copies were 
distributed in Aachen and its neighbouring counties, for example at relevant fairs and through 
university events and courses (GründerRegion Aachen 2001, p. 2). It includes a detailed start-
up reference book, guidelines for the different steps, such as writing a business plan and 
useful contacts in the support institutions.  
 
                                                 
415 For more information on the ‘start-up region Aachen’ initiative, see http://www.gruenderregion.de 
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Additionally, the event calendar on the initiative’s website, as well its quarterly newsletter, 
Gründer, allowed the different support providers to coordinate their events and avoid 
overlaps. 
 
In its first year, the initiative managed to involve 17 established businessmen in providing 
advice to potential entrepreneurs and acting as start-up mentors (GründerRegion Aachen 
2000, section 2.2.1). Complementary, it organised an event in 2001 with regards to business 
succession. It also installed two information terminals (VOSS – Virtueller-One-Stop-Shop) at 
the technical university (RWTH) and the university of applied sciences/polytechnic (FH). 
 
Complementary to the Land initiative ‘GO!’, the concept for this initative was jointly 
developed by Aachen’s chamber of commerce and industry, AGIT and the local branch of the 
Sparkasse, which also represents the link to the regional awards of the bank’s national 
‘StartUp’ competition.416 Two further award competitions for start-ups were held in 2000: in 
cooperation with the ‘female entrepreneurs network of the Aachen economic region’417, the 
initiative launched the ‘VISION’ award for business concepts of female entrepreneurs; with 
the chambers of handicrafts and another bank, the initiative carried out the second edition of 
the competition ‘Weiter so!’ for young entrepreneurs in crafts. 
 
Overall, the initiative claims to have had 16,019 first contacts with interested potential 
entrepreneurs through its dense support infrastructure between May 1999 and June 2000, 
                                                 
416 The ‘StartUp’ initiative supported by the Sparkasse bank, the consultancy McKinsey & Company and the 
stern magazine comprise the competition, a conference and an internet-based planning game for pupils. The 
initiative introduced two phases for the competition 2001/2002 with a submission first of a basic business 
concept idea and calculations, and later a detailed business plan – similar to the start2grow competitions of 
dortmund-project – and also launched the first German start-up award (Deutscher Gründerpreis) in 2002. For 
more information, see the brochure ‘StartUp Kurzinformation 2002’ and http://www.startup-initiative.de  
417 For more information on the ‘Netzwerk für Existenzgründerinnen in der Wirtschaftsregion Aachen‘, see 
http://www. Netzwerk-gruenderinnen.de 
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which led to nearly 4,000 advisory meetings that may have contributed to some of the 5,000 
new ventures in crafts, trade and high-tech registered in the chamber district during this 
timeframe. While Aachen’s absolute figure still lags behind other regions, it saw a 35% 
increase of registered firms between 1990 and 1999, which represents a ranking as the second 
most dynamic region in a comparison of 12 selected chamber districts nation-wide 
(GründerRegion Aachen 2001, pp. 13-14). However, this early progress was achieved prior to 
the set up of the start-up region initiative and thus should rather be attributed to the Land’s 
start-up offensive ‘GO!’ (Gründungsoffensive). After the start of GO!, the number of 
interested potential entrepreneurs making contact with the Aachen chamber of commerce and 
industry was said to have doubled to 3,000 inidividual advisory meetings in 1997 (Brösse, 
2000, p. 66).  
 
The success of the ‘start-up region Aachen’ initiative still has to be evaluated itself. While on 
paper the initiative looks well-coordinated and the virtual signposting is a very useful tool for 
potential entrepreneurs to find the most suited advisor more quickly, it seems still not to have 
enabled more closer practical cooperation between the providers of start-up support. An early 
analysis stressed the importance of more cooperation for achieving a better coordination and 
transparency of the different advisory services (GründerRegion Aachen 2001, pp. 12-13), 
which seems crucial for the participation of the practitioners and thus success of the 
initiative.418 One interviewee pointed out that the initiative is ‘patchwork’, lacks organisation 
and is ‘the best example of how little coordination’ there is to the extent that one important 
player decided not to cooperate at all.419 However, another interviewee also stated that 
                                                 
418 An exchange of the working group on establishing aids for the advisors for structured first contacts had to be 
postponed for instance due to different opinions about the choice of presentations. 
419 Interview No. 13, transcript page 11. 
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conflicts in this field have decreased in recent years due to a higher concentration of specific 
target groups.420  
 
Therefore, this initative can be viewed as a partial success in that it appears externally to be a 
success in terms of having a clear profile and marketing and its virtual coordination but is still 
in the early stages of internal coordination and cooperation between actors from an 
oversupply of start-up support organisations. 
 
Nevertheless, given the university’s potential for spin-outs from high-calibre graduates and 
scientific personnel, the region’s focus on entrepreneurial support seems particularly 
appropriate from a strategic point of view. According to AGIT, 85% of all firms located in the 
region’s technology and start-up centres stem from the university sphere (Foerster, 2000). 
Around 450 spin-outs from the university were created between 1984 and 2001, which 
created around 4000 jobs directly with a similar indirect effect (Industrie- und 
Handelskammer zu Aachen & Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, 2001, 
p. V).  
 
Furthermore, the 1% start-up ratio amongst Aachen’s university graduates was above the 
national average of only 0.4% (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Aachen, 2000, p. 22). Yet, 
the aim of the university’s technology transfer unit was to raise Aachen’s graduates start-up 
ratio to 2%.421 
                                                 
420 Interview No. 25, transcript page 18. 
421 Transcript page 6. 
 341 
 
 
Aachen’s dense technology centre network 
 
The efforts for more entrepreneurial activities can further build upon an oversupply of twelve 
technology and start-up centres in the wider region that are said to have reached the ‘absolute 
degree of saturation’ (cf. Eschweiler & Indetzki, 2000, p. 142). In 2000, they provided a total 
of 90,000 m² of commercial space and advisory services to more than 450 firms with 3700 
employees. The centres apparently the interest of around 40 to 60 firms annually, of which 
eventually 20 young firms decide to locate there (Foerster, 2000).  
 
The region’s largest centres are the technology park Herzogenrath ‘TPH’ and the technology 
centre at the Europa square ‘TZE’ (Technologiezentrum am Europaplatz). The TPH opened in 
1989 just outside the boundaries of the city of Aachen after the TZE was approaching its 
capacity limits. The TZE had opened in 1984 as Germany’s second technology centre but as 
the first of many that were set up in the following years in North Rhine-Westphalia.422 The 
TZE and the city’s smaller sector-specific medical technology centre ‘MTZ’ 
(Medizintechnisches Zentrum), which opened in 1993 in proximity to the university hospital, 
are both operated by AGIT, which is discussed further in the following part. The start of the 
construction of another bio technology centre ‘BTZ’ (Bio-Technologiezentrum) close to the 
MTZ was planned for the end of 2001.  
 
                                                 
422 The TPH offers 25,000 m² for around 100 firms with 1,100 jobs, while the TZA offers 14,300 m² for 70 firms 
with 929 employees and the MTZ 4,200 m² for 20 firms with 150 jobs. For an overview and more information 
on the region’s technology and start-up centres, see the special supplement to the 03/2000 edition of the Gründer 
newsletter (Foerster, 2000). The first German technology centre ‘BIG’ (Berliner Innovations- und 
Gründerzentrum) was opened in Berlin in 1983 (Henschel-Neumann, 1988, p. 53). 
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The supporting advisory services provided by the technology and start-up centres in Aachen 
contributed to the low failure rate of 10% of start-ups according to its operator AGIT 
(Foerster, 2000). Indeed, technology transfer within the Aachen region is still viewed as a 
good practice example. This concerns not only Aachen’s technology centre (Gesellschaft für 
Wirtschaftsförderung in Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH, [1987], p. 33), which was mentioned by 
interviewees from other regions,423 but also the cooperation between firms and the Fraunhofer 
institute for laser technology ‘ILT’.424  
 
Not only did the Fraunhofer institute undertake over ten years over 1000 R&D projects on 
industry-relevant problems, applied for 250 patents and was the origin of 10 spin-offs from 
former staff, but it was also able to attract ten firms to locate to its application competence 
centre. Long-term cooperation contracts with these firms gave them their own office space 
and access to the technical infrastructure and separate laboratories that was intelligently 
electronically managed according to project teams. A collaborative culture based on 
transparency, good communication and trust was said to have been built to the extent that two 
competing leading laser producers both used the centre for the development of a common 
platform (Poprawe & Bauer, 1999, pp. 690-692). 
 
The central role of AGIT – Aachen’s corporation for innovation and technology transfer 
 
A special role in Aachen’s system of business and support organisations is played by 
Aachen’s corporation for innovation and technology transfer AGIT Ltd. (Aachener 
Gesellschaft für Innovation und Techologietransfer mbH), which was founded in 1983 to 
                                                 
423 Interview No. 46, transcript page 2. 
424 Interview No. 18, transcript page p. 4 
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operate the first of 12 technology centres (MTZ) in the wider Aachen area (Eschweiler & 
Indetzki, 2000, p. 142) .425 
 
While at the beginning AGIT was only foreseen to operate for the city and the neighbouring 
county of Aachen, its institutional set-up was soon widened by bringing together the bodies of 
the five counties of the wider Aachen region (Mahnke, [1987(?)], pp. 18-19), the chambers, 
the large research institutions as well as representatives from the private sector which, by 
1997, had provided a capital contribution of around 3.5 million Euro (Eschweiler & Indetzki, 
2000, p. 129).426  
 
AGIT states as its most pressing aims the creation of sustainable jobs and the renewal of the 
regional economic structure. Its main activies comprise advisory services for technology-
orientated entrepreneurs, innovative business (especially developed by the city’s higher 
education institutions) and international investors, the international location marketing of 
Aachen as a technology region, the support of selected technology fields, and the management 
of both of the technology centres in Aachen. With regards to the latter, it is said to have had a 
positive performance on employment effects (Fromhold-Eisebith, 1992, pp. 206-207; Körfer 
& Latniak, 1994). 
 
AGIT’s role has evolved and widened to the leading regional economic development agency 
in the region, illustrated by the fact that it hosts the back office for the regional conference 
that is responsible for the regional development concept. Correspondingly, three areas of 
                                                 
425 The technology centre at the Europa square ‘TZE’ (Technologiezentrum am Europaplatz) was opened in June 
1984 (Eschweiler & Indetzki, 2000, p. 124; Foerster, 2000). 
426 At its beginnings, AGIT was only to serve the citys of Aachen, but the planning conference of 1985, a spatial 
and functional extension was decided (Eschweiler & Indetzki, 2000, p. 129).  
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work can be identified for AGIT: technology centres, technology transfer and technology-
orientated economic development support and location marketing (Eschweiler & Indetzki, 
2000, p. 129).  
 
Given its unique combined function in the wider region, AGIT assumes the moderating role 
of the mediation process between science, intermediary actors and industry, as well as the 
leading role for providing impulses into thematic cooperation and lobbying networks, and 
market analysis for specific science and technology fields.427 This has consequently lead to 
some reported overlap with the other governance actors in the city-region (Meyer, 2000, p. 
42). 
 
The RITTS intermediate report (Aachener Gesellschaft für Innovation und 
Technologietransfer mbH, 1996c, p. 31) points out the external expectation for the need to 
maintain the expertise in the implementation of joint projects and the search for additional 
funding, as well to pressure from political scrutiny concerning the effenciency of technology 
policy. Concerning the latter, one external interviewee further indicated that the role of 
politicians as part of AGIT’s steering committee was not helpful giving the policial criticism 
and that apparently AGIT were becoming more dependant on third-party funding.428 
 
Given the particular role of AGIT, the region’s economic development coporations and 
offices were said to focus their activities more on attracting firm relocations and providing 
support to the established business base, while innovation and technology transfer remained a 
more implicit role (ibid.,1996c, p. 31). As economic development support is also the role of 
                                                 
427 AGIT’s website highlights this development of changing roles. See http://www.agit.de, last accessed 
December 2006. 
428 Interview No. G, transcript page 2 and No. F, transcript page 22. 
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AGIT, it is thus not suprising that there is no additional public-private partnership 
‘corporation’ besides the economic development office of in the city administration, whereas 
the region’s surrounding counties of Aachen, Heinsberg and Düren do have such body 
(Brösse, 2000, p. 63). 
 
Aachen’s competitive network 
 
Some of the earlier reported criticism concerning the coordination of Aachen’s business and 
innovation support system still very much appeared to be the case in the investigated period 
of 2002-2003. For instance, one interviewee highlighted that there were ‘too many captains’ 
and ‘everybody is trying to be the dominant player’ to the extent that ‘if you cooperate with 
one, the other looks at you in a bad way’.429 It was said that ‘close cooperation of institutions 
has failed due to egos and power interests’ and that the ‘grass is burned’ between 
intermediaries with the effect that new initiatives were said to be best not discussed and 
arranged with others due to a lack of trust and some organisations seeing each others as 
enemies. Instead, and a plea was made for less policy and more foresight and annual planning 
with quantified targets for specific sectors and areas.  
 
A different interviewee reported the ‘fighting over the same pot’ again and again with another 
organisation and the potential for more cooperation in particular areas such as location 
marketing.430 In this area, the scope for more cross-cluster marketing was identified and 
pursued via an external consultant as a ‘bypass strategy’ due to interpersonal animosities. 
Awaiting a change of staff was the solution mentioned by one interviewee for resolving the 
reported conflict. 
                                                 
429 Interview No. 13, transcript pages 2-3, 5-6 and 11. 
430 Interview No. 19, transcript pages 8-10. 
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Nevertheless, another interviewee states that while there are still ‘very autonomous, very self-
confident individual organisations, they managed to develop a culture of cooperation in the 
last 10/15 years’ in the Aachen region through informal structures even though several 
intersections in the network exist.431 However, ‘vested own interests for the survival of 
institutions’ and individual political orientations were said to be a more intensive obstacle to 
cooperation. At a higher level, the multiple levels of governance were criticised for being 
insufficiently formalised with no binding responsibility, onwer and resources. 
 
The strongly raised interpersonal conflicts and consequent lack of cooperation cited in this 
section is also reflected in the type attributed to relationships with other local core 
institutional actors within the local economic and innovation support system. Interviewees 
were asked to complete a supporting matrix tool (see appendix VI) to list other organisations 
according to their level of activity and the nature of the relationship distinguished broadly 
between competititve, collaborative or a mixture of both. Based on a non-representative social 
network analysis (see the following table at the end of this section), the results show that more 
network combinations with other local actors were said to be a mixture of a competitive and 
collaborative relationship (16) than purely collaborative (14). This points to a lower degree of 
cooperation within the system, especially bearing in mind the expected and resulting tendency 
across all case studies that very few relationships are rated as purely competitive. A positive 
point is that good cooperation with local bank institutions was mentioned. 
 
                                                 
431 Interview No. 47, transcript pages 6 and 9. 
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The accompanying figure depicts the relationships according to the matrix results and 
highlights, for instance, that relationships between the key institutional actors – represented 
by larger circles – are viewed more as a mix of competition and cooperation. Moreover, it 
shows that relationships with one organisation are viewed by nearly all others as 
collaborative, while another organisation is viewed by none as purely collaborative.  
 
A predominantly collaborative mentioning of relationships is found with regional actors 
indicating good connections at the Land level and umbrella networks, while several linkages 
with national and EU/international actors are also mentioned, more with a balanced 
assessment. The latter is a reflection of the international orientation of the ‘European’ city-
region due to its geographical border location next to Belgium and the Netherlands and the 
increasing activities within the transnational Euregio Meuse-Rhine initiative.  
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Figure 31 Network of relationships of the local actors in Aachen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Circles represent local organisations within Aachen. Their names have been omitted for privacy reasons. 
The thickness of arrows indicates the nature of relationships mentioned as explained below.  
Arrows pointing at no particular circle represent relationships with regional organisations at Land level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 Relationships within Aachen’s business and innovation support system  
              Level of involvement/ 
 
 
Relationship to other 
organisations 
Local 
City-region 
 
 
(Aachen) 
Regional 
 
 
 
(Land NRW)
National 
 
 
 
(Germany) 
EU / 
International
Interregional 
 
(EU)  
Competitive 
 
0 0 2 3 
Mixture of competitive and 
collaborative 
16 1 
(****) 
3 2 
(*) 
Collaborative 
 
14 6 
(**) 
4 5 
None of the above or  
no connections 
0 0 
 
0 0 
Note: The numbers indicate the network combinations of organisations entered in the institutional matrix 
mapping tool. There were no fixed numbers or type of organisations that had to be mentioned by interviewees. 
Stars (*) represent a double entry of an organisation that was (re)moved, e.g. cooperation with local actors at the 
international level to be displayed as an entry at the local level. See footnote 537 for more information.  
 
Source to figure and table: Own creation based upon supporting matrix tool completed by 5 local interviewees 
(one academic was not asked to complete it). 
Collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at.  
Mixture of competitive and collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
Competitive relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
F 
E 
H 
L 
JK 
I 
C 
G 
D 
B 
A 
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Local economic development policy and actors in the city-region of Dortmund  
 
While Dortmund’s industrial tradition of coal production ended in the 1980s and steel 
production was reduced to refinements by 2000, the city is still one of Europe’s biggest 
brewery locations although with significantly lower dominance in terms of employment.432 
Overall, Dortmund suffered severly from employment reductions in the 1990s; around 15,000 
jobs in industry were lost between 1990 and 1997 (see Stadt Dortmund, 2001, annex 2). 
Consequently, the city had to cope with avery high unemployment rate of 14.7% in 2002. 
While the city did not manage to reduce the structural unemployment – it even rose slightly to 
15.5% by 2007 –, Dortmund considerably raised its GDP ratio per employed person from 
nearly €54,000 in 2001 to nearly €64,000 in 2006 (see Table 26). 
 
As the old sectors coal, steel and beer have declined, new sectors are emerging but are not yet 
fully developed, such as microsytems technology (Bömer, 2001; Jonas, Berner, Bromberg, 
Kolassa, & Sözen, 2002, p. 47; Dieter Rehfeld & Wompel, 1999). A number of young but 
internationally recognised software developing firms have been regarded as the core focus for 
the city’s structural change as reflected in the city’s economic development initiatives. 
Dortmund’s regional airport has become a new city asset in terms of infrastructure following 
the airport’s enlargement in 2000 and a consequent increase in the route network and 
passenger numbers (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, p. 29).  
 
                                                 
432 By 2000, 35 beer brands were still brewed in the city (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Dortmund, 2001, p. 
44) with the Brau und Brunnen AG producing 6 million hecto litres of beer annually, while the Dortmunder 
Actien-Brauerei (DAB) produced around 4 million (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, pp. 22-23). 
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Dortmund’s business and employment promotion agency ‘WBF-DO’ (Wirtschafts- und 
Beschäftigungsförderung) as a unit of the city’s administration with about 70 staff has the 
classic economic development tasks of looking after its business base, location marketing and 
providing advisory services concerning commercial locations and financial support schemes, 
as well as several tasks linked to the field of employment (and start-up) support as its name 
indicates.433 This comprises managing the local labour market fund and coordinating 
functions concerning European Social Funds, and equality and youth related activities 
(Bömer, 2000, pp. 141-143; Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 
33; Küpper & Röllinghoff, 2000, pp. 23-24).  
 
In the early 1990s, the WBF-DO took the lead for the work on the Dortmund part of the 
regional development concept (REK) for Dortmund/Unna/Hamm (Bade & Theisen, 1997, p. 
124). The regional development concept for the wider Eastern Ruhr area and its action 
programme did not appear to have had a significant influence in Dortmund’s economic 
development strategy judging from overlaps in terms of content according to the KVR 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. XXXIII-XXXVIII of annex). 
 
The WBF-DO viewed itself as a ‘learning organisation’ (Stadt Dortmund, 1999, p. 2) and 
added sectoral and technology development as another activity field in 1997. The combination 
of business and employment functions is also clearly reflected in the city’s strategic approach 
in terms of sectoral skills development and personnel recruitment (cf. Bömer, 2000, pp. 141-
143). 
 
                                                 
433 Interviewee from WBF-DO, transcript page 2. 
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dortmund-project: organisational innovation for local cluster policy making 
 
The city’s sectoral and cluster orientation was further enhanced at the end of 1999 when a 
project group developed a future concept for a ‘new’ and ‘fast’ Dortmund as a response to the 
end of steel production in Dortmund. This led to the creation of the ‘dortmund-project’ in 
May 2000 as a public-private partnership by the City of Dortmund (initiated through WBF-
DO) and the steel corporation ThyssenKrupp Inc., in close cooperation and strategic input 
from the consultancy McKinsey and Co. Inc.434  
 
The consultancy input was financed by Thyssen Kruppen Inc. as a corporate contribution – 
i.e. ‘regional political responsibility’435 – to the city’s further structural change necessary to 
compensate for the firm ending steel production in the city.436 The McKinsey study on the 
future concept is said to have played a key role in developing dortmund-project’s strategic 
business plan and cluster approach.437 While the McKinsey study picked up the results of an 
earlier IAT study (Rehfeld & Wompel, 1999) that identified the three innovation and 
competence fields in Dortmund, it perhaps was rather more instrumental in developing the 
implementation strategy for the cluster initiatives in these areas and in bringing attention to 
the project’s objectives. Inspiration for commissioning the work to McKinsey was the 
consultancy’s role in developing the model regional economic development concept for 
Wolfsburg Inc. (AG).  
 
                                                 
434 For more background on the establishment of dortmund-project, see the supplement of the magazine ‘Ruhr 
Nachrichten PLUS extra’, volume 19 – January 2002, Dortmund.  
435 Interview No. 36, transcript page 3. 
436 See the article of Heinrich Kahmeyer, the ThyssenKrupp representative for Dortmund on the establishment of 
dortmund-projects entitled ‘Die Vorgeschichte’, see the supplement of the magazine ‘Ruhr Nachrichten PLUS 
extra – Information für Handel, Handwerk und Gewerbe’, volume 19 – January 2002, pp 2-3.  
437 Wolfsburg Inc. (AG) is a joint subsidiary of the Wolfsburg city and its main employer Volkswagen (VW). 
For more information on the Wolfsburg AG, see http://wolfsburg-ag.com 
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Another model reference in this context was Pittsburgh’s experience with a similar economic 
background especially in terms of cooperative planning processes and effective public-private 
partnership (Kunzmann, Lang, & Theisen, 1993), where McKinsey also provided a SWOT 
analysis in 1997 (Güntner, 1999). This link also led to an international cooperation agreement 
with the Pittsburgh Regional Alliance (PRA) in December 2001, mutual delegation visits and 
cooperation projects (Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung Dortmund, 2002) as well as 
with the establishment of the internationalisation team at WBF-DO.438 
 
The dortmund-project is seen as 10 year project with the aim to create 70,000 new jobs by 
2010 (dortmund project, 2000, p. 5; Opl, 2002). This target has been set high 439 – probably 
deliberately too high – but the boldly stated ambitious vision together with the aim to achieve 
it quickly, as implicit in the pronounced slogan ‘the new Dortmund is the fast Dortmund’ 
(‘Das neue Dortmund ist das schnelle Dortmund’), certainly succeeded in gaining attention. 
One interviewee highlighted the following in this respect:440 
 
‘People listen with such a figure. They may not believe that one can achieve this but 
they listen. And if one can provide them with reasonable arguments, they may then 
even believe it. It is not really that we have thought this figure up and said let’s do it, 
but we have thought about it and deliberated it [...] to use the sledgehammer 
approach’.  
 
The dortmund-project focuses on specific projects on Dortmund’s attractiveness as a business 
location and on supporting the growth and development of businesses in the following three 
future growth sectors or clusters with high innovation potential (Rehfeld & Wompel, 1999): 
                                                 
438 See also Wirtschafts-report of WBF-DO of February 2002. 
439 Interview No. 34, transcript page 1. 
440 Interview No. I, transcript page 8. 
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information technologies (IT, including e-commerce); microsystems technology (MST or 
MEMS); and e-logistics. The employment in these three sectors was envisaged to have the 
potential to rise from 13,000 jobs identified in 2000 to 73,000 by 2010, thereby creating 
60,000 jobs, whereas an additional 10,000 were expected from secondary effects in 
complementary and other sectors.441 Thereby, it was hoped to halve the city’s unemployment 
rate, which in 2002 was still 14.7% (see Table 26).442  
 
By 2006, the city hosted around 680 IT and software firms with around 12,000 employees, 
100 e-commerce firms with more than 3,000 employees, 250 logistics firms with nearly 
22,000 employees, and 24 MST firms (up from only 10 with 1200 employees in 1999), which 
is claimed to be the largest MST-Cluster in Germany (Stadt Dortmund, 2002, p. 11) and one 
of the biggest in Europe with linkages to medical technologies and the automotive sector –
representing 15% of all jobs in this field according to the dortmund-project.443 This would 
show that some progress towards the ambitious objective was made. Iking (2004, p. 17) also 
reports that the number of commercial enterprises rose between 1999 and 2003 from 34,886 
to 42,455 creating around 9000 jobs. The city certainly provided sufficient redeveloped 
industrial land sites in six particular locations for new business developments, some of them 
being allocated to one or more of these strategic sectors (see dortmund-project, 2000, p. 
                                                 
441 PowerPoint presentation on ‘dortmund-project’ of 19.06.2000 provided by dortmund-project. See also the 
article of Dr. Thomas Heuser from McKinsey on the analysis (‘Die Analyse’) of the consultancy’s study for 
Dortmund economic development concept, see the supplement of the magazine ‘Ruhr Nachrichten PLUS extra – 
Information für Handel, Handwerk und Gewerbe’, volume 19 – January 2002, pp 4-5. It details that the forecast 
potential of 60,000 jobs in the lead industries were based upon an expected 34,000 in IT, 16,000 in microsytems 
technologies and 10,000 in logistics and established sectors. 
442 See also the six core of the dortmund-project aims stated in the brochure of WBF-DO entitled ‘Engagement 
für Innovation und Arbeit’, Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung Dortmund, October 2000. 
443 See website of dortmund-project at http://www.dortmund-project.de, Stadt Dortmund (2002, p. 11), the flyer 
of ‘e-port-dortmund: Kompetenzzentrum für E-Logistik’, ARGE PHOENIX et al. (2000, p. 5), and confer Jonas 
et al. (2002, p. 12). 
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27).444 A mid-term review report by the Dortmund city council of June 2005 also showed 
positive progress in the three lead sectors above the State and national average. However, it 
also ascertained that it would be unlikely that the project will attain its ambitious objectives 
after 10 years given overall economic conditions (Küpper & Röllinghoff, 2005). 
 
The focus on three key sectors with high potential, based on identified strength and 
competences in industry and science, together with a holistic approach in developing projects 
supporting their development from various angles seemed highly innovative at the time. A 
policy approach, that previously seemed to be reserved for the national and occasionally 
wider regional level, was applied to the sub-regional city level. Importantly, it succeeded to 
maintain a narrow sectoral focus on the three selected growth clusters – for which a critical 
mass for a potentially leading national position was identified in Dortmund – despite 
intensively debated calls for including sectors such as bio-medicine/biotechnology, 
environmental technologies, media and robotics & automatisation technologies.445 This 
concentrated approach allowed sufficient resources for detailed support and animation. This 
contrasts with the majority of comprehensive cluster policies that can usually be found to 
cover too large a portfolio, which often appears to be watered down due to political pressure 
and vested stakeholder interests.  
 
                                                 
444 The six sites include the former iron and steel works site PHOENIX, the technology park Dortmund, the 
harbour, the Westfalenhütte, the old airport, and a site in the eastern part of the city (Stadtkrone Ost). See also 
PowerPoint presentation on ‘dortmund-project’ of 19.06.2000 provided by dortmund-project that outlines the 
locations of the new lead industries as well as the identification of sector development needs for location in 
ARGE Phoenix et al. (see 2000, p. 11). 
445 See the article of Dr. Thomas Heuser from McKinsey on the analysis (‘Die Analyse’) of the consultancy’s 
study for Dortmund economic development concept, see the supplement of the magazine ‘Ruhr Nachrichten 
PLUS extra – Information für Handel, Handwerk und Gewerbe’, volume 19 – January 2002, pp 4-5 as well as 
the minutes of the meeting on 07.11.2001 of the City Council committee for economic and employment 
promotion ‘AWBF’ (see Stadt Dortmund, 2001, p. 5 and annex 4).  
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In this respect, it was important that the setting up of this new organisation in the local 
governance system received the political backing not only from the city council, who decided 
upon its implementation in June 2000, but also from the city’s lord mayor (Jonas et al., 2002, 
p. 38; Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 33) who acts not only 
as chairmen of the City Council but as chief of the city administration too (Tata, 2007, p. 14). 
The latter declared the project as a matter of his own top level priority giving it the status of 
an independent unit responsible only and directly to the lord mayor, hence not a sub-unit of 
WBF-DO.  
 
In addition to this important direct link to the Lord Mayor, controlling processes were forseen 
to assess the progress of dortmund-project (see Stadt Dortmund, 2001, annex 3) e.g. through 
annual reporting to the City Council committee for economic and employment promotion 
‘AWBF’ (Auschuss für Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung). 
 
The governance structure of dortmund-project also includes a supervisory ‘steering 
committee’ (Steuerkreis) and a supporting ‘project committee’ (Projektausschuss) to provide 
directions and advice (see Figure 32 further below). The composition of the steering 
committee as the supervisory board brought together 24 key movers and shakers from 
industry, politics and science. The participation of the high-profile actors was said to mirror 
the ‘Dortmund consensus’ for innovative economic development support in the city (Stadt 
Dortmund, 2001, annex 3).446  
                                                 
446 The members of the steering committee initially included the Lord mayor, the CEO of WBF-DO, the 
chairpersons of the three political parties in the City Council, the vice chancellors of the universities, the CEOs 
of the regional chambers, the director of the job center, two high representatives of unions, the CEOs of Projekt 
Ruhr and IKR, the Land’s minister for the economy and three senior officials, the chief administrator of the 
Arnsberg regional administrative district, and the business CEOs of RWE Systems and ThyssenKrupp, latter of 
which was also represented with two further board mebers and the ThyssenKrupp Dortmund representative. 
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What appears to be unique to the dortmund-project is the entire professional approach that can 
be grasped when visiting the organisation. This impression is also relected in the analysis by 
Tata (2007, p. 14), who reports about a ‘special culture of work’ with a readiness to work 
overtime which he believed to have evolved from the initial involvement of consultants from 
McKinsey and the employees of ThyssenKrupp. The involvement of these inspiring movers 
and shakers together with the recruitment of fresh university graduates supported by a certain 
financial budget may explain this visible dynamism. 
 
While the initial concept foresaw a 36-strong team, the dortmund-project and was eventually 
allocated 18 staff by the City Council (see Table 28), together with 3 additional secondees 
from ThyssenKrupp for the first 2 years, and a significant finanicial commitment of an annual 
budget of around 6.5 million Euro (13 million DM) over 10 years.447 Having its own PR staff, 
a large marketing budget, specialised staff allocated to the growth sectors and cluster 
initiatives (see Table 28) means that the dortmund-project is able to create trademarks for its 
activities, which communicate leitmotifs and secure a positive external presentation. Although 
obviously the dortmund-project has received large scale financial support and the employment 
target may be more marketing than actually achievable, the approach is seen here clearly as a 
good practice model. 
 
                                                 
447 The project started temporarily with a 25-strong team at the end of October 2000. See the articles of Dr. 
Thomas Heuser from McKinsey on the analysis (‘Die Analyse’) of the consultancy’s study for Dortmund 
economic development concept, the article on the makers (‘Die Macher’), the interview article with Udo Mager, 
the CEO of dortmund-project, on the organisation’s start (‘Startbilanz’), and the article on the steering 
committee (‘Der Steuerkreis’) in the supplement of the magazine ‘Ruhr Nachrichten PLUS extra – Information 
für Handel, Handwerk und Gewerbe’, volume 19 – January 2002, pp 4-5, 7 and 14-15. See also dortmund-
project (2000, p. 28). 
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This view is shared by some interviewees from other city-regions and wider stakeholders, 
who refer to Dortmund’s overall policy approach as good practice448, even though there was 
scepticism raised by one interviewee with regards to the future of one of the projects 
measures, namely the Phoenix land site development.449  
 
Table 28 Personnel of dortmund-project according to activity areas 
Activity areas Own full-time 
personnel 
Additonal seconded 
personnel 
Location, spin-outs and development E/IT 2 staff  
Location, spin-outs and development MST 1 staff  
E-logistics 1 staff  
Start2grow competitions 3 staff  1 staff for 75% from 
ThyssenKrupp Inc. and 
1 staff for 50% from the 
City of Dortmund 
E-City location development 3 staff  
Human resources 1 staff  
Project communication 2 staff  2 staff from 
ThyssenKrupp Inc. 
Administrative support 5 staff   
Total staff of dortmund-project for all areas 18 own staff 3 seconded staff  
 
Note: E/IT stands for Information technologies and software development for e-commerce and mobile services; 
MST for microsystems technology linked to nanotechnology and production technology; and e-logistics for 
software solutions which are specially developed for logistics application sectors (City of Dortmund, 2007). 
Source: Own translation of presentation by Udo Mager from dortmund-project of October 2001 (see Stadt 
Dortmund, 2001, annex 5). 
 
In addition to the direct funding of the dortmund-project, the city was said to have provided 
further funding of around €50 million for key initiatives. All in all, together with funding 
from the EU, the Land and other private and public actors, about €500 million of investment 
                                                 
448 Interviews No. 18, transcript page 2, No. 17, pages 5 and 9. 
449 Interview No. 14, trasnscript page 19. 
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were said to be invested in projects linked to the dortmund-project.450 This success was 
strongly attributed to the convinction of the political actors.451  
 
Out of the 69 projects selected by the Projekt Ruhr GmbH out of roughly 400 applications for 
€400 million in the framework of the objective 2 funding452 for the Ruhr area, Dortmund 
alone gained support for a total of nine specific projects, nearly all linked to the dortmund-
project, together with further support for the future development location of Phoenix West 
and Ost (Projekt Ruhr GmbH, 2002). The nine particular projects include support for: the 
MST.factory and the establishment of a robotic and automisation centre (RACe) in the 
competence fields of industrial technologies and materials; a software shed at Phoenix West, 
the establishment of an ‘Internet III Development Centre’, and the B1st Software factory in 
the competence field ICT; the e-port-dortmund in the field of logistics; for a biomedical 
centre Dortmund in the competence field of medical technology and health economy; the 
further transformation of the former coal mines Zollern Zollern II/IV as cultural locations for 
the Triennale; and the new housing development of the economic vocational schools for hotel 
business and catering trade (WIHOGA). This might be viewed as an indication of the 
conceptional quality of Dortmund’s strategic approach for economic development support. 
 
Moreover, the Dortmund-foundation (Dortmund-Stiftung) was set up in July 2000 to support 
institutions and individual projects with funds of private donors in view ‘to support public 
welfare in terms of science, research, education, education and culture, if they, at the same 
                                                 
450 Interview No. 40, transcript page 3. 
451 Interview No. 34, transcript page 14. 
452 Over the period 2000-2006, objective 2 of the EU Structural Funds aimed “to revitalise all areas facing 
structural difficulties, whether industrial, rural, urban or dependent on fisheries”. For more information see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/objective2/index_en.htm. 
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time, help to secure the future chances of Dortmund as a location for innovative technologies 
and creating new jobs’.453  
 
The Dortmund-foundation already accumulated endowments of over 1.5 million Euro (3.1 
million DM) from 100 donors (see Stadt Dortmund, 2001, annex 6) by June 2001, while this 
rose to over 2 million Euro from about 120 private donors by 2005 (Küpper & Röllinghoff, 
2005). The foundation’s statute allows that up to 50% of its endowments are used to support 
the start-up or investment in businesses, which activities can be seen to follow this objective. 
For this puropose, the investment corporation dopro Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbh was set up 
at the same time as a 100% subsidiary of the non-profit Dortmund-foundation.454 Figure 32 
highlights some of these strategic investments in public-private partnerships closely linked to 
the dortmund-project’s key initiatives. Some of them are described in the next section. 
                                                 
453 Own translation of the draft statute of the Dortmund-Stiftung of 19.06.2000 provided by dortmund-project. 
For more information see http://www.dortmund-stiftung.de/ By March 2009, nearly 100 contributing supporters 
for the Dortmund Foundation were registered. 
454 The capital endowment of dopro was raised to 200,000 Euro by April 2001 (Stadt Dortmund, 2001, annex 6). 
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Figure 32 Organisational set-up and network of the dortmund-project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own creation, partly based upon similar figures in Ruhr Nachrichten Plus, 19. Ed., January 2002, p. 15 
and PowerPoint presentation on ‘dortmund-project’ of 19.06.2000 provided by dortmund-project and see Stadt 
Dortmund (2001, annex 5) 
 
 
Innovative tools and instruments: strategic implementation for local cluster initiatives 
 
The following quote illustrates the strategic approach applied by dortmund-project to achieve 
its ambitious goals, which is not focussed on supporting innovation as such but on supporting 
key sectors in a holistic manner:  
 
Our aim is not to support innovation technology but employment and we achieve 
that by doing three things: on the one side, to get business, which are already located 
at our end, to grow; on the other side, to catch new external businesses and bring them 
here; and thirdly, to contribute to start-ups. It’s true that these are general things but 
we really tackle this. And that means that we run regular workshops in the United 
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States and IT firms and soon also systems technology will have a location here. With 
regards to the area of start-ups, we do start-up competitions split up into sectors. That 
is the IT sector, the systems technology sector and a competition where all sectors are 
fixed up. 455 
 
The dortmund project appears to have been very active in its self-proclaimed role as an 
‘accelerator’456 and initiated several projects such as the MST.factory dortmund and e-port-
dortmund incubators, the campain ‘Locate IT’ aiming to attract foreign IT business, the 
annual start up competitions ‘start2grow’ and the similar growth aid competitions 
‘ziel.wachstum’, and the JOY (Junior of the Year) initiative to get more young people 
interested in an apprenticeship in the software industry.457 It is evident from the range of 
projects that the dortmund project has innovatively followed a holistic approach covering 
infrastructure projects and entities, addressing skills issues and marketing/communication 
aspects as well as implemented measures at the local level that are usually found at national or 
the wider regional Land level. Some of the projects are briefly introduced in this case study to 
show their strategic alignment. 
 
The dortmund-project helped to establish the MST.factory in 2000, which is the first start-up 
and development centre for micro systems technology (MST or MEMS) in Germany 
providing office and laboratory space and especially, since its completion in April 2005, a 
clean room facility with equipment – built as a collective good accessable on a rental basis – 
as well as integrated business advisory services from around 6-8 employees e.g. for the 
development of prototypes, training, coaching and networking. This competence centre for 
micro and nanotechnology sees itself as an incubator for young enterprises in the field, which 
                                                 
455 Interviewee from dortmund-project, transcript page 3. 
456 Interviewee from dortmund-project, transcript page 17. 
457 Interviewee from dortmund-project, transcript page 14. 
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after three to five years of support shall then find their own location in the 110-hectare 
Phoenix West business park, where the MST.factory is based.  
 
While the infrastructure development received 32.3 million € funding from the Land and an 
ERDF contribution of 18.2 million €, the operating corporation MST.factory Dortmund 
GmbH was set up in 2001 as a limited company from a partnership between the Dortmund 
Foundations’ investment corporation dopro and the microsystems technology industry 
association ‘IVAM NRW e.V.’ (Interessengemeinschaft zur Verbreitung von Anwendungen 
der Mikrostrukturtechniken NRW e.V.), each providing 50% of the starting capital.458 It was 
later transferred to the technology centre Dortmund management corporation, itself a 100% 
subsidiary of the city of Dortmund. The heavy public investment into the MST.factory may 
have also addressed a market failure, given the reported initial unwillingness of businesses to 
commit the risk capital (Jonas et al., 2002, p. 40).459 By May 2007, the MST.factory incubator 
was said to be fully occupied with four out of the twelve start-ups hosted having relocated 
from abroad.460 
 
The integration of IVAM NRW e.V. – which in 2001 brought together around 83 firms and 
31 institutions as members of this microsystems technology network based in Dortmund (cf. 
Jonas et al., 2002, p. 29) – can be seen an important aspect that provided a driving force for 
MST.factory’s development as well as linkages to the Centre for Structural and 
                                                 
458 Transcript page 1 and PowerPoint presentation entitled ‘MST.factory Dortmund: Tasks and concepts’ of 
September 2002 provided by MST.factory Dortmund GmbH. For more information on the MST.factory see 
http://www.mst-factory.com.  
459 Interview No. 20, transcript page 1. 
460 See case study about the MST.factory entitled ‘MST-Factory: a high-tech incubator hatching a “nano-
future”’, available at the European Commission’s Regional Policy – Inforegio website under Regional 
Innovation Projects in the section ‘Bringing ideas to the market’ at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/interregional/ecochange/studies_a_en.cfm?nmenu=5#cl3 
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Interconnection technologies ‘AVT’ (Zentrum für Aufbau und Verbindungstechnik).461 The 
cluster organisation IVAM started as an initiative in 1993, established an association in 1995, 
and founded a fee-based service corporation in 2000.462  
 
Another incubator established by dortmund-project with a similar concept is e-port-dortmund, 
a start-up and competency centre for e-logistics. The e-port-dortmund GmbH (Ltd.) was set 
up in December 2000 (Stadt Dortmund, 2001, annex 6) and since 2002 provides office space 
at Dortmund’s port and advice to 24 enterprises.463 
 
A further e-factory Dortmund was planned to support businesses in the areas of IT, software 
and e-commerce with the establishment of the ‘E-Lab dortmund’ incubator with private 
funding and with supporting roadshows and competitons. The ECC Electronic Commerce 
Centre Ltd. located at the technology centre Stadtkrone Ost started in August 1999 to pool the 
products and services of 18 companies (see dortmund-project, 2000, p. 7). It goes back to the 
concept of the thematic development of the location Stadtkrone Ost (see Stadt Dortmund, 
2001, annex 8).464 
 
The particularity of the three annual start up competitions ‘start2grow’ for nurturing business 
plans into start-ups and two similar growth promotion competitions ‘ziel.wachstum’ is the 
inherent socialised learning that is encouraged and for which a strategy is provided. They are 
both not simply submission-based competitions but follow a standardised support and 
advisory programme, which brings applicants into contact with each other through 
                                                 
461 For more information on IVAM e.V. see http://www.ivamnrw.com 
462 Interview No. 5, transcript page 2. 
463 For more information about e-port-dortmund see http://www.e-port-dortmund.de 
464 For more information on the ECC, see http://www.ecc-gmbh.de 
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networking events (especially in the growth aid competition) as well as with a mentor and 
pool of experts in around 10 advisory sessions/events spread over several months that 
interactively help to bring ideas to implementation in the business community. This is also 
reflected in the prize winning incentive structure. For instance, in its second edition in 2002, 
the microsystems technology start2grow competition awarded 2,500 € in phase 1 for each of 
the five best initial basic business plans, a total of 230,000 € to the six best refined business 
plans in phase 2, while the best three start-up teams were awarded 12,500 € each.  
 
Two of the start-up competitions follow the cluster focus, while one is open to all sectors. The 
sector-specific start2grow competition for e-commerce, m-commerce and IT started in March 
2001 and the business plan competition for microsystems technology firms – the first in 
Europe - started in April 2001.465 The former attracted 75 teams, of which 45 submitted a 
detailed business plan at the end of phase 2 after about four months, while the latter 
comprised 12 teams which all submitted a detailed business plan at the end of phase 2. For the 
latter, an intensive phase 3 was added for prototype development, which means that this 
competition lasts longer for the successful teams.466 These sustainability figures for the 
initative were better than the 50% retention rate predicted by McKinsey. The open 
competition also attracted another 100 teams.467 Overall, these start-up competitions 
developed by McKinsey managed to activate over 550 volunteer coaches and created 3 IT 
firms, 5 microsystems technology firms and 56 other firms from the competitions for all 
                                                 
465 See start2growth brochures and website of dortmund-project at http://www.dortmund-project.de, last accessed 
December 2006 as well as htpp://www.start2grow.de.  
466 Interview No. I, transcript page 4. 
467 See the article on start2grow (‘Gründungswettwerbe’) and the interview article with Udo Mager, the CEO of 
dortmund-project, on the organisation’s start (‘Startbilanz’) in the supplement of the magazine ‘Ruhr 
Nachrichten PLUS extra – Information für Handel, Handwerk und Gewerbe’, volume 19 – January 2002, pp 9, 
14-15. 
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sectors between 2001-2004 (Küpper & Röllinghoff, 2005).468 The relatively small number of 
five new microsystems technology firms was seen to be a success for this sector given that 
there were apparently only a total of nine start-ups in the sector nationwide in 1999 and that 
there were only around 15 firms in this sector in 2002 in Dortmund.469 
 
Correspondingly, the two growth promotion competitions ‘ziel.wachstum’ support the growth 
of SMEs with up to 250 employees through corporate development coaching. One 
competition targets IT businesses while the other is open to all sectors. Both foster growth 
plans and provide prizes for growth awards along with networking and partnering events 
along the process. Given that coaching involves a degree of (‘mirror’) self-analysis, firms 
must be carefully approached and can need quite some convincing to participate: this 
dimension was said to have improved after product was launched and better explained, and 
further sponsors  were found.470 The first edition of the growth competitions attracted around 
40 businesses. A specific growth initiative for the microsystems technology firms at the time 
was not set up given that the around 15 existing firms were said to have been growing already 
at double-digit rates.471 By 2002, about 70 evening events were said to be organised annually 
for both the start2grow and growth promotion competitions with around 50-200 people 
attending each.472   
 
                                                 
468 The development of such learning and cooperation platforms is particularly important for clustering processes 
in cross-cutting sectors such as microsystems technologies that require the combination of different competence 
fields (cf. Jonas et al., 2002, pp. 15 and 33). Further – off the record – ideas for improving the efficiency of the 
coaching system were mentioned by one interviewee from the dortmund-project (transcript page 6). 
469 Interview No. I, transcript page 11. 
470 Interview No. I, transcript page 10. 
471 Interview No. I, transcript page 9. 
472 Interview No. I, transcript pages 10-11.  
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Sectoral location marketing complements the start-up and growth competitions. The ‘Locate 
IT’ campagne, for instance, aims to attract foreign IT business by means of road shows and 
scouts in other contries, detailed welcome packages and so on (City of Dortmund, 2007). 473 
 
The annual JOY competition raises the profile of apprenticeships in the IT sector aiming to 
ensure an adequate supply of skilled labour in the core sectors. It is targeted, on the one side, 
at getting more young people interested in an apprenticeship and,on the other side, to drive the 
software industry in Dortmund to employ more trainees.474 This measure complements the 
pool of high-skilled graduates from the city’s higher education institutions, namely the 
university and the polytechnic university, where more than 4,500 students are enrolled in 
informatics subjects producing around 400 graduates annualy.  
 
The IT-Centre (ITC) of the International School for Advanced Study in Information 
Technologies also provides the opportunity to obtain after the 2-year fast-track ‘IT-
professional’ degree, as well as the Bachelor and Masters degrees. The ITC was set up in 
2000 by Dortmund’s university and polytechnic, the chamber of commerce and industry and 
dortmund-project and its exceptional accelerated model was officially authorised by the Land 
in March 2002.475  
 
Another planned initiative was the setting up of a Personnel Service Agency ‘PSA’ 
(Personalserviceagentur) intended for active specialist search and recruitment of employees 
                                                 
473 Interview No. 36, transcript page 8. 
474 Interviewee from dortmund-project, transcript page 14. 
475 For more information about the ITC, which was based at B1st-Software-factory but is now part of the 
International School of Management (ISM), see http://www.ism.de/itc_dortmund/ 
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for the growth sector firms, including personnel and organisation advisory services, and 
advertising and location marketing in this respect.476  
 
These initiatives clearly show the focus on qualified employees and personnel training (see 
dortmund-project, 2000, pp. 22-23) as a ‘decisive factor’ for fostering the growth sectors 
based on competences and excellence. These measures were further complemented by a range 
of urban development projects aimed at increasing Dortmund’s (‘e-city’) attractiveness as a 
business location and its quality of life, e.g. with projects such as a new central railway station 
with multiple city functions – known as 3do, which later failed after the investor pulled out in 
2007 –, the redevelopment of industrial sites and the building of lakeside residential housing 
and leisure-time amenities like a concert hall for the Dortmund philharmonic. This was 
viewed as being also an important part of attracting highly skilled workers to the city for its 
growth sectors in competition with other cities such as Munich, regarded as having a high 
quality of life.477  
 
Overall, a tripartite economic development policy can be identified in Dortmund’s vision for 
2010 as a ‘e-city’. The ‘local and regional management of change’ (Küpper & Röllinghoff, 
2000, p. 30) comprises the three pillars of lead sectors, people and event city Dortmund (see 
dortmund-project, 2000, p. 25 and 5).478 The clear focus on lead sectors/clusters is embedded 
in the implementation across different measures such as in terms of fostering entrepreneurship 
and growth, location marketing, infrastructure and property development, and creating a new 
skills base. This is linked to the other complementary policy pillars addressed at people and 
                                                 
476 See the article on the concept of dortmund-project (‘Das Konzept’) in the supplement of the magazine ‘Ruhr 
Nachrichten PLUS extra – Information für Handel, Handwerk und Gewerbe’, volume 19 – January 2002, pp 6-7. 
477 Interview No. 34, transcript page 15 and No. 44, trasnscript page 11. 
478 See also PowerPoint presentation on ‘dortmund-project’ of 19.06.2000 provided by dortmund-project. 
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competences through training and qualifications and at attractiveness of the city as place to 
live and work. 
 
In contrast to the Land’s dense structure and oversupply of technology centres that overall 
have been criticised (Elle et al., 1997), Dortmund’s technology centre (TechnologieZentrum-
Dortmund) and adjoining technology park next to the university campus is mentioned first as 
one that has fulfilled expectations with its connection between university and technology 
centre (City of Dortmund, 2007; Dreher, [1987(?)], p. 22; Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & 
ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 42).479 These links were intially supported through a 
cooperation agreement.480 Sectoral reference handbooks listing businesses and research 
institutions in a particular field were seen as simple but very useful tools for facilitating 
cooperation.481 
 
The close proximity of Dortmund University, with its strengths in engineering and natural 
sciences (Dreher, [1987(?)], p. 22) is a key asset of the technology park. Following its 
establishment in 1985, it had attracted around 220 companies with over 6000 highly qualified 
and predominantly scientific employees by 1999, while this rose to 265 companies with 8400 
employees by 2009.482 Even though in the early days Henschel-Neumann saw only limited 
employment effects (Henschel-Neumann, 1988, p. 188), Dortmund’s technology centre is 
                                                 
479 The KVR names over 100 companies with 2200 employees at the technology centre which compares well to 
total of more than 600 companies with around 4600 employees that have located in all of the 30 technology, 
innovation and start-up centres in the Ruhr area (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, p. 46). 
480 Interview No. 45, transcript page 10. 
481 Interview No. 45, transcript pages 17 and 35; No. 36, transcript page 16. 
482 See brochure ‘TechnologiePark Dortmund’ by WBF-DO of August 1999 and information from the website of 
the technology park at http://www.technologiepark.de and the technologie centre at http://www.tzdo.de, last 
accessed 30.03.2009. Core areas were said be in 1999 micro systems technologies, software/ITC, electronics, 
quality control, logistics/material flow/packaging technology, environmental technologies, robotics and materials 
technology. The technology centres’ partners are the city of Dortmund (46.5%), Dortmund banks (25%), the 
chambers (16%) and the university and polytechnic (12.5%). 
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nowadays viewed as a good practice example by both internal stakeholders and external 
stakeholders from other regions.483  
 
Cooperative and inclusive network 
 
Already in the early 1990s, decision-making structures and processes for the development of 
the regional development concept of the wider eastern Ruhr area (Dortmund/Unna/Hamm) 
were said to be inclusive. Representatives from the social partners, such as the chambers, 
employer’s associations and unions, as well as other stakeholders like environmental, equal 
opportunities, education and charity representatives, were consultated in the irregular 
Dortmund conference (Bade & Theisen, 1997, p. 129). 
 
This inclusive approach was still reported by the interviewees. For instance, close cooperation 
with the Federation of German Trade Unions ‘DGB’ (Deutscher Gewerschaftsbund), as well 
as with the association ‘windo’ (Wissenschaft in Dortmund) comprising all the city’s 
scientific institutions, was reported.484 While the latter was said to be an important stakeholder 
to have on board, the former was said to be a reflection of the unique consensus-driven 
approach still prevailing. The involvement of the DGB was, for instance, not mentioned in 
any of the other case study city-regions. 
 
Similarly, one interviewee pointed out that it had been achieved to ‘unite the actors of the 
location’ in a ‘remarkable way’485 for the development of the dortmund-project. However, it 
was also pointed out that this did not happen naturally. To the contrary, it was highlighted that 
                                                 
483 Interview No. 46, transcript page 2; No. 1, page 3; and No. 45, page 10. 
484 Interview No. 44, transcript page 12; No. 45, pages 27 and 33. 
485 Interview No. 44, transcript page 7. 
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a ‘delicate situation’ had existed in the years prior to 1998 when ‘one was attacking the other’ 
due to interpersonal conflicts at the heads of organisations and actions were ‘to make one’s 
mark and that was it then’.486  
 
While one interviewee still reported that one individual network organisation did not to work 
properly due to conflict on a personal level caused by egos and power battles 487, in general 
interviewees predominantly reported very collaborative relationships. For instance, one 
interviewee saw no competition in the business and innovation support system at all 488 while 
another stated: ‘Well, at local level I can only say that we cooperate with all’.489 
 
The dortmund-project mentioned its collaboration with small and large business consultancies 
on the start2grow and growth promotion competitions, and in other activities, with supporting 
institutions that seconded personnel.490 Furthermore, the regional relation or embeddedness of 
higher education instutions was said to be an existing high priority and a result of traditionally 
grown structures.491 Cooperation with the job centre and the ‘Early bird’ association of the 
software industry in Dortmund was also mentioned.492 
 
Therefore, Dortmund’s business and innovation support system should be seen as both 
inclusive and cooperative due to the overall picture of very positively rated relationships 
                                                 
486 Interview No. 44, transcript page 7. 
487 Interview No. 36, transcript page 10. 
488 Interview No. 7, transcript page 11.  
489 Interview No. 44, transcript page 18. 
490 Interview No. I, transcript page 13. 
491 Interview No. 45, transcript page 28. 
492 Interview No. 44, transcript page 13. 
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between the different actors and the integrated approach towards a ‘Dortmund consensus’, as 
reported by several interviewees.493 
 
The positive relationships mentioned with other core local actors within the local economic 
and innovation support system were also reflected in the results of the interview supporting 
matrix tool (see appendix VI), with which interviewees were asked to map other organisations 
according to their level of activity and the nature of the relationship distinguished broadly 
between competititve, collaborative or being a mixture of both. A non-representative social 
network analysis (see following table) indicatively shows that the overwhelming majority of 
network combinations with other local actors were said to be collaborative relationships (22) 
while only a few (5) were mentioned as being a mixture of a competitive and collaborative 
relationship. The accompanying figure highlights this picture clearly. 
 
Furthermore, the relationships with regional actors at Land level were also predominantly 
characterised by cooperation as collaborative relationships were mentioned 17 times, while a 
mixed relationship between competition and collaboration was mentioned 7 times and a 
competitive relationship once. This included a close collaborative relationship mentioned with 
the Land ministries494, while most of the competitive and competitive/collaborate 
combinations at Land level were attributed to local actors of other competing city-regions.  
                                                 
493 Interview No. 36, transcript page 5. 
494 Interview No. 41, transcript page 4. 
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Collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at.  
Mixture of competitive and collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
Competitive relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
 
Figure 33 Network of relationships of the local actors in Dortmund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Circles represent local organisations within Dortmund. Their names have been omitted for privacy 
reasons. The thickness of arrows indicates the nature of relationships mentioned as explained below.  
Arrows pointing at no particular circle represent relationships with regional organisations at Land level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29 Relationships within Dortmund’s business and innovation support system  
              Level of involvement/ 
 
 
Relationship to other 
organisations 
Local 
City-region 
 
 
(Dortmund) 
Regional 
 
 
 
(Land NRW)
National 
 
 
 
(Germany) 
EU / 
International
Interregional 
 
(EU)  
Competitive 
 
0 
(*) 
1 0 0 
Mixture of competitive and 
collaborative 
5 
 
7 1 
(*) 
0 
Collaborative 
 
22 
(*) 
17 
(*****) 
2 
(***) 
9 
(**) 
None of the above or  
no connections 
0 0 0 0 
Note: The numbers indicate the network combinations of organisations entered in the institutional matrix 
mapping tool. There were no fixed numbers or type of organisations that had to be mentioned by interviewees. 
Stars (*) represent a double entry of an organisation that was (re)moved, e.g. cooperation with local actors at the 
international level to be displayed only as an entry at the local level. See footnote 537 for more information. 
 
Source to figure and table: Own creation based upon supporting matrix tool completed by 5 local interviewees 
(two interviewees did not complete the matrix and one academic and one interviewee were not asked to complete 
– the latter because the interviewee was from the same organisation as another interviewee). 
F G 
I 
H 
E 
C 
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J
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Cooperation with venture capitalists at the national level was mentioned 495, whilst at the 
international level collaborative relationships were mentioned with actors from the EU and 
international partners. 
 
A crucial part in driving the process towards a common vision and joint action was explicitly 
said to have been the involvement of the consultancy firm McKinsey: an external actor 
without vested interest or binding ties, butwith expertise and a renowned name. The 
participation of McKinsey was reported to have ensured that a contentious strategy focus on a 
limited number of sectors was agreed by stakeholders. An important contributor was that all 
of the relevant actors were integrated into the process through individual consultations with an 
advisor or a senior consultant. After people were properly integrated into the project, they 
carried the vision to the outside.496 
 
Yet, while dortmund-project is focussing its endeavours upon the three future growth sectors, 
other actors such as the chamber of commerce and industry and the City of Dortmund’s 
business and employment promotion agency (WBF-DO) have to serve all, or the remaining 
business base. Firms operating outside the three key growth sectors were said to have voiced 
their impressions of not being sufficiently looked after.497 This, together with highly 
imbalanced press coverage, are a potential source of conflict.  
 
When asked whether his organisation was viewed as being part of a regional innovation 
system, an interviewee from dortmund-project highlighted the success in advancing 
                                                 
495 Interview No. 41, transcript page 18. 
496 Interview No. 44, transcript pages 7-9. 
497 Interview No. 36, transcript page 13. 
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‘dortmund-project as a vision or as a task’ in the way that around 500 people are part of it. 
Yet, he pointed also out that ‘dortmund-project as a institution or a unit of 20 or 30 people’ is 
part of many networks, with the diffulty of distinguishing between the task and institution and 
consequent marketing problems.498  
 
However, it seems that the actors have so far overcome this in a cooperative network. The 
more recent decision to merge the dortmund-project with the WBF-DO to an independent 
department of the city administration also reduces potential future conflict from overlaps in 
this respect. 
 
An analysis of the learning processes by Tata (2007, p. 16) concludes that ‘the core team of 
dortmund-project seems to be closer to being a community of practice than other 
organisations of this kind’, even though he points out that the ‘initial euphoria has partly 
declined – a tendency which might be usual during the life cycle of an organisation’ and that 
some stakeholders kept a ‘critical-constructive distance’.499  
 
The question remains whether the driving role of dortmund-project and the initial ‘open, 
transparent, creative and innovative’ atmosphere (Tata, 2007, p. 16) can be maintained over 
time. It certainly managed to reach out to stakeholders in its early phase and engage them in 
the implementation of their acticities.  
                                                 
498 Transcript page 17. 
499 Besides the previous outlined governance structure, Tata (2007) further highlights the importance of trust, 
transparency and clear communication for ensuring learning effects and enabling collaboration between partners. 
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Local economic development policy and actors in the city-region of Duisburg 
Similar to the economic history of other cities in the Ruhr area, Duisburg’s industrial tradition 
is closely linked to coal and steel production. Although these sectors declined over the last 
decades and contributed heavily to the loss of 50,000 jobs in Duisburg between 1980 and 
2000 to a level of only 157,000 – a loss of every 4th job –, traditional sectors with low growth 
rates are still overrepresented. For example, steel production represents one in eight jobs and 
every second job in the processing industries (Stadt Duisburg, 2001, p. 5).500 
Correspondingly, Duisburg’s economic structure is heavily dominated by large firms such as 
Thyssen, Klöckner, and Haniel and hence lacks a strong SME base. Thyssen steelworks is 
still the most important employer in Europe’s largest remaining steel city (Kommunalverband 
Ruhrgebiet, 2001, p. 22) – an important difference in comparison to Dortmund. Linked to this 
competence in steel are other industrial strengths in the materials, metal, and chemical 
industry (Burkhard, [1991(?)], pp. 31-42). 
 
Duisburg’s economic development corporation GFW and technology development 
corporation GTT 
 
The Corporation for Economic Development ‘GFW Duisburg’ (Gesellschaft für 
Wirtschaftsförderung Duisburg mbH) was founded in 1988 as the first economic development 
agency in Germany privately organised as a Limited corporation.501 It is a public-private 
partnership with 50% funding coming from the city and 50% coming form private enterprises, 
which in 1988 comprised 33 firms including the chambers of industry & commerce and 
handicrafts as well as the Ruhr/Lower Rhine business association of the metal industry 
                                                 
500 The iron and steel producing sector alone lost around 22,000 jobs between 1974 and 1986, nearly as much as 
the mining sector following its earlier crisis from 1961 (Stadt Duisburg, 1988, p. 5). 
501 GFW website: www.gfw-duisburg.de/. 
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(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 32). GFW’s supervisory 
board also reflects the public-private partnership nature as it comprises 12 members with 
equal representation from the private and public sectors with the chairman being Duisburg’s 
Lord Mayor and the deputy chairman being the CEO of the chamber of commerce and 
industry.502  
 
GFW employed around 19 persons in 2000 focussing its activities on providing classical 
support services for existing firms and SME activities, providing and managing landsites and 
office accommodation, and attracting new businesses and providing relocation services 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 32).503 Judging also from 
GFW 2000 annual report (Gesellschaft für Wirtschafsförderung Duisburg mbH, [2001]), a 
clear overall focus on facilty support service in terms of arranging business locations and 
office space can be identified. This may partly be rooted in GFW’s former main aim of 
addressing the bottleneck in business development land sites (Gesellschaft für 
Wirtschaftsförderung in Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH, [1987], p. 40; Kommunalverband 
Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 32; Niederrheinische Industrie- und 
Handelskammer Duisburg-Wesel-Kleve zu Duisburg, 1993, p. 9; Stadt Duisburg & 
Niederrheinische Industrie- und Handelskammer Duisburg-Wesel-Kleve zu Duisburg, 1990, 
p. 3).  
 
Perhaps as a consequence, other business support services and activities offered by GFW 
appeared to be rather traditional with funding advice and measures such as business 
networking events and get-togethers of CEOs, which seemed to lack innovative approaches.  
                                                 
502 The supervisory board further comprises one MP (MdB) and four councillors as well as four CEOs and two 
chairmen of supervisory boards of large firms (Gesellschaft für Wirtschafsförderung Duisburg mbH, [2001]). 
503 See also GFW’s website at http://www.gfw-duisburg.de 
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A start-up award (StartUp Duisburg – Existenzgründerpreis 2005) was later added in 2005 
addressed at the 110-120 participants of the annual small business management course at the 
Duisburg Campus with the three winners being able to use Duisburg’s technology centre 
services and coaches for up to a year.504  
 
Duisburg’s technology centre ‘TechnologieCentrum’ together with the event and 
communication part of the telematic forum (TelematikForum), the MicroElectronicCentrum 
(MEC) and the house of economic development – where GFW is based – are all located in the 
business park ElecTronicPark Duisburg, later renamed ‘Tectrum – Technologiezentrum für 
Duisburg’.505 The number of business based at the technology centre has remained fairly 
stable with 25 in 1994 after 7 years of completion (GTT, [1994]) and 23 firms hosted by 
Tectrum in 2009.506 
 
The technology centre has been funded and operated by the separate corporation for 
technology support and advice Ltd. – ‘GTT’ (Gesellschaft für Technologieförderung und 
Technologieberatung mbH), which is in charge of renting the office space, centre 
management, providing advice for start-ups and mediation of contacts. GTT was established 
at the end of 1986 to support the structural change in the city and region. Its founding partners 
are the city of Duisburg, the chamber of commerce and industry, the Land’s bank WestLB 
                                                 
504 See press release of 02.05.2005 entitled ‘Duisburg stiftet Existenzgründerpreis’, available at 
http://www.tectrum.duisburg.de/tectrum/tectrum/pressemitteilungen/2005/102030100000006261.php 
505 For more inoframtion see http://www.tectrum.de 
506 See http://www.tectrum.duisburg.de/tectrum/tectrum/unternehmensdatenbank/index.php, accessed 
08/04/2009 
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(now NRW.bank) and the Duisburg sections of the large banks of Stadtsparkasse and 
Deutsche Bank.507  
 
Duisburg’s structural economic policy  
 
The city’s current structural policy programme of 2001 entitled ‘impuls.duisburg’ (Stadt 
Duisburg, 2001) builds upon the established development paths that were outlined in the 
‘Duisburg 2000’ programme agreed in 1988 following the steel crisis, but also adds new 
development options (ibid., diagram 2 on p. 10). The earlier programme was the outcome of 
the consensus decision of the Duisburg regional conference that took place in October 1987 in 
the framework of the ‘ZIM’ Land initiative and was further developed as a local action 
programme on several occasions, most recently in 1999 under the title ‘Future Duisburg’ 
(ibid., p. 6).  
 
While the city’s structural policy objective in the building phase between 1987-2001 was to 
‘develop strengths’, the new objective in the reinforcement phase from 2002 until 2010 is to 
‘strengthen the strengths’. The new impuls.duisburg programme outlines Duisburg’s sectoral 
policy approach that focusses its activities on the following six competence fields or impulse 
sectors with growth potential: Internet-Economy [ICT] & microtechnology; material 
technology [with the link to the strong steel and metal sector]; people related and business-
oriented services; urban entertainment & retail; logistics; and city tourism.508 Later on, the 
competence field of environment & energy replaced urban entertainment, which was merged 
                                                 
507 See brochure entitled ‘ElecTronicPark Duisburg – Veransataltungen’. 
508 For more information on the impuls.duisburg programme see Stadt Duisburg (2001), available at 
http://www.duisburg.de/micro/impuls/programm/medien/impuls.duisburg.pdf and 
http://impuls.duisburg.de/impuls/ 
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with city tourism.509 The areas of microelectronics and logistics already featured explicitly in 
the earlier ‘Duisburg 2000’ programme (Stadt Duisburg, 1988, pp. 9-10). 
 
While the impulse.duisburg programme makes reference to ‘economic cluster’ in relation to 
its concentration on core competences, a clear overall cluster approach does not shine 
through. Conceptionally, there is no clear overall cluster approach (e.g. illustrated by the 
generic mentioning of the overall service sector and the grouping of competence fields) but 
predominantly infrastructure/technology park projects accompanied by envisaged competence 
centres. This is also reflected in the three outlined activity priorities, which are: 
 
1. Creation of space for new future-oriented employment in relation to the reactivation of 
fallow land. 
2. Improvement of the quality of these spaces by means of optimal traffic connections, 
attractive environmental quality and a positive image. 
3. Support to the creation of new future-oriented jobs though the improvement of 
technology-orientated infrastructure (technology transfer, advice etc). 
 
The programme also underlines the objective to develop a location profile in light of the 
increasing trend of regional profiling and thematic marketing of regions – mentioning 
ChemSite [Ruhr area], biotechnology regions [Aachen/Cologne/Düsseldorf], media cities 
[Cologne], exhibition cities [Düsseldorf], E-Cities [Dortmund].510 However, it then outlines 
several generic and non-sectoral regional profiles and corresponding lead projects, master 
                                                 
509 See http://www.gfw-duisburg.de/standort_duisburg/branchen_impuls/index.php, accessed 08.04.2009. The 
sectors of environment and energy also feature in the six competence fields of the 2007 regional economic 
development strategy ZIKON for the Lower Rhine region (agiplan, 2007, p. 11). In addition, agro-business / 
food are also present due to the stregth of the county of Kleve in this area, while the service sector is omitted. 
510 The examples added here in squared brackets only concern the cities and regions in North Rhine-Westphalia 
that follow the famous example of Silicon Valley. There are obviously many other examples in Germany and 
globally. 
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plans and activity fields, such as ‘science and technology location’, ‘services location’ and a 
‘city tourism centre Lower Rhine/Ruhr’ (Stadt Duisburg, 2001, pp. 6-7), which, with the 
exception of the ‘international logistics location’ profile, are likely to fail in the objective to 
be of lasting value for city marketing. A complementary activity is the overall improvement 
of the location quality including education and qualification levels, good administrative 
support, quality of life and urban development projects, such as the failed MultiCasa project. 
Education and qualification levels are particularly important given the reported clear deficits 
in terms of a qualified workforce (Niederrheinische Industrie- und Handelskammer Duisburg-
Wesel-Kleve zu Duisburg, 2001, p. 13). 
 
The above-mentioned sectoral focus on six competence fields and functions was accompanied 
by a spatial concentration, which means that specific locations considered to have particular 
qualities were allocated to the different sectoral profiles. Yet, the spatial concentration 
appears to be somewhat hidden given that the technology centre, for instance, does not have 
such a noticeable presence as in other cities. Figure 34 below depicts this sectoral and spatial 
profiling. 
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Figure 34 Sectoral and spatial profile of the future Duisburg according to impuls.duisburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stadt Duisburg (2001, diagram 1 on p. 10), slightly adapted and own translation 
 
The city of Duisburg followed the approach of dortmund-project by also giving itself a 
quantified target by stating the ambition to create 25,000 jobs in the decade up to 2010 (Stadt 
Duisburg, 2001, p. 9).  
 
An explicit reference to the dortmund-project can be found in the more recent regional 
development concept (REK) entitled ‘future initiative competence region Lower Rhine – 
ZIKON’ (Zukunftsinitiative Kompetenzregion NiederRhein) that was developed in 2007 as 
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part of the Land’s regionalised structural policy for the city of Duisburg and its neighbouring 
counties of Kleve and Wesel.511 The ZIKON strategy hightlights the strategic-communicative 
framework and considerable budget of dortmund-project and its success in terms of increasing 
positive public perception as reflected in improved positions in city rankings (agiplan, 2007, 
pp. 16-17 and 106).  
 
In contrast, the ZIKON strategy points out that the bundling of activities in Duisburg was only 
driven by internal expert groups and was not the subject of strategic marketing efforts to 
communicate the stakeholder consensus with the result that location advantages are not so 
well known publicly (agiplan, 2007, p. 106). Correspondly, the ZIKON strategy added 
location communication as well as the creation of an innovative environment (by more 
actively fostering entrepreneurship and synergies through an innovation dialogue) to the 
development of the competence fields and the optimisation of Lower Rhine as a living 
location. In terms of organisation, it also highlights that sufficient human resources must be 
made available for the project and suggests using the resources of the LowerRhine regional 
agency (Regionalagentur NiederRhein) in this respect (agiplan, 2007, p. 21).512 
 
Duisburg’s specific sectoral logistics focus 
 
A core of focus in Duisburg’s economy are the river port and logistics (cf. NiederRhein, 1993; 
Stadt Duisburg, 2001, pp. 5-6), which in 2001 already accounted for around 15,000 direct and 
indirect jobs (Stadt Duisburg, 2001, p. 16). Duisburg hosts the world’s largest inland port with 
modern container terminals and is connected to a close waterways canal network giving direct 
                                                 
511 The regional development concept ZIKON is available at http://www.regionalagentur-
niederrhein.de/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=88&Itemid=83 
512 For more information on the LowerRhine regional agency, see http://www.regionalagentur-niederrhein.de 
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access to the North Sea (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, pp. 29-31). With the additional 
rail container terminal and connection to a dense motorway transport network, Duisburg 
markets itself as a perfect ‘trimodular logistic centre’.513 Adding the proximity to Düsseldorf’s 
international airport 15 km away, Duisburg has a clear competitive advantage in terms of 
transport infrastructure which also goes back to its position on the ancient Hellweg trade route 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, pp. 22-23) and membership of the Hanse during the 
middle ages (Heid et al., 1996, p. 61).  
 
Duisburg’s sectoral support is clearly concentrated on logistics. This is reflected in the Lower 
Rhine (Niederrhein) area’s regional development concept (REK) from 1993 (see summary in 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. XXVI of the annex; Region 
NiederRhein, 1993, p. 131), on the basis of which Duisburg also established a list of projects 
and measures to follow up on the core focus areas of Duisburg as a logistics location, 
entrepreneurial activities, tourism innovation, employment impulses and qualifications 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. XXX of the annex). For 
instance, out of the 32 projects listed as part of the 2001 impuls.duisburg programme, 12 
projects alone are linked to the competence field of logistics (Stadt Duisburg, 2001, p. 20).  
 
The strategic focus on the logistics sector was further developed in the master plan for the 
Lower Rhine (Niederrhein) logistics region that was presented at the end of 1998 by Dornier 
SystemConsult – a consultancy specialised in the area of transport. This master plan was 
commissioned by the Land’s Economic Ministry for Duisburg and the surrounding area to 
provide an input to developing a strategy for a logistics region through a new regional 
                                                 
513 See the Logport Logistic-Center Duisburg website at http://www.logport.de, accessed December 2006. 
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coordination committee for logistics that included the Land’s State Secretary and economic 
ministry (ex-MWMTV), the Lord Mayor of Duisburg, GFW, and duisport – Duisburg’s port 
group (Duisburger Hafen AG). This kind of intervention by the Land government is said to be 
the result of the perception that the decision-making mechanism of the regional conference (in 
charge of the regional development concept REK) was too cumbersome (Kommunalverband 
Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 32). 514 
 
The master plan stressed concentrating support on the three pillars of management, capital 
and competence. This included the following recommendations: 
 
• establishment of management capacities in dedicated organisations for the marketing 
of the logistics location and its services;  
• mobilisation of regional and international capital for the development of logistics 
locations (e.g. through an investment agency);  
• complementary supply of existing competences and creation of new competences (e.g. 
by setting up International Business School of Logistics). 
 
Logport – Duisburg’s specialised agency for supporting the logistics sector 
 
In operation since the beginning of 1999, Logport Logistic-Centre Duisburg Ltd., with 6-8 
staff (including 2 engineers), is a full-service provider of location management in terms of 
development and marketing a 265-hectare industrial business park area in Duisburg-
Rheinhausen at the site of the former Krupp steelwork.515 This praised mobilisation of new 
commercial space and focussed land site management was at the centre of projects to develop 
                                                 
514 An interesting aspect in this respect is that the composition of the regional conference Lower Rhine for 
developing regional development concept (REK) structures process was on purpose restricted to polical and 
administrative elite. It excluded several stakeholders, most notably actors from the private sector, which can be 
said to have only be represented through the chamber (Forth & Wohlfahrt, 1997, pp. 40, 57 and 76). 
515 Interviewee of logport, transcript pages 2 and 5. 
 385 
 
Duisburg further as a logistics location (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult 
GmbH, 2000, p. 46 and p. XXX of the annex).516 The use of the Krupp site was already 
envisaged in the ‘Duisburg 2000 programme’ (Stadt Duisburg & Niederrheinische Industrie- 
und Handelskammer Duisburg-Wesel-Kleve zu Duisburg, 1990, p. 92) and the regional 
development concept (Region NiederRhein, 1993, p. 144). 
 
At the heart of the strategy to attract new firms to Logport’s logistics centre was the 
enlargement of Krupp’s former harbour and the setting up of the trimodular Duisburg 
Intermodal Terminal (DIT) that started in October 2002 with a capacity of 200,000 tons of 
transship container goods. This project also received support in the framework of objective 2 
funding (ERDF) following the successful bid with the Projekt Ruhr GmbH (2002, pp. 13-14).  
 
By 2002, around 70% of the site was developed and 40% already allocated to investors 
(Logport, 2002, p. 11). In October 2001, the logistics competence centre ‘KCL’ (Kompetenz-
Centrum Logistik) was established in close cooperation with logport to provide information 
and advisory services and support demand-driven qualification of the labour pool.517 
 
Between 2000 and 2004, around 225 million € were invested into the redevelopment of the 
logport site by logport’s mother corporation, the duisport group (Duisburger Hafen AG, 2001, 
p. 17), which is jointly owned by the German Federal level, the Land and the City of 
                                                 
516 The measures of city were titled as Duisburg projects for compensating the reduction of coal subsidies and the 
merger in the steal area (‘Duisburger Projekte zur Kompensierung eines Abbaus der Kohlebeihilfen und der 
Fusion im Stahlbereich’). 
517 For more information on the KCL, see the website http://www.kcl-duisburg.de/ 
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Duisburg (Duisburger Hafen AG, 2001, p. 88).518 The potential synergies with the more than 
200 logistics firms already located at the other site – Duisburg’s main harbour area – were 
highlighted. This includes the services offered by the duisport group such as the established 
duisport rail services between the two port areas or the Packing-Centre-Duisburg (PCD), a 
specialised firm for the stuffing and stripping (i.e. loading and unloading) of containers. The 
following figure illustrates the various organisational units of the duisburg port group which, 
in 2000, had 236 employees and a turnover of around 30 million € (Duisburger Hafen AG, 
2001, pp. 37 and 43):  
 
Figure 35 The duisport group’s organisational units 
 
Source: Logport’s website at http://www.logport.de, last accessed December 2006 
 
Logport’s cluster orientation is also visible in the label ‘Silicon valley of transport services’ 
that it was apparently given by the P&O chairmen Lord Jeffrey Sterling and which it now 
                                                 
518 For more information about Duisburg group see http://www.duisport.de, while more information about the 
history of Duisburg’s harb our can be found in Appelbaum & Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH (1991) and Heid et al. 
(1996, pp. 60, 161-166 and 202-203). 
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uses to market itself. 519 As a result of its concerted focus on logistics, the wider Lower Rhine 
area has been labelled as a ‘pioneer of a sectoral and cluster-orientated structural policy in 
North Rhine Westphalia’ (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet & ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 
XXXI of the annex). The reported fast and unbureaucratic strategic approach of Logport in 
dealing with potential investors, for instance, is said to derive from three factors: flexibility in 
terms of construction restrictions due to the area’s former brownfield use; the pressure to act 
following persistent unemployment and increasing competition, in particular from the 
Netherlands; and the organisation’s direct link to strong politicians who sit on the steering 
committee. This support from the city’s high-level politicians is said to have allowed for fast-
track approvals of investment undertakings. 520  
 
On the lacking connectedness and critical mass of Duisburg’s network  
 
The ambitious but narrow focus on logistics risks a future over-reliance on this sector, which 
leaves the city vulnerable to changing framework conditions, such as the recent financial 
crisis affecting world-wide trade. This is particularly problematic given that Duisburg seems 
to find it very hard to nurture new areas of strength. This is illustrated by the comment of one 
interviewee who states that ‘there are structures, which we also try to create somehow, to 
bring people together and bring institutions together, but the critical mass is still very 
low’.Yet, the provision of an example where apparently 1,500 businesses where were invited 
to an information event and only 10 business took it up with the addion of the statement that 
‘you need to constantly dig deep to keep people on board’ does not just raise the question 
about the dynamism of the business base, but also about the innovativeness, effectiveness and 
demand-orientation of the support offered. The latter question appears to be more pressing 
                                                 
519 See the Logport Logistic-Center Duisburg website at http://www.logport.de, accessed December 2006. 
520 Interviewee from Logport, transcript pages 2 and 5. 
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when at the same time no references are made to good practice models – except to the 
national competence network competition – and no influential persons or organisation for the 
implementation of measures are mentioned.521 The use of conditional language with regards 
to networking activities also hints that the predominance of large businesses may not be alone 
the reason for a lack of dynamism of SME cooperation and business networks. 
 
Another interviewee concludes that ‘structural policy does not reach the firms’522 even though 
networking and cooperation were apparently the building stones of professional change 
management at the chamber of commerce and industry (Niederrheinische Industrie- und 
Handelskammer Duisburg-Wesel-Kleve zu Duisburg, 2001, pp. 5-7). 
 
A different interviewee points out that ‘Duisburg is ill [in terms of entrepreneurial spirit] with 
few approaches, no networking, no network [...] and a weak industry’ and a ‘lack of high-tech 
firms means that the university potential cannot be used’. The need for ‘a lighthouse, a vision’ 
is stated and while other policies and initiatives are mentioned as good practice examples – 
such as those in Dortmund –, the question was raised as to why it was not tested here. An 
answer might be provided with the statement that ‘everybody is trying to do their thing’.523  
 
The statement of one interviewee also suggests a rather non-collaborative environment 
amongst the support organisations by pointing out that ‘if I want to market a product, I do it 
alone’ and by bemoaning that ‘everybody has a say’ even if the organisation has ‘no funding 
competences and only a coordination role’.524 This is exactly what another interviewee saw as 
                                                 
521 Interview No. 22, transcript pages 5, 6 and 10. 
522 Interview No. 14, transcript page 1. 
523 Interview No. 18, transcript pages 1, 2 and 4. 
524 Interview No. 14, transcript page 24. 
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a problem: that ‘one is often of the opinion that one can do everything alone [...] and then a 
quick shot is launched at some activity mainly to be positioned there first’ while the ‘tasks are 
pushed into the background’ and a perhaps more effective joint initiative was not 
considered.525 This also meant for this person that the relationships with a different 
organisation in the governance structure had to be seen as flexible: for one activity it may 
represent a competitor, for another, a useful collaborator (e.g. for the EU/international 
level).526 
 
Another interviewee also refers to ‘counterproductive’ similar overlapping functions launched 
by different local organisations and the consequent lack of coordination by adding that ‘it is 
not always clear which unit represents competition and which not. Well, it is really the 
interfaces that are not clear and there is always an intersection that is served by two 
organisations at the same time.’527 A different interviewee highlighted the 2-3 working groups 
that existed in the area of e-logistics and pointed to the field of start-up support as another 
area where usually a high number of organisations are active and under pressure to justify 
their existence.528  
 
High-level actors were said to be ‘ill-advised’ in strategic terms by trying to cling to the steel 
sector, which has a low innovation effect, and focus on logistics, which is characterised by a 
low value added.529 Strong efforts in bringing together SMEs in other sectors seems to be 
absent. Indeed, other emerging sectors and competences indeed appear not to be very visible, 
even if innovative materials (linked to the traditional competence in the steel industry) as well 
                                                 
525 Interview No. 16, transcript pages 18 and 23. 
526 Interview No. 16, supporting interview tool of the institutional matrix mapping. 
527 Interview No. 22, transcript page 12. 
528 Interview No. 16, transcript page 17. 
529 Interview No. 18, transcript pages 2 and 6, and No. 17, transcript page 2. 
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as environmental technologies/recycling (linked also to the existing steel and chemical 
industries) have been outlined as core competences of the city (Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet 
& ISA Consult GmbH, 2000, p. 32).  
 
Existing competences appear not well. For instance, one of the city’s competence centres 
appeared to be neither well integrated into governance structures nor well mentioned in 
interviews (once) although referenced in the impulse.duisburg programme (Stadt Duisburg, 
2001, p. 11).530 This concerned the competence centre of the network for optical and optic-
electronic technologies and systems OpTech-Net (Neztwerk für optische und 
optoelektronische Technologien und Systeme e.V.), which had around 40 members, mostly 
SMEs, by March 2002. The fact that out of the 32 member firms, only four were located in 
Duisburg, may partly explain that the competence centre was not on the radar of other local 
stakeholders.531  
 
The establishment of a centre for fuel cell technology ‘ZBT’ (Zentrum für Brennstoffzellen-
Technologie) and the extension of the Fraunhofer Institute for Micro Electronic Switches and 
Systems ‘IMS’ following a successful bidding for funding from the Projekt Ruhr Gmbh 
(Projekt Ruhr GmbH, 2002, pp. 5-10) was also only mentioned by one local interviewee, 
while the former was criticised by an external stakeholder due to the apparent lack of a 
business base in this field.532 
 
                                                 
530 Interview No. 14, transcript page 8, and No. 31, transcript page 6. 
531 This competence centre was established in 1999 by several firms together with the university under the name 
of ‘DiEnO’ – service and development centre opto-electonics (Dienstleistungs- und Entwicklungszentrum 
Optoelektonik), which changed its name in February 2001 to OpTech-Net following the merger with the Aachen 
competence network for optical system technology ‘AKOS’ and its successful bidding for national funding from 
the competition for regional competence centres for optical technologies by the German Federal Ministry for 
Education and Research (bmbf). For more information about OpTech-Net e.V. see http://www.OpTech-Net.de 
532 Interview No. 16, transcript page 20. 
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The reported lack of a functioning network between firms533 appears to be reflected by the 
lack of cooperation between governance support actors, despite the pressing urgency for 
economic and structural change. This view is shared by one interviewee who points out that 
contacts still exist between the main business and innovation support actors but that these are 
less regular than previously.534  
 
Technolgy transfer was reported by one interviewee to have become less of a priority for the 
city’s university. Given its principle occupation to negotiate the terms of a merger with the 
University of Essen at that time, Duisburg University’s cooperation with industry was said to 
be only managed and not actively pursued.535 Nevetheless, another interviewee reported 
recent efforts by the university to increase these linkages due to the heightened pressure on 
the university to find third-party financing for research projects. For instance, a cooperation 
with large firms in the neighbouring city of Ratingen was initiated by the university.536 
 
Overall, the reported breakdown of close ties, institutional and functional overlaps, and lack 
of cooperation and coordination raises serious questions about the notion of an innovation 
system in Suisburg. The statements by interviewees recited in this section provide a consistent 
picture that is also reflected in the indicative social network analysis of the relationships 
between the core institutional actors within the local economic and innovation support system 
of Duisburg. The following figure indicatively shows that the majority of relationships 
between local actors were not characterised as fully cooperative but are as a mixture of 
cooperation and competitive collaboration. Duisburg is one of the two city-regions where this 
                                                 
533 Interview No 22, transcript page 9. 
534 Interview No 16, transcript page 16. 
535 Interview No 16, transcript page 16. 
536 Interview No. 23, transcript page 2. 
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is the case (Aachen being the other). One likely reason contributing to the reported overlap 
could be the additional presence of organisations with tasks for specific sectors. 
 
It should be noted that one of the two network combinations in the category of ‘none of the 
above or no connections’ concerns an overall collaborative relationship that was not explicitly 
attributed to individual organisations but can be assumed to concern several organisations. 
Therefore, this response distorts the picture slightly by making it appear more positive than it 
is (or rather, less negative than it is). 
 
In addition, the accompanying table shows that very few references to regional (1), national 
(0) and EU/international (1) actors have been made, indicating that perhaps actors are too 
inward-looking and therefore the system does not have access to global nodes and input for 
fresh ideas.537 Furthermore, a negative feature of the support system is the absence of any 
reported active involvement of local banks in the governance system – even though banks are 
involved, for instance, in the corporation for technology support and advice Ltd. – ‘GTT’. 
                                                 
537 It should be noted that a duplicated entry of three local organisations at EU/international level was removed 
(indicated by stars in the following table) in order to have cooperation with local actors at the international level 
only displayed as an entry at the local level so that the (important) indication of cooperation with international 
actors is not distorted. As elaborated earlier, the reason for the double entry was probably that the interviewee 
separated the nature of relationships of local actors according to local and EU/international level (or tasks) 
instead of considering actors from the EU/international level.  
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Collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at.  
Mixture of competitive and collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
Competitive relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
 
Figure 36 Network of relationships of the local actors in Duisburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Circles represent local organisations within Duisburg. Their names have been omitted for privacy reasons. 
The thickness of arrows indicates the nature of relationships mentioned as explained below.  
The arrow pointing outwards at no particular circle represents a relationship with a regional organisation at Land 
level, while the arrow pointing to the centre at no particular circle represents a general competitive relationship 
without individual mentioning. 
 
 
 
 
Table 30 Relationships within Duisburg’s business and innovation support system  
 
              Level of involvement/ 
 
 
Relationship to other 
organisations 
Local 
City-region 
 
 
(Duisburg) 
Regional 
 
 
 
(Land NRW)
National 
 
 
 
(Germany) 
EU / 
International
Interregional 
 
(EU)  
Competitive 
 
1 0 0 0 
Mixture of competitive and 
collaborative 
8 1 
(*) 
0 0 
Collaborative 
 
5 0 0 1 
(***) 
None of the above or  
no connections 
2 0 0 1 
 
Note: The numbers indicate the network combinations of organisations entered in the institutional matrix 
mapping tool. There were no fixed numbers or type of organisations that had to be mentioned by interviewees. 
Stars (*) represent a double entry of an organisation that was (re)moved, e.g. cooperation with local actors at the 
international level to be displayed only as an entry at the local level. See previous footnote 537 for more 
information. 
 
Source to figure and table: Own creation based upon supporting matrix tool completed by 4 local interviewees 
(one interviewee did not complete the matrix and one academic was not asked to complete the matrix). 
A 
B 
G 
H 
G 
I
E 
C 
F 
D 
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Local economic development policy and actors in the city-region of Düsseldorf 
The Land’s capital, Düsseldorf is host to many international businesses and often acts as a 
headquarter location for Germany. For instance, seven of the top 100 German firms, with 
together a turnover share of 9.7% of the top 100, have their headquarters in the city 
(Schneider, 1998, pp. 32-33). Furthermore, as mentioned earlied, there is a strong 
concentration of Japanese firms in Düsseldorf. Around a third of all of the 1076 Japanese 
firms located in Germany in 1999 were based in the wider Düsseldorf area alone, while 
around 450 firms in total were said to be located in NRW (see Gesellschaft für 
Wirtschafsfördrung Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH, 2000a; 2000b, p. 16; Legewie, 1995).  
 
International business location with strength in creative industries 
 
Efforts to attract international businesses and support foreign trade were already strong in the 
1980s (Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung in Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH, [1987], p. 39). 
By 1989, of the 30,000 firms in the wider job office district of Düsseldorf, 4,000 had been 
foreign branches a decade earlier.538 The largest presence of foreign firms were from the USA 
and the Netherlands (400 each), Japan (320), Great Britain (270) and France (160) (Region 
Düsseldorf / Mittlerer Niederrhein, 1991, p. 89). According to Henning (1981b, p. 715), there 
are however different purposes behind these presences. While Düsseldorf is merely the gate to 
the Rhine-Ruhr area for Dutch firms, it is generally the gate to the whole of the German 
market for American firms, and to the entire EU market for Japanese firms. 
 
                                                 
538 Even as early as 1966, the chambers district (IHK) of Düsseldorf hosted 942 foreign firms (Henning, 1981b, 
p. 705). 
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The city’s international Rhein-Ruhr-airport – the largest in NRW and the third largest in 
Germany with 15.4 million passengers in 2001 (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2002, p. 5) –
,good transport linkages, international exhibition centre, highly ranked quality of life and 
international schools are favourable factor conditions for the city’s attractiveness. The 
infrastructure associated with the long-standing presence of Japanese firms constitutes an 
important location factor for Japanese firms today causing a virtuous circle: the presence of a 
Japanese school since 1971; three Japanese Kindergarten; the social and cultural network that 
includes the EKO house of Japanese culture and the Japanese club with nearly 6000 members; 
the Japanese chamber of commerce and industry with 600 members; a presence of the 
Japanese foreign trade centre JETRO; a Japanese general consulate; and Japanese 
supermarkets and banks (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2000b).  
 
The city has a strong presence of business services and creative industries, such as banking, 
insurance, legal and management consultancies, fashion, media and advertising 
(Wirtschaftsförderung Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001, p. 5). Because of its traditional 
strength in services provision for the wider area and the location of the Land’s parliament and 
government, it has been called the ‘writing desk of the Ruhr area’ (Henning, 1981a, p. 14; 
1981b, p. 745), despite being located outside the Ruhr area delimitations. Already by 1989, 
Düsseldorf had a service sector share of 69.1% of the region’s economy in contrast to the 
Land’s average of 50.7% (Region Düsseldorf / Mittlerer Niederrhein, 1991, p. 42). For 
instance, in the year 2000, Düsseldorf employed 26,000 persons in 1,500 companies in the 
ICT sector; 9,000 persons in 2,000 media companies; and 7,000 persons in 1,000 companies 
in the advertising sector (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001b, p. 3). The latter comprises 12 
of the top 100 advertising agencies including the three largest German advertising agencies: 
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BBDO Group Germany, Grey Global Group Deutschland and Publicis Gruppe (ibid., pp. 12-
13).  
 
At the same time, Düsseldorf still has strong employment in the traditional industrial sectors 
due to the closeness of the Ruhr area (Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf & Seering, 1966, p. 9). 
Degussa, the world’s largest specialist chemical company and Henkel are located in the city 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, p. 22). The industrial core in Düsseldorf in 2000 was 
the metal producing and refinement industry with the highest industrial turnover and 33,208 
jobs, while the chemical industry accounted for the second highest industrial turnover and 
with 13,056 jobs (Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Köln & Industrie- und Handelskammer 
zu Düsseldorf, 2001, p. 64). Vehicle construction with 10,047 jobs and machinery 
construction with 9,488 were the other strong industrial sectors.539 It should be noted that 
handicrafts are also much stronger in Düsseldorf than the other cities and counties in the 
wider region (Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf & Seering, 1966, pp. 176-177; Region 
Düsseldorf / Mittlerer Niederrhein, 1991, p. 48).  
 
The case of the Mannesmann corporation is a successful example of Düsseldorf’s structural 
change from manufacturing to services over the last decades. This traditional company 
reputed for producing large seemless pipes transformed itself by diversifying its activities 
successfully into telecommunications with the effect that it was merged with Vodaphone 
following a public and highly contested take-over bidding war (Dross, 2007, pp. 135-136; 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 2001, p. 22). In addition to D2/Vodaphone’s presence 
                                                 
539 In 1989, the chemical industry and machinery construction were both the industrial core with each 
representing around 16% of industrial employment in the wider region (Region Düsseldorf / Mittlerer 
Niederrhein, 1991, pp. 41 and 44), while vehicle construction, the iron producing industry and the steel & metal 
procuring industry were the other remaining strong traditional industrial sectors. 
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managing the European activities, another leading private mobile telephone operator – E-Plus 
Mobilfunk GmbH – is also located in the city, together with 30 other network operators 
(Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001b, p. 5). 
 
With its own stock exchange, several headquarters of large firms, high value services, 
international exhibitions, excellent transport infrastructure including the international airport, 
attractive office spaces, Düsseldorf has been characterised as a global city and node in the 
network of the globalised economy (Schneider, 1998, pp. 30-43) – even though it is a small 
global city compared to the likes of London and Paris.  
 
Düsseldorf and the wider region had an economic performance in the 1980s that was above 
the Land average in terms of value added (Region Düsseldorf / Mittlerer Niederrhein, 1991, p. 
39). Despite the strong wealth indicators, the city has suffered from a high unemployment rate 
of 9.2% in 1990 (ibid., p. 74 ) and 10% in 2002 (see Table 26 above) even though it was still 
generally lower than most of the Land’s larger metropolitan cities. The unemploment rate was 
certainly comparably higher than its hinterland and some of Düsseldorf’s negative 
employment performance – a reduction of 2.2% between 1980 and 1998 – can hence be seen 
as a decentralisation effect with firms locating just outside Düsseldorf (Industrie- und 
Handelskammer zu Düsseldorf, 1999a, p. 5 and table 1).  
 
The regional development concept 1991 
 
As part of the Land’s regionalised structural policy, a regional development concept (REK) 
for fostering the Düsseldorf / Middle Lower Rhine region as ‘the modern European industry 
and service region’ was presented in 1991 (Region Düsseldorf / Mittlerer Niederrhein, 
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1991).540 The concept recognises the important political and economic role of the Land’s 
capital for the wider region (ibid., p. L2) and identifies the following ten activitiy fields: 
 
1. Intensification and permanent adaptation of professional qualifications 
2. Provision of commercial space according to demands 
3. Extension of the inter- and intraregional traffic network 
4. Extensions of transport and communication links within the European area 
5. Creation of a long-term waste disposal security 
6. Extension of the communication infrastructure 
7. Troop reduction and regional development 
8. Living, leisure, culture 
9. Regional marketing 
10. Strengthening of administrative power 
 
With regards to the higher education infrastructure under point 1, the establishment of a law 
faculty and extension of the faculty of commerce at Düsseldorf’s Heinrich-Heine-University 
were proposed (ibid., pp. L4-5 and 80-81).541 This was viewed as an important issue given the 
strong international and export orientation of the economy and its role as an important 
investment location of foreign companies.  
 
Despite the wide range of activity fields, the REK 1991 should be regarded primarily as an 
economic concept. The strategic content focuses mainly on the following six more detailed 
actitvity fields of further development of a strong economy; the restructuring of the labour 
market; forward-looking transport infrastructure; an infrastructure of utility supply and 
disposal capable of development; demand-orientated communication infrastructure; and the 
                                                 
540 The region comprises 33 municipalities including the metropolitan cities of Mönchengladbach, Krefeld and 
Düsseldorf as well as the counties of Viersen, Neuss and Mettmann – latter of which covers the pilot case city 
Ratingen. 
541 The Heinrich-Heine-university Düsseldorf now comprises five faculties (law, medicine, philosophy, 
mathematic/natural sciences and commerce) and has around 25,000 students. 
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soft location factors. The further development of a strong economy comprises the provision of 
business landsite and office space, regional marketing, information and cooperation of actors 
and the – then underdeveloped – area of technology and innovation support (Region 
Düsseldorf / Mittlerer Niederrhein, 1991, pp. 62 and 70). 
 
Düsseldorf’s programme for strengthened SME support 
 
The city council unanimously adopted in November 2000 the ‘programme for strengthened 
SME support in Düsseldorf’ (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2000d) by the city’s office for 
economic development support (Wirtschaftsförderungsamt). The programme does not outline 
any clear overall strategic approach but instead presents an annotated catalogue of measures 
that are categorised into 13 activity fields (see table below). The stated objective of the 
programme as its title states is to support and look after SMEs, especially craft firms, in view 
of developing their innovation and employment potential (ibid., p. 2). This is complemented 
by the support of start-ups and attracting the relocation of SMEs. 
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Table 31 Activity fields and measures of Düsseldorf’s programme for strengthened SME support  
 
Activity fields  Examples of measures Number 
of 
measures
1. Supply of land sites and office space Mediation; consultation; demand 
identification; development of location 
concepts (e.g. trade/craft yard, media 
harbour, WTZ technology centre); SME 
land register, new site for university spin-
offs. 
13 
2. Advisory and information services  Thematic information sheets and brochures 
(e.g. construction, environment); firm visists 
and business mentors for young entrepre-
neurs from senior experts of the chambers. 
3 
3. SME-orientated administratitive 
behaviour 
Extension of guiding functions to SME 
service for administrative tasks; support 
hotline. 
2 
4. Start-up support 
(Gründungs-Offensive NRW ‘GO’) 
Extension of the Düsseldorf start-up 
network and events with sectoral emphasis 
on ICT/media and biotechnology. 
4 
5. Financial support Extension and intensifying of financial 
support and advice, in cooperation with 
banks. 
2 
6. ‘SME offensive NRW’ initiative 
(Mittelstands-Offensive NRW) 
Participation in the initiative; organisation 
of SME congress and an annual competiton 
for ‘innovative ideas for SMEs’. 
3 
7. Science and technology transfer  Joint SME events with universities/VDI for 
better information and contact mediation. 
1 
8. Foreign trade support Mediation of information and contacts via 
chambers and Land; support of joint firm 
stands at foreign exhibitions.  
3 
9. City marketing Set up of the ‘Düsseldorf Marketing und 
Tourism GmbH’; organisation of city 
district campaigns; retail development 
concept. 
3 
10. Public procurement Creation of fair framework conditions for 
competitive public calls for tenders. 
2 
11. Taxes and fees Review of the communal taxes and fees to 
reduce the burden on SMEs 
1 
12. Further education and qualifications Adaptation of professions (dual system), 
extension of the city’s vocational courses 
4 
13. Employment support Cooperation with SMEs: direct mediation, 
qualifications, school-industry 
1 
 
Source: Own translation and summary of Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf (2000d). 
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The programme lists several measures that are the responsibility of other organisations and 
therefore calls for an improved and enhanced cooperation in the framework of the SME 
network. In addition, the subjunctive tense used for several measures and lack of strategic 
ambition seem to be linked to the statement that ‘[t]he implementation of the programme for 
strengthened SME support, i.e. the intensification of current measures and the realisation of 
additional activities, is only possible if improved personnel and financial framework 
conditions are created for the city’s economic development support’ (ibid., p. 10). In terms of 
human resources, the programme specifies the demand by calling for four additional posts 
together with two administrative support personnel. 
 
Out of the 42 listed measures, nearly a third (13) concern the provision of commercial space. 
Therefore, the programme’s focus clearly lies in the activity field of supplying land sites and 
office space. Here, a more strategic approach can be detected as these measures also include 
the development of specific location concepts such a trade/craft yard 
(Gewerbehof/Handwerkerhof) and the establishment of sectoral start-up centres and 
technology centres (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2000d, p. 3). This comprises the setting up 
of a start-up centre for the media sector in the media harbour (Gründungszentrum für die 
Medienbranche im MedienHafen) and a science and technology centre ‘WTZ’ 
(Wissenschafts- und Technologiezentrum) at the Merowinger Square with links to 
biotechnology. 
 
This reflects the relevance attached to firms from ‘future sectors’, which are viewed as 
important for the necessary modernisisation of the city’s economic structure (ibid., p. 2).       
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In addition to the focus on media and biotechnology in terms of location concepts, the 
programme also states this sectoral focus for start-up support (ibid., p. 6) and the adaptation of 
further education and vocational qualifications. Concerning the latter, the areas of ICT –
especially telecommunications –, environmental technology, alternative energies, 
mechatronics, logistics, service technology, medical technology, care management and IT are 
mentioned (ibid., p. 9).  
 
Support to businesses is provided by the city’s office for economic development support, 
which in September 2002 consisted of 22 staff in two units: one dealing with the existing 
business base, attracting foreign firms and foreign trade, the other with location site advice 
and support to firms (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2002, p. 16).542 In addition to the head of 
the office and two unit managerial posts, six posts at least partly dealt with the supply of land 
sites and office space; five posts were allocated to attracting foreign firms and economic 
analysis and statistics; four to press and public relations; while technology advice/funding 
support, start-up advice/coaching and acquisition in biotechnology and acquisition in ICT 
(Information & Kommunikation) were each only allocated one post. To an extent, this reflects 
the core focus of the city’s SME support programme and the wider region’s development 
concept which emphasise commercial locations but are weak on specific sectoral support.543  
 
Even though overall specific sectoral support is not so actively pursued, at least for the 
media/ICT sector networking activities and events do take place. The city’s office for 
economic development support initiated the ‘digital city Düsseldorf’ network association 
                                                 
542 For more information on Düsseldorf’s office for economic development support, see 
http://www.duesseldorf.de/wirtschaftsfoerderung 
543 According to a firm survey carried out by the Insitute for Economic and Social Research ‘IWS’ for the city, 
firms raised the wish for the organisation of sectoral networking events (cf. Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2002, 
p. 7). 
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(‘Digitale Stadt Düsseldorf e.V.’) in 1995.544 The network aims to bring together businesses 
from the media industry (i.e. printing, publisher, TV, radio, internet, film and music), 
communication industry (i.e. advertising, public relations and design), information technology 
and telecommunications (including software, hardware and services) and service providers 
and applicant industries. By April 2009, ‘digital city Düsseldorf’ comprised 113 fee-paying 
member organisations.545 Plans for creating a similar network in the field of medicine were 
also reportedly envisaged.546 
 
The 2001 report by office for economic development support on office space development 
(Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001a, p. 5) further outlines the city’s location profile and 
sectoral core focus areas, yet without providing strategies to support the sectors: fashion, 
communications and media, banks, foreign trade, insurance services, exhibitions and 
congresses, business consultancies and stock exchange. 
 
Overall, Düsseldorf’s economic development support appears to be of a rather traditional 
nature focusing on serving its established business base and providing good framework 
conditions such as the city’s efforts towards becoming an e-city (i.e. with e-school, e-
governance and e-commerce)..547 Having a dynamic business base in comparison to the other 
city-regions studied here might be an explanation for the absence of groundbreaking or 
energetic innovation support. However, focussing on providing good framework conditions 
might have well been the right strategy, given that the city’s economy is comparatively doing 
fairly well. 
                                                 
544 More information about the network is available at http://www.duesseldorf.de/digitalestadt/ 
545 See http://www.duesseldorf.de/digitalestadt/mitglieder.shtml, last accessed 19.04.2009 
546 Interview No. 1, transcript pages 1 and 9 
547 Interview No. 1, transcript page 2 
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Düsseldorf’s urban planning with a sectoral focus on media 
 
An important recent urban planning project in Düsseldorf is the media harbour 
(MedienHafen), which aims at ‘positioning Düsseldorf as a European location for advertising, 
art and the media – in short, for the creative industries’ (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001b, 
p. 10). The conversion of the old Rhine harbour gained a visible flagship with the opening of 
the landmark three eye-catching buildings by architect Frank O. Gehry (Neuer Zollhof) in 
1999. Architecture has played a key role in making this site a popular location for the 
communications industry.  
 
By 2001, the media harbour in the Kaistrasse/Zollhof area had received investments of 400 
million € and further investments of 600 million € were planned at that time 
(Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001b, p. 11).548 According to the fifth edition of the firm 
reference handbook of the media harbour, 268 mostly small firms in the advertising and art, 
communications and TV production sector were said to have located by August 2001 to the 
riverside development area providing 5,000 jobs, while a further 3,000 jobs were expected to 
be created in the extended areas (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001d, p. 2). Importantly, the 
city had also started building a public start-up centre for the film and TV economy 
(Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, 2001c, p. 11) indicating a shift towards providing more 
specialized business and start-up support. 
                                                 
548 For more information on the media harbor, see https://www.duesseldorf.de/medienhafen/index.shtml 
 405 
 
 
Düsseldorf’s specific location concept in the field of biotechnology 
 
Another recent project in the city is the Düsseldorf Life Science Centre (LSC), an incubator 
initiated in 2001 by the city of Düsseldorf in cooperation with the Heinrich Heine University 
Düsseldorf. The idea for its establishment was said to have come from one of the university 
professors that was also the co-founder of a large biotechnology firm, which was then pushed 
by the cit at the highest level.549 The following Figure 37 gives an overview of its entire 
supporting institutional network. While the city of Düsseldorf provided the land site, the 
Centre was implemented and is operated by the property development corporation Düsseldorf 
‘GEO mbH’ (Grundstücksentwicklungs-Gesellschaft Düsseldorf), which is jointly owned by 
the city’s 100% subsidiary firm ‘IDR AG’ (Industrieterrains Düsseldorf-Reisholz AG) and the 
bank Stadtsparkasse Düsseldorf. 
 
Since opening in 2002, the LSC supports the establishment and enlargement of business 
activities of start-ups, young enterprises and established firms in the areas of 
biotechnology/genetic engineering, bioinformatics, biopharma, biomedicine and medical 
technology.550 It aims to support cooperation and technology transfer through networking 
among firms and contacts with the neighbouring university, university hospital and 
polytechnic / university of applied science by combining the three pillar functions of a 
technology centre, start-up centre and service centre.  
 
 
                                                 
549 Transcript page 2. 
550 See the LSC website at http://www.lsc-dus.de, accessed 19.04.2006. 
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Figure 37 The institutional network of the Life Science Centre Düsseldorf 
 
 
Source: http://www.lsc-dus.de, last accessed December 2006 
 
The sectoral focus of the incubator seems to be suitable given the university’s strength in this 
area and the overall lack of technology and start-up centres in the city means that it does not 
represent an addition to an already existing oversupply.  
 
The technology centre offers support services from a network of experts in the areas of 
finance, patents, R&D and technology transfer as well as 12,000 m² of laboratory and office 
space, complemented by a further 9,000 m² in an adjacent office building. By April 2009, the 
centre has attracted 36 organisations renting office space, of which 32 are firms.551 The 
centre’s activities are further linked to those of the Bioregio Rhineland network of the (other) 
                                                 
551 For more information on the media harbor, see https://www.duesseldorf.de/medienhafen/index.shtml 
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ABCD cities of Aachen/Jülich, Bonn and Cologne (in addition to Düsseldorf) that also focus 
on the biotechnology sector.  
 
Assessment of Düsseldorf’s institutional support network 
 
Düsseldorf’s business and innovation support system was reported to lack proactive initiative 
and ideas for fostering cooperation amongst firms amongst its support institutions, where one 
actor was said to ‘always wait until somebody comes up with an idea’552 and university-
industry linkages were only nascent due to a slowly developing uptake of this opportunity by 
professors and students.553 It therefore seems that the city is not fully using its potential in 
terms of support for cooperation. Given that that city does not have a specific public-private 
partnership active in the field of economic and business support – such as AGIT, dortmund-
project or GFW in the other case studies –, one could surmise from this that perhaps the scope 
and extent of activities is more limited.  
 
An apparent more dynamic self-driven business base may also mean that pressure for 
innovation support is not as high as elsewhere. However, as comparative economic key 
figures indicate that Düsseldorf is doing relatively well, a more general focus on providing 
good framework conditions may well have been a successful strategy.  
 
In any case, while there was some criticism about the local inter-institutional relationships in 
that it was reported that ‘too many have a say, too much is done democratically’554, an overall 
collaborative support certainly still appears to prevail. A non-representative social network 
                                                 
552 Interview No. 2, transcript page 4. 
553 Interview No. 8, transcript page 8. 
554 Interview No. 46, transcript page 5 
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analysis of the relationships between the core institutional actors within the local economic 
and innovation support system of Düsseldorf (see following figure and table) suggests that the 
interactions between local actors are broadly characterised by cooperative attitudes. However, 
the overall number of local actors mentioned by the core institutions has been low, perhaps 
indicating that a vibrant network of business and innovatin support actors does not exist. The 
reported active involvement of local banks in the activites should be seen as positive feature 
of the support system. 
 
In summary, it is the author’s impression that Düsseldorf seems to be characterised by a 
collaborative yet less forceful governance system. Although a clear strategic approach cannot 
be detected, some lighthouse projects have been pushed through and the city migt be able to 
rely on maintaining its good framework conditions. Admittedly, a somewhat mixed picture 
therefore emerges for this particular case study given the rather positive relationships between 
the governance actors and the city’s economic performance.  
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Collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at.  
Mixture of competitive and collaborative relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
Competitive relationship mentioned with organisation pointed at. 
 
Figure 38 Network of relationships of the local actors in Düsseldorf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Circles represent local organisations within Düsseldorf. Their names have been omitted for privacy 
reasons. The thickness of arrows indicates the nature of relationships mentioned as explained below.  
Arrows pointing at no particular circle represent relationships with regional organisations at Land level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 32 Relationships within Düsseldorf’s business and innovation support system  
              Level of involvement/ 
 
 
Relationship to other 
organisations 
Local 
City-region 
 
 
(Düsseldorf)
Regional 
 
 
 
(Land NRW)
National 
 
 
 
(Germany) 
EU / 
International
Interregional 
 
(EU)  
Competitive 
 
2 2 1 0 
(*) 
Mixture of competitive and 
collaborative 
0 1 0 0 
(*) 
Collaborative 
 
10 6 2 4 
None of the above or  
no connections 
0 0 0 0 
Note: The numbers indicate the network combinations of organisations entered in the institutional matrix 
mapping tool. There were no fixed numbers or type of organisations that had to be mentioned by interviewees. 
Stars (*) represent a double entry of an organisation that was (re)moved, e.g. cooperation with a regional actor at 
the international level to be displayed only as an entry at the regional level. 
 
Source for figure and table: Own creation based upon supporting matrix tool completed by 3 local interviewees 
(one interviewee did not complete the matrix and two interviewees were not asked to complete it – one due to a 
telephone interview and one because he was part of the same organisation as another interviewee). 
J 
E 
I 
F 
G H 
C 
A 
B 
D 
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CHAPTER 9 
FIELDWORK FINDINGS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND ISSUES 
RAISED CONCERNING GOVERNANCE DYNAMICS  
 
Following the description of the strategies and support provided, the key actors for policy-
making and implementation, and the dynamic governance aspects that influence the working 
of the innovation system in each of the case studies discussed before, this chapter compares, 
int the first part, the fieldwork findings of the case studies, especially in regard to governance 
dynamics. It highlights differences and similiarities in the dynamics of the innovation systems 
studied and provides some possible explanations as to why these exist.  
 
To facilitate the cross-case analysis and discussions, a tabular overview is introduced to give 
an overview linking the fieldwork findings in relation to the research questions raised in the 
thesis. These dynamics very much concern the measures and processes of policy development 
and implementation, organisational and relationship issues between the actors within the 
governance infrastructure, and their perceptions that were outlined as drivers of systemic-ness 
of the governance system.  
 
The second part of this chapter presents more explorative issues raised by the interviewees 
concerning governance dynamics. It aims to capture the overall different perceptions by 
academics, on the one hand, and policy-makers and practitioners, on the other, in terms of 
innovation policy-making and implementation of core issues, as well as obstacles and 
contributing factors, for instance, for achieving more coordination and cooperation between 
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the different actors. These issues are therefore presented in a thematic structure. This is 
complemented by an indication of the overall trends that were identified in local economic 
development policy before this part concludes with a list of enablers for building governance 
systemic-ness for business and innovation support that was identified from the fieldwork 
findings.  
 
The final part provides comparative inferences by outlining implications from the fieldwork 
findings for policy and theory.  
 
Comparative analysis of the governance dynamics inherent to the local innovation and 
business support system of city-regions 
 
The following Table 33 provides an overview of the extent of governance dynamics within 
the different case studies and at multiple levels of governance. It should be noted that since a 
qualitative research approach has been taken, these assessments have to be interpreted as a 
qualitative academic judgement.555 The table serves also as a conclusion to the previous 
chapter, as well as an introduction to the discussion of the governance dynamics, as it 
provides an indication of the author’s impression of the governance patterns found across the 
case studies. 
 
                                                 
555 Due to the limitations of this research approach, the judgements on the extent of governance dynamics 
represent only an indicative inference since the qualitative judgement was based on a snapshot of insights from a 
small sample of actors (cf. chapter 8). 
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Table 33 Extent of governance dynamics according to case studies and level of governance  
 
Level of governance Aspects of governance dynamics  
- Characteristics and activities  NRW AA DO DU D Rtg 
Policy measures (and funding) 
 
- Own programme/instruments developed
- Outlined holistic strategic orientation 
- Cluster policy approach 
- Informed by diagnostic and comparative 
analytical studies (e.g. by consultancies)
- Own competitions for funding 
 
 
++ 
+ 
++ 
o 
 
++ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
 
++ 
 
 
o 
– 
– 
– 
 
– 
 
 
– 
– 
o 
– 
 
o 
 
 
– – 
– 
– – 
– – 
 
– – 
Structure (and policy links) 
 
- Connections between actors (i.e. 
contacts and exchange as opposed to 
fragmentation) 
- Clear-cut allocated responsibilities 
between actors (as opposed to overlap) 
- Coordination of tasks amongst actors 
(as opposed to duplication) 
- Recent organisational innovation within 
governance structure (e.g. new core 
organisation or mediator) 
- Existence of hybrid organisations (PPP) 
- Existence of dynamic business base  
 
 
++ 
 
 
o 
 
– 
 
++ 
 
 
+ 
o 
 
 
+ 
 
 
– – 
 
++ 
 
o 
 
 
+ 
o 
 
 
++ 
 
 
– 
 
+ 
 
++ 
 
 
+ 
o 
 
 
– – 
 
 
– 
 
– – 
 
–  
 
 
+ 
– 
 
 
o 
 
 
o 
 
o 
 
–  
 
 
o 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
o 
 
o 
 
– – 
 
 
– – 
+ 
Relationships (and cooperation ties) 
 
- Cooperative attitudes/mutual trust (as 
opposed to competitive attitudes/ 
conflict, opportunism, antagonism) 
- Identifiable lead organisation (main 
communication or strategy hub) 
- Identifiable animateurs and drivers 
(mover & shakers) or mediators  
 
 
+ (reg.) /
 – – 
(sub-reg.)
+ 
 
o 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
+ 
 
o 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
– – 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
– – 
 
– – 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
+ 
 
o 
 
Processes (and decision-making) 
 
- Intense and consistent interactions 
- Inclusiveness of stakeholders (i.e. 
participatory approach) 
- Openness/outreach to external actors  
 
 
++ 
+ 
 
– – 
 
 
++ 
+ 
 
++ 
 
 
++ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
o 
– 
 
- 
 
 
o 
o 
 
++ 
 
 
o 
o 
 
++ 
Perceptions (and ideas) of policy 
 
- Theory-derived or awareness  
- Reference to good practice models 
 
 
++ 
+ 
 
 
++ 
+ 
 
 
++ 
+ 
 
 
– – 
– 
 
 
– – 
– 
 
 
– – 
– – 
 
Source: Own creation. The categories have been phrased in a way, so that a ‘++’ denotes a very positive extent 
or quality of the characteristic; ‘+’ positive; ‘o’ average/normal; ‘–’ negative; and ‘– –’ very negative. 
NRW=North Rhine-Westphalia; AA=Aachen; DO=Dortmund; DU=Duisburg; D=Düsseldorf; Rtg.=Ratingen 
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Table 34 Characteristics of the local governance dimension across the four case studies 
Key drivers of the 
systemic-ness of the 
governance system 
Aachen Dortmund Duisburg Düsseldorf 
Focus of policy 
measures and strategy 
 
Entrepreneurial 
activities and 
university 
potential (start-
up region); 
transnational 
cooperation 
Clearly focussed 
cluster policy 
and holistic 
implementation 
approach;  
e-city 
General policies 
with one clear 
sectoral focus 
(logistics) 
Suply-side urban 
development 
focussed on 
sectoral strength; 
global city 
Organisational structure 
and policy links of the 
governance systems 
Virtual 
(via umbrella 
organisation) 
Dynamic core 
organisation 
Seperate 
organisations 
driving themes 
Lack of specific 
business support 
actor but links to 
government  
Relationships and 
cooperation ties 
between actors  
Competitive and 
bypassing 
Collaborative 
(identification) 
and constructive 
Rather 
competitive and 
weak 
Collaborative but 
weak, yet global 
ties 
Processes and decision-
making 
 
Inclusive but 
dominated  
Inclusive 
(community of 
practice); 
external 
moderation 
Restricted and 
disconnected 
from 
stakeholders at 
multiple levels  
Self-driven; key 
individuals 
Perceptions of policy 
and sources of 
innovative ideas 
External input; 
transnational 
cooperation 
External input; 
qualified 
personnel; 
international 
cooperation 
Traditional; 
networks but 
lack of business 
dynamics 
Policy-push; 
Non-
interventionist; 
global pipes  
Source: Own creation. 
 
The cross-case findings clearly suggest that there are important differences in terms of 
governance dynamics across different city-regions within the same Land setting. 556 Not only 
do some individual actors seem to be more successful in actively driving certain processes 
within their respective governance system, but it also seems that the overall degree of 
systemic-ness, i.e. the coordination and cooperation, differs among the municipalities.  
 
                                                 
556 The same Land setting means that the various governance structures of case city-regions consist, overall, of 
fairly homologous settings and actors (cf. chapter 8). 
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To briefly summarise, Dortmund and Aachen are viewed here to represent cases where 
systemic-ness of the governance dimension of their innovation system was found, or at least 
partly found (in the latter case).The question of what makes these cases distinct from the 
others, Duisburg and Düsseldorf, where governance relations do not appear to constitute 
systemic-ness is of particular interest.  
 
Dortmund is viewed as a model case of a successful  construction of a functioning network of 
actors, which was reported to have managed to overcome and avoid an ‘immobilisation of 
policy as a result of conflict between different elites’557. This was seen partly as the result of 
an open and participatory governance approach. A critical incident in this case was the 
involvement of the consultancy firm McKinsey558 in the development of a committed cluster 
strategy. The creation of the fundamental dortmund-project with a reported ‘massive 
implementation capacity’559 can be seen as an investment by a learning city-region. 
Correspondingly, the start2grow competitions are an example of how the dortmund-project 
has tried to construct socialised learning in communities of practice with the objective to 
create new start-ups. By providing intellectual and social leadership in building a cooperation 
space for learning to take place, the dortmund-project can be partly regarded as a community 
of practiceas defined by Wenger and Snyder (2000, p. 139): ‘groups of people informally 
bound together by shared expertise and passion’ with the primary output being knowledge.  
 
The business and innovation support system in Aachen was partly seen to be systemic. 
Despite a strategic approach to use the university’s potential more efficiently, the city-
                                                 
557 Interview No. 29, transcript page 5. 
558 Interview No. 44, transcript page 8. 
559 Interview No. 48, transcript page 6. 
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region’s dynamism appeared to be on hold due to rather competitive interinstitutional 
relationships and ‘parallel structures’. 560 
 
Duisburg on the contrary was viewed rather as a ‘dark black spot’ in terms of economic 
development support 561 with no functioning network due to non-collaborative actors and a 
university that appeared to be less embedded into the innovation system than its counterparts 
in Aachen and Dortmund.562 
 
The author’s impression of Düsseldorf’s governance system was of a weak one due to a 
limited focus on urban development projects and a lack of strategic design of implemented 
policies even though a collaborative environment seemed to be present. Given that the 
subjective feeling of a weak governance system is not reflected in the economic performance 
indictors, this mixed picture should be viewed more as a snapshot of how this innovation 
system is working. A likely dynamic business base – only covered indirectly through 
intermediaries – may be a potential driving force here. 
 
The underlying reasons that are viewed as obstacles and drivers are discussed in more detail 
in the following and a list of key enablers is provided later on in this chapter.  
 
Besides the sub-regional differences across the case studies, there appear to exist also 
significant horizontal differences regarding the characteristics of governance dynamics. Most 
notably, this concerns the allocation of responsibilities between actors, the coordination 
amongst them, and the degree of cooperative attitudes. These three determining factors of 
                                                 
560 Interview No. 29, ttranscript page 10. 
561 Interview No. 35, transcript page 12 
562 Interview No. 29, transcript page 8. 
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governance systemic-ness seem to have been difficult to achieve in the case study city-regions 
(cf. Table 33). This strongly suggests that governance dynamics prevail that act as obstacles 
to achieving a systemic-ness. The reverse implication of this is that there is widespread 
overlap of responsibilities, duplication of tasks, and opportunism or antagonism between 
stakeholders.  
 
Cooperation and coordination amongst governance actors: Systemic-ness to be found?  
A key finding of this thesis is the extent of inter-institutional conflict and lack of systemic-
ness, i.e. lack of a common vision and cooperation which, at least partly, feature in all the 
case studies. While inter-institutional competition had been expected, the reported scale of 
conflict was suprising.  
 
The following two tables give an indicative overview in this respect as they compile the types 
of relationships mentioned by local actors of the business and innovation support system 
across the case studies.563 It shows for instance that in two of the four case studies, namely 
Aachen and Duisburg, the relationships amongst local actors were seen as a mixture of 
competition and collaboration. Dortmund and, to a lesser extent, Düsseldorf are noticeable 
positive examples of predominantely cooperative relationships. 
 
Concerning linkages to the meso (e.g. Projekt Ruhr) and regional (Land) levels, Dortmund 
stands out as a positive example, whilst Duisburg is a negative example, with the lack of cited 
relationships to regional actors. 
 
                                                 
563 Due to the overall low numbers of relationships mentioned at national and international level, a compiled 
table was only produced for the local and regional governance levels. However, the results for the national and 
international level are still listed individually in each of the case study reports. 
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This negative impression of the limited outreach of Duisburg is also reflected in the low 
number of relationships mentioned with actors at the national and EU/international levels. 
Due to its geographical border location and its Euregio activities, it is not suprising that 
Aachen appears to be more active at these levels.  
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Table 35 Relationships amongst local actors compared across the four case studies 
              Level of involvement/ 
 
Relationship to other 
organisations 
Local 
City-region 
 
Aachen 
Local 
City-region 
 
Dortmund 
Local 
City-region 
 
Duisburg 
Local 
City-region 
 
Düsseldorf 
Competitive 
 
0 0 
(*) 
1 2 
Mixture of competitive and 
collaborative 
16 5 8 0 
Collaborative 
 
14 22 
(*) 
5 10 
None of the above or  
no connections 
0 0 2 0 
Total number of combinations 30 27 16 12 
Number of interviews  5 5 4 3 
Average of combinations  6 5.4 4 4 
 
Table 36 Relationships with regional actors mentioned by local actors across the case studies 
              Level of involvement/ 
 
Relationship to other 
organisations 
Regional  
(Land NRW) 
mentioned by 
Aachen 
Regional  
(Land NRW)
mentioned by
Dortmund 
Regional  
(Land NRW) 
mentioned by 
Duisburg 
Regional  
(Land NRW)
mentioned by 
Düsseldorf 
Competitive 
 
0 1 0 2 
Mixture of competitive and 
collaborative 
1 
(****) 
7 1 
(*) 
1 
Collaborative 
 
6 
(**) 
17 
(*****) 
0 6 
None of the above or  
no connections 
0 0 0 0 
Total number of combinations 7 25 1 9 
Number of interviews  5 5 4 3 
Average of combinations 1.4 5 0.25 3 
Note to both tables: The numbers indicate the network combinations of organisations entered in the institutional 
matrix mapping tool unilaterally by local actors. The first table corresponds to the relationships mentioned with 
other local actors, the second table to the relationships mentioned with regional actors at the meso (e.g. Ruhr 
area) or Land level (NRW). There were no fixed numbers or types of organisations that had to be mentioned by 
interviewees. Stars (*) represent a double entry of an organisation that was (re)moved, e.g. cooperation with a 
regional actor at the international level to be displayed only as an entry at the regional level. 
 
Source for both tables: Own creation based upon the supporting matrix tool completed by 17 local interviewees 
(four interviewees did not complete the matrix and three interviewees were not asked to complete it – one due to 
a telephone interview and two because they were part of the same organisation as another interviewee). 
Academics were not asked to complete the matrix and actors operating mainly at the meso and regional levels 
are not considered here as they were asked only to indicate relationships with local actors in general but not 
specifically for the individual case studies.  
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The causes for the extent of previous (Dortmund) or current (Aachen and Duisburg) conflicts 
and competitive relationships within the innovation systems were reported to be different but 
interpersonal animosities and functional overlaps of the business and innovation support 
organisations were commonly mentioned .  
 
For instance, one interviewee pointed out that ‘overlap is normal as everbody targets the same 
customer – its firms’564. Therfore, it was highlighted that interpersonal communication is 
important when activites in intersections are concerned. Interestingly, start-up support was 
singled out by a number of interviewees in three of the four case-studies as an area where the 
potential for conflict was apparently higher than in other areas.565 Corrspondingly, a few 
interviewees actually reported different types of relationships to other organisations according 
to the different activity fields concerned. As an example, the relationship between two 
organisations was labelled as competitive in the area of start-up support but collaboratitve in 
location marketing. Therefore, it seems that flexibility is required from actors of the business 
and innovation support system and a friend-or-enemy attitude in terms of ‘you are either with 
me or against me’ would be counter-productive.  
 
In addition, there appears also to be a prevailing level of overlap of responsibilities and 
continuous duplication of activities (such as the provision of similar thematic information or 
networking initiatives and services) by actors within the same business and innovation 
support system. The following selected extracts from interviews with policy-makers and 
                                                 
564 Interview No. 17, transcript page 7 
565 Interview No. 15; No. 27, transcript page 17; and No. 45 for instance. 
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practitioners provide an insight into from where competitive attitudes stem and why a 
systemic-ness of the governance dimension can be so hard to achieve.  
 
Lack of cooperation  
 
Firstly, the following quote illustrates the scale of the reported lack of cooperation between 
governance actors:  
 
[W]e have ascertained that we work massively against each other. Everybody has 
partly supported projects. It is not the aim of Land support measures that we use the 
funding for the same or similar offers. 566  
[…] 
Good cooperation is due to close personal contacts, then one can repair many 
things.567 
 
The interview extract below gives an explanation for this:  
 
It is rather that the individual institutions or organisations only work together 
locally/regionally if at all. Supra-regionally is always difficult, because of the different 
interests and positions.568 
[…] 
[Cooperation] is in principle always dependent upon people. And one has to see that 
there is inevitably some overlapping, where one has to be very communicative, 
otherwise irritations will soon arise. [...] We ascertain strongly that, overall, businesses 
are massively overloaded with offers and information. [...] In this respect, it would be 
useful if certain things, areas or activities would go in the same direction, if one would 
                                                 
566 Interview No. 16, transcript pages 20-21 
567 Interview No. 16, transcript page 22 
568 Interview No. 16, transcript page 6 
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do such things together, or just coordinate them with each other via email lists and so 
on. 569  
 
The creative pressure of economic suffering 
 
Multiple reference were made across many interviewees to ‘pressure from economic 
suffering’ (‘Leidensdruck’) being a key driver of reform.  
 
‘The severity or necessity of the economic problems once brought all the main actors 
together, but the close working ties have broken down’ 570 
 
The desperateness and necessity of municipalities or regions to do something in the wake of 
severe structural difficulties acts as a strong incentive to cooperate. It is arguably an enabler 
of stakeholders ‘burying the hatchet’ and overcoming any apparent interpersonal and inter-
organisational antipathy and conflict. 571 
 
Overlap of responsibilities and functions 
 
There is also an overlap in responsibilities, or functions. The subsequent quote is just one of 
many examples where this was reported. This consequently hints at a lack of coordination. 
 
                                                 
569 Interview No. 16, transcript page 7 
570 Interview No. 16, transcript page 16 
571 For instance, interviews No. 33, transcript page 5 and No. 43, transcript page 7. 
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The city, for example, also has a contact unit, a kind of administration hearing, which 
shall also be a contact point for businesses. We perceive this as a bit 
counterproductive, although not in every aspect. 572  
[…] 
There are overlaps, which one could transfer from competition into cooperation. […] 
It really concerns the interfaces, which are often not sufficiently clarified. And there is 
always an intersection, which is covered by two organisations at the same time. 573 
 
The following extract from an interview with one practitioner provides a more detailed insight 
into the underlying reasons behind the occurrence of duplication and competitive attitudes 
amongst the different actors within the innovation and business support system. 
 
If you have two or three working groups in the e-logistics sector at our location, then 
the businesses ask themselves “what is the difference?”. […] There is a bit of 
pressure to perform, everybody must always show that they have a right to exist 
and that is particularly the case for the start-up area. There is a start-up organisation 
for women and alternative existence, many organisations that deal with and want to 
help start-ups. And we need to be careful that this does not also happen for the 
innovation area. 574 
[…] 
But the problem is always that with constant consensus talk nothing happens. One 
has to drive in a peg and say “I do this, irrespective of whether somebody participates 
or not”. If others participate, the better, then one can vote on how to go about it. It is 
very important to be open, for instance, when creating a logo for the operating circle 
or clearly indicating the participating organisations. That also creates a higher 
acceptance amongst businesses, who see that the initiative is not merely organised by 
one organisation. 575 
 
                                                 
572 Interview No. 22, transcript page 12 
573 Interview No. 22, transcript page 12 
574 Interview No. 16, transcript pages 17-18 
575 Interview No. 16, transcript page 19 
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This call for more coordination can be seen to exemplify the need to create institutions that 
mediate between and coordinate actors. The set-up of a virtual one-stop-shop, that bundles 
activities and provides clear responsibilities under one umbrella organisation without 
centralising expertise in one organisation, is to be seen as a possible solution in this respect as 
the case of Aachen’s ‘start-up region’ initiative shows. This appears to be a particularly 
suitable approach in the case of interpersonal or interinstitutional conflicts. 
 
Another possibility is the support of networking and cooperation between different 
stakeholders by supporting the process of joint policy development and discourse.  
 
I would support projects that foster inter-institutional dialogue and create [such 
Regional Innovation Strategies], however I see a problem in the financial support. I 
would welcome such an initiative but would not support it with money. Instead, the 
actors need to come together and collaborate out of their own free will or on their own 
initiative, otherwise you do not achieve anything. 576 
 
However, there are diverging opinions on whether such activities ought to be financially 
supported or not. While the previous interviewee speaks out against it, another practitioner 
takes a different stance by pointing out that is such an action is done‘voluntarily, then it is 
often not consequently followed-up.’577 
 
The next quote also indicates that there is a waste of resources as a consequence of the 
duplication that occurs:  
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There are no arrangements [with regards to the integration of different programmes] 
between different funding institutions, between different actors even within the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, who work on that. This is rather arbitrary […] and it 
happens that you look into other databases and suddenly see a firm with the same title 
with the same project that already applied for EU funding or Federal funding. You can 
interpret that as you wish. 578 
 
The duplication of activities and services does not only mean that resources are wasted, but 
that the client base is alienated too. This obviously threatens the governance system’s ability 
to reach out to its business base and to initiate cooperation between and with them.  
 
[T]oo much is duplicated here, double and threefold. For instance, a different 
initiative and a different institute work on the same project as we do, sometimes 
without knowing about it. I see a further weakness in that we are often in danger of 
losing the practical relevance. In that projects are too theoretical and too scientific 
for our clients, that is too abstract for SMEs. […] They often do not understand – not 
because they are stupid – what such a network can actually offer them. […] The 
practical relevance is often already lost because the language of SMEs is not used. 
Many consultants speak High German, a consultant dialect […] and talk about 
benchmarking and so on. The ordinary businessman then shuts down and then it is 
over. Sometimes, even a tie may already be too much. Advisers, whether technology 
advisors or business consultants are always equated with job rationalising measures.579 
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579 Interview No. 35, transcript pages 13-14 
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Perceptions of innovation policy-making and -implementing  
Having mainly asked policy-makers and practitioners for their understanding of successful 
innovation support, it becomes obvious that there is an abundance of different perceptions on 
how to support innovation – let alone what innovation means.  
 
Nevertheless, the following quotes show that there are some common themes in the different 
opinions. Broadly they can be distinguished according to the point of view taken. For 
instance, some practitioners respond with an answer about a more effective set-up of 
innovation support programmes; others refer to ways on how to reach the business base with 
their support, or make them cooperate with each other; whilst others stress a systemic view 
and point to the need for cooperation within the governance dimension.  
 
Flexibility and openness of programmes  
 
With regards to the successful structure of programmes in support of innovation, it is stressed 
that these programmes have to remain flexible and open in order to achieve a demand-led 
orientation and ensure that a critical mass of business with specific competencies is found. 
 
Interviewer:  What in your opinion and your expertise epitomises successful innovation 
support? 
Interviewee: The organisation of innovation should definitely be flexible.[…] If I say 
open and flexible, I do not mean without delimitation. There should be some 
delimitation but it should have very wide corridors. Let’s say not just the shape 
of a corridor, but also funnel-shaped. So that one can enter a lot at the top […] 
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of the funnel, and that the conical form produces an output that one desires to 
achieve all measures of innovation. 580 
 
The interviewee later explains his conceptualisation with his perception of demand often 
being too narrow for specific programmes available for certain spatial areas. 581 
 
Another interviewee also names flexibility as important for programme design in order to 
have a demand- led orientation. 
 
Interviewer:  What in your opinion and your expertise epitomises successful innovation 
support? 
Interviewee: Well, an intelligent innovation support, that is fairly easy to answer. It is a 
support generally for SMEs, which must be cleverly knit together. This means 
that I don’t have to complete an application of over 10-20 pages, and that it is 
not about describing what one is doing. If I have to fill in the relevant forms, 
how many staff, what costs and so on, then many businesses are overstretched 
with that. […] After all, such a programme is one that is relatively flexibly 
handled; because different businesses have different needs. 582 
 
Later comments further highlight that there is a need to provide the right targeted approach to 
reach businesses and this involves, as the practitioner point outs, not to create too many 
administrative hurdles – certainly not at the beginning of making contact. 
 
 
                                                 
580 Interview No. 35, transcript pages 3-4 and cf. 17 
581 Interview No. 35, transcript page 17 
582 Interview No. 16, transcript pages 4-5 
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Reaching the business base  
 
The fact that several interviewees stressed the need to reach the business base provides an 
indication that this is a thorny task. Still, it remains a crucial task if the governance dimension 
is to play a role within the innovation system and if a cooperative and associative type of 
innovation system is aspired to.  
 
The point is that many small enterprises shy away from bringing external 
consultants into their businesses. It is not that they cannot afford it […], but 
they are afraid of it, because they are getting a mirror held up in front of 
them. And you are also told that what you are doing is stupid and nobody 
wants that. […] One has to be a bit careful in this respect and we have to 
explain to businesses why this makes sense for them. 583 
 
As much as SMEs may be concerned about being lectured by consultants providing advice, is 
it equally hard to bring them together and convince them to engage in cooperative activities 
(cf. Burfitt et al., 2002, p. 29), as the next comment stresses. 
 
The individual businesses are mainly all lone fighters, who look out for what is 
happening. […] Trust grows slowly amongst businesses […] and it is hard 
work getting businesses to cooperate. That is a process that can often take two 
years. 584   
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A careful selection of structures and processes for networking and cooperation activities is 
thus important in the ‘fight to keep people interested’ as one practitioner put it.585 The 
following description by an interviewee points exactly to that. 
 
The [specific round table club] rules lay down clearly that it is a democratic 
body, which means that members can decide by a majority what topics they 
want to discuss and what they want to see transferred into activities. We ensure 
that the organisational framework remains in our hands, but that the 
moderation is undertaken by elected members of these specific round table 
clubs. 586 
 
It should not be forgotten that especially small enterprises often lack the resources to engage 
in lengthy and continuous gatherings. This is sometimes even worse if these businesses are 
based upon an internal management where the CEO does everything, cannot delegate, and has 
to read everything, i.e. is a ‘chain businesses’ as an interviewee called them.587 However, one 
important challenge for practioners is to facilitate cooperation amongst innovative SMEs and 
facilitate their participation, for instance, in cluster organisations that ‘provide or channel 
specialised and customised business support services, especially to SMEs’ (European 
Commission, 2008a, p. 44). 
 
 
Systemic view of innovation support  
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586 Interview No. 16, transcript page 3 
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Other interviewees also stress the need for businesses to engage in networking, which at its 
core means bringing people together. 
 
Interviewer:  What in your opinion and your expertise epitomises successful innovation 
support? 
Interviewee: ‘There is the question of what we want to understand as innovation. Well, 
technology is always one aspect, but it is often equated with innovation. There 
is the question of whether a new marketing strategy can also be an innovation, 
or whether a certain kind of network can be an innovation, when businesses say 
that it does not make much sense to view each other just as competitors, 
because in certain aspects it makes sense for us individual businesses, for 
example, to work together in networks.’ 588 
 
As much as this applies to networking and cooperation amongst businesses, this is equally 
important for the governance dimension, as the next excerpt stresses. 
 
Interviewer:  What in your opinion and your expertise epitomises successful innovation 
support? 
Interviewee:  What from my experience in every case has to be achieved – and we place that 
before innovation – […], one has to succeed in uniting the actors at a 
location. And we achieved that in a remarkable way. We had, in the years 
1998 and before, a delicate situation, where one attacked the other and did not 
get along with each other, meaning against those people at [managing] Director 
level, or equivalent, in the various institutions like, I don’t know, for example, 
unions, chamber of commerce, economic development agency and so on. 
“Great we can do that, that serves our own profile”, but that was it. So, what 
we did was: we created a vision and that vision is very, very daring. That 
came from the anglo-saxon area. There it is not that unusual what we did with 
[our ambitious] objective, which we put out as a slogan. Yet, people listen and 
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then start at some point, if they are properly integrated, to identify with it and 
to support that externally. 589 
Interviewer:  But how were you able to get there from the previous conflictive situation? 
Interviewee: Very simple. We brought in an external person. Because if I would do this 
[…] and would go there and say: “Listen, folks, that doesn’t work, that is 
totally stupid. You all have to sit down at one table and we should support 
three sectors instead of supporting everybody with the watering can. 
Furthermore we should think about this and that”; then they would say: “We do 
that already. We know that. Who are you anyway and what is all that about?” 
[…] Because one needs the big, renowned, independent name, who can 
move things. Yet, that person costs a lot of money. 590 
[…] 
[I]t is very important [in a political stalemate situation] to bring in the external 
element and really go in there with a crowbar. The point is that these people are 
external; they can withdraw themselves because they are not from the region. 
They can say: “Yes, we understand this, or we don’t understand this and it is 
silly, if you think about it, that – leaving the predominating circumstance aside 
– Mr. XY does not get along with Mrs. So-and-so.” 591 
 
The latter comment also makes a case for the need to have a mediator, yet it argues that it is 
beneficial if this person is an external high-profile, renowned actor and thus potentially can be 
viewed by the different stakeholders as being objective. 
 
Finally, the role of universities and research institutions is also stressed as shown by the 
subsequent two quotes. Their involvement is seen as crucial for achieving the systemic view 
of innovation.  
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[With regards to cooperation] it is necessary to have also these [scientific 
institutions] on board, because if you have one who starts firing against it, 
then it becomes difficult. 592 
 
The fact that there is a university […] is very important for technological 
innovation, which is something that the city cannot decide. Universities are 
Land matters but the university as such is of course one of our key partners 
with regards to technology support – to support the cooperation between the 
different departments, research institutes and businesses.593 
 
On innovation policy and cluster policy – are they implemented?  
 
The question is raised as to whether there is actually ‘such a thing’ as innovation policy in 
practice as conceptualised by academic theory. The inclination here is to answer this in the 
affirmative since a clear holistic cross-cutting policy approach has been identified at least in 
one or two settings, namely Dortmund and perhaps Aachen (cf. Table 33 above), as well as at 
the Land level. Having said this, overall it is possible to detect a deviation from the strategic, 
holistic and systemic orientation of innovation policy. In many cases, innovation policy is 
understood as merely one elements of either SME growth policy, pure technology policy or 
general economic development policy, and so on. The impression was gained that not only is 
reference rarely made to innovation but its elements are also treated more as standalone policy 
initiatives (cf. also Lagendijk, 1999a, pp. 22 and 24). In other cases, innovation policy is 
simply not the priority as the following quotes demonstrates: 
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Our aim is not to support innovation technology but employment.594 
[…] 
Innovation support, we don’t do that; we also don’t do information transfer 
or knowledge transfer. Our task is actually to help people with ideas – which 
are commercial – insofar that they are able to transfer these ideas, that they can 
turn it into a business and at best, of course, employ people at the location and 
thus have more employment. 595 
 
Assessing the extent of innovation policy orientation is particularly difficult if explicit 
references to it are rare. Therefore, attention has also been placed on cluster policy, which is 
subjectively regarded here as a key tool for innovation policy. Indeed, cluster policies are 
viewed as a ‘vital element of building strong innovation systems’ (European Commission, 
2008a, p. 32) that are most effective when they represent a ‘horizontal approach‘ that brings 
together different policies (cf. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2007). 
 
Overall, several of the formulised strategies at the Land, meso (Projekt Ruhr) and local 
(dortmund-project and Aachen’s foREK) levels, as well as numerous interviewees, referred 
explicitly to the cluster approach and the national competence centre initiative as a source of 
inspiration. Furthermore, their underlying concept was implictly referred at by numerous 
mentionings of the need to ‘strenghthen the strength’. This is quite a significant finding given 
North-Rhine Westphalia’s previous ‘subsidy mentality’ that was still reported by some actors 
to be an obstacle for successful innovation policy-making.596 
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Although the cluster approach appears to be a fashionable concept – given its repeated 
mentioning by interviewees –, a cluster policy was only found to be seriously implemented in 
one case study, namely the city-region of Dortmund.  
 
In the other case studies this approach was only partly visible and mostly lacking an 
overarching local approach across different policy fields. For instance, Aachen managed to 
focus its strategic policy orientation on a narrow number of sectors but this focus is not 
explicitly relected in measures addressing skills shortages, as in the case of Dortmund . Still, 
an attempt to foster clustering and university-industry linkages, and support to the 
establishment of several cluster organizations were found in Aachen.  
 
In Duisburg, a holistic cluster approach was found but was restricted to one sector (logistics). 
In Düsseldorf, such a holistic approach was not explicitly noticeable, although the urban land 
site development of the media harbour could be viewed as being a potential innovative 
element. 
 
Given the holistic nature and different departmental competencies and responsibilities 
concerned, it appears that the implementation of full-scale cluster policy has high hurdles to 
overcome. Such an approach needs support from high-level politicians in order that 
stakeholders subordinate their vested interests and keep their criticism constructive. 
Furthermore, an inclusive process that is perhaps mediated by neutral externals can be a 
contributor to achieve this – as in case of dortmund-project –, especially if inter-personnel or 
inter-institutional conflict is present. 
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The theory-practice gap of conceptualising innovation policy and governance  
 
There appear to be varying degrees of awareness of theoretical and best-practice models for 
business and innovation support and policy at a wider scale.  
 
Interviewer:  Were there any theoretical models or best practice examples that inspired 
initiatives? 
Interviewee:  Well, let’s say, not explicitly. Explicitly that played no role. What I see, for 
example in the area of technology, […] is that there is a focus on competence 
centres and competence networks, which were supported by the Federal 
government as well as by the State governments. They don’t follow anymore 
the watering can principle, where everybody can try to develop something, but 
very strongly place an emphasis on competition. Competition between 
locations, so that it is not anymore said that everybody can do everything 
equally well, but that there are cities and regions that can do some things better 
than others and these develop a competence centre. 597 
 
It is surmised that there is indeed a significant gap between theoretical conceptualisations and 
those of practitioners. This gap is seen here to be fuelled from both sides. First, academic 
conceptualisations are seen here to lack operational guidance and relevance, while on the 
other hand practitioners’ unawareness of theoretical models acts as an obstacle in the 
successful implementation of theory-derived policy.  
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It is speculated here that this is potentially a source for common policy pitfalls (see chapter 7) 
and perhaps also epitomises the assumed lack of institutional capacity by municipalities to 
develop endogenous growth strategies.  
 
Overall trends in local economic development policy 
 
The following section provides the author’s impression of current overall trends in local 
economic development policies on the basis of the findings of the case studies. It builds upon 
and goes beyond the identification of trends by Hoppe (2000) in her analysis of the 
implementation of European Regional Policy comparing information and support services for 
SMEs in North Rhine-Westphalia and the English North West region. 
 
Hoppe (2000, pp. 60-62) identifies three trends in the decentralised provision of local 
economic development support by municipalities. In summary, they are:  
 
• the widening of measures applied besides the classical measures of improving 
infrastructure and provision of office and accommodation and plant sites (e.g. by 
including activities concerning communication and process-orientated cooperation, 
location marketing, moderation of thematic projects); 598 
• an emerging customer service orientation (with a demand-led provision of information 
and advisory services and mediation, including more support for start-ups); and  
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• an increasing reorganisation and externalisation of local economic development 
support (with tasks or policy fields being transferred from local public administration 
to private firms or public-private partnerships). 
 
Although these trends were not found universally in the economic development policy of this 
study’s case city-regions, the overall trends are indeed corroborated by the present fieldwork 
findings. However, the externalisation trend is viewed here more strongly. While Hoppe 
(2000, p. 61) explains this trend as a reaction to new challenges and budgetary constraints, the 
case of dortmund-project GmbH, together with that of Projekt Ruhr GmbH at the 
intermediary level, lends credence to a more proactive explanation of this trend. Thus the 
following trend is added here: 
 
• an increasing approach of institutional innovation by establishing new organisations 
with a limited life span – hence the label ‘project’ – in order to provide an impetus for 
a new dialogue process towards achieving a paradigm change in attitudes and 
activities.  
 
Furthermore, the two examples of dortmund-project and Projekt Ruhr GmbH also suggest a 
further trend in local economic development support and policy, namely of  
 
• a rising and widening use of the cluster approach (i.e. the application of topic- and 
sector–focussed strategies for networking, for building competency centres, and for 
the externalisation of economic development agencies, increasingly at local level). 
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Indeed, there seems to be an increasing decentralised application of the cluster concept. The 
trend in North Rhine-Westphalia is labelled here as representing a ‘localised regional cluster 
policy approach’, which indicates that the development of individual cluster concept 
applications is localised, whilst the Land retains central top-down strategic policy-making 
control (e.g. over the selection of sectoral and thematic cluster fields). 
 
While overall, this study advocates the cluster model as a useful methodological tool for 
developing economic strategies, it has to be noted that their success at the local level (i.e. 
micro cluster strategies that go beyond mere networking) should be questioned. The reason 
for this is that the problem of a critical mass (of firms and supporting specialised institutions) 
is likely to be greater at the local level.  
 
Moreover, two further trends are identified that strongly affect the local economic 
development policy, which are 
 
• the growing relevance and dependence upon funding from competitive bidding, which 
is increasingly used at national level, but also introduced at regional and more 
importantly sub-regional (e.g. in the case of allocation of Objective 2 funding by the 
Projekt Ruhr GmhH).  
• the emerging set-up of own competitions for competitive bidding at the local level for 
attracting entrepreneurs and so on (as seen in Dortmund). 
 
These trends recognise the increasing importance attached to the local level. The 
decentralisation of cluster policy and application of competitive bidding increase the 
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complexity at this governance level and amplify any diverging developments and dynamics 
amongst different sub-regional settings. The subsequent section discusses these governance 
dynamics in more detail and identifies some potential enablers and obstacles to achieving a 
systemic-ness of the business and innovation support.  
 
Enablers and obstacles to the systemic-ness of local innovation and business support  
A common theme in the opinions of the policy-makers and practitioners interviewed is that 
achieving a common cooperative economic development approach depends very much upon 
people. Other studies have highlighted this aspect (e.g. see Boekholt & Thuriaux, 2000, pp. 7-
8 and 55-57; Hassink, 1992, p. 105). The repetitive reference to people as enablers or 
obstacles means that interinstitutional problems – such as competitive attitudes, opportunism, 
and antagonism – are, at the core, interpersonnel problems. In consequence, it has to be asked 
what can be done to mitigate the tendency for interinstitutional conflict deriving from the   
pursuit of partisan interest.  
 
The following enablers for building governance systemic-ness for business and innovation 
support can be identified from the fieldwork findings:  
• Severity of economic problems (i.e. ‘pressure from economic suffering’ and the then 
expected phasing out of Objective 2 funding for the Ruhr area) 
• Institutional innovation to the support infrastructure (e.g. by creating a new key 
organisation such as dortmund-project and Projekt Ruhr leading a new policy 
approach) 
• Engagement and back-up of the political elite (e.g. representation in the Supervisory 
Board or Steering Committee) 
• Concentration upon a cluster strategy narrowly focussed on key strengths (that are to 
be marketed internally and externally through common trademarks and leitmotifs) 
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• Clearly allocated responsibilities and tasks (by means of negotiating allocation keys 
for requests) 
• Existence of a (virtual) anonymous umbrella institution acting as a first point of 
contact (i.e. one-stop-shop) for business and innovation that bundles and channels 
advisory requests through to individual institutions (e.g. Aachen’s start-up region) 
• Presence of a lead organisation that integrates and mediates between different 
stakeholders and acts as information broker and feedback provider  
• Inclusive process of strategy development for internalisation and identification (e.g. 
dortmund-project) 
• Lighthouse projects and outside marketing as part of location branding (Düsseldorf’s 
media harbour, Dortmund’s MST.factory, Duisburg’s logport and so on) 
• Involvement of external actors perceived as objective and high-profile in moderating 
the policy development process towards a consensus 
• Available research studies influencing the policy-making process (i.e. diagnostic phase 
for more evidence-based policy) 
• Existence of a critical mass of institutions (presence and embeddedness of a 
university, funding and so on) 
• Quality of staff in terms of interpersonal communication skills and specialisations (as 
a result of an emphasis on recruitment and budget) 
 
Importantly, the impression gained from the fieldwork findings of this thesis is that systemic-
ness can only be achieved if several enablers are present at the same time. 
 
The reverse characteristics of these enablers would represent obstacles to the systemic-ness of 
the governance for business and innovation support. 
 
The following section outlines the implications for theory and practice that can be drawn from 
the fieldwork findings. 
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Implications for theory and practice 
Firstly, building upon some of the enabling factors outlined above, certain policy suggestions 
are presented for the improvement of the governance of innovation and business support 
systems. Secondly, the theoretical implications are presented that are derived from the 
fieldwork.  
 
Policy implications 
The experience of North Rhine-Westphalia indicates that achieving structural change takes a 
lot of time. It shows that regions facing structural difficulties and lacking an endogenous 
innovative business base, struggle to build up new strength and competencies that can drive 
development. It can take decades before the first significant benefits arise from policy 
approaches. North Rhine-Westphalia and the endeavours of the dortmund-project have shown 
that this requires substantial financial investment and endurance, and even then success is not 
guaranteed. Indeed, there is no quick fix to these captured situations but a need to build an 
institutional capacity which can support new seeds of development.  
 
Nevertheless, the following core message can be drawn from the findings of this thesis. They 
concern the efforts to bring people together, the creation of a common vision and the revival 
of cooperation and coordination; that is, the building of governance systems for the support of 
innovation, and economic development in general.  
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Advocating institutional innovation in the meaning of organisation innovation 
 
The setting-up of new organisations appears to be a radical means applied by policy-makers 
in order to initiate a paradigm change amongst stakeholders within a certain setting. The 
examples of the Projekt Ruhr GmbH and the dortmund-project GmbH show that this is, at 
least to some extent, possible. Both are examples of stipulating this process from the top 
down, yet a local organisation such as the dortmund-project may find it easier to ‘sell’ this as 
a common endogenous vision, while a supra-local and sub-Land body such as the Projekt 
Ruhr is likely to be perceived more as a higher level ‘alien’ in charge of funding.  
 
Whilst it is argued here that the creation of new organisations within a system that suffers 
from archaic institutional structures, can revive interinstitutional dynamics, this is not a 
panacea. Firstly, in a setting without major interinstitutional problems, these new 
organisations are unlikely to provide an added value; instead, they may be more likely to 
contribute to an institutional overlap. Secondly, the creation of such institutions alone is not 
sufficient in any means. At the very least, they have to be complemented by other efforts, and 
most importantly funding, to build the capability to change things. 
 
Running the business of business support  
 
The trend towards the ‘externalisation of local economic development support’ is outlined 
above. The preliminary indication of the success of transferring policy fields and tasks from 
public administration to newly created private firms, suggests that perhaps a certain type of 
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organisational set-up is more conducive to inherent dynamism and external acceptance, for 
example, by the business base. Practitioners repeatedly stated the advantage of having 
business job titles instead of administrative titles (such as CEO instead of head of unit). These 
are details, yet details, such as the obligation first to fill in a form when accessing a business 
support service, can be a significant barrier to reaching out to SMEs.599 Indeed, running 
business support like a business, and thus having a business-like setting and culture, arguably 
endows business support organisations with the skill of sensing and raising awareness of such 
obstacles compared to a predominantly administrative environment. The catch is that this 
approach comes with a steep price tag for specialised staff, marketing, public relations and so 
on.600  
 
The importance of mediators and key movers and shakers in driving a common vision and 
projects – a role for consultancies? 
 
The importance of mediators in the governance system is something that has been recognised 
and stressed before. Similarly, it is common sense that institutions need key people as the 
main drivers, hubs or ‘movers and shakers’ – as practitioners call them – to keep active the 
dynamics of networks of people. Business support organisations that, for instance, rely 
heavily upon informal contacts and interaction with businesses know that once one of its staff 
or partners leaves, informal networks will have to be rebuilt. 601 
 
 
                                                 
599 Interviewe No 45, transcript page 13 
600 Confer aslo Interview No. 44. 
601 Interviews No. 38 and No. 35, transcript page 9 
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Implications for current theoretical conceptualisations 
As can be seen, the fieldwork findings have been analysed according to the research questions 
outlined in the introduction. Above all, the key question here is whether the regional 
innovation systems concept (Braczyk et al., 1998b) takes sufficient account of the 
peculiarities of regional governance. The governance sphere represents one of the two key 
dimensions constituting a regional innovation system (together with the business 
superstructure). The governance dimensions have also been termed as a ‘black box’ (den 
Hertog, Oskam, Smith, & Segers, 2003, p. 25), that is not yet researched well enough.  
 
Limitations of the regional innovation systems concept  
 
This thesis argues that the regional innovation systems model inadequately describes the 
governance dynamics found by this fieldwork. It is suggested that the complexity of these 
dynamics needs to be more embedded into the concept. It is reiterated that the regional 
innovation systems model is a useful analytical methodological tool. However, it is seen here 
to be rather static and unable to describe what is happening at the sub-regional level. 
Furthermore, it is argued here that the model lacks operational guidance of how to make 
innovation systems work in practice. Firstly, while it does outline a potential structure and key 
nodes between actors, it does not go beyond stressing ‘the importance of inclusiveness and 
cooperation in the policy steering committee and the interest representation forum’ (Cooke, 
1998, Figure 1.1 on p. 18). Therefore the actual process of bringing the different stakeholders 
together is neglected and it wrongly implies that setting up a regional innovation structure 
also means that it is functioning.  
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On this account, the findings highlight that there are obstacles to the proper functioning of 
such formal structures. Indeed, it is stated here that the extent of interinstitutional conflicts 
and lack of systemic-ness are underestimated and therefore not adequately addressed by 
current conceptualisations. For instance, the long experience of North Rhine-Westphalia’s so-
called ‘regionalised structural policy’ shows that such inclusive corporatist structures are not 
self-sufficient in instilling a fruitful dialogue and creating viable strategies. The recent 
paradigm shift in North Rhine–Westphalia with the turning away from the former bottom-up 
inclusive policy-making to a top-down process of competitive bidding illustrates the 
limitations of such participatory and consensus-orientated approaches of institutionalism. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the formal structures and elements of the regional innovation 
systems approach may provide a useful model for building such structures in regional settings 
where they do not exist. However, at the same time these general blueprints are meaningless 
for a regional setting such as North Rhine-Westphalia, where an endogenously grown 
congested institutional structure exists. For the question on how to revive archaic institutional 
structures, no answer is found in the regional innovation systems model. 
 
On regional conceptualisations - Towards local innovation systems?  
 
This thesis investigates multiple sub-regional governance systems within the same regional 
setting. The findings provide ample evidence that there are substantial difficulties at sub-
regional level in providing a systemic-ness of governance, namely due to competitive 
attitudes amongst actors within the innovation and business support system and because of a 
lack of coordination and allocated responsibilities. Moreover, significant differences were 
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found in the extent and degree of these dynamics across the homologous settings of city-
regions (see Table 33). In consequence, an alternative conceptualisation of urban or local 
innovation systems may be more suitable in addressing and accounting for these sub-regional 
dynamics. However, posing such new a model comes with a policy warning. As the pilot case 
study of Ratingen shows, there is an issue of critical mass of institutional capacity. Therefore, 
the level of small towns (i.e. municipalities) seems inadequate. Instead, this thesis focused on 
the level of unitary metropolitan authorities, namely city-regions with critical mass of a 
university and with a minimum agglomerative scale (for instance, a population of 200,000), in 
order to gain from the triple helix of university-industry-government relations (Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 2000). Nevertheless, the mere agglomerative and knowledge infrastructure asset 
do not automatically ensure a systemic governance system nor an environment conducive to 
innovation, let alone the question of a mass for the business superstructure dimension.  
 
Besides the possible proposition of local innovation systems as an alternative model, 
reference has to be made to the different modes of regional technology transfer as proposed 
by Cooke & Morgan (1994a), namely grassroots RIS, Network RIS, and Dirigiste RIS (cf. 
Cooke, 1998, pp. 19-22). Cooke & Morgan group technology transfer action, where the 
initiation is ‘locally organised, at town or district level’ under the ‘grassroots’ regional 
innovation system. Yet, it remains unclear why regional governance structures that display an 
‘initiation for systemic coordination coming from within the technology districts’ and those 
with ‘distinctive types of localised innovation systems in terms of both governance and 
business interrelationships’ are still subordinate under the heading of a grassroots regional 
innovation systems governance modality (Cooke, 1998, p. 20). Here it is suggested that those 
governance systems should constitute local innovation systems.  
 446 
 
 
Finally linked to the recognition of increasing importance of the local governance dimension 
are the trends towards the decentralisation of cluster policy, or, as it was labelled here 
‘localised regional cluster policy’, and that of decentralised competitive bidding for funding 
programmes. This also provides evidence to corroborate the importance of proximity in our 
globalised world. Indeed, this thesis vividly argues against interregional virtual networks or 
clusters since potential interpersonal problems become harder to solve and to overcome. 
 
With regards to cluster policy, it is not yet possible to provide a clear message. While some 
local settings like Dortmund may be in the slow process of succeeding in carrying out a local 
cluster policy, it is to be evaluated whether it goes beyond the mere notion of micro-cluster 
networking. 
 
On innovation 
 
With regards to innovation it seems that many policy measures lack the holistic character of 
cutting across different policy fields. An innovation imperative in the policy domain has not 
yet materialised. It is to be seen whether it ever will, particularly in this time of economic 
crisis. Perhaps the pressure from economic suffering is not strong enough to make this 
happen. Therefore important synergies are not met and innovation policies remain individual 
policy elements. 
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On systemic-ness 
 
The research has also shown that creating governance systemic-ness is a difficult task. It has 
stressed that this is very much an interpersonal undertaking and has identified a number of 
enablers that can support the process of building functional structures of cooperation and 
coordination. Most notable are the importance of a mediator, a business-base client orientated 
approach, and the backing of the political elite in the policy-making process.  
 
Against the proposed possible benefit in using external high-profile actors, there stands the 
risk of a weaker commitment of regional actors due to the negative perception of a 
consultancy-led process (Boekholt, 1999; Nauwelaers & Morgan, 1999, p. 226). Yet, while 
this danger is acknowledged, the advantages of having an as objective perceived animator 
with specialised knowledge and/or experience seem to outweigh this. The use of such external 
actors might be particularly useful in cases of changing political majorities and an absence of 
strong political actors. 602 
 
In addition, the creation of virtual ‘one-stop-shop’ structures as first point of contacts for 
businesses are advocated. However, this has to be accompanied by a clearly outlined 
allocation of responsibility. Consequently, it is concluded that the importance of systemic-
ness is not at all overrated but rather the opposite, it is hard to achieve.  
 
Whether a more innovative and focused business and innovation support system and systemic 
governance would have or has made a difference to the economic success or failure of the 
                                                 
602 Interview No. 44, transcript page 8. 
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city-regions analysed here cannot be answered. While governance aspects are implicitly 
assumed to contribute to the economic performance of city-regions, the extent is not as such 
analysed and no detailed impact assessments of policies have been undertaken as this was not 
the aim of this thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, the importance of governance issues has been raised in numerous case studies. 
Their disadvantage is however that results cannot be easily generalised nor compared to other 
settings. In this respect, Brenner & Mühlig’s (2007) meta-study of 183 case studies that 
analyse 159 local industrial clusters is useful to better understand the success factors of 
clusters, which are regarded as important drivers for innovation and growth (cf. European 
Commission, 2008). These cases were analysed with respect to whether 35 different local 
conditions and processes were mentioned as an “important” individual factor that may lead to 
the emergence of the respective cluster.603 
 
Brenner & Mühlig’s results suggest that the most important “prerequisite” for the emergence 
of clusters is qualified labour (as mentioned to be important in 105 out of the 159 cases) and 
strong networks of actors. Regarding networks, great differences in attributed importance can 
be observed: in 78 case studies networks were an “important” factor; in 37 cases, 
“unimportant”. The existence of renowned universities and public research centres is another 
prerequisite frequently mentioned as important (70 case studies). Thereafter follow tradition 
and historical preconditions (66), industrial structure (61) and local policies (56).  
 
                                                 
603 Each case study is classified as either mentioning the individual factor as “important”, “unimportant” or as 
giving “no information”. 
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Concerning “triggering events” and actions that launch the process of making use of the 
cluster development potential as the second category of factors analysed, the founding of a 
leading firm (62), special policy measures (53) and historical events such as wars (52) are the 
three most frequently mentioned important factors which represent a mix of chance and good 
policies. 
 
The third category of success factors analysed were “self-augmenting processes” such as so-
called Marshallian externalities or localisation economies which cause the activity in an 
industry and a region to increase further once a critical mass has been reached. Among them, 
the accumulation of human capital (116), the cooperation among firms (87) and the choice of 
co-location with other firms (83) are the three most important factors identified by the 
majority of the case studies. 604 Another interesting result of this study is that policy measures 
are considered to be of high importance and this importance even increased over time. 
 
The overall importance widely attached to networks, cooperation and local policies across the 
case studies reviewed by Brenner & Mühlig provides support for the investigation of 
governance aspects here in more detail. The parallel observed high frequency of cases where 
networks were partly not viewed as an important factor is perhaps an indication that these 
aspects are still to some extent underestimated and undervalued.  
 
In addition, the existence of renowned universities and public research centres viewed as an 
important prerequisitie is also echoed here by the indicative findings from the pilot case study 
                                                 
604 It should be pointed out that intraindustrial and interindustrial spill-overs as well as buyer-supplier relations 
partly overlap with the cooperation factor which therefore seems to be important as well. 
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and consequent change of methodology (opting not to analyse non-university cities), and the 
emphasis on triple helix configurations. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has looked at the concept of regional innovation systems and what the practical 
governance of such systems looks like. This chapter’s conclusions start by briefly reiterating 
the objective of the thesis and presenting a summary of the key findings. Whilst the previous 
chapter presents the implications for policy and theory, namely the regional innovation 
systems model, this chapter highlights the originality and importance of the research 
undertaken terms of its contribution to both academic and policy thinking. Next, the 
limitations are discussed, and finally issues for future research are presented. 
 
Objectives of thesis  
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of how to build a regional policy and 
business support environment conducive to innovation or, in simpler words, what are the 
ways to make a regional innovation system work and what important aspects are to be 
considered for implementing innovation policy – such as cluster policy – successfully. This 
entails asking the question how and why systemic governance is, or is not, achieved. 
 
Key findings  
 
This thesis has provided an overview of North Rhine-Westphalia’s regional innovation 
system. It explained its innovation policy approach and presented the main governance actors 
at the Land level. The reported failure of the consensus-based regionalised structural policy 
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and the recent paradigm shift in North Rhine–Westphalia, with the turning away from the 
former bottom-up inclusive policy-making approach to a top-down process of competitive 
bidding via the (former) quango Projekt Ruhr GmbH, illustrate the limitations of participatory 
and consensus-orientated approaches of institutionalism. 
 
The thesis presented an overview of the recent main trends in local economic development 
policy. Whilst Hoppe (2000, pp. 60-62) presents the trends of a widening of measures 
applied; an emerging customer service orientation; and an increasing reorganisation and 
externalisation of local economic development agencies, this thesis presents four further 
trends. The first is aligned to Hoppe’s mention of externalisation, but provides a new 
explanation for it, i.e. the proactive attempt to achieve a paradigm change (as opposed to such 
a change being a reactive result to budgetary constraints). The second trend identified was the 
increasing and widening use of the cluster concept, which is labelled here in North Rhine-
Westphalia as a ‘localised regional cluster policy approach’. The remaining two new trends 
are the growing relevance and dependence upon funding from competitive bidding as well as 
the emergence of competitive bidding at the local level.  
 
The findings from the pilot case study of Ratingen show that a certain critical mass in terms 
of population and presence of a university is needed to constitute regional innovation systems. 
 
The cross-case analysis of the policy-making and governance dynamics at sub-regional level 
show that there are significant differences between the systemic-ness of governance in the 
four case-studies of the city-regions of Aachen, Dortmund, Düsseldorf, and Duisburg. Besides 
these differences amongst the case studies, the analysis also highlighted significant horizontal 
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differences concerning three important characteristics of governance dynamics. They concern 
the allocation of responsibilities between actors, the coordination amongst them, and the 
degree of cooperative attitudes (not) found. The fieldwork findings pointed to a surprisingly 
high extent of interinstitutional conflict and lack of cooperation and coordination. The 
comparatively negative characteristics of these important factors indicated that achieving 
systemic-ness is a thorny task and thus difficult to achieve.  
 
 
Contribution to academic thinking 
 
The findings of this thesis have shown that within a common geographically defined regional 
innovation system, diverse sub-regional settings and dynamics can be present that bear little 
resemblance to what a homogenous regional innovation systems could be expected to 
constitute. Therefore, it is argued that fully functioning regional innovation systems may be 
rare to find and that a proposition of any one-size-fits-all best practice model will fail to 
address the peculiarities of reality and policy practice. Therfore, conceptual models or 
typologies of an innovation governance system (Cooke, 1998, p. 25) – which labels North 
Rhine-Westphalia as a globalised network (see Figure 4) – are of little value as they fail to 
point to the inherent distinct differences in governance dynamics found in the case studies at 
the sub-regional level.  
 
Therfore, it is argued that conceptualisations of regional innovation systems do not adequately 
capture the regional and, in particular, the sub-regional governance dynamics – i.e. the 
structures and relationships between innovation actors – and thus are of little operational 
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guidance to innovation policy-making. This statement applies even more to the case of 
innovation systems with an already institutionally congested governance structure. In 
addition, whilst the concept stresses the governance dimension and the importance of 
networks and relational space (Capello & Faggian, 2005, p. 79; Morgan, 2001a, p. 26), it 
provides no indications for how to overcome the obstacles to the success factors.  
 
The way in which a consequent inclusive policy implementation and commitment succeeded 
in Dortmund to overcome interinstitutional conflict and lack of cooperation provides 
arguments for the propositions of the ‘new institutionalism’ that are linked to ‘dense social 
networks’ and ‘institutional thickness’, which play an important role in embedded, collective 
learning processes and thus in achieving competitiveness. It highlights the importance of 
institutional capacity and people in driving a region towards becoming a regional innovation 
system, developing communities of practice and fostering clustering. However, the cases of 
Duisburg and Aachen have shown that the building of dense social networks is a difficult 
task.  
 
This thesis proposes a more local conceptualisation of innovation systems since the important 
systemic factors of the governance dimension are perceived here to be more of urban, city-
regional nature. It therby contests the ‘hierarchy of the region’ (Hassink, 1992, p. 11), at least 
in terms of governance. Given the previously stated need for a degree of critical mass (a 
university and a minimum agglomerative scale), the level of unitary metropolitan authorities 
is the appropriate minimum level of innovation governance. Due to the fuzziness of the 
regional definition, these findings have to be seen in the specific context and are not necessary 
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transferable to another setting. There are lessons learned here but what may work in 
Dortmund may not necessarily work in Birmingham. 
 
The thesis adds to the understanding of what innovation systems comprise, what systemic-
ness constitutes, and which factors can be analysed to judge whether a functioning innovation 
system is present. Correspondingly, it defines the systemic-ness of the institutional 
governance framework as the strategic and effective governance which encompass a ‘well 
connected and functioning’ status of the structure and relationships between innovation actors 
that goes beyond the mere existence of an instititutional businesss support and governance 
superstructure. Insofar, it is supposed to actively facilitate the clustering or ‘clusteredness’ of 
the business dimension of a regional innovation system. Certain conditions (or incentives) are 
assumed to be needed to constitute the ‘well connectedness and functioning’ of an innovation 
system, such as the general cooperation and coherency in an overall strategic approach which 
must be present.  
 
A set of intangible success factors of systemic-ness was derived from theory in order to 
characterise and analyse the dynamics and structures of the governance system (cf. also 
Brosza, 1993, p. 89; European Spatial Planning Observation Network, 2005, p. 73). These 
factors can also be used as analytical criteria in other settings in order to compare the 
fieldwork results, and explain differences. The factors that are thought to signify evidence of 
systemic-ness include the following: 605 
                                                 
605 See also the list of important aspects of governance as outlined by ESPON (European Spatial Planning 
Observation Network, 2005, p. 73), which are proposed as a basis for approaches to measure differences in the 
capacity of governance. They comprise the areas of existing institutional settings including government 
structures (e.g. satisfaction with actual government, number of public employees, and openness in terms of cross 
border activities); economic governance (e.g. network activities expressed by the number of regional cluster, e-
government, and regulatory burdens); civil society (e.g. participation, trust, and information & communication 
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1. whether there is a strategic and theory-informed policy orientation;  
2. whether there is organisational connectedness, cooperation and coherence;  
3. the extent of inclusiveness;  
4. the extent of participatory and an open policy-making process, and support for 
coordination; and finally 
5. the extent of opportunism.  
 
Furthermore, the fieldwork identified a theory-practice gap in terms of the role given to 
innovation within policies, and elucidates the myth behind the innovation focus of policy and 
governance.  
 
Contribution to policy thinking   
The fieldwork findings illustrate that the building of regional innovation systems by means of 
constructing institutional capacity, a dense social network and implementing a holistic cluster 
policy are a thorny and difficult task to achieve, but the case of Dortmund shows that it is 
possible to pursue such strategy at least in terms of conceptionalisaton and successful 
implementation at city-region level.  
 
This thesis has identified a number of enablers that are regarded as conducive to building 
systemic-ness of the governance dimension of innovation systems. These included the clear 
                                                                                                                                                        
patters, and ‘attachment to region’ as an indicator of decentralisation); and space (e.g. ‘flow’ characterising 
relations and exchange between different regions, interdisciplinarity and multi-level composition of actors 
involved in governance processes. Furthermore, also consult the ‘Explorative Innovation Scoreboard’ of the 
EXIS report (Arundel & Hollanders, 2005), which features data for the governance dimension. Moreover, confer 
Hoppe’s (2000, pp. 232-233) reference criteria for the detection of system immanent strength and weaknesses of 
implementation procedures of information and support structures.  
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allocation of responsibilities; the setting-up of a virtual one-stop-shop for signposting 
business support; the presence of a lead organisation; regular informal contact between 
stakeholders; involvement of external actors; diagnostic research; the existence of a critical 
mass of institutions; and the quality of staff. Yet, they should be read in connection with the 
case-studies. It is believed that, in particular, the case study of Dortmund entails several 
positive lessons learned in how an implementation capacity can be built and what different 
pillars a holistic cluster policy can entail at the sub-regional level of city-regions. 
 
Thereby, it can be suggested that the thesis has contributed to the understanding of how to 
build a regional policy and business support environment conducive to innovation, or in 
simpler words, how to make a regional or local innovation system work. Inasmuch it has 
provided a glance into the black box of innovation governance.  
 
Although these conclusions point to a better practice case of Dortmund, this thesis warns of 
any attempts to copy the examples of others without considering the endogenous strengths of 
the home region. Therefore, it calls for a more analytical approach in applying cluster 
strategies by using ex-ante and ex-post evaluations and benchmarking tools (see also Jakoby, 
2006) and for the allocation of a sufficient implementation capacity and commitment to make 
such a strategy work. It further indicates that there is potential added benefit in using external 
expert advice and studies to inform policy development as their (as ‘objective’ perceived) 
input can broaden acceptance of common strategies and policies.  
 
This thesis shares the calls for more strategic policy-making and argues that successful 
innovation policy is to be based upon the following three main pillars: building an 
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‘institutional thickness’ (Amin, 1999, p. 368; Amin & Thrift, 1995, p. 53); facilitating cluster 
development; and ensuring the pre-eminence of innovation in the overall policy-making 
process. 
 
Regarding the policy implications, three further aspects were addressed. Firstly, this 
concerned the advocacy of institutional innovation (in the meaning of organisational 
innovation) where governance systems appear to suffer from archaic structures and a lack of 
systemic-ness. Secondly, some advantages were outlined from running a business support 
agency like a business. Thirdly, the importance of a mediator and movers & shakers were 
stressed again, while at the same time pointing out that there is a role for external 
consultancies to be played in this.  
 
The fieldwork findings also stresses the importance of an active involvement of policy-
makers and the open commitment of politicians in developing an effective regional innovation 
system and in the development of active and working networks around the business 
community to further innovation. The thesis finishes in recalling the flaws between the 
transfer of theory and practice. It corroborates that innovation policy-making and governance 
are meticulous tasks and that the particular suitable policy route to take in practice depends 
upon individual characteristics and endogenous strengths and path-dependencies. 
Furthermore, it argues that the regional innovation systems model has little value for the 
implementation of policy. 
 
In addition, it details possible problem solutions and suggests that policy measures need to 
consider institutional innovation to ensure coherence and cooperation of governance. It 
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corroborates the thinking that institutions, and in particular, organisational structures, matter. 
In consequence, it calls for more attention to be placed upon interpersonal and 
interorganisational obstacles to cooperation and policy development. Subsequently, as 
successful innovation policy-making is seen to be based upon competencies and structures of 
people and organisations, it can be argued that there is a need for sufficient investment to be 
made on these accounts.  
 
Limitations and critical analysis of the thesis 
While this thesis has been able to present the insights gained into the working of the 
governance dimensions in the different settings, not all aspects and themes that were derived 
from the fieldwork were possible to cover in the limitations of the PhD programme.  
 
In retrospect, the specific case study design for this research has been particularly valuable in 
gaining insight into the governance dynamics across homologous settings and at multiple 
levels of governance, all within the same framework of the German national innovation 
system and the same wider regional Land setting. This meant that national and regional policy 
approaches and actors were nearly always the same across all case studies, thus allowing a 
focussed view on differences at the sub-regional level. Although the research methodology 
that was applied was particularly suited in gaining an in-depth insight into dynamics at 
multiple levels of governance within the same broader setting, it lacks an international 
comparative dimension. This was beyond the scope of the thesis but could be addressed 
within further work.  
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However the results seem reasonable and are available for further discussion. In any case, the 
results of this thesis are not simply transferable to other settings but have to be seen within the 
particular context of this thesis, i.e. the German innovation system, the regional innovation 
system of North Rhine-Westphalia and the specific context of the individual case studies. 
 
Furthermore, and this is arguably the most crucial limitation of this thesis, an alternative 
interpretation of the results is possible concerning some aspects of the thesis, if it is argued for 
a different regional categorisation. This very much is due to the definitional fuzziness of the 
term ‘region’. Therefore, similar to Martin & Sunley’s (2001; 2003) cluster critique, this 
thesis also criticises the fuzziness of the conceptualisation of regional innovation systems.  
 
Firstly, the fuzziness of the definition of what a region is, means that there is uncertainty as to 
whether North Rhine-Westphalia represents a region. The basic problem with the regional 
innovation system (as well as the cluster) concept is that it is not possible to define properly 
the region. Hence, one needs to look at the individual system and see what region it occupies. 
Indeed, it could be argued that North Rhine-Westphalia may not necessarily correspond to a 
sufficiently homogenous and self-contained regional system of innovation (cf. Evangelista et 
al., 2002, p. 176) as it is too extensive and economically heterogeneous, including distinct 
local sub-systems within them. On the other hand, it can be argued that it does constitute a 
self-contained ‘administrative region’, albeit admittedly a large one.  
Yet, there also remains a certain degree of ambiguity about whether the sub-regional case 
studies represent regions themselves. Due to its policy, institutional and functional linkages as 
described in the case study, Aachen perhaps represented the clearest case of a city-region that 
comprises its hinterland counties, while the other city-region case studies constitute more 
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insular metropolitan cities. At the meso level, the wider Ruhr area is also difficult to view as a 
collective innovation system due to its fragemented policy, institutional and functional 
polycentric areas. Hence, it is not possible to conclude conclusively whether the findings of 
the thesis represent an empirical support for posing the alternative conceptualisation of local 
innovation systems. A simplistic implication would be to state that there is a need to provide a 
more narrowly defined terminology of a region, which is difficult to achieve without 
compromising the definitional complexity of the term. A more pragmatic implication is that 
the level of the innovation system must be analysed thoroughly in each individual case. 
 
Secondly, the term innovation policy is also fuzzy in that it sparks very divergent perceptions 
and conceptualisations of policy, which in consequence widen the theory-practice gap and 
make the research analysis a much more complex task. The implications are that attempts 
ought to be made to fill the theory-practice gap. In order to support this, pre-policy 
development studies (diagnostic research) and continuous benchmarking are advocated.  
 
Thirdly, the presumed existence of a systemic-ness of governance within a regional 
innovation system gives the impression that the mere existence of elements is enough, and 
that there are no obstacles to the policy process. In reality, the presence of an innovation 
policy within a region does not mean that a (functioning) regional innovation system is 
present. Innovation systems must be built around the endogenous strengths of a region, 
largely by firms. In this respect, the implications are that institutional structures matter, and 
that, if institutions at the city-region level are provided with the implementation capacity, they 
can actually undertake a holistic cluster policy. However, cluster support ought to be at least 
partly remain to be alos regulated at the national or Land level in order to avoid duplication. 
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One measure to perhaps limit the emergence of too many aspirational cluster types (for 
fashionable growth sectors irrespective of endogenous strengths) is the organisation of 
competitive bidding for funding, as discussed before. 
 
The chapter concludes by raising some new questions that have evolved from the research 
findings and, therefore, proposes some issues and scope for future research to be undertaken.  
 
Scope for future research  
As stated above, this thesis was unable to cover all the themes and aspects raised by 
interviewees. Yet, some may well be worth re-investigating.  
 
For instance, little attention was placed within the analysis on topics concerning the 
monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects. However, as this thesis advocates 
undertaking pre-policy development research (ex-ante evaluation, benchmarking and on), e.g. 
for cluster development, it would be interesting to investigate in detail the degree of actual 
monitoring and evaluation, or, to be more precise, the actual effect that monitoring and 
evaluations have on the policy-development process.  
 
Another interesting aspect worth following up from this research is the question of the policy 
target group. As the current policy agenda is preoccupied with focussing on strengths and 
clusters, this means that other less successful sectors or firms lose out. The interesting 
question is whether policy should focus on the weak, less innovative firms (within a given 
cluster) or upon innovators (within a given cluster). This question is thus not to be confused 
with the question of whether to focus upon core sectors or weak sectors. 
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The core questions of this thesis raise further questions that need to be answered. Firstly, as 
this thesis has found a surprisingly high extent of opportunism and competitive attitudes 
amongst innovation and business support organisations, it would be interesting to compare 
this experience with those in different economic, cultural and institutional settings. The 
question is raised whether these inter-organisational conflicts and overlapping of 
responsibilities and so on are to be found elsewhere to a similar extent. Secondly, it would 
also be of interest to carry out some further in-depth research on individual questions such as 
the underlying sources of inter-organisational differences. This thesis has provided some 
indications but it is believed that there is more to discover if the focus were solely upon this 
interesting aspect. One possible option would be to use a more detailed and sophisticated 
social network analysis involving a questionnaire addressing a higher number of stakeholders 
including businesses to analyse dynamics between organisational actors within an innovation 
system also at least partly quantitatively. Similar attempts of capturing and measuring the 
governance ‘black blox’ by ESPON (European Spatial Planning Observation Network, 2005) 
could also be considered. 
 
Obviously, the issue of the conceptualisation of local innovation systems needs further 
investigations and more, wider evidence. Firstly, other settings need to be investigated to see 
whether the governance dimension is seen to be centred around the more local level. 
Secondly, as this thesis has focussed on the governance dimension, the business 
superstructure needs now also to be investigated to establish whether the governance 
dimension and the dimension of the business superstructure are congruent.  
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Moreover, it would also be interesting to find out how other aspects are appearing, or dealt 
with, elsewhere. This could concern, for example, the area of funding programmes. A 
comparative study between the German competency centre approach and other similar 
programmes would also be worth investigating.  
 
Similarly, the implementation methods employed elsewhere in comparison to the 
Land/Projekt Ruhr GmbH model of Objective 2 funding implementation is another attractive 
area for research. For instance, the future of the new ‘localised regional cluster policy’ ought 
to be analysed. Will North Rhine-Westphalia succeed in making paradigm change happen? 
An early impression indicates that the Land managed to depart from its former ‘subsidy 
mentality’ and providing funding equally like through a watering can. What consequences did 
the Land‘s return to a top-down policy approach have, e.g. on the structures of the 
regionalised structural policy, regarding the conceptualisation of a new type of programmes 
and so on?  
 
Moreover, the future and/or follow-up of an organisation such as Projekt Ruhr and dortmund-
project would be worth examining. The investigative focus could be placed on what happened 
after the initially proposed limited life-span and dissolution and what was the lasting effect. 
 
Inasmuch as this thesis has been an evolutionary process and some questions have been 
answered, far more have been raised. It seems that we are only at the beginning of 
understanding the governance black box. This thesis hopes to be a contribution to a better 
understanding of governance dynamics and the functioning of regional innovation systems in 
view of improving their effectiveness. 
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APPENDIX I : LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
(and their German or English equivalents [and Internet address], if applicable) 
 
[letter or text]  altered letter or text section of a ‘quotation’ 
∑   sign for the sum total (Summenzeichen) 
§, §§ Index or Paragraph number(s) 
24/7 24 hours, 7 days a week (round the clock) 
Abb. Abbildung (illustration) 
ABCD The cities of Aachen, Bonn, Cologne and Düsseldorf 
Abs. Absatz (paragraph) 
Abt. Abteilung (unit) 
AG Aktiengesellschaft (PLC) 
AGIT Aachener Gesellschaft für Innovation und Technologietransfer mbh 
(Ltd. Company for innovation and technology transfer in Aachen) 
[http://www.agit.de/AGIT2001/index.html] 
AiF Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller Forschungsvereinigungen e.V. 
(Association of Industrial Research Organisations, registered 
association) [http://www.aif.de/en/index.htm]  
aka also known as (alias, anderweitig bekannt als) 
Art. (Arts) Article(s) (Artikel) 
Aufl. Auflage (Edition) 
AvH Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (Alexander von Humboldt 
Foundation) [http://www.avh.de/en/index.htm 
AWBF Auschuss für Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung des rates der 
Stadt Dortmund (Committeee for economic and employment suppport 
of the Dortmund City Council) 
AWM Advantage West Midlands (Regional Development Agency) 
[http://www.advantage-westmidlands.co.uk/] 
BDA Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände 
[http://www.bda-online.de] 
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie [http://www.bdi-online.de/] 
BERD Business expenditure in Research and Development 
BES Business Enterprise Sector 
BIC Business Innovation Centre 
BINGOs Business International Nongovernmental Organization(s) 
BIP Bruttoinlandsprodukt (Gross Domestic Product, in short: GDP) 
BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung /Bundesministerium für 
Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie (German Federal 
Ministry for Education and Research) [http://www.bmbf.de] 
BMWA Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, entstanden in 2002 durch 
Zusammenlegung des  BMWi mit Teilen des Bundesministeriums für 
Arbeit und Sozialordnung (German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Labour, set up in 2002 by amalgamation of the BMWi with 
parts of theMinistry for Labour and Social Order) 
[http://www.bmwa.bund.de/ and http://www.bmwi.de] 
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BMWi  Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft /Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Technologie, bis 2002 Vorgänger des BMWA (German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Technology, until 2002predecessor 
of the BMWA) [http://www.bmwi.de/Homepage/Startseite.jsp]  
BSP Bruttosozialprodukt  
BTW  Büro Technologietransfer und Wissenschaftliche Entwicklung 
(university technology transfer anc continuing education office) 
bzw.   beziehungsweise (respectively) 
c.   circa 
Calif.   California 
Car e.V. competence center automotive region aachen euregio maas-rhein 
[http://www.car-aachen.de/] 
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic 
Union of Germany, comparable to UK’s Conservative and Unionist 
Party) 
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries (Staaten aus Mittel- und 
Osteuropa, kurz MOE) 
cf.   confer (vergleiche) 
Chap.   Chapter 
CI Community initiative 
CIP The European Commission’s Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme 
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/cip/index_en.htm] 
CIS Community Innovation Survey [http://www.cordis.lu/eims/src/cis.htm] 
CURS Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham 
[http://www.bham.ac.uk/curs/]  
CURDS Centre for Urban & Regional Development Studies, Newcastle 
[http://curdsweb1.ncl.ac.uk/curds/Default.asp] 
DAX ® Deutscher Aktienindex (Index of the German Stock Exchange) 
DFG Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) 
[http://www.dfg.de/english/index.html]  
DG Directorate-General (of the European Commission) 
[http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs_en.htm] 
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Association of Trade Unions) 
[http://www.dgb.de] 
DM Deutsche Mark (former German currency) 
DTI / dti Department of Trade and Industry (of the UK government) 
[http://www.dti.gov.uk] 
DtA Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (German Settlement Bank) [http://www.kfw-
mittelstansbank.de] 
€   Euro (currency) 
e.g.   exempli gratia = for instance (zum Beispiel; kurz:  z.B.) 
e.V.   eingetragener Verein (Registered Association) 
EC 1) European Commission (Europäische Kommission); or  
2) European Community (Europäische Gemeinschaft, kurz: EG)  
[http://www.europa.eu.int/index-en.htm] 
EC-6   see EU-6 
EC-9   see EU-9 
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EC-10   see EU-10 
EC-12   see EU-12 
ECC Electronic Commere Center  
ed.   Edition 
Ed. / Eds.  Editor(s) 
EEC   European Economic Community, now European Community (EC) 
EIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme of the European 
Commission’s Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) 
EIS European Innovation Scoreboard. See 
http://trendchart.cordis.lu/scoreboards/scoreboard2005/index.cfm  
EMR  1) Europäische Metropolregion Rhein-Ruhr (European 
metropolitan region Rhine-Ruhr) 
 2) Euregio Meuse-Rhine 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union (Europäische Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion, kurz: EWU) 
EPPD Einheitliches Programmplanungsdokument (Operatives Programm) 
EPRC  European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, 
UK [http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/default.htm] 
EPZs Export processing zones 
ERA European Research Area (Europäischer Forschungsraum, kurz EFR) 
ERC European Research Council 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund, one of the EU’s four Structural 
Funds (EFRE, Europäischer Fonds für regionale Entwicklung, einer 
der vier EU-Strukturfonds) 
ERIS European Regional Innovation Survey 
ERSA European Regional Science Association 
erw. erweiterte (enlarged) 
ESF European Social Fund one of the EU’s four Structural Funds 
(Europäischer Sozialfonds, einer der vier EU-Strukturfonds) 
ESPON European Spatial Planning Observation Network [http://www.espon.lu] 
et al. et alii = and others (und andere) 
etc. et cetera = and the rest, and so on (und so weiter, kurz: usw.) 
EU European Union (Europäische Union) [http://www.europa.eu.int/] 
EU-6 The first 6 countries of the European Community  
EU-9 The first 9 countries of the European Community  
EU-10 The first 10 countries of the European Community 
EU-12 The first 12 countries of the European Community 
EU-15  The ‘older’ first 15 Member States of the European Union (prior 
to the EU enlargement in May 2004), namely Belgium Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy (founding Members since 1952), 
Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom (since 1973), Greece (since 
1981), Spain, Portugal (since 1986), Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
(since 1995). 
EU-25  The 25 Member States of the European Union since enlargement 
in May 2004, comprising the ‘old’ EU-15 Member States (see above) 
and ten ‘new’ Member States, namely Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, and 
Malta 
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EU-27  The 27 Member States of the European Union since January 
2007, comprising the EU-25 Member States (since enlargement in May 
2004) plus Romania and Bulgaria (since 2007) 
EUR   Euro (currency) 
EUR-11 The group of the 11 Member States first participating in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) since 01.01.1999; namely the EU-15 except 
Denmark, the UK, Sweden and Greece (who joined later in 2001 before 
the issuing of Euro notes on 01.01.2002) 
EUR-12  The group of the 12 Member States currently participating in the 
monetary union (EUR-11 and Greece). The 10 ‘new’ Member States 
(see EU-25) will first have to meet the so-called Convergence Criteria 
of Maastricht before joining the EMU. 
Euratom European Atomic Energy Community 
Eurofound European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions [http://www.eurofound.eu.int/] 
Eurozone The group of Members States participating in the European Monetary 
Union (EMU), in which the Euro is the official currency (see EUR-12). 
EXIS Exploratory Innovation Scoreboard, complementary to the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) 
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (German nationwide newspaper 
published in Frankfurt) 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment, inward or outward 
(Auslandsdirektinvestionen, kurz ADI, in ein Land hineinströmend oder 
herausströmend) 
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, comparable to 
UK’s Social and Liberal Democrats) 
FhG   Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft [http://www.fraunhofer.de/english/]  
Fig.   Figure 
foREK Fortschreibung Regionales Entwicklungskonzept (updated regional 
development concept) 
FP Framework Programme (see FP5, FP6, or FP7) 
FP5, FP6, or FP7 Fifth, Sixth, or Seventh Framework Programme of the European 
Community for research, technological development and demonstration 
activities (Das Fünfte, Sechste, oder Siebte Rahmenprogramm der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiet der 
Forschung, technologischen Entwicklung und Demonstration, kurz 
RP5, RP6, oder RP7) 
FT   Financial Times (http://www.ft.com) 
FUA Functional Urban Areas (of the European urban system) that correspond 
to the nationally defined Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) 
GA Gemeinschaftsaufgabe zur Verbesserung der regionalen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur 
GB   Great Britain 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (Bruttoinlandsprodukt, kurz: BIP) 
GEM Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
GEO  Grundstücksentwicklungs-Gesellschaft Düsseldorf (property 
development corporation Düsseldorf) 
GEP   Gebietsentwiclungsplan 
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GERD Gross expenditure in Research and Development 
GfdS   Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache (Society for the German language) 
GfW / GFW Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung (Economic Development 
Agency/Corporation/Office) 
GG Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic constitutional law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany) 
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Limited [liability] company; in 
short: Ltd.) 
GO 1) Gründungsoffensive [http://www.go-online.nrw.de/]  
2) Government Offices (GO) for the regions  
Gr. Graph 
GREMI Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs (Group of 
European Research on Innovative Milieux/Environments)  
Grüne   Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (Alliance 1990 / Green Party) 
GTT Gesellschaft für Technologieförderung und Technologieberatung 
(corporation for technology support and advice) 
GU  Großunternehmen (Large enterprises) 
HE Higher Education 
HEI(s)   Higher Education Institution(s) 
HGF Hermann von Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren 
[http:www.helmholtz.de] 
HLEG High-Level Expert Group  
HWK Handwerkskammer (Chamber of Handicrafts) 
i.e. id est = that is to say (das heißt, kurz: d.h.) 
IAI IAI - Institut für angewandte Innovationsforschung e.V. [http://www.iai-
bochum.de/] 
IAS Integriertes Auslandsstudium (Integrated foreign studies programme) 
IAT Institut Arbeit und Technik, Gelsenkirchen (Institute for Employment 
and Technology, Gelsenkirchen) [http://iat-info.iatge.de/] 
IBA   Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park 
ibid. ibidem = in the same place (ebenda, kurz: ebd.) 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies (Informations- und 
Kommunikationstechnologien, kurz: IuK-Technologien) 
IDB   Northern Ireland’s Industrial Development Board 
IDR Industrieterrains Düsseldorf-Reizholz (city subsidiary firm for the 
industrial site Düsseldorf-Reizholz) 
IfW  Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel (Institute for the World Economy, Kiel) 
[http://www.uni-kiel.de:8080/IfW/] 
IGM Industriegewerkschaft Metall (Trade Union for the Metall Industry) 
IHK Industrie- und Handelskammer (German Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce) [http://www.ihk.de] 
ILO International Labour Organization (Internationale Arbeitsorganisation) 
ILS Institut für Landes- und Stadtentwicklungsforschung des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen [http://www.ils.nrw.de/] 
IMF International Monetary Fund (Internationaler Währungsfonds, kurz: 
IWF) 
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INEF Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden der Gerhard-Mercator-Universität 
- Gesamthochschule Duisburg (Institute for Development and Peace at 
the Gerhard-Mercator-University Duisburg) [http://www.inef.de/] 
INGOs International Nongovernmental Organizations 
IÖW Institut für Ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin (Institute for 
Ecological and Economic Research, Berlin) 
INTERREG Interregional Community Initiative concerning border areas 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights  
IRE Innovating Regions in Europe [http://www.innovating-regions.org] 
IRPUD Institut für Raumplanung, Universität Dortmund (Institute for Spatial 
Planning at the University of Dortmund) [http://irpud.raumplanung.uni-
dortmund.de/irpud/] 
ISA-Consult Beratungsgesellschaft für Innovation, Strukturpolitik und Arbeit GmbH, 
Bochum 
IRTU   Northern Ireland’s Industrial Research and Technology Unit 
ISI 1) Fraunhofer-Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung, 
Karlsruhe (Fraunhofer Institute for System Technology and Innovation 
Research, Karlsruhe) [http://www.isi.fhg.de/] 
 2) Innovation Sector Index (of the European Innovation Scoreboard) 
IT Information Technologies 
ITT Innovation & Technology Transfer (periodical publication by the 
European Commission) 
IVAM NRW e.V. Interessengemeinschaft zur Verbreitung von Anwendungen der 
Mikrostrukturtechniken NRW e.V., Dortmund (Interest Group for the 
Application of Microstructure Technologies NRW, Dortmund) 
IWS Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialforschung (Institute for Economic 
and Social Research) 
JEL Journal of Economic Literature [for their classification see for example 
http://netec.mcc.ac.uk/WoPEc/data/JEL/] 
JETRO Japanese Foreign Trade Centre 
KCL Kompetenz-Centrum Logistik (Logistics Competence Centre) 
KMU  Klein- und Mittelunternehmen (SMEs) 
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communistic Party of Germany) 
KVR The former Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (Local Association for the 
Ruhr Area), which is now the Regionalverband Ruhr (Regional 
Association Ruhr) [http://www.rvr-online.de] 
LDA Local Development Agency 
LDCs   Least-Developed Countries  
LDS Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Regional Office for data processing and statistics) 
[http://www.lds.nrw.de/] 
LEG  Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft (property development 
corporation of the Land) 
LEDU   Northern Ireland’s Local Economic Development Unit, formerly known  
   as Local Enterprise Development Unit 
LEP   Landesentwicklungsprogramm (development programme of the Land) 
LFR   Less Favoured Region(s) 
LPSs Local Production Systems 
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LSC Life Science Center Düsseldorf 
Ltd. Limited (Liability Company) 
LV Lippeverband 
MA / Mass.  Massachusetts 
MASQT Ministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Qualifikation und Technologie des 
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Ministry for Labour, Social Affairs, 
Qualification and Technology of North Rhine-Westphalia) 
[http://www.masqt.nrw.de/home.html] 
MBA 1) Multinational business activity 
 2) Master of Business Administration 
mbH mit beschränkter Haftung (with limited liability), see GmbH 
MdB Mitglied des Bundestages / Bundestagsabgeordnete(r) (Member of the 
German National Parliament, in short MP) 
MdL Mitglied des Landtages / Landtagsabgeordnete(r) (Member of a Federal 
/ Regional Parliament) 
MEGAs Metropolitan European Growth Areas 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MNC Multi-National Corporation 
MNE Multi-National Enterprise 
Mo. Missouri 
MPG Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (http://www.mpg.de/english/)  
MRR   Metropolregion Rhein-Ruhr 
MS Member States [of the EU] (Mitgliedstaaten [der EU]) 
MST Mikrosystemtechnologie (mircrosystems technology or MEMS) 
MWA Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour of North Rhine-Westphalia) 
[http://www.mwa.nrw.de/] 
MWMEV Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Energie und Verkehr des 
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Ministry for Economic Affairs, 
Technology and Transport of North Rhine-Westphalia) 
[http://www.mwmev.nrw.de/cgi-bin/mwmev/custom/pub/visit.cgi] 
MWMTV Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Technologie und Verkehr 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Ministry for Economic Affairs, 
Technology and Transport of North Rhine-Westphalia)  
n. d. no date 
n. p. no place (of publication) 
n. pub. no publisher 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement (Nordamerikanisches 
Freihandelsabkommen) 
NE North East 
neuberab. neubearbeitete (revised) 
NGO(s) Nongovernmental Organization(s) (Nichtregierungs-Organisation(en)) 
NGT New Growth Theory, also known as endogenous growth theory (Neue 
Wachstumstheorie, abgekürzt NWT) 
NICs Newly industrialized countries 
NIS New Industrial Spaces [if used]  
NISys National Innovation System [sometimes also abbreviated as NIS or NSI 
for National Systems of Innovation] 
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No. Numero, number 
Nr. Nummer (number) 
NRP National Reform Programmes 
NRW Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia, one of Germany’s 16 
Federal States) 
NUTS Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (of the EU) - from the 
French ‘Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques’ 
(Nomenklatura/ Systematik der Gebietseinheiten für die Statistik der 
EU-Regionen) 
N.Y. New York 
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[http://www.oecd.org] 
OMC The ‘Open Method of Coordination’ of policies between the Member 
States of the EU, mainly used where the EU has little or shared 
competence. It is based upon the following five principles (cf. Baneth & 
Cserey, 2005, p. 267): subsidiarity, convergence, management by 
objectives, country surveillance, and integrated approach. 
OpTech-Net  Netzwerk für optische und optoelektronische Technologien und Systeme 
e.V., Duisburg (Network for optical and optoelectronical technologies 
and systems, Duisburg) 
p. Pagina, page (Seite) 
Pa. Pennsylvania 
para. paragraph 
PAXIS Pilot Action of Excellence on Innovative Start-ups (of FP6) 
PDF format 
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Democratic Socialism Party, 
successor of the former East German Socialistic Unity Party ‘SED’, the 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) 
PISA OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (The PISA-
study) 
PLC Public Limited Company  
pp. Pages (Seiten) 
PPP 1) Purchasing Power Parity 
 2) Public-Private Partnership 
PPS Purchasing Power Standards 
Quango Quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization 
(Regierungsunabhängige Kommission oder Körperschaft) 
R&D Research and Development (Forschung & Entwicklung, kurz: F&E ) 
RDA   Regional Development Agency 
REGINA Regionaler Industrie-Club Informatik Aachen e.V. (regional industry 
club IT of Aachen) 
REK Regionale Entwicklungskonzept (regional development concept) 
RES Regional Economic Strategy 
RIS 1) Regional Innovation Strategy (programme of the EU) 
 2) Regional Innovation System  
RITTS Regional Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures 
(programme of the EU) 
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RP Rheinische Post (Regional Newspaper in North Rhine-Westphalia) 
RSA Regional Studies Association [http://www.regional-studies-
assoc.ac.uk/] 
RSAI   Regional Science Association International 
RTD Research and Technological Development (Forschung und 
technologische Entwicklung, kurz FTE) 
RVR Regionalverband Ruhr (Regional Association Ruhr)  
[http://www.rvr-online.de]  
RWI Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen 
(Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research, Essen) 
[http://www.rwi-essen.de/] 
RWTH Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen (RWTH 
University of Aachen) [http://www.rwth-aachen.de/] 
SFB Sonderforschungsbereich (Special research area) 
SIBU Strathclyde International Business Unit, University of Strathclyde 
SIC Standard Industry Classification 
SII Summary Innovation Index (of the European Innovation Scoreboard) 
SMEs  Small and medium-sized enterprises (Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen, 
kurz: KMU) 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of 
Germany, comparable to UK’s Labour Party) 
STRIDE Science and technology for regional development (Community 
Initiative financed by the EU’s Structural Funds between 1990 and 
1993.  
SVR   Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk 
SWOT   Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (analysis) 
SZ Süddeutsche Zeitung (nationwide newspaper from South-Germany, 
published in Munich) 
Tab.   Table 
TFP   Total (or multifactor) productivity 
TIM   Territorial Innovation Models (coined by Moulaert & Sekia, 2003) 
TNC   Transnational corporations 
TPP   Technological product and process 
TQM   Total Quality Management 
Trans.   Translator 
TTWAs  Travel to Work Areas 
TZ   Technologiezentrum (technology centre) 
u.   und (and) 
u.a.   und andere (et al. = and others) 
UK   United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UN / UNO United Nations (Vereinte Nationen) / United Nations Organization 
(Organisation der Vereinten Nationen) 
UNICE Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederations of Europe 
[http://www.unice.org/] 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization (Organisation der 
Vereinten Nationen für industrielle Entwicklung) 
[http://www.unido.org/] 
US/USA  United States (of America) 
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UVR Unternehmensverband Ratingen e.V. (Association of Enterprises in 
Ratingen) 
v. / vs.   versus (contra, gegen) 
VDI   Verein Deutscher Ingenieure e.V. (Association of German Engineers) 
verb.   verbesserte (improved) 
viz.   videlicet = namely (nämlich) 
Vol.   Volume (Bd. = Band) 
VRR   Verkehrsverbund Rhein Ruhr 
Vt.   Vermont 
VW   Volkswagen 
WASG Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (The ‘Election 
Alternative’ Party for ‘Labour & Social Justice’) 
WAZ Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (regional newspaper for North 
Rhine-Westphalia) 
WBF-DO Wirtschafts-und Beschäftigungsförderung der Stadt Dortmund 
(Dortmund’s business and employment promotion agency) 
WGL Wissensgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz [http://www.wgl.de] 
WSI Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut des Deutschen 
Gewerkschaftsbundes (Economic and Social Research Institute of the 
German Federation of Trade Unions) 
WTO World Trade Organisation (Welthandelsorganisation)  
WTZ Wissenschafts- und Technologiezentrum (science and technology 
centre) 
ZENIT Zentrum in Nordrhein-Westfalen für Innovation und Technik, Mühlheim 
an der Ruhr (Centre for Innovation and Technology in North Rhine-
Westphalia, Mühlheim an der Ruhr) [http://www.zenit.de/ and 
http://www.traegerverein.zenit.de/home.htm] 
Zentrum  Zentrumspartei (Centre Party) 
ZEW Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim (Centre for 
European Economic Research, Mannheim) [http://www.zew.de/] 
ZIKON Zukunftsinitiative Kompetenzregion NiederRhein (Initiative for the 
future of the competence region of the Lower Rhine area) 
ZIM Zukunftsinitiative Montanregionen (Initiative for the future of coal and 
steel regions)  
ZIN Zukunftsinitiative Nordrhein-Westfalen (Initiative for the future of 
North Rhine-Westphalia) 
 
 
 
For statistical symbols and abbreviations, confer section 4 of Annex 3 to the Publications 
Office’s Interinstitutional style guide at http://publications.eu.int/code/en/en-5000300.htm  
For country and currency abbreviations, confer EU-25 preparation document for point 7 of 
the Publications Office’s Interinstitutional style guide at 
http://publications.eu.int/code/pdf/370000en.htm  
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APPENDIX II : GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS 
 
German  English  
Abteilung Department, Group 
Agentur für Arbeit, Arbeitsamt Job Agency (Job Centre) 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) Public limited company (PLC) 
Amt/Ämter der Stadt City/town authority offices  
Amt für Wirtschaftsförderung Office for Economic Development 
Angewandte Forschung Applied research 
Ausschuss  Committee 
Band Volume 
Bezirk (Verwaltungseinheit einer Stadt) Borough, (City) District  
(different to Regierungsbezirk) 
Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Bundes… Federal… 
Bundeskanzler/-in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (i.e. head of government, Prime 
Minister) 
Bundesland/-länder Federal State(s), see Land, Länder 
Bundesminister/-in Federal Minister  
Bundesministerium Federal Ministry, Federal Department 
Bundespräsident/-in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 
Federal President of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (i.e. head of state with the main task 
of representing Germany at home and 
abroad) 
Bundesrat  Upper House of the German Parliament, 
Bundesrat (i.e. the second chamber of the 
Federal Republic of Germany representing 
the ‘Länder’, consisting of delegates by the 
16 Land governments) 
Bundesregierung Federal (i.e. national) government 
Bundestag Lower House of the German Parliament, 
Bundestag (i.e. the representative body of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which 
representatives are elected half by direct vote 
[Erststimme] and half taken from the 
regional party lists according to the second 
party vote [Zweitstimme]) 
Bundestagsabgeordnete/-r, Mitglied des 
Bundestages (MdB) 
(German) Member of Parliament (MP) 
Bundestagswahl General, national (i.e. federal) parliamentary 
elections  
Bürgermeister/-in, Oberbürgermeister/-in Mayor, Lord Mayor 
Dekan Dean 
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Dezentralisierung 
(Delegierung von administrativen Aufgaben 
an eine niedrigere Ebene, z.B. an Regionale 
Entwicklungsagenturen) 
Decentralisation 
(i.e.delegation of administrative tasks to a 
lower level, e.g. to Regional Development 
Agencies in England) 
Drittmittel Private or alternative funding  
Existenzgründung Start-up 
Exportbasistheorie Economic base theory 
Fachhochschule (Former) Polytechnic, Technical College, 
University of Applied Sciences 
Gebietskörperschaft Territorial body 
Gemeinde, Kommune Municipality 
(subdivision of a district; smallest 
administrative unit in Germany)  
Gemeinsamer Binnenmarkt Single Market (alternatively Internal Market 
or Common Market) 
Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung  Economic Development Agency, government 
appointed quango to promote regional 
economies, e.g. Regional Development 
Agency (RDA) 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
(GmbH) 
Limited Liability Company (Ltd./Limited) 
Gewerkschaft Union (trade union) 
Gremium Body 
Grenz… Marginal... 
Grünbuch Green Paper606 
Gründerzentrum Start-up centre, incubator, primarily serving 
young enterprises 
Grundgesetz (GG) Basic (constitutional) law (of the Federal 
Republic of Germany)  
Grundlagenforschung Basic research 
Handwerkskammer (HWK) Chamber of Handicrafts (Self-governing 
bodies which represents craft interest) 
Heft Issue 
Industriedistrikte Industrial districts 
Industrie- und Handelskammer (IHK) (German) Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce (Regional associations of 
industrial, commercial, banking, insurance, 
transport firms; their tasks: rationalization, 
foreign trade, professional training, credit, 
pricing, legal and tax questions, economic 
surveys and statistics) 
Innovationszentrum Innovation centre (generic term for 
technology centre, incubator, business park 
                                                 
606 Green Papers are discussion documents published by the European Commission on a specific policy area that 
present a range of ideas for public debate and consultation. It is sometimes (but not necessarily) followed by a 
White Paper and can provide an impetus for subsequent legislation. For a list of Green papers see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/green/index_en.htm 
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with support services) 
Klein- und Mittelunternehmen (KMU) Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
Kohäsionfonds der EU Cohesion Fund of the EU 
Kommunalbehörde Local Authority 
Kommunale Entwicklungsschwerpunkte (im 
Ruhrgebiet) 
Municipal Priority Development Areas (in 
the Ruhr District) 
Kommunalwahlen, Wahl der 
Gemeindevertretungen (z.B. des Stadtrates) 
Local elections 
Kommune/-n Local Authority (District), District Councils 
(i.e. rural communities and small towns)  
Kompetenzzentrum, Kompetenzfeld, Cluster Cluster 
Kooperation, Zusammenarbeit Cooperation, collaboration 
Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts Public body 
Kostenvorteile durch flexible 
Produktionsorganisation 
Economies of scope 
Kostenvorteile durch Skalenerträge Economies of scale 
Kreis/-e 
(Verwaltungseinheit der Regionen) 
County, Administrative district(s),  
(a subdivision of an administrative region, 
thus an intermediate level of administration 
between the Länder and the local / municipal 
levels (Gemeinden)  
Kreisfreie Stadt/Städte, Stadtkreis(e) Administrative urban district(s), urban 
unitary authority/authorities, or metropolitan 
districts(s), usually a city/cities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants 
(subdivision of an administrative region) 
Kuratorium (Ausschuss) / Aufsichtgremium 
z.B. einer Stiftung 
Board of trustees (committee) e.g. of a 
foundation 
(Bundes-) Land Region(s), State(s), Province(s), or Land 
(plural: Länder)  
(The Federal Republic of Germany consists 
of 16 Federal States, called ‘Länder’. Each 
Land has also its own regional parliament 
and constitution, and is represented at the 
federal level in the Federal Council 
‘Bundesrat’. The Länder are most commonly 
referred to as ‘States’ due to American 
English influence, but this term is to some 
slightly ambiguous as it can be wrongly 
interpreted to mean a sovereign nation. (See 
http://europa.eu.int/eurodicautom/Controller)
Landkreis Rural District (Kreis, i.e subdivision of an 
administrative region) 
Landschaftsverbände Area associations (with little power) 
Landtag Landtag, Regional (State) Parliament  
(with elected Members and more 
rights/powerful than, for example, a Regional 
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Assembly of an English Region) 
Landtagsabgeordnete/-r, Mitglied des 
Landtages (MdL) 
Member of State (Regional) Parliament 
Landtagswahl, bzw. Wahl des Berliner 
Abgeordnetenhauses, und der Bürgerschaft in 
Hamburg und Bremen  
Regional elections 
Lenkungsausschuss Steering Committee 
(Lokale) Wirtschaftsförderungsagentur (einer 
Stadt, Gemeinde oder Kommune) 
Local Development Agency (LDA) 
Ministerialbeamte(r)/Ministerialbeamtin(nen) Ministry official(s) 
Ministerialdirektor/-in Head of a government department, permanent 
secretary 
Ministerialrat/-rätin Assistant head of a government department, 
assistant secretary 
Ministerium Ministry, department  
Ministerpräsident des Landes Prime Minister (or elected Leader) of a 
Federal German State such as North Rhine-
Westphalia 
Neue Ökonomische Geographie New Economic Geography 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  North Rhine-Westphalia (one of the 16 
Länder/States of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) 
Oberbürgermeister/-in Lord Mayor 
Rat Council (body of representatives) 
Ratsmitglied Councillor 
Referat Unit / Section 
Rektor/-in Vice-chancellor / rector 
Regierung Government 
Regierungsbezirk 
(Verwaltungseinheit eines Bundeslandes 
bestehend aus Stadt- und Landkreisen)  
Administrative regional unit, regional 
administrative district, i.e. primary 
administrative subdivisions of certain federal 
states (Länder) that are themselves further 
divided into districts (Kreise). 
Regierungspräsident/-in Chief administrator of a Regierungsbezirk 
(chairman/-woman of the regional council, 
administrative district) 
Regierungsrat Senior civil servant 
Regierungsunabhängige Kommission oder 
Körperschaft 
Quasi-autonomous nongovernmental 
organization, in short: quango  
(body created by the government but which is 
not under its control. It may execute 
governmental functions or just have 
consultative functions) (Terrell, Schnorr, 
Morris, & Breitsprecher, 1999, p. 1699)  
(Regionale) Wirtschaftsförderungsagentur Regional Development Agency (RDA) 
Ruhrgebiet Ruhr area 
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Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 
(Gremium aus fünf Experten der 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften, die 
umgangsprachlich auch als „Fünf Weise“ 
bezeichnet werden 
[http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-
wirtschaft.de/]) 
German Council of Economic Experts 
(official advisory body to the German 
Government consisting of five Economic 
experts that are colloquially called the ‘Five 
Wise Man’) 
Skalenerträge (Kostenvorteile durch erhöhte 
Produktion) 
Economies of scale 
Stadt (Kleinstadt / Großstadt) City (Small city or town / large metropolitan 
city) 
Stadtverwaltung Council offices 
Strukturwandel Economic change / structural change 
Stadtrat City/town council 
Strukturfonds der Europäischen Union 
(Europäischer Fonds für regionale 
Entwicklung, Europäischer Sozialfonds, 
Europäischer Ausrichtungs- und 
Garantiefonds für die Landwirtschaft, 
Finanzinstrument für die Ausrichtung der 
Fischerei) 
Structural Funds of the European Union 
(comprising the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund, and the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance607) 
Strukturpolitik /Strukturförderung Structural policy / Structural development 
Technologiezentrum Technology centre, innovation centre, 
incubator, business park with support services 
for technological orientated start-ups (cf. 
Dressel, in: Asche, 2004) 
(Technologie-) Transferstelle (einer 
Universität) 
(Technology) Transfer Unit, Industrial liaison 
office (ILO), within a university or large 
public research institution 
(e.g. Research and Enterprise Services) 
Träger (Organisation, Institution) Responsible body 
Transferstelle Transfer Unit, Liaison office 
Unternehmensverband Employer’s association 
Verein Association, organization 
Verlag Publisher 
Verwaltungsbehörde, Amt Administrative Authority 
Wirtschaftsförderungsagentur einer Stadt, 
Gemeinde oder Kommune 
Local Development Agency (LDA) or 
Regional Development Agency (RDA) 
Wirtschaftspolitik / Wirtschaftsförderung Economic development policy 
Weißbuch White Paper608 
Source: Own creation, compilation partly based upon Collins German Dictionary (Terrell et al., 1999). 
                                                 
607 The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance will be replaced by the European Fishery Fund in 2007. 
608 White Papers are documents published by the European Commission containing an official set of proposals 
for Community action in specific policy areas - that sometimes (but not necessarily) follow upon consultations 
and debate of a Green Paper. For a list of White Papers see http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/white/index_en.htm 
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APPENDIX III : EUROPEAN INITIATIVES RELATED TO CLUSTERS 
Chronological overview of selected Community initiatives related to clusters 
 
Year Initiatives from the European Community Reference 
December 
1999 
Publication of a study on ‘Cluster Building and Networking:- Analysis of 
transnational technology networking between existing clusters of SMEs and one 
or more technology poles’609 
Study 
April 2002 Publication of a study on ‘Creating Smart Systems - A guide to cluster 
strategies in less favoured regions’.610 
Study 
May 2002 Publication of the study on ‘Regional Clusters in Europe’. 611 Study 
April 2003 Publication of the thematic TrendChart report on ‘cluster policies’ under the 
European Trend Chart on Innovation.612 
Study 
May 2003 Final Report of the Expert Group on Enterprise Clusters and Networks613 Study 
April 2004 Selection of 14 pilot projects under the ‘Regions of Knowledge’ initiative  
supporting the development of research-driven clusters.614 
Milestone 
October 
2005 
Launch of the Europe INNOVA initiative including 11 sectoral cluster networks 
facilitating trans-national cooperation.615 
FP6 projects 
October 
2005 
Communication ‘More Research and Innovation – Investing for Growth and 
Employment: A Common Approach’.616 
COM(2005)488 
May 2006 The discussion on cluster policy at Community level started at the Informal 
Competitiveness Council in May 2006 in Graz, Austria 
Milestone 
June 2006 INTERREG IIIC “Clusters linked Over Europe” (CLOE) project selected as 
“fast-track” pilot project of the “Regions For Economic Change” initiative.617 
Milestone 
June 2006  Publication of the study on ‘Innovation Clusters in the 10 new Member States 
of the European Union’.618 
Study 
July 2006 Publication of the Innobarometer 2006 report on ‘Cluster’s role in facilitating 
innovation’.619 
Study 
September 
2006 
The European Cluster Alliance is created based on 4 INNO-Net cluster projects 
under PRO INNO Europe.620 
FP6 projects 
September 
2006 
Establishment of the European Cluster Observatory. 621 FP6 project 
                                                 
609 The report prepared by agiplan was published by the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry.  
610 The report published by the Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion is available at 
http://www.innovating-regions.org/download/GuideRosenfeldfinal.pdf 
611 The report of the Observatory of European SMEs (2002/No.3) published by Directorate-General Enterprise 
and Industry is available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/analysis/observatory_en.htm 
612 The report is available at http://www.proinno-europe.eu/docs/reports/documents/TR_clusters_03_1.pdf 
613 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/cluster/map_project.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/cluster/final_report_clusters_en.pdf 
614 See the Commission Press Release IP/04/548, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/setLanguage.do?language=en and for more information on the initiative see 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/capacities/regions-knowledge_en.html 
615 More information on the cluster networks can be found at http://www.europe-innova.org/index.jsp?type 
=page&lg=en&classificationId=4961&classificationName=Cluster%20Networks&cid=5104 
616 The text is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0488en01.pdf 
617 More information on CLOE, originally launched in 2004, can be found at http://www.clusterforum.org/ 
618 The Europe INNOVA paper N° 1 published by the Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry is available at 
http://www.europe-innova.org/servlet/Doc?cid=7752&lg=EN 
619 The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_187_en.pdf 
620 More information on the European Cluster Alliance, and how to join it, is available at http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=223&parentID=0 
621 The analysis and cluster mapping is available at www.clusterobservatory.eu and www.europe-innova.org/ 
index.jsp?type=page&lg=en&classificationId=5967&classificationName=Cluster%20Mapping&cid=5981 
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September 
2006 
Communication ‘Putting knowledge into practice: A broad-based innovation 
strategy for the EU’. 622 The development of competitive clusters in Europe is an 
integral part of the Community agenda for innovation. 
COM(2006)502 
November 
2006 
Communication ‘Regions of Economic Change’.623  COM(2006)675 
December 
2006 
The Competitiveness Council included cluster development among the 9 
strategic priorities for innovation.624 
Council 
Conclusions  
Dec. 2006 Establishment of the High Level Advisory Group on under Europe INNOVA.625 Milestone 
December 
2006 
‘Community Framework for State Aid for Research, Development and 
Innovation’, including section 5.8 on ‘Aid for innovation clusters’.626 
Official Journal 
2006/C 323/01 
April 2007 Green Paper - The European Research Area: New Perspectives627 COM(2007)161 
June 2007 The European Cluster Observatory delivered the first results: database and 
mapping of clusters and cluster policies.621 
Milestone 
August 
2007 
Communication ‘Competitive European Regions through Research and 
Innovation - A contribution to more growth and more and better jobs’ 
COM(2007)474 
September  
2007 
Publication of the report on ‘Regional Research Intensive Clusters and Science 
Parks’.628  
Study 
October 
2007 
Publication of a report on ‘Innovation Clusters in Europe: A statistical analysis 
and overview of current policy support’.629  
Study 
October 
2007 
Commission Staff Working Document on Maritime Clusters.630 SEC(2007)1406 
November 
2007 
The European Cluster Memorandum prepared by the High Level Group of 
experts on clusters was sent to regional governments and innovation agencies. 
631  
Milestone 
December 
2007 
Communication ‘A lead market initiative for Europe’.632 COM(2007)860 
January 
2008 
European Presidency Conference on Innovation and Clusters held in Stockholm 
organised by the Swedish government under the Slovenian presidency.633 
Conference 
Jan. 2008 Publication of the report ‘Cluster policy in Europe’.634  Study 
March 
2008 
The Brussels European Council in March 2008 urged to better coordinate 
efforts in support of clusters and to facilitate the participation of innovative 
Presidency 
Conclusions 
                                                 
622 The text is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0502en01.pdf 
623 More information about the Regions for Economic Change initaitive and the text of the Communication can 
be found at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/interregional/ecochange/index_en.cfm 
624 The Council Press Release 15717/06 (Presse 337) on the conclusions of the 2769th Council meeting can be 
found at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/intm/92107.pdf 
625 Information on the High Level Group is available at www.europe-innova.org/index.jsp?type=page&lg=en& 
classificationId=7155&classificationName=High%20Level%20Advisory%20Group%20on%20Clusters&cid=7160  
626 The text of the ‘Community Framework for State Aid for Research, Development and Innovation’ is available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_323/c_32320061230en00010026.pdf 
627 The Green Paper and its Annex are available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/consultation-era_en.html 
628 Third report prepared by an independent expert group was published by the Directorate-General for Research. 
629 The Europe INNOVA / PRO INNO Europe paper N° 5 by the Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry is 
available at http://www.europe-innova.org/ index.jsp?type=page&cid=8702&lg=en 
630 The document is avaialble at http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/Maritime_clusters_SEC_2007_1406.pdf 
631 The European Cluster Memorandum is available http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/NWEV/uploaded_documents/ European_Cluster_Memorandum.pdf 
632 More information on the Lead Market Initiative and the text of the Communication can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/leadmarket/leadmarket.htm 
633 More information on the conference which was organised on 22-23 January 2008 with support of the PRO 
INNO Europe initiative is available at http://www.VINNOVA.se/innovationandclusters and 
http://www.proinno-europe.eu/ index.cfm?fuseaction=nwev.NewsReader&news=2072&lang= 
EN&ParentID=0&topicID=90 
634 As part of the Europe INNOVA Cluster Mapping project, this report provides a brief summary of cluster 
policies in 31 European countries. It is available at the European Cluster Observatory at 
http://www.clusterobservatory.eu/upload/Synthesis_report_cluster_mapping.pdf 
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SMEs in clusters.635  
May 2008 The Competitiveness Council recognised the importance of cluster policy in 
terms of fostering innovation and excellence and addressing the specific needs 
of SMEs and invited Member States, the European Commission and regions to 
coordinate their efforts to improve framework conditions for innovation. 636  
Council 
Conclusions 
June 2008 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on ‘Clusters and cluster policy’.637 Opinion 
October 
2008 
Communication ‘Towards world-class clusters in the European Union: 
Implementing the broad-based innovation strategy’ aiming to contribute to 
creating a more efficient policy framework for cluster support in the EU in 
order to facilitate the development of more world-class clusters in the EU. 
Annexed by a Commission Staff Working Document on ‘The concept of 
clusters and cluster policies and their role for competitiveness and innovation: 
Main statistical results and lessons learned’, which provides available evidence 
for the economic impact that clusters have on competitiveness and innovation, 
an overview of the different Community initiatives in support of clusters, and a 
more detailed description of the challenges addressed by the Communication.638 
COM(2008)652 
 
 
 
SEC(2008)2637 
October 
2008 
Commission Decision of 22/10/2008 setting up a high-level ‘European Cluster 
Policy Group’639 
Decision 
November 
2008 
European Presidency Conference on Clusters held under the French Presidency 
in Sophia-Antipolis on 13-14 November 2008.640 
Conference 
December 
2008 
The Competitiveness Council welcomes the October 2008 Commission 
Communication on clusters.641 
Council 
Conclusions 
April 2009 The high-level European Cluster Policy Group meets for the first time with a 
view to further explore how to better assist Member States in supporting the 
emergence of world-class clusters in the EU.639 
Milestone 
Mid 2009 Launch of the new generation of cluster activities under the Europe INNNOVA 
and PRO INNO Europe® initiatives selected through a call for proposals.642 
CIP-EIP 
projects 
Source: Own creation, but the author wishes to acknowledge having benefitted from the research undertaken for 
the Commission Staff Working Document (2008a) that accompanied the Commission Communication (2008b) 
on clusters. The selection for this table expresses however the opinion of the author alone and not necessarily 
those of the European Commission. More information about European initiatives in support of clusters is 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/clusters 
                                                                                                                                                        
635 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (13/14 March 2008) available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/99410.pdf 
636 The 2871st meeting of the Competitiveness Council of 29-30 May 2008 adopted the Council Conclusions 
10174/08 on the competitiveness and innovation of the European industry that are available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st10/st10174.en08.pdf 
637 The Opinion prepared by the rapporteur Antonio GONZÁLEZ TEROL (ES/EPP), Director-General for 
European affairs from the Autonomous Community of Madrid, and adopted by the Committee of the Regions on 
19 June 2008 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 09.10.2008 (C 257) and is 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:257:0076:0082:EN:PDF 
638 The Communication and Annex are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/clusters 
639 The Commission Decision has been published together with the Terms of Reference and a Call for 
Applications in the Official Journal of the European Union on 30/10/2008, available via the EUR-Lex website at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (see OJ versions L288 and C 275). 
640 More information on the conference, which was organised with support from the European Commission is 
available at www.sophia-antipolis.org/ue2008 
641 The 2910th meeting of the Competitiveness Council of 1-2 December 2008 adopted the Council Conclusions 
14679/08 on the Commission communication “Towards world-class clusters in the European Union: 
implementing the broad-based innovation strategy” that are available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st14/st14679.en08.pdf 
642 For more information about the calls for proposals under PRO INNO Europe ® and Europe INNOVA 
published on 12.11.2008 see the respective guides for applicants that are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/funding/files/themes_2008/calls_prop.htm  
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APPENDIX IV : REGIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT HIERARCHIES OF 
BRITAIN AND GERMANY  
BRITAIN GERMANY 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPHERE 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
executes central control over local government 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (NATIONAL) 
no direct link with local government 
COMPONENTS OF THE UK 
Devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland with own parliament/assemblies. 
England without separate representation 
LÄNDER (STATE) GOVERNMENTS (16) 
execute supervisory role as central government for 
municipalities (Kommunen) 
REGION: SPHERE OF COMPETITIVE INFLUENCE BY  
CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
A. Central Government-Led Regions 
Government Offices as joint regional 
representation of national government 
departments, established to enhance 
communication with local govt., primarily for 
more effective implementation of central policies. 
 
Regional Development Agencies as government 
appointed quangos to promote regional economies
Regierungsbezirke (Administrative regions): 
regional representation of Land governments 
(varies between Länder) to control and supervise 
legality of local administration, and facilitate 
central (Land) government policies. They also 
help to convey local governments up to the centre 
(similar role to GOs in England) 
 
Planning Regions: established by Land 
government to implement regional planning (local 
definition in some Länder) 
B. Local Government-Led Regions 
A. Regional Assemblies, Regional Chambers as 
(democratic) regional representations. 
 
B. Shire Counties (non-metropolitan county 
councils): statutory body with democratic 
representative councils. 
 
C. Unitary Metropolitan Authorities (since 
1986), combine local and county functions 
(similar to unitary urban authorities in Germany). 
 
A. Planning Regions, locally defined by group or 
municipalities. 
 
B. Kreise (non-metropolitan). Statutory bodies as 
group of municipalities, legitimated through local 
councillors delegated to assemblies (similar to 
regional assemblies in England). Kreise provide 
local service of higher centrality for a group of 
municipalities. 
 
C. Kreisfreie Städte (unitary urban authorities): 
Kreis function combined with local function in 
larger cities (here focus on subregional Kreis 
functions). 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPHERE  
A. Metropolitan Districts (incl. London 
Boroughs).  
 
B. District Councils (rural communities and 
small towns) incl. subdivision into 
‘neighbourhood’-based representational bodies of 
parish councils.  
A. Kreisfreie Städte (here: local function) (see 
above). Compulsory creation of neighbourhood-
based representation (Bezirksvertretungen) with 
no governmental function. 
 
B. Kommunen (rural communities and small 
towns). 
Source: Herrschel & Newman (2002, p. 117). 
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APPENDIX V : LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
This appendix contains the list of interviewed policy-makers, practitioners and academic 
experts from North Rhine-Westphalia during the period of January 2001 and January 2003. 
The listing is always headed by the date the interview took place, followed in the next line by 
the name of the interviewee, their organisation’s position and/or unit – where citable -, the 
organisation and finally the city where the organisation is based. If necessary and applicable, 
the next line in brackets and in italic provides an English translation of the interviewee’s 
position and/or unit and the organisation name only. In the few case where the city of the 
organisation’s base differs from the place where the interview took place, the latter is added 
below in square brackets. 
 
 
Interviewees from North Rhine-Westphalia 
 
08 February 2001 
Mr. Reiner Heinz, Amt für Wirtschaftsförderung der Stadt Ratingen, Ratingen 
(Economic Development Office of the City of Ratingen) 
 
14 February 2001 
Mr. Dr. Herbert Jakoby, Ministerialrat (MR), Leiter des Referates II A 2 (EU-
Angelegenheiten; EU-Strukturfonds; Verwaltungsbehörde für das NRW-Ziel 2-Programm; 
Zusammenarbeit mit Regionen in Europa), Abteilung II (Wirtschafts- und 
Strukturentwicklung; Mittelstand), Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Technologie 
und Verkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (MWMTV), Düsseldorf 
(Head of Section II A 2 (EU Affairs; Structural Funds; Administrative authority for the 
Objective 2-programme, cooperation with European Regions), Department II (Economic and 
Structural Development), Ministry for Economic Affairs, Technology and Transport of North 
Rhine-Westphalia) 
[First short discussion during RETI General Assembly 13 November 2000, Brussels] 
 
15 February 2001 
Mr. Siegfried Stillings, Unternehmen in der Krise, Regionalsekretariat, Düsseldorf 
(Initiative for ’Enterprises in crisis’) 
[Telephone interview] 
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20 February 2001 
Mr. Burkhard J. Marcinkowski, Geschäftsführer, Unternehmensverband Ratingen e.V. 
(UVR)643, Ratingen 
(Managing Director, Association of Enterprises in Ratingen) 
 
23 February 2001 
Mr. Reinhard Theimann, Arbeitsamt Düsseldorf Zweigstelle Ratingen, Ratingen 
(Job Centre of Düsseldorf, Ratingen branch) 
 
01 March 2001 
Mr. Reiner Schröteler, Prokurist, Förderberatung, Investitions-Bank NRW (IB), 
Zentralbereich der WestLB, Düsseldorf 
(Executive Director, Business Support Advisory Unit, Regional Investment-Bank NRW (IB) 
Central Unit of WestLB) 
 
01 March 2001 
Ms. Carola Kindermann, Business Information Center (BIC), ZENIT GmbH (Zentrum in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen für Innovation und Technik), Mühlheim an der Ruhr 
[Meeting following the Bio-Gen-Tec Forum NRW, Köln Messe, Cologne] 
 
01 March 2001 
Mr. Michael Nolden, ZENIT GmbH (Zentrum in Nordrhein-Westfalen für Innovation und 
Technik), Mühlheim an der Ruhr 
(ZENIT Ltd, the Centre in North Rhine-Westphalia for Innovation and Technology,)  
[Meeting following the Bio-Gen-Tec Forum NRW, Köln Messe, Cologne] 
 
06 March 2001 
Mr. Konrad Hachmeyer-Isphording, Project Manager, dortmund project, Dortmund 
 
07 March 2001 
Mr. Wolf-Thomas Nußbruch, Leiter der Transferstelle Hochschule – Praxis, Gerhard-
Mercator-Universität Duisburg, Duisburg 
(Head of Transfer Unit University - Practice, Gerhard-Mercator-University of Duisburg)  
 
08 March 2001 
Mr. Rainer Hornig, Prokurist/Geschäftsbereichsleiter, Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung 
Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH (GfW), Düsseldorf 
(Executive Director, Economic Development Corporation for North Rhine-Westphalia Ltd) 
 
14 March 2001  
Mr. Dr. Wulfhard Hischebeth, Stv. Hauptgeschäftsführer, Industrie- und Handelskammer zu 
Düsseldorf, Zweigstelle Velbert, Velbert 
(Assistant Executive Director, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Düsseldorf, Velbert 
branch) 
 
                                                 
643 In 2005, Dr. Axel Mauersberger succeeded Mr. Burkhard J. Marcinkowski in the role as Managing Director. 
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15 March 2001 
Mr. Wulf Noll, Ministerialrat (MR), Referat II A 1 (Strukturpolitische Konzeptionen und 
Regionalentwicklung; Logistik; Konversion; Geschäftsstelle, HRK und PROFIS), Abteilung 
II (Wirtschafts- und Strukturentwicklung; Mittelstand), Ministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Mittelstand, Energie und Verkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (MWMEV), Düsseldorf 
(Section II A 1 (Structural policy conception and regional development; logistics; conversion; 
office for HRK and PROFIS), Department II (Economic and Structural Development), 
Ministry for Economic Affairs, Technology and Transport of North Rhine-Westphalia) 
 
20 March 2001 
Ms. Dr. Andrea Hoppe, Projektmanagement, Projekt Ruhr GmbH, Essen 
(Project Management, Project Ruhr Ltd) 
 
05 April 2001 
Mr. Dr. Gros, Referat Mittelstandsförderung, Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (BMWI), Bonn 
(SME Support Unit, German Ministry of Economic Affairs) 
 
13 December 2001 
Mr. Siegfried Stillings, Unternehmen in der Krise, Regionalsekretariat, Düsseldorf 
[Telefoninterview] 
(Initiative for ’Enterprises in crisis’) [Telephone interview; follow-up from 15.02.2001] 
 
15 February 2002 
Mr. Michael Nolden, ZENIT GmbH (Zentrum in Nordrhein-Westfalen für Innovation und 
Technik), Mühlheim an der Ruhr 
(ZENIT Ltd, the Centre in North Rhine-Westphalia for Innovation and Technology,)  
 
20 February 2002 
Mr. Dr. Wolf-Eberhard Reiff, Geschäftsführer des Geschäftsbereiches Bildung und 
Technologie, Niederrheinische Industrie- und Handelskammer für Duisburg, Wesel und 
Kleve, Duisburg 
(Executive Director of the Education and Technology Unit, Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Duisburg, Wesel und Kleve, Duisburg branch)  
 
26 February 2002 
Mr. Werner Glock, Leiter der Transferstelle, Fachhochschule Dortmund und Vorstand der 
Geminus e.G. (Gesellschaft für Management, Innovationsförderung und Sonderprojekte), 
Dortmund 
(Head of Transfer Unit, University of Applied Sciences of Dortmund [Polytechnic] and 
Managing Director of Geminus e.G. [Registered company for management Innovation 
support and special projects], Dortmund) 
 
28 February 2002 
Mr. Klaus Zimmermann, Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Düsseldorf (IHK) 
(Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Düsseldorf) 
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28 February 2002 
Ms. Renate Orywa, Projektmanagerin, Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung Duisburg mbH 
(GFW Duisburg – die Wirtschaftsförderung), Duisburg 
(Project Manager, Economic Development Corporation for Duisburg Ltd.) 
 
01 March 2002 
Mr. Dr. Manfred Sicking, Fachbereichsleiter, Fachbereich Wirtschaftsförderung / Europäische 
Angelegenheiten, Stadt Aachen 
(Head of Unit, Economic Development and European Affairs, City of Aachen) 
 
01 March 2002 
Mr. Ralf P. Meyer, EuREGIONALE 2008, Leiter der Geschäftsstelle bei der AGIT (Aachener 
Gesellschaft für Innovation und Technologietransfer) mbH  
(Head of Unit, EuREGIONALE 2008, AGIT Ltd. – the company for innovation and 
technology transfer in Aachen) 
 
06 March 2002 
Mr. Dr. Peter Jonk, Leiter der Transferstelle, Mr. Dr. Hans Koeppke, bizeps-
Projektkoordination, Bergische Universität-Gesamthochschule Wuppertal (BUGH), 
Wuppertal 
(Dr. Peter Jonk, Head of Transfer Unit; and Mr. Dr. Hans Koeppke, the bizeps-Project 
Manager, University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal) 
 
06 March 2002 
Mr. Professor Dr. Lambert T. Koch and Mr. Marc Grünhagen, Unternehmensgründung und 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Bergische Universität-
Gesamthochschule Wuppertal (BUGH), Wuppertal 
(Professor and Senior Lecturer, Business Start-ups and Economic Development, Department 
of Commerce, University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal) 
 
07 March 2002 
Mr. Dr. rer. pol. Stefan Röllinghof, Fachreferent, Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung 
Dortmund, Stadt Dortmund 
(Economic and Employment Development Agency for the City of Dortmund, Dortmund) 
 
08 March 2002 
Mr. Univ.-Professor Dr. Dr. Werner Gocht, Forschungsinstitut für Internationale Technische 
und Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (FIZ), Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule 
(RWTH) Aachen, Aachen 
(Institute Director and Senior Lecturer, Research Institute for International Technological 
and Economic Collaboration, RWTH University of Aachen) 
 
11 March 2002 
Ms. Margarete Beye, Abteilungsleiterin, Technologie- und Innovationstransfer, Büro 
Technologietransfer und Wiss. Weiterbildung (BTW), Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische 
Hochschule (RWTH) Aachen, Aachen 
(Head of Division, Innovation and Technology Transfer, Technology Transfer and Continuing 
Education Office (BTW), RWTH Aachen University) 
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11 March 2002 
Ms. Claudia Horch, Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (KVR), Essen [Telefoninterview] 
(Local Association Ruhr Area (KVR), Essen) [Telephone interview] 
 
13 March 2002 
Mr. Asche, Leiter der Transferstelle, Universität Dortmund, Dortmund 
(Head of Transfer Unit, University of Dortmund) 
 
13 March 2002 
Mr. Professor Dr. Bernd Kriegesmann, Institut für Angewandte Innovationsforschung, 
Bochum [Telefoninterview] 
(Professor, Institute for Applied Innovation, Bochum) [Telephone interview] 
 
14 March 2002 
Ms. Gabrielle Pirstadt, Ltd. Ministerialrätin (LMR), Arbeitsbereich: Innovation /Technologie- 
und Innovationspolitik in NRW (Gruppe III A) und Mr. Dr.-Ing. Ulrich Steger, Ministerialrat 
(MR), Leiter des Referates III A 3 (Biotechnologie; Gesundheits- und Ernährungswirtschaft), 
Abteilung III (Innovation; Außenwirtschaft), Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, 
Energie und Verkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (MWMEV), Düsseldorf 
(Ministry official in charge, Innovation Group (III A) / Technological and Innovation policies 
in NRW, and, Head of Section III A 3 (Biotechnology, Medical Technology, Life Science), 
Ministry for Economic Affairs, Energy and Transport of North Rhine-Westphalia) 
 
15 March 2002 
Mr. PD Dr. Dieter Rehfeld, Abteilung Industrieentwicklung, Institut Arbeit und Technik 
(IAT), Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-Westfalen, Gelsenkirchen 
(Unit for Industry Development, Employment and Technology Institute, Science Centre North-
Rhine Westphalia, Gelsenkirchen) 
 
15 March 2002 
Mr. Joachim (Jochen) Odenell, Wirtschafts- und Strukturförderung, Industrie- und 
Handelskammer zu Dortmund, Dortmund 
(Economic and Structural Development, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dortmund) 
 
15 March 2002 
Mr. Patrick Dufour, Chief Information Officer, dortmund-project, Dortmund 
 
18 March 2002 
Mr. Michael Bayer, Innovationsberater und Mitglied der Geschäftsführung, Arbeitsbereich 
Industrie, Technologie und Umweltschutz, Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Aachen, 
Aachen 
(Innovation Adviser and Member of Management, Unit for Industry, Technology and 
Environmental Protection, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Aachen) 
 
18 March 2002 
Mr. Jörg Meyer-Stamer und Michael Geyer, Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden der 
Gerhard-Mercator-Universität Duisburg, Duisburg  
(Institute for Development and Peace, Gerhard-Mercator-University of Duisburg, Duisburg) 
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19 March 2002 
Mr. Ferdinand Nett, Arbeitsbereich Technologietransfer, Existenzgründung und 
Fördermittelberatung, Wirtschaftsförderungsamt Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf 
(Unit for Technology Transfer, Start-up Support and Subsidy Consulting, office for Economic 
Development Office of the City of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf) 
 
20 March 2002 
Mr. Dr. Hermann Bömer, Fachbereich Raumplanung, Uni Dortmund, Dortmund 
(Researcher, University of Dortmund, Dortmund) 
 
20 March 2002 
Mr. Professor Rolf G. Heinze, Ruhr-Uni Bochum, Bochum 
(Professor and Senior Lecturer, Ruhr University of Bochum, Bochum) 
 
20 March 2002 
Ms. Dr. Andrea Hoppe, Projektmanagement, Projekt Ruhr GmbH, Essen 
(Project Management, Project Ruhr Ltd) 
 
22 March 2002 
Mr. Professor Dr. Rolf Sternberg 
Universität zu Köln, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeographisches Institut, Köln 
(Professor at the Institute for Economic and Social Geography, University of Cologne) 
 
04 April 2002 
Ms. Lilia Monika Hirsch, Forschungs- und Technologie-Transfer, Heinrich-Heine-Universität 
Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf 
(Research and Technology Transfer, Heinrich-Heine-University of Düsseldorf) 
 
27 September 2002 
Mr. Dr. Karl Grosse, Geschäftsführer, rubitec Gesellschaft für Innovation und Technologie 
der Ruhr-Universität Bochum mbH, Bochum 
(Chief Executive Officer, rubitec limited company for Innovation and technology of the Ruhr 
University Bochum, Bochum) 
 
27 September 2002 
Mr. Dr. Heinz Brückelmann, Leiter Firmenbetreuung, MST.factory dortmund, Dortmund  
(Head of Business Support, MST.factory dortmund, Dortmund) 
[Meeting during START, the Start-up and Entrepreneur Fair for Germany, Messe Essen] 
 
30 September 2002 
Mr. Dr Thomas Heck, Center Manager, Life Science Center, Düsseldorf 
 
30 September 2002 
Ms. Dr. Christine Neuy, Geschäftsführerin, IVAM NRW e.V. (Interessengemeinschaft zur 
Verbreitung von Anwendungen der Mikrostrukturtechniken NRW e.V.), Dortmund 
(Managing Director, IVAM NRW e.V. (Interest Group for the Application of Microstructure 
Technologies NRW), Dortmund) 
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04 October 2002 
Mr. Dirk Kalinkowski, Geschäftsführer, OpTech-Net (Netzwerk für optische und 
optoelektronische Technologien und Systeme e.V., Duisburg 
(Managing Director, OpTech-Net (Network for optical and optoelectronical technologies and 
systems, Duisburg) 
 
09 January 2003 
Mr. Dr. Jochen Otzipka, Geschäftsführender Vorstand, car e.V. (competence center 
automotive region aachen euregio maas-rhein), Aachen  
(Managing Director, car e.V. (competence center automotive region aachen euregio maas-
rhein), Aachen) 
 
10 January 2003 
Mr. Christian Scheffs, Technisches Projektmanagement, Logport Logistic Center Duisurg 
GmbH, Duisburg 
(Technical project management, Logport Logistic Center Duisburg Limited, Duisburg) 
 
 
Total number: 50 interviews with 47 interviewees (of which 3 were interviewed twice) 
 
 
 
Supplementary interviewees from the West Midlands, Great Britain 
 
09 March 1999 
Mr. Jonathan Lloyd, Economic Development Manager, Telford & Wrekin Council, Telford;  
Mr. Mike Duckett, Representation Manager, Shropshire Chamber of Commerce, Training & 
Enterprise, Telford 
[As part of research for a MBA dissertation (Schierenbeck, 1999) on the competitive 
advantage of a New Town ‘Telford’ in the West Midlands] 
 
10 December 1999 
Mr. Michael J. Thompson, Economic Strategy Unit, Advantage West Midlands - The 
Regional Development Agency, Birmingham 
 
19 June 2000 
Mr. John Cornbill, Director, The European Programmes Integration Centre (EPI), Coventry 
University TechnoCentre, Coventry 
 
 
Note that this study has been also fuelled by insights from further interviews regarding research on a centre of 
competence for medical technology (MITT) in Baden-Württemberg (Burfitt et al., 2002). 
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APPENDIX VI : INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND SUPPORTING TOOL 
 
This appendix contains the two standard sets of broad themes and questions that guided the 
semi-structured open-ended interviews for both policy-makers and practitioners, and 
academics. They are attached in both, English and German, together with the supporting 
interview tool of an institutional mapping matrix (show card) for policy-makers and 
practitioners.  
 
The presented structure here corresponds to the sequencing of questions in the interviews. 
Although the set of questions was consistently followed, not every interviewee was asked 
exactly the same questions. First, a different set of questions was used for the two groups of 
policy-makers and practitioners, on the one side, and pure academics on the other. Secondly, 
some questions were slightly altered or omitted, if necessary, depending upon the expertise of 
interviewees, the nature of their organisations, and individual constrains of interviewees. For 
instance, in case of time limitations, the first broad opening question regarding the economic 
and social milieu was omitted. Furthermore, certain probing questions were added at relevant 
points, when appropriate.  
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English version 
 
Set of interview themes and for policy-makers and practitioners 
 
Topic Guiding questions 
Economic and social 
environment 
Within which institutional and economic environment is your 
organisation operating (cultural issues, size of region, economic 
situation)? 
Objectives and aims of 
organisation and its 
business support initiatives  
What support does your organisation offer to businesses in 
particular to foster their innovativeness? How does the support 
get delivered and which form does it take (financial, technical, 
informative)? What are the main objectives and aims of 
initiative(s) and support offered?  
Selection, conception and 
setting objectives for 
initiatives  
How were support initiatives selected and how were they 
developed? In setting up initiatives, was there a practical or 
theoretical focus (reactive or proactive)? Did any theoretical or 
best practice models inspire your initiatives?  
Individual perspective on 
regional innovation policy  
What in your opinion and your experience epitomises 
successful support for businesses innovation? How should it be 
organised?  
Targeted businesses Which businesses are targeted with those initiatives?  
Embeddedness of 
initiatives (Integration and 
financial links) 
Are initiatives linked, partly financed, cross-financed or 
incorporated in/by other programmes such as EU Structural 
Funds, national programme, inter regional (Ruhr), and so on? 
Where does the funding for the initiatives and for your 
organisation come from? How are the relationships to the 
following actors and how do they fit into the innovation 
promotion system (what role): universities, governmental 
bodies and, local administration, politicians, businesses, 
businesses networks and associations, and so on? 
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Implementation Which organisation(s) or key actor(s) were involved in 
implementing and promoting the initiatives?  
Business networks Do some networks of companies or organisations exist who 
facilitate or hinder the appliance for support? 
Results, assessment and 
encountered problems 
What is your assessment of the initiative or programme? Has it 
achieved the aims? What opportunities and problems derived 
from it for businesses and your organisation? Was it necessary 
to make changes to the initiative or programme? Which 
companies took advantage of the support offered 
Who asks, applies for help/support/ funding and which 
companies receive help/support/ funding? How can those 
companies be described (according to innovativeness, size, 
industry, success, location and so on)? Did any specific sectors 
or companies do particular well? What was the specific 
innovation output? 
Monitoring, evaluation and 
dissemination of best 
practice examples 
What is the monitoring and evaluation process? Is the above 
monitored and evaluated? Do you have identified best practice 
cases? Have you taken steps towards their dissemination?  
Institutional network and 
regional system 
With which organisations do you have regular contacts and 
exchange of information and experiences (informal or formal)? 
Institutional network and 
regional system 
institutional mapping 
Please describe the relationship of your organisation with the 
various organisations within the innovation and business 
support system. If possible, please distinguish between the type 
of these relationships according to competition, collaborative, a 
mixture of both, or non-existent. How would you describe the 
role of your organisation within the regional network of 
economic development and business support agencies? Do you 
regard your organisation as being part of a system and is it 
legitimate to speak overall of a regional network?  
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Supporting interview tool: institutional matrix mapping exercise (show card) for policy-
makers and practitioners 
 
For your information: 
Please fill in the following matrix card by entering the various active organisations of the 
innovation and business support system in North Rhine-Westphalia. If possible, please also 
distinguish between the type of relationships that you have with these organisations according 
to competition, collaborative, a mixture of both, or non-existence. 
The aim of this exercise is to analyse the coherence of the overall system as a whole, how it 
works and how it is organised together. Hence, the success, or capabilities, of single parts or 
individual organisations within the system is not assessed.  
 
The relationship to other important organisations within the regional business and innovation 
support system and the level of their involvement. (Please also make a circle around the level 
of involvement of your organisation) 
 
Level of involvement/ 
 
 
Relationship to  
other organisations  
Local Regional National EU / 
International 
Competitive     
Mixture of 
competitive and 
collaborative 
    
Collaborative     
None of the above or 
no connections 
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Set of interview themes and questions for academics 
 
Topic  Guiding questions 
Role of Innovation Which part does Innovation play in the business environment and 
how important is it for economic success of regions?  
Form What support should organisations within the regional system offer 
to businesses in particular in order to foster innovation? How 
should the support get delivered and which form should it take 
(financial, technical, informative)? 
Organisation In your opinion, what are the characteristics of successful 
innovation policy and support? How should it be organised 
(organisational level, actors, form of cooperation and so on)?  
Initiatives Can you identify a reactive or a proactive direction in 
contemporary policy and support initiatives and programmes? 
Networks What is the role of networks in the regions?  
Best practice What are the best practice models for innovation policy and 
support, and which do you favour? 
Target group Which firms and sector should be targeted by initiatives (size, 
innovativeness, economic situation)? 
Cluster-Analyse Do you regard a cluster analysis as important for the development 
of economic development policies? If yes, how should a cluster 
approach be conceptualised (geographical focus, sectoral focus, 
minimum scale / critical mass, top-down/bottom-up and so on)? 
Which other analytical concepts do you perceive as important for 
the implementation of an effective and efficient economic and 
innovation development policy? 
Problems In your opinion, what are the main reasons leading to failures of 
policies and initiatives? 
Literature 
recommendations 
Recommended literature and further interviewees 
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German version 
 
Interviewleitfaden für Akteure der Innovations- und Wirtschaftsförderung 
 
Thema Mögliche Fragen 
Wirtschaftliches und 
soziales Milieu 
In welchem institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Umfeld 
operiert ihre Organisation (kulturelle Eigenschaften, Größe der 
Region, Wirtschaftliche Situation)? 
Absicht und Zielvorstellung  
ihrer Organisation sowie 
der angebotenen 
Förderprogrammen 
Welche Fördermaßnahme(n) bieten/t ihre Organisation den 
Unternehmen zur Innovationsförderung an? Welche Form hat 
diese Unterstützung (finanziell, technisch oder informativ)? 
Was sind die Absichten und Zielvorstellungen der Initiative(n), 
ihrer Organisation und der Region? 
Auswahl, Konzeption und 
Zielsetzung der 
Unterstützung 
Wie wurde(n) die Initiative(n) ausgewählt und wie wurden sie 
entwickelt? Gab es einen reaktiven oder proaktiven Ansatz in 
der Konzeption (praktischer oder theoretischer Art)? Gab es 
Vorbilder für ihre Initiative(n)?  
Ihre persönliche Meinung 
über Regionale 
Innovationspolitik 
Wie hat ihrer Meinung nach eine erfolgreiche 
Innovationsförderung für Unternehmen auszusehen und wie 
sollte sie organisiert sein? 
Zielgruppe für Initiative(n) Welche Unternehmen versuchen sie durch ihre Initiative(n) zu 
erreichen und zu fördern? 
Integration der Initiative(n) 
und deren Finanzierung 
Sind die angebotene(n) Initiative(n) und die Unterstützung mit 
anderen Programmen verknüpft oder eingebunden? Erhält ihre 
Initiative und Organisation finanzielle Unterstützung von 
anderen Organisationen oder Programmen, z. B. EU-
Regionalförderung? Wie finanzieren Sie die Initiative und ihre 
Organisation? Wie sehen die Beziehungen aus zu den 
folgenden Akteuren und wie würden sie deren Rolle 
beschreiben: Universitäten, Regierungsbehörden, Politiker, 
Unternehmensverbände und -netzwerke etc.?  
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Einführung und 
Durchführung 
Welche Organisationen und Schlüsselpersonen waren an der 
Einführung und Werbemaßnahmen beteiligt? 
Netzwerke von 
Unternehmen 
Existieren Unternehmensnetzwerke, die eine 
Innovationsförderung erleichtern oder erschweren? 
Ergebnisse, Beurteilung 
und Probleme 
Wie sieht die allgemeine Beurteilung der Initiative(n) aus? Hat 
die Initiative ihre Ziele erfüllt? Welche Möglichkeiten und 
Probleme haben sich durch die Initiative für Unternehmen und 
ihre Organisation ergeben? Waren Änderungen am Programm 
während der Durchführung notwendig? Welche Unternehmen 
haben Ihre Unterstützung in Anspruch genommen 
(Innovationsreichtum, Größe, Industriezweig, Erfolg, 
Niederlassung)? Gab es spezielle Unternehmen, die sehr 
erfolgreich waren? Was war die wesentliche 
Innovationsleistung und -ergebnis? 
Evaluierung und 
Verbreitung von guten 
Praxisbeispielen 
Wie sieht der Kontroll- und Auswertungsprozess aus? Haben 
Sie gute Praxisbeispiele identifiziert und wurden Maßnahmen 
zu deren Verbreitung getätigt? 
Institutionelles Netzwerk 
und regionales System 
Mit welchen Organisationen pflegen sie regelmäßigen Kontakt 
und Austausch (informell, formell)? Können Sie die 
Beziehungen zu anderen wichtigen Förderungseinrichtungen 
jeweils bezüglich der folgen Unterscheidung einteilen: 
Konkurrenz, Mischung aus Konkurrenz und Zusammenarbeit, 
Zusammenarbeit oder trifft keines der genannten zu? Wie 
würden Sie die Rolle ihrer Organisation im regionalen 
Netzwerk der Wirtschaftsförderer beschreiben? Sehen Sie ihre 
Organisation als Teil eines Systems und würden sie von einem 
regionalem Netzwerk sprechen? 
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Matrix-Hilfsmittel zur Struktur des institutionellen Systems für Akteure im Regionalen 
System der Innovations- und Wirtschaftsförderung 
 
Zu Ihrer Information: 
Bitte tragen Sie Organisationen in die folgende Matrix ein, die eine aktive Wirtschafts- und 
Innovationsförderung in NRW betreiben und unterscheiden Sie dabei, wenn möglich, 
zwischen den Beziehungen zu den Organisationen bezüglich der folgenden Unterscheidung: 
Konkurrenz, Mischung aus Konkurrenz und Zusammenarbeit, Zusammenarbeit.  
Mit dieser Unterteilung soll hier die Zusammenarbeit und das Wirken innerhalb des gesamten 
Wirtschafts- und Innovationsförderungssystems, und nicht die Stärken oder Fähigkeiten 
einzelner Organisationen untersucht werden. 
 
Die Beziehungen zu anderen wichtigen Förderungseinrichtungen im Regionalen System der 
Wirtschafts- und Innovationsförderung und deren Aktionsebene. (Bitte umkreisen Sie auch die 
Aktionsebene Ihrer Organisation) 
 
Aktionsebene / 
 
 
Beziehungen zu 
anderen Organisationen  
Lokal Regional National EU / 
International 
Konkurrenz     
Mischung aus 
Konkurrenz und 
Zusammenarbeit 
    
Zusammenarbeit     
Keine der oben 
genannten 
Unterscheidungen 
oder keine 
Verbindungspunkte 
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Interviewleitfaden für Akademiker 
 
Thema Mögliche Fragen 
Rolle von Innovationen Wie wichtig sind Innovationen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung 
einer Region? 
Form Welche Form von Innovationsförderung sollte angeboten werden 
(finanziell, technisch, informativ...)? 
Organisation Was sind die Charakteristika einer erfolgreichen 
Innovationspolitik/ -förderung?  
Wie sollte Innovationsförderung organisiert werden 
(Organisationsebene, Akteure, Kooperationsform...)? 
Initiativen Sind in der momentanen Ausrichtung von Initiativen und 
Programmen eher reaktive oder proaktive Ansätze zu erkennen? 
Netzwerke Welche Rolle spielen Netzwerke in den Regionen? 
Best practice Welche Vorbilder für eine erfolgreiche Innovationsförderung sind 
Ihnen bekannt? 
Zielgruppe Welche Firmen und Branchen sollten mit Initiativen angesprochen 
werden (Größe, Innovationsreichtum, Wirtschaftliche Situation)? 
Cluster-Analyse Halten Sie eine Cluster-Analyse für notwendig in der Ausrichtung 
der Wirtschaftspolitik von Regionen? Wenn ja, wie sollte dieser 
Cluster-Ansatz konzeptionalisiert werden (geographischer Fokus, 
sektoral Fokus, Mindestgröße, top-down/bottom-up...)? 
Mit welchen Methoden sollte man Produktionscluster 
identifizieren? 
Welche anderen Analyse-Konzepte halten Sie für notwendig für die 
Durchführung einer effektiven und effizienten Wirtschaftspolitik? 
Probleme Welche Hauptgründe können Sie erkennen, die zu einem Scheitern 
vieler Initiativen führen? 
Literaturempfehlungen Literatur und mögliche zusätzliche Gesprächspartner, die Sie 
empfehlen. 
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